TIMOTHY FALCON AND JEWELL FALCON v. THE PARISH OF JEFFERSON AND THE JEFFERSON PARISH COUNCIL (2025)

Plaintiffs/appellants, Timothy Falcon and Jewell Falcon, appeal the trial court's November 14, 2024 judgment which granted the motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendants/appellees, the Parish of Jefferson and the Jefferson Parish Council, and denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts concerning this matter were established in Falcon v. Par. of Jefferson, 22-526 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/14/23), 367 So.3d 857, 858-62, writ denied, 23-974 (La. 10/31/23), 372 So.3d 809, as follows:

Plaintiffs, Timothy Falcon and Jewell Falcon, are the owners of property located on Willow Lawn Street in Marrero in Jefferson Parish. The property is bounded generally by Bald Eagle Park, a pipeline canal, and Elm Lawn Drive, and is zoned R-1A (single-family residential). Plaintiffs sought to resubdivide their one tract of land into a residential development known as “Falcon Estates Subdivision,” to be comprised of 20 lots for single-family homes. The first phase of the project would include development of twelve lots, the extension of Willow Lawn Street as a route of ingress and egress, and the partial construction of Belle Vie Lane. Plaintiffs submitted an application for resubdivision to the Jefferson Parish Planning Department (“the Planning Department”). Upon initial review, the Department of Public Works opposed the application until certain stipulations were made. One such stipulation was that there was to be no vehicular traffic or pedestrian traffic from Falcon Estates to Bourgeois Lane, a 16-foot wide substandard roadway adjacent to the western boundary of the subject property. Notably, the Traffic Engineering Division did not require a traffic impact analysis for the proposed resubdivision. Thereafter, all of the Jefferson Parish Departments supported the revised application for resubdivision. The Planning Department ultimately approved the application, after finding that it met all of the requirements of the Jefferson Parish Unified Development Code.

On June 10, 2021, a public hearing on the application for resubdivision was held before the Planning Advisory Board (“the PAB”). Mr. Falcon and Tildon Jay Dufrene, Jr., a registered land surveyor and civil engineer who was hired by the Falcons to work on this project, spoke in favor of the proposed development. Eight people spoke in opposition to the proposal, many of whom live on Cypress Lawn Drive, a street which intersects with Willow Lawn Street and extends from Barataria Boulevard. They expressed concerns regarding the exacerbation of an existing traffic and speeding problem. Audie Hymel, a resident of Cypress Lawn Drive, stated that he did not oppose the development, but was opposed to the use of Willow Lawn Street as access to this development because of concerns about traffic and speeding. He anticipated that between 75 to 100 vehicles will be added per day, plus construction vehicles, which will contribute to the traffic and speeding issues in the neighborhood.

Emails and letters were also submitted in opposition. Harry Solhjoo, a resident of Cypress Lawn Drive, wrote that the proposed resubdivision will create additional traffic and greatly overburden Willow Lawn Street and the first block of Cypress Lawn Drive. He stated that excessive speed is a continuous problem on Cypress Lawn Drive, and as a parent of a five-year-old boy who was struck by a speeding driver in front of his house, he is concerned with the resubdivision plan. William H. Jones, Jr. of Cypress Lawn Drive wrote that traffic is “horrific” on Cypress Lawn Drive and speeding on the street is “rampant.” He stated that the new subdivision will only add to the current issues since, according to his estimation, between 22 and 88 or more additional vehicles will be traveling on Cypress Lawn Drive on a daily basis.

The PAB deferred a recommendation on the application for resubdivision until July 8, 2021.

At a public hearing before the PAB on July 8, 2021, Mr. Falcon again spoke in support of the proposal, and sixteen people spoke in opposition. E-mails in opposition were also submitted for the record. Mr. Falcon stated that since the last hearing, he had met with members of the neighboring subdivision who expressed their concern about Willow Lawn Street being the route of ingress and egress to Falcon Estates and had inquired as to why Bourgeois Lane could not be used. Mr. Falcon stated that Bourgeois Lane is not an option since it is a substandard roadway. He also stated that using Bald Eagle Park to the north for access is also not an option, since the property immediately adjacent to his property is owned by a church. In opposition, many residents of Cypress Lawn Drive expressed their concern with traffic, speeding, and the parish not allowing the use of Bourgeois Lane as access to the proposed development. Mr. Hymel again spoke in opposition, stating that his biggest concern was traffic. The PAB deferred the case to an August 5, 2021 public hearing and recommended that Mr. Falcon meet with his councilman, Byron Lee, to discuss the possible use of Bourgeois Lane for this development.

At the August 5, 2021 public hearing before the PAB, a representative from the Planning Department stated that a meeting occurred with the Department of Public Works to discuss potentially improving Bourgeois Lane so that it could be used for this project. In 1996, the Parish requested a servitude from the property owners on Bourgeois Lane to widen the road, but the requested servitude was never provided. In order to fully develop the road, the Parish would need to purchase property from the property owners on Bourgeois Lane. The Department of Public Works said that it would not be allowing access to Falcon Estates Subdivision from Bourgeois Lane. Nonetheless, the Planning Department maintained its approval of the application for resubdivision. Mr. Falcon again spoke in support of the proposal and noted that although he had attempted to meet with Councilman Lee, a meeting never occurred. Nine people spoke in opposition, again expressing their concern regarding traffic and speeding. Pamela Watson, Councilman Lee's chief-of-staff, communicated that Mr. Lee was aware of everyone's concerns. Emails and letters in opposition were submitted for the record. The PAB recommended that the application for resubdivision be denied. A member of the PAB stated that the main issue was the widening of Bourgeois Lane, since there was a problem with emergency vehicles using Bourgeois Lane.

On August 25, 2021, the Jefferson Parish Council considered the application for resubdivision. The Falcons and their attorney spoke in support of the application, and seven people spoke in opposition. Mr. Hymel again noted that those in his neighborhood were concerned with a potential increase in traffic and its impact on the neighborhood's quality of life, and he requested that the Parish give plaintiffs access on Bourgeois Lane. The Council denied the application for resubdivision. At the meeting, Councilman Lee stated:

I've had an opportunity to review this, and certainly I've gotten phone calls from those who have been against and few who are for this development. And I have received, like many of my colleagues, emails and letters from the majority of the people who live back there in that community who are against this development. ․ Then in addition to that I also asked the administration ․ to look at Bourgeois Lane, and they came back and they told me that it is a substandard road. ․ And so based on all of the information that's been provided to me as well as the constant letters and phone calls from those in the community, I have to move to deny it.

In response, on September 20, 2021, plaintiffs filed a verified petition for injunctive relief and appeal of the decision of the Council, naming as defendants the Parish of Jefferson and the Jefferson Parish Council. Plaintiffs asserted in their petition that the Council's decision to deny their application for resubdivision was arbitrary and capricious.

A trial on the matter was held on July 19, 2022. In support of their argument, plaintiffs called Mr. Falcon and Mr. Dufrene as witnesses. Defendants called three residents of Cypress Lawn Drive as witnesses: Mr. Hymel, Judy Perrin, and John Combel, who testified via a trial deposition. The trial court found that the Council's denial of plaintiffs’ application for resubdivision was arbitrary and capricious. In its oral reasons for judgment, the trial court stated:

Before coming to an answer on this issue, this Court extensively reviewed the Fifth Circuit's jurisprudence namely KGT Holdings, LLC versus Parish of Jefferson, 169 So.3d 628, Louisiana Fifth Circuit, 2015; Willow Inc. versus Jefferson Parish, 928 So.2d 756, Fifth Circuit 2006; Cuny Family LLC versus Parish of Jefferson, 288 So.3d 235, Fifth Circuit, 2020; and the Second Circuit's decision on the Urban Housing of America Inc. versus City of Shreveport, 26 So.3d 226, 2009. That's a Second Circuit case.

This Court must decide whether Jefferson Parish [sic] denial of [the] Falcon's [sic] application as [sic] arbitrary and capricious. In order to render the decision arbitrary and capricious, the decision must bear so little relationship to public safety, health, or general welfare.

In Willow Inc. versus Jefferson Parish, the Fifth Circuit stated that the Parish cannot deny a request for a resubdivision and a private landowner use of his property without a valid reason related to the public safety, health, and welfare. In Willow, the Fifth Circuit ultimately upheld the Parish's denial of a resubdivision because of the concern regarding documented issues with drainage and overlapping servitudes.

Here, the main concern is traffic. This Court notes that the concern of the neighboring residents regarding traffic, but it's bound to follow the Fifth Circuit's jurisprudence. In fact, the Willow and KGT Holdings cases opine that although concerns from residents may be a factor of consideration, the Parish cannot solely rely on the residents’ opinions.

It appears in this case that there are several workarounds to ease the potential for traffic. None of which were explored by the Parish before denying the Falcon's [sic] application. From the testimony heard today, the Court finds that Jefferson Parish has not stated a valid reason for denying the Falcon's [sic] application and such decision was made arbitrarily and capriciously.

Falcon, 367 So.3d at 858-62. (Footnotes omitted.)

On August 10, 2022, the trial court signed a judgment vacating the denial of plaintiffs’ application for resubdivision and approving plaintiffs’ application. Defendants timely filed an appeal of this judgment.

On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding as follows:

Upon review, we agree with the trial court's well-reasoned finding that the Council's decision to deny the Falcons’ application for resubdivision did not meet the heightened burden imposed on defendants and was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. The application did not involve a rezoning request and was unopposed by all of the Jefferson Parish Departments. It was established that speeding and traffic are already an issue on Cypress Lawn Drive, but it was unsupported that allowing an additional 20 lots to the neighborhood would create a legitimate safety concern. We find that under the particular facts and circumstances presented in this case, the Council's decision to deny the Falcons’ application for resubdivision bears so little relationship to public safety, health, or general welfare as to render it unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. While we do not take the concerns voiced by neighborhood residents regarding the current traffic violations in their neighborhood lightly, we find that there is simply no evidence in the record that supports the conclusion that approval of the Falcons’ resubdivision would exacerbate the traffic violations in their neighborhood. The remedy for the issues that the neighborhood residents are experiencing with traffic violations is through traffic enforcement by the appropriate authorities, not the denial of the Falcons’ resubdivision based on mere unsupported speculation that it would contribute to those problems. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court to allow the Falcons’ resubdivision as proposed and approved by all of the Jefferson Parish Departments, since it is in full compliance with applicable zoning regulations and the Jefferson Parish Unified Development Code.

Falcon, 367 So.3d at 867.

While the injunction suit was pending, on August 18, 2022, plaintiffs filed a petition for damages, asserting: 1) a claim of inverse condemnation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution; 2) a claim for violations of their due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and 3) a claim for damages and attorney's fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Plaintiffs further asserted a claim for damages for lost business opportunity, costs to maintain the property, loss of use and enjoyment of the property, and increased costs of construction (“general damages claim”).

After a stay of the matter was lifted, on June 20, 2024, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for any alleged damages between the denial of the original plat proposal on August 25, 2021 until the final judgment in the injunction suit on October 31, 2023. Defendants argued they are immune from liability pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1 since they had discretion to deny plaintiffs’ application for resubdivision based on policy considerations, specifically drainage, speeding, and child endangerment.

In response, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued therein that defendants are not entitled to immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1 because defendants’ actions were not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective and their denial of the application for resubdivision based on “unsupported speculation” constituted intentional, willful, and reckless misconduct. They also argued that immunity under La. R.S. 9:2798.1 is inapplicable to their claims for inverse condemnation under the Louisiana Constitution and their claims made under federal law. Plaintiffs additionally filed an opposition to defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.

Following a hearing, on November 14, 2024, the trial court signed a written judgment with reasons, granting defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court found that consideration of citizens’ input is an essential function of elected officials and is related to a legitimate governmental objective. Additionally, it found that there was no evidence that defendants’ denial of the application for resubdivision was based on criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct. On December 3, 2024, the judgment was certified as a final judgment subject to immediate appeal in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1). Plaintiffs timely sought an appeal of the November 14, 2024 judgment.

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that La. R.S. 9:2798.1 is not applicable to their claims since defendants’ actions were not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective and constituted willful and reckless misconduct. Additionally, they argue that immunity under La. R.S. 9:2798.1 does not apply to their claim of inverse condemnation and their federal claims.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

“After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). “The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo using the same criteria as the trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Lapuyade v. Rawbar, Inc., 18-474 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/18), 263 So.3d 508, 511, writ denied, 19-315 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So.3d 1126. Therefore, appellate courts must ask the same questions as the district court: whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 512.

The denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory judgment and is appealable only when expressly provided by law. However, where, as here, there are cross-motions for summary judgment raising the same issues, this Court will review the denial of a summary judgment in addressing the appeal of the granting of the cross-motion for summary judgment. Calderon v. Sanabria, 21-579 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/4/22), 342 So.3d 101, 107, writ denied, 22-894 (La. 9/27/22), 347 So.3d 157.¹ We will thus review the trial court's denial of plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment while addressing plaintiffs’ appeal of the trial court's granting of defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.

Immunity Pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1

On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that defendants are not entitled to immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1 because the denial of the resubdivision application based solely on unsupported speculation was “not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists.” La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(1).

Under La. R.S. 9:2798.1, public entities and their officers and employees are immune from tort claims based on their policy-making decisions or discretionary acts carried out within the course and scope of their employment. Aucoin v. Larpenter, 20-0792 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 324 So.3d 626, 636-37, writ denied, 21-688 (La. 9/27/21), 324 So.3d 87. La. R.S. 9:2798.1 states:

A. As used in this Section, “public entity” means and includes the state and any of its branches, departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, employees, and political subdivisions and the departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, and employees of such political subdivisions.

B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.

C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not applicable:

(1) To acts or omissions which are not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists; or

(2) To acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.

D. The legislature finds and states that the purpose of this Section is not to reestablish any immunity based on the status of sovereignty but rather to clarify the substantive content and parameters of application of such legislatively created codal articles and laws and also to assist in the implementation of Article II of the Constitution of Louisiana.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that La. R.S. 9:2798.1 is “clear and unambiguous” and applies to “policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of ․ lawful powers and duties.” Mariana v. Magnolia Auto Transp., LLC, 21-447 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/22), 341 So.3d 1281, 1288, citing Gregor v. Argenot Great Cent. Ins. Co., 02-1138 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 959, 967. The Gregor court concluded that “policymaking” in the public sector means “the planning of a course of action for the social or political well-being of the state,” and that “discretionary” means that the state actor had a “power of free decision or latitude of choice within certain legal bounds.” Id. at 965. (Emphasis in original.)

The approval or disapproval of a subdivision plat is a legislative function involving the exercise of legislative discretion by the governing authority of a parish or municipality. Falcon, 367 So.3d at 862; See also La. R.S. 33:101.1.

In Falcon, this Court found that the Council wrongly denied plaintiffs’ use by right resubdivision application. Based on the evidence presented at trial, this Court determined that there was nothing in the record to support the allegations that the application for resubdivision would significantly increase traffic, nor anything in the record to support the communities’ belief that the resubdivision would exacerbate the ongoing speeding issues. We found that the Council's decision to deny plaintiffs’ application for resubdivision bore so little relationship to public safety, health, or general welfare as to render it unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.

In GBT Realty Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 50,104 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 180 So.3d 458, 464-65, writ denied, 15-2002 (La. 1/8/16), 184 So.3d 693, the court of appeal found that a municipality's denial of a use by right zoning application was “subject to strict scrutiny and the zoning ordinances and actions will be construed in favor of the use proposed by the owner.” The court then determined that even when a public entity has wrongly denied a “use by right” plan, the entity may still be entitled to immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1.

There, the plaintiffs, commercial property developers, argued that the trial court erred in finding that the City of Shreveport was not liable for damages caused in its denial of their site and subdivision plans to build a Dollar General store. On appeal, the court found that while the City may have wrongly denied the site plans, the City was still immune from liability. Applying La. R.S. 9:2798.1, the court determined:

The record supports the district court's conclusion that the City's action in this case, although ultimately overturned, was a discretionary act genuinely based in the City's attempt to ensure that the use of the property comported with the public interest in a safe and well-ordered community. Unmistakably, some of the City's proposed justifications for denying the plans were improper; for example, the plans’ failure to comply with potential future land use rules was never a proper consideration. The City—again—failed to give the proper respect to the use by right zoning for this property.

However, the City had some discretion in the choice to approve the site plans, and that choice was based in part upon various reasonable grounds such as the plans’ provision for access into and out of this type of store and the detrimental effect on traffic, and thus public safety, that the proposed access allowed. The subsequent judicial determination that these concerns were inadequate to deny the plan does not equate to a finding that the City's action based on those concerns was “not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists.” Likewise, the district court's conclusion that the City's actions were related to its legitimate objectives and not misconduct was, on this record, not plainly wrong. In this case, the store tenant, Dollar General, itself did not approve the site plan after it had been approved by the district court; instead, the retailer asked the plaintiffs to change the site plan's proposed access to the property prior to agreeing to a final plan. Clearly the access issue was a genuine concern for all of the parties here.

In no way is this conclusion intended to diminish the strict scrutiny that must be given to the disapproval of use by right site plans upon direct review. However, recovery of tort damages against a public entity, even for a wrongly denied use by right case, requires proof of wrongdoing not found in this case.

Id. at 464-65. (Footnote omitted.)

Upon de novo review, like GBT, we conclude that the Council has some discretion in approving subdivision plans and that discretion includes consideration of citizens’ concerns regarding such things as traffic and neighborhood safety. Although the Council's denial of the resubdivision application was misplaced, even “unreasonable,” given it was not supported by objective record evidence, denying the resubdivision application was not based on any non-legitimate government objective for which the Council's policymaking or discretionary power exists. We conclude that the plaintiffs’ burden of proving that the Council erroneously denied their resubdivision application is different from the burden of proving that a governmental entity is not entitled to discretionary immunity. One does not necessarily follow from the other. The Council may exercise its discretion to approve or deny applications in light of community concerns, including concerns of traffic and neighborhood safety. That the Council's action in this case was unsupported by any evidence other than opinion testimony given by several neighboring residents does not render the Council's decision outside of the bounds of legitimate, discretionary decision-making. In our previous opinion, this Court recognized that the concerns of neighborhood residents should not be taken lightly. Falcon, 367 So.3d at 867.

“Under [the discretionary function] doctrine, governmental decisionmakers exercising discretionary functions are immune from suit, because the courts should not chill legislative discretion in policy formation by imposing tort liability for discretionary decision.” Hanson v. Steven Caruso, Willow Creek, L.L.C., 15-449 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/15), 182 So.3d 1187, 1191, writ denied, 16-134 (La. 3/24/16), 190 So.3d 1196. Consideration of residents’ safety concerns when exercising a discretionary function is a legitimate government objective, even when those concerns ultimately are not supported by objective evidence in the record.

Plaintiffs additionally argue that defendants’ actions are exempt from immunity since they constituted willful and reckless misconduct. See La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(2). They argue defendants’ failure to provide any support for their decision other than the opinions of a few members of the public shows their “willful indifference.”

This Court has established that the list in paragraph (C)(2) of La. R.S. 9:2798.1—acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct—connotes conduct more severe than negligent behavior. Recklessness is, in effect, “gross negligence.” Mariana, 341 So.3d at 1291.

Only the most egregious conduct by parish agents, employees, or representatives that exhibits an active desire to cause harm, or a callous indifference to the risk of potential harm from flagrantly bad conduct, will rise to the level of “willful misconduct” or “criminal, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct” resulting in a forfeiture of all the immunity protections afforded by the discretionary immunity statute. Mariana, 341 So.3d at 1291, citing Haab v. E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. of Jefferson Par., 13-954 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/14), 139 So.3d 1174, 1182, writ denied, 14-1581 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So.3d 609.

In order for plaintiffs to defeat defendants’ claims of discretionary immunity, it was incumbent upon them to put forth evidence showing that the conduct of defendants rose to the level of misconduct required by La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(2). See Haab, 139 So.3d at 1179-80.

Upon de novo review, we conclude that plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing defendants’ actions rose to the level of misconduct required by La. R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(2). Having previously recognized that the concerns of neighborhood residents should not be taken lightly, we cannot say that the Council's reliance on the residents’ concerns exhibits an active desire on their part to cause harm.

Accordingly, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law concerning the application of the discretionary immunity doctrine as to plaintiffs’ “general damages claim.”

Immunity as to plaintiffs’ claim for inverse condemnation and their federal claims

We pretermit at this time review and consideration of whether plaintiffs’ claim for inverse condemnation and their federal claims are subject to immunity under La. R.S. 9:2798.1. The record does not adequately establish that the trial court's ruling on discretionary immunity was made applicable to plaintiffs’ claim for inverse condemnation and their federal claims.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's rulings which granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

LINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

(504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY NOVEMBER 19, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

25-CA-159

E-NOTIFIED

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)

HONORABLE NANCY A. MILLER (DISTRICT JUDGE)

MICHAEL L. VINCENZO (APPELLANT)

IVANA DILLAS (APPELLEE)

PATRICK T. ISACKS (APPELLANT)

JACOB K. BEST (APPELLEE)

GUICE A. GIAMBRONE, III (APPELLEE)

MAILED

TIMOTHY S. MADDEN (APPELLANT)

ATTORNEY AT LAW

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NEW ORLEANS, LA 70170

FOOTNOTES

1.   See also ASI Fed. Credit Union v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London Syndicate 1414 Subscribing to Policy FINFR1503374, 18-164 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/7/18), 259 So.3d 552, 555 n.1 (citing Waterworks Dist. No. 1 of DeSoto Parish v. La. Dep't. of Pub. Safety & Corr., 16-0744 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/17/17), 214 So.3d 1, 3 n.1, writ denied, 17-0470 (La. 5/12/17), 219 So.3d 1103 (“The denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory judgment and is appealable only when expressly provided by law. However, where there are cross-motions for summary judgment raising the same issues, this court can review the denial of a summary judgment in addressing the appeal of the granting of the cross-motion for summary judgment.”)); Marseilles Homeowners Condo Ass'n v. Broadmoor, LLC, 12-1233 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/27/13), 111 So.3d 1099, 1103 n.2 (“Generally, the denial of a partial summary judgment motion is an interlocutory judgment which is not eligible for designation as final and appealable. But, in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment, a party may obtain appellate review of the judgment denying its motion when it appeals the judgment which granted the opposing party relief on the issue.” (Citations omitted.)); Ferguson v. Bocskov, 07-924 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/08), 983 So.2d 162, 164, wherein this Court reviewed the denial of the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment in the context of the appeal from the grant of the plaintiff's cross-motion on the same issue.

JUDE G. GRAVOIS JUDGE