STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TELVIN DA SHAWN GULLETTE (2025)

Defendant Telvin Da Shawn Gullette was found guilty by a jury of the second degree murder of Trewande Vallery.  ¹ He was sentenced to life imprisonment, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defendant has appealed his conviction, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second degree murder and that the jury should have instead found him guilty of the responsive verdict of manslaughter. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On New Year's Eve 2023, police were dispatched shortly after 8:00 p.m. in response to reports of an armed robbery at 2207B West Sycamore Street, located in a housing project in Alexandria. Officer Matthew Wood of the Alexandria Police Department testified that he arrived soon after the call but was only on scene of the armed robbery for approximately five minutes when he “heard a loud crowd begin to scream” on the other side of the housing project. Officer Wood returned to his unit and drove around to the other side of the complex, where a crowd flagged him down at 2227A East Sycamore Street and informed him that someone had been shot. They directed Officer Wood to the body of Mr. Vallery, which was slumped face down against a brick wall without a pulse. Numerous witnesses in the crowd identified the shooter as “Taboo,” which was Defendant's street name. Two witnesses also claimed to have seen “Taboo” pistol-whipping Mr. Vallery before shooting him. Paramedics declared Mr. Vallery dead at the scene at 8:45 p.m.

According to Dr. Christopher Ramos Robles, the forensic pathologist who conducted Mr. Vallery's autopsy, Mr. Vallery died as a result of being shot in the neck. Dr. Ramos noted that the wound was inflicted by a medium caliber bullet at an indeterminate range, entering from the front and exiting at the back of the neck along a right-to-left trajectory. Dr. Ramos also observed two small lacerations on the forehead and a contusion around Mr. Vallery's left eye.

On April 23, 2024, Defendant was charged by a grand jury with one count of second degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. On September 24, 2024, Defendant proceeded to a trial by jury. On September 26, 2024, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder. Defense counsel filed a Motion for Judgment Non Obstante Verdicto and For Notice of New Trial, arguing that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence presented at trial. The trial court denied the motion on October 28, 2024, and proceeded to sentence Defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant has appealed his conviction, asserting as his single assignment of error that the evidence was insufficient to uphold the conviction for second degree murder and that, instead, the evidence established the killing was done in sudden passion or heat of blood such that he is entitled to a verdict of manslaughter.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find one error patent.

The trial court sentenced Defendant on October 28, 2024, shortly after denying his motion in arrest of judgment and for new trial. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 873 provides:

If a defendant is convicted of a felony, at least three days shall elapse between conviction and sentence. If a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled. If the defendant expressly waives a delay provided for in this article or pleads guilty, sentence may be imposed immediately.

In State v. Kisack, 16-797 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1201, cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1160, 138 S.Ct. 1175 (2018), the supreme court found that the La.Code Crim.P. art. 873 waiver must be express, not implicit. Distinguishing between the two types of waivers, the court explained that merely participating in the sentencing hearing would be considered an implicit waiver. Although announcing a readiness for sentencing has been considered an implicit waiver by some appellate courts, the supreme court explained that, under the circumstances of those cases, such a waiver should really be considered an express waiver. Subsequently, in State v. Boyd, 17-1749 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 407, the supreme court found an express waiver was made when the defense responded that it had no objection to proceeding with sentencing.

In the absence of a waiver, the supreme court made it clear in Kisack, 236 So.3d 1201, that an Article 873 violation may still be considered harmless. This court recently addressed the issue in State v. Toby, 22-386, pp. 19-20 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/8/23), 358 So.3d 289, 304, writ denied, 23-491 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So.3d 714:

Prior to the supreme court's ruling in Kisack, “errors in failing to observe La.Code Crim.P. art. 873’s mandatory sentencing delay were found harmless where a mandatory life sentence was imposed or when the defendant did not challenge his sentence on appeal and did not claim prejudice due to the lack of the delay.” State v. Holden, 19-867, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/15/20), 304 So.3d 520, 525, writ denied, 20-1016 (La. 2/9/21), 310 So.3d 174. Since Kisack, courts have continued to find harmless error where a mandatory life sentence is imposed or where the defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal and does not claim prejudice due to the lack of the delay. See State v. Deville, 22-317 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/19/22), 349 So.3d 1158; State v. Williams, 20-605 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/21), 329 So.3d 938, writ denied, 21-1798 (La. 4/12/22), 336 So.3d 85; and State v. Chester, 19-363 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/3/21), 314 So.3d 914, writ denied, 21-350 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d 321. In the present case, Defendant neither challenges the sentences imposed nor claims he was prejudiced by lack of a delay. Thus, we conclude the error to be harmless under these circumstances.

See also, State v. Hills, 23-629 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/24), 387 So.3d 702, writ denied, 24-658 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So.3d 648.

In the present case, a mandatory life sentence was imposed, and Defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal. Thus, we find that the trial court's failure to abide by the La.Code Crim.P. art. 873 delay was harmless.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second degree murder. He states in his brief that “[t]he defense does not dispute that Trewande Vallery was shot and killed by [Defendant.]” However, he asserts that he acted in sudden passion or heat of blood and that he is therefore entitled to have his conviction reduced from second degree murder to manslaughter.

The State counters that it presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for second degree murder, such as testimony from two eyewitnesses that Defendant pistol-whipped and then shot Mr. Vallery. The State further argues that there was sufficient temporal and physical distance between the armed robbery and the shooting of Mr. Vallery for Defendant's blood to cool, and the actions of procuring a weapon and tracking Mr. Vallery down to accost him on the opposite side of the apartment complex are not consistent with the mitigation required to support the verdict of manslaughter.

Statement of Law

The analysis for sufficiency of the evidence is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determination of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Second degree murder is defined in La.R.S. 14:30.1 as the killing of a human being when the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31(A)(1) defines manslaughter as a first or second degree murder “committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31(A)(1) further provides that “[p]rovocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time offense was committed[.]”

Thus, the presence of “sudden passion” or “heat of blood” distinguishes manslaughter from murder. The court has stated on several occasions, however, that “sudden passion” or “heat of blood” are not elements of the offense of manslaughter; rather, they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense which exhibit a degree or culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed without them. State v. Tompkins, 403 So.2d 644 (La.1981); State v. Temple, 394 So.2d 259 (La.1981); State v. Peterson, 290 So.2d 307 (La.1974). Since they are mitigatory factors, a defendant who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in a “sudden passion” or “heat of blood” is entitled to a manslaughter verdict. Where such proof has been introduced, a second degree murder verdict is inappropriate.

State v. Lombard, 486 So.2d 106, 110-111 (La.1986) (footnotes omitted). “Questions of provocation and time for cooling are questions for the jury to determine under the standard of the average or ordinary person with ordinary self-control.” State v. Perkins, 11-955, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/12), 85 So.3d 810, 818.

Evidence Presented

Detective Chad Jeansonne with the Alexandria Police Department testified regarding the course of the investigation. The two addresses at issue—2207B West Sycamore, where the armed robbery took place, and 2227A East Sycamore, where Mr. Vallery was killed—are located in a housing complex formerly known as Karst Park. Detective Jeansonne described Karst Park as being a group of apartments arranged in a semi-circle around a common field, with East and West Sycamore being the two sides of the complex. According to Detective Jeansonne, police learned that the events of the night started at 2207B West Sycamore where Defendant was staying with his girlfriend, Kerriel Arms. Defendant's friend John Harris was also at the apartment that night. A group of men approached Defendant while he was in the apartment and asked if they could borrow some ammunition from him. Defendant admitted in statements to police that he gave them the ammunition. The group of men subsequently robbed Defendant, at some point opening fire on him and hitting Mr. Harris, who sustained a non-fatal gunshot wound to the neck.

Detective Jeansonne then testified regarding the scene at 2227A East Sycamore. Photographs of the scene, as well as a discussion of relevant forensic evidence such as bullet trajectories, blood splatter, and the absence of any bullet casing or cartridge, were previously entered through the testimony of the crime scene detective, Detective Chris Fonville. Detective Jeansonne briefly summarized Detective Fonville's testimony and then discussed the two witnesses who identified Defendant as the shooter. Both witnesses identified Defendant in a photo lineup and were able to provide both his real name and his street name, Taboo.

After interviewing other witnesses, including John Harris, Detective Jeansonne contacted Defendant's father, who promised to find Defendant and get him to call Detective Jeansonne. Defendant called police later that day and agreed to an interview. During his interview, Defendant explained “that he went looking for the victim because he wanted to retrieve his gun that he believed the victim had taken.” According to Defendant, he met the victim, Mr. Vallery, at the corner of 2227 East Sycamore where “they got into it.” Defendant admitted to pistol-whipping Mr. Vallery a couple of times. He also admitted that his street name was Taboo.

911 calls relevant to establishing the time of the events that night were entered into evidence during the testimony of Angie Branton, the Communications Director for Rapides Parish's 911 center. According to the timestamps on the 911 audio recordings, the first caller, Kerriel Arms, reported an armed robbery at her residence, 2207B West Sycamore, at 8:14 p.m. A subsequent caller reported an ongoing altercation featuring an armed assailant near 2227 East Sycamore at 8:26 p.m., and another caller reported that someone had just been shot near 2227 East Sycamore at 8:30 p.m.

The State called two witnesses to testify regarding the shooting at 2227 East Sycamore—Tashira Lucius and Kaylyn Blake.

Tashira Lucius was fifteen at the time of the shooting and lived in the apartment where the shooting occurred. She testified that Defendant banged on her door around 8:30 p.m. in a panicked manner and was “screaming for a certain person[.]” Tashira went outside shortly after Defendant left, at which point she observed Defendant with Mr. Vallery. According to Tashira, Defendant pistol-whipped Mr. Vallery while continuously asking him “where a certain person was[.]” Mr. Vallery kept telling Defendant he didn't know where that person was. Defendant then shot Mr. Vallery “near his head,” pointed at one of the kids in the crowd, and said “don't tell anybody anything” before running off into the nearby field. Tashira testified that she knew both Defendant and Mr. Vallery from the neighborhood, but denied having “anything against either one of them[.]”

Kaylyn Blake, who was nineteen at the time of trial, was at Tashira's apartment at the time of the shooting. She testified that she was alerted to the incident when “somebody knocked on the door and said somebody was getting pistol-whipped.” When Kaylyn went outside with the others, she observed Mr. Vallery being dragged and pistol-whipped by Defendant. Defendant then stopped pistol-whipping Mr. Vallery and the two of them began talking. Kaylyn didn't know what they were talking about, but she stated that Mr. Vallery kept insisting “he don't know, he don't know.” Defendant then shot Mr. Vallery one time. Before running off, Defendant told the crowd standing around not to tell anybody. Kaylyn testified that she knew who Defendant was from around the neighborhood and that Mr. Vallery was a friend of hers.

After the State rested, the defense called four witnesses. The first witness, John Harris, testified about the armed robbery at 2207B West Sycamore earlier in the evening. Mr. Harris, who was a good friend of Defendant's, was at his house New Year's Eve “chilling watching TV.” Defendant's girlfriend, Ms. Arms, and several children were also there that night. Mr. Harris testified that four individuals, whom he identified as Jeremiah, Kayso, Derrick, and Mr. Vallery, came to the door asking for bullets. The group, which was armed, attempted to rob Defendant after Defendant gave them some ammunition. Mr. Harris was shot in the neck during the ensuing altercation but managed to return fire. Mr. Harris did not know what subsequently happened to his gun. He was also unable to identify who shot him and, for obvious reasons, had no direct knowledge of any subsequent events that evening.

Defense's next witness was Emmanuel London, whose street name was Kayso. Mr. London pled guilty to committing the armed robbery on New Year's Eve at 2207B West Sycamore, although he denied ever being there and insisted that he only pled guilty under the advice of his counsel. Mr. London testified that Mr. Vallery was his cousin and his best friend. At this point during his testimony, Mr. London emotionally broke down. After he recovered, Mr. London emphasized that he would never harm a person he loved, never put Mr. Vallery in harm's way, and that he and Mr. Vallery “would protect each other.”

Kerriel Arms, Defendant's girlfriend, also testified regarding the armed robbery. She lived with Defendant at 2207B West Sycamore Street along with her four children. According to Ms. Arms, she was sleeping when Mr. Harris arrived at the apartment that night. She was awakened by several gunshots sometime around 8:00 p.m. and observed Mr. Harris with a gunshot wound to his neck. Ms. Arms ran outside to call the police, who arrived within a few minutes. After arriving at her apartment, one of the officers left “within minutes” to go to the scene of the shooting at East Sycamore. Ms. Arms testified that she did not see who shot Mr. Harris or who fired any of the shots.

The final witness for the defense was Kiana Gines, who confirmed her street name was Butter. Ms. Gines testified that she was present for both the armed robbery at Defendant's apartment and the shooting of Mr. Vallery. She claimed to have lived at 2227 West Sycamore, which would have been directly across the central field of the apartment complex from 2227 East Sycamore. Ms. Gines testified that she was walking by 2207 West Sycamore on the way to her residence on New Years's Eve, close to midnight,² when she saw Mr. London, Mr. Vallery, and Jeremiah standing at the door of the 2207B West Sycamore apartment with a gun. She “heard a gunshot fired” but didn't know if anyone was injured because she was outside the apartment. She then saw Mr. London, Mr. Vallery, and Jeremiah take off running through the field towards the front of the apartment complex.

Ms. Gines testified that she saw Defendant and Mr. Vallery “in a little altercation” with a crowd around them. She claimed she was able to see this because she was in the field “just a couple feet away.” According to Ms. Gines, she then saw Mr. London and Jeremiah “[come] around from ․ the side of the building facing the back of [Defendant,]” and she saw Mr. London shoot his gun. She claimed that Mr. London was trying to shoot Defendant but shot Mr. Vallery. When the shot was fired, Defendant “took off running back towards the back of the apartments.” Ms. Gines further testified that after Mr. Vallery was shot, she ran back to 2207B West Sycamore “to tell the Detectives that it had been another shooting.” When questioned about how much time passed between the armed robbery of Defendant and the shooting of Mr. Vallery, Ms. Gines replied “maybe ten, fifteen minutes,” although she later testified about fifteen to twenty minutes.

The State extensively cross-examined Ms. Gines regarding the consistency of her testimony. The State noted that in the statement she gave Detective Jeansonne on January 7, 2025, Ms. Gines claimed that, rather than walking by 2207B West Sycamore and observing the armed robbery from a distance, she was actually directly adjacent to Mr. Harris providing him with a lighter when the men ran up to him and robbed him. When confronted with this statement at trial, Ms. Gines changed her story so that Mr. Harris asked to use her lighter as she walked past and he then walked back to the apartment just prior to the armed robbery.

The State also pressed Ms. Gines for further details regarding from where exactly she supposedly observed the shooting of Mr. Vallery. The State admitted into evidence a map of the complex during this portion of her testimony, showing 2207B West Sycamore's location in relation to 2227A East Sycamore, which was over two hundred yards away. Ms. Gines claimed that she resumed her walk back to her apartment after the armed robbery and, while doing so, observed a fight break out near the basketball court, which is visible on the map as being on the side of the field near 2227 East Sycamore. According to Ms. Gines, a large crowd of kids followed the altercation in a circle, moving with the fight closer to 2227 East Sycamore. When questioned, she admitted that she did not see Defendant by himself knocking on the door of 2227A East Sycamore. However, she maintained that she “had a good look on everything that was going on” and claimed she could see people's faces despite admitting she was not close to the altercation. She also claimed that she was able to identify Mr. London as the shooter because of his purple and yellow hoodie.

Although Ms. Gines testified that she talked to police at the scene, the State noted that her name did not come up in any of the police reports and none of the officers testifying at trial recalled interacting with Ms. Gines the night of the shooting. It wasn't until January 7, 2025, that she spoke with Detective Jeansonne after she “ran across [Defendant's] dad one day” and told him that she “wanted to talk to someone to try to help the case a little bit because, you know, I seen, I seen it.” Ms. Gines claimed to be close friends with Defendant and his girlfriend, Ms. Arms. According to Ms. Gines, she was not close to Mr. Vallery, whom she claimed once pointed an assault rifle at her face when his iPad went missing. Ms. Gines also claimed that Mr. London approached her a month before Mr. Vallery was shot and asked her to set Defendant up “so that I guess the robbery could be easier for them[.]” The State further noted during Ms. Gines’ cross-examination that Mr. Harris testified that he did not remember seeing Ms. Gines the night of the armed robbery.

The final witness to testify was Lisa Walker, a bailiff whom the State called for rebuttal testimony. Ms. Gines claimed during her testimony that Mr. London threatened her not to say anything while he was being escorted into the courtroom to give his testimony. According to Ms. Gines, “He just pointed at his head, did like this and said to be careful.” Defense counsel clarified for the record that Ms. Gines “pointed to her head with two fingers.” Ms. Walker, who escorted Mr. London into the courtroom, denied that this incident occurred and insisted that Mr. London did not even look at Ms. Gines.

Analysis

Although Defendant does not contest on appeal that he killed Mr. Vallery, defense counsel maintained at trial that Defendant did not kill Mr. Vallery. We will, therefore, briefly address this issue.

As previously noted, second degree murder is the killing of a human being where the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1. A positive identification by one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Hughes, 05-992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047. In this case, the State presented two witnesses who observed Defendant shoot Mr. Vallery, namely Tashira Lucius and Kaylyn Blake. These two witnesses had no obvious ulterior motives, and their narratives were relatively consistent with one another. The jury was entitled to disregard the testimony of the witness who claimed otherwise, Kiana Gines. See State v. Patterson, 10-415 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 63 So.3d 140, writ denied, 11-338 (La. 6/17/11), 63 So.3d 1037. Ms. Gines was an extremely unreliable witness with an obvious bias towards Defendant. Her testimony was contradicted at many points by the other witnesses at trial on issues large and small, as well as by her own prior statements. Accordingly, the State presented more than sufficient evidence that Defendant shot and killed Mr. Vallery.

In order to justify a reduction from second degree murder to manslaughter, Defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he shot and killed Mr. Vallery in “sudden passion” or “heat of blood” immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. State v. Charles, 00-1611 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/9/01), 787 So.2d 516, writ denied, 01-1554 (La. 4/19/02), 813 So.2d 420. The facts of this case closely correspond to those in State v. Patterson, 63 So.3d 140, and State v. Arabie, 496 So.2d 554 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1986), writ denied, 502 So.2d 565 (La.1987). In Patterson, while the defendant testified that the victim robbed him at gunpoint, the defendant admitted that the victim was also leaving the scene when the defendant retrieved his weapon and followed the victim. The defendant then shot the victim when he entered his car. In Arabie, the defendant pursued his armed robbers with the explicit intention to regain his stolen possessions, which the court treated as evidence that the defendant had “acted with deliberation and reflection and not from heat of passion[.]” Arabie, 496 So.2d at 558. In each case, the court rejected the defendant's argument of provocation because while “[o]ur law may extend limited indulgence to passion justly excited, but it does not indulge revenge.” Id.

Both Mr. Harris and Defendant, via his statements to police, claimed that Mr. Vallery robbed Defendant at gunpoint and shot at him. The 911 calls indicate that there was a gap of at least sixteen minutes between the armed robbery and the shooting of Mr. Vallery. Such a timespan is sufficient for the average person's blood to cool. See State v. Johnson, 06-623 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/06), 941 So.2d 696, writ denied, 06-3024 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.2d 995; State v. Collier, 474 So.2d 529 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1985). Additionally, the jury could infer that Defendant retrieved a weapon during this time since Defendant claimed to police that Mr. Vallery had stolen his gun. Retrieving a weapon from another location shows intent to murder rather than sudden passion. State v. Cumbrera, 14-372 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/14), 149 So.3d 869; Johnson, 941 So.2d 696. Defendant then tracked Mr. Vallery down to the other side of the apartment complex, which was over two hundred yards away. Pursuing a victim or pursuing a fight with a victim also shows intent to murder. State v. Richards, 06-1553 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/07), 956 So.2d 160, writ denied, 07-1129 (La. 12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529; Arabie, 496 So.2d 554. After chasing down Mr. Vallery, Defendant proceeded to pistol-whip him and interrogate him before shooting him. This was not an act of passion, but an execution.

We find that the evidence presented at trial in this case was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for the second degree murder of Mr. Vallery and that Defendant failed to establish the mitigatory factors of manslaughter. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit, and Defendant's conviction is affirmed.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Telvin Da Shawn Gullette's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The victim's name is written as both “Trewande Vallery” and “Tre'Wande Vallery” throughout the record.

2.   When questioned by the State on cross-examination, Ms. Gines reiterated that it was around midnight when she happened to be walking by.

WILBUR L. STILES JUDGE