GRANT TAYLOR v. AIDAN MICHEL SMITH THE OFFICE BAR BATON ROUGE LLC AND BACKOFFICE ENTERTAINMENT LLC (2025)

Plaintiff, Grant R. Taylor, appeals the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant and Defendant in Cross Claim, Crum and Forster Specialty Insurance Company (C&F). For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

ISSUES

In this appeal we must decide whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting C&F's motion for summary judgment.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the night of February 13, 2021, Mr. Taylor was a patron at The Office Bar in Lafayette, Louisiana. While there, Aiden Michael Smith threw a glass beer bottle at another patron. The bottle bounced off the other patron and struck Mr. Taylor in the head. Mr. Taylor filed a lawsuit against Aiden Michael Smith, The Office Bar, and Backoffice Entertainment, the assumed owner of The Office Bar, seeking damages resulting from the torts of battery and negligence. Mr. Taylor later filed an amended and supplemental petition correcting the bar owner to DBE, LLC (DBE) and adding their insurer, C&F. DBE filed a cross claim against C&F alleging that it had a duty to defend DBE in the lawsuit and provide coverage for losses incurred under the insurance policy.

On October 4, 2024, C&F filed a motion for summary judgment denying coverage and defense of its insured. C&F argued that the insurance policy issued to DBE contained an assault and battery exclusion which precludes coverage for injury that arises from any assault or battery. Mr. Taylor and DBE opposed the motion on the grounds that the four corners of the petition, when compared to the four corners of the insurance policy, did not unambiguously exclude coverage.

The parties presented their arguments at a hearing on January 27, 2025. The trial court found that the claims fell squarely within the exclusions of the policy and granted C&F's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Taylor now appeals.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue before this court is whether C&F is entitled to summary judgment based on the assault and battery exclusion. Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, applying the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Bernard v. Ellis, 11-2377 (La. 7/2/12), 111 So.3d 995. A motion for summary judgment shall only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact that the provisions of an insurance policy do not afford coverage. Id.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In his only assignment of error, Mr. Taylor asserts that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. He argues that there are genuine issues of material fact and that the allegations of the petition do not unambiguously exclude coverage.

When addressing whether an exclusion precludes insurance coverage, the questions before this court are “(1) whether the exclusion is clear and unambiguous; (2) whether the exclusion applies to the facts of this case; and (3) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.” Proshee v. Shree, Inc., 04-1145, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), 893 So.2d 939, 942. In Kazan v. Red Lion Hotels Corp., 21-1820, pp. 3–4 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 267, 270, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided the following guidelines for interpreting insurance contracts:

An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules for the interpretation of contracts set forth in our Civil Code. Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc., 07-0054, p. 7 (La. 5/22/07), 956 So.2d 583, 590. Interpretation of an insurance policy is the determination of the common intent of the parties – this analysis starts by examining the words of the policy itself. Id. (citing La. C.C. arts. 2045 and 2046). Words and phrases in an insurance policy must be given their generally prevailing meaning unless they are words of art or have acquired a technical meaning. Id., 07-0554, p. 8, 956 So.2d at 589 (citing La. C.C. art. 2047). When the words of an insurance policy are clear and explicit and do not lead to absurd consequences, courts must enforce the language as written. Id., 07-0054, p. 8, 956 So.2d at 589 (citing La. C.C. art. 2046). Courts lack the authority to alter the terms of an insurance policy under the guise of interpretation and should not create an ambiguity where none exists. Id., 07-0554, pp. 8-9, 956 So.2d at 589. An insurance policy is construed against an insurer and in favor of coverage only when an ambiguity remains after applying the aforementioned general rules for the interpretation of contracts. Id., 07-0054, p. 9, 956 So.2d at 590 (further observing that for strict construction to apply, an ambiguous provision must be susceptible to two or more reasonable alternative interpretations); Edwards v. Daugherty, 03-2103, p. 12 (La. 10/1/04), 883 So.2d 932, 941. The language of an insurance policy may be general without being ambiguous. Ledbetter, 95-0895, p. 6, 665 So.2d at 1170 (citing United National Ins. Co. v. Waterfront New York Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1993)).

The C&F assault and battery exclusion provides:

This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following:

COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART

A. SECTION I—COVERAGES, COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY, 2. Exclusions and SECTION I - COVERAGES, COVERAGE B PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY, 2. Exclusions are amended and the following added:

Assault, Battery or Assault and Battery

This insurance does not apply to “bodily injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” arising out of or resulting from:

(1) “Assault”, “Battery” or “Assault and Battery” caused, directly or indirectly, by you, any insured, any person, any entity, or by any means whatsoever;

(2)the failure to suppress or prevent “Assault”, “Battery” or “Assault and Battery” by you, any insured, any person, any entity, or by any means whatsoever;

(3)the failure to provide an environment safe from “Assault”, “Battery” or “Assault and Battery”;

(4)the failure to warn of the dangers of the environment which could contribute to “Assault”, “Battery” or “Assault and Battery”;

(5) “Assault”, “Battery” or “Assault and Battery” arising out of the negligent employment, investigation, hiring, supervision, training or retention of any person;

(6) the use of any force to protect persons or property whether or not the “bodily injury” or “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” was intended from the standpoint of you, any insured or any person, or committed by or at the direction of you, any insured or any person;

(7)the failure to render or secure medical treatment or care necessitated by any “Assault”, “Battery”, or “Assault and Battery”; or,

(8)death, including any allegation of wrongful death, arising out of items (1) through (7) listed above.

B. SECTION V — DEFINITIONS is amended and the following is added:

“Assault” means:

a. an intentional or unintentional act, including but not limited to sexual abuse, sexual assault, intimidation, sexual harassment, verbal abuse, or any threatened harmful or offensive contact between two or more persons creating an apprehension in another of immediate harmful or offensive contact; or

b. an attempt to commit a “Battery”.

“Battery” means an intention[sic] or unintentional act, including but not limited to sexual abuse, sexual battery, sexual molestation, or any actual harmful or offensive contact between two or more persons which brings about harmful or offensive contact to another or anything connected to another.

“Assault and Battery” means the combination of an “Assault” and a “Battery”.

The first issue we must consider is whether the exclusion is ambiguous. It is clear that the exclusion precludes coverage for any bodily injury resulting from assault or battery caused by any person in any manner. The terms “Assault” “Battery” and “Assault and Battery” are then clearly defined. We do not find any ambiguity in the language of the policy exclusion.

Mr. Taylor does not argue that the language of the exclusion is ambiguous, rather, he argues that the exclusion does not apply to the facts of this case. In his petition, Mr. Taylor alleges that “Defendant Aidan Michael Smith threw a glass bottle which grazed another patron and struck [Mr. Taylor] with such force that the bottle shattered on his left temple and forehead causing him to bleed profusely.” He then states that as a result of this incident, he suffered injuries. Moreover, Mr. Taylor specifically claims that Mr. Smith committed the tort of battery.

Mr. Taylor argues that the exclusion does not apply in this case because he was not the intended target or at least there is a fact issue regarding whether he was the intended target. In support of this contention, Mr. Taylor claims that this case is analogous to Lawrence v. Security Professionals, 32,325 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/18/99), 743 So.2d 247, writ denied, 750 So.2d 991 (La. 11/24/99). In Lawrence, the plaintiff contended that she was struck by a security guard's flashlight while he was breaking up an altercation. The second circuit found there was an issue of fact as to whether the assault and battery exclusion applied because there was a factual dispute as to whether the plaintiff's injuries were accidental or intentional. Mr. Taylor argues the same is true in this case and requires the same result. This case, however, is clearly distinguishable from Lawrence. In Lawrence the assault and battery exclusion did not define the terms. Subsequently, the court relied on the tort definition of battery which defines it as intentional. Thus, a factual dispute over whether plaintiff's injuries were intentional was sufficient to defeat summary judgment. In this case, the C&F assault and battery exclusion defines both terms as an “intentional or unintentional act[.]” Consequently, any factual dispute over intentionality would be immaterial.

Mr. Taylor also argues that there is an issue of fact whether the throwing of the bottle created “an apprehension in [Mr. Taylor] of immediate harmful or offensive contact” and C&F had a burden of proving that fact is not genuinely disputed to avoid summary judgment. Mr. Taylor is correct that it was never alleged that he was ever in apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive contact by another. The bottle was not thrown directly at Mr. Taylor, nor did he ever expect to be hit by the bottle. Therefore, the facts of the petition do not show that an assault took place. However, the policy exclusion does not require both an assault and battery, but specifically applies to any “[‘]Assault[’], [‘]Battery[’] or [‘]Assault and Battery[.’]” While Mr. Taylor may not have been assaulted, the exclusion still applies if he received a battery.

Mr. Taylor contends that the exclusion does not apply because there was no contact between Mr. Taylor and Mr. Smith. The definition of battery provided in the exclusion does not require contact between Mr. Taylor and Mr. Smith. The exclusion defines battery as “an intention[sic] or unintentional act.” It then gives a nonexclusive list of possible acts “including but not limited to sexual abuse, sexual battery, sexual molestation, or any actual harmful or offensive contact between two or more persons[.]” Finally, it is required that the act “brings about harmful or offensive contact to another or anything connected to another.” The alleged act in this case was Mr. Smith throwing the beer bottle at the unknown other patron. This act caused the bottle to bounce off that patron and ultimately caused the bottle to strike Mr. Taylor. Being struck by the bottle was a harmful contact to Mr. Taylor. The incident alleged in Mr. Taylor's petition falls squarely within the definition of battery, and his injuries are excluded from coverage.

“The issue of whether a liability insurer has a duty to defend a civil action against its insured is determined by application of the [‘]eight-corners rule,[’] under which an insurer must look to the [‘]four corners[’] of the plaintiff's petition and the [‘]four corners[’] of its policy to determine whether it owes that duty.” Hoffpauir v. Cajundome Comm'n, 20-423, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/21/21), 318 So.3d 334, 339 (quoting Maldonado v. Kiewit Louisiana Co., 13-756, 13-757, pp. 11–12 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/14), 146 So.3d 210, 218–19). The insurer is obligated to provide a defense unless it is clear from the petition “that the policy unambiguously excludes coverage[.]” Id. If the facts alleged in the petition do not fall within the scope of coverage, the insurer is not legally required to defend the suit. Id.

As previously stated, Mr. Taylor's allegation that he was injured when struck in the head by a bottle clearly falls within the assault and battery exclusion. In his petition, Mr. Taylor also asserts that DBE was negligent in a variety of different ways such as “[f]ailing to provide a reasonably safe place for its patrons[,]” and “[f]ailing to provide adequate security[.]” Mr. Taylor's claims against DBE essentially amount to DBE allowing the battery to occur. The assault and battery exclusion plainly excludes coverage for bodily injury which results from a battery as well as from “the failure to suppress or prevent ․ [‘]Battery[’]” or “the failure to provide an environment safe from ․ [‘]Battery[.’]” In this case, the policy unambiguously excludes coverage, and C&F had no duty to defend its insured.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiff/Appellant, Grant R. Taylor.

AFFIRMED.

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE