STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JOSHUA HARDIN (2025)

Defendant, Joshua B. Hardin, appeals his sentences for manslaughter and attempted manslaughter following a plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970).

In June 2022, Defendant was indicted for the second-degree murder of Stephen Wayne Sturlese; the attempted second-degree murder of Kenny Jules Sturlese; and possession of a weapon by a person convicted of domestic abuse battery, fourth offense.

Seven months later, Defendant entered an Alford plea to the amended charges of manslaughter under La.R.S. 14:31 and attempted manslaughter under La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:31.2. As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the weapons charge.

That same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty years at hard labor for manslaughter and fifteen years at hard labor for attempted manslaughter. Although the State recommended running the sentences concurrently, the trial court ordered five years of the sentence for attempted manslaughter to run consecutively to the sentence for manslaughter. Defendant made a general objection to the sentences at that time.

Three days later, Defendant filed a motion, asking “the court to reconsider his sentence pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 on the basis that the sentence imposed upon her [sic] is excessive.” The trial court denied the motion. Defendant now appeals.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

All criminal appeals are initially reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record under La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. Here, we find no errors patent.

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant asserts that “[t]he sentences imposed, totaling 35 years at hard labor, constitute unconstitutionally harsh and excessive sentences given the circumstances of this case.” However, because Defendant did not set forth the specific grounds for this objection in the trial court, we review his assignment as a bare claim of constitutional excessiveness. State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La.1993).

The standard of review for this type of claim was addressed in State v. Williams, 03-1537 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/9/04), 875 So.2d 1043, writ denied, 04-1951 (La. 12/17/04), 888 So.2d 864. There, this court explained:

Louisiana Constitution Article 1, § 20 expressly prohibits the imposition of “cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.” State v. Delgado, 03-46, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/03), 845 So.2d 581, 582. A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it is so greatly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense so as to shock one's sense of justice, or if it provides no appreciable contribution to acceptable penal objectives and, consequently, is nothing more than the unnecessary imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Day, 02-1039 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/03), 838 So.2d 74. In its opinion in State v. Smith, 01-2574, pp. 6-7 (La.1/14/03), 839 So.2d 1, 4, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that an appellate court is to review an excessive-sentence claim in accordance with the following standard:

A trial judge has broad discretion when imposing a sentence and a reviewing court may not set a sentence aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Cann, 471 So.2d 701, 703 (La.1985). On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate but whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion. State v. Walker, 00-3200, p. 2 (La.10/12/01), 799 So.2d 461, 462; cf. State v. Phillips, 02-0737, p. 1 (La.11/15/02), 831 So.2d 905, 906.

In addition to the above considerations that factor into a defendant's sentence, in State v. Williams, 02-707, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1095, 1101, a panel of this court discussed the impact of a plea bargain upon the sentencing process, stating that:

The trial court may also consider other factors not provided by La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. Specifically, when the offense to which the defendant has pled guilty inadequately describes the entire course of the defendant's conduct, the court may consider the benefit obtained by the defendant through the plea bargain. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475 (La.1982). The trial court should particularly make such considerations where the plea bargain results in a significant reduction in the defendant's potential exposure to imprisonment. State v. Robinson, 33,921 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/1/00); 770 So.2d 868; State v. Waguespack, 589 So.2d 1079 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991), writ denied, 596 So.2d 209 (La.1992).

Id. at 1045–46.

Additionally, in determining whether a trial court abused its sentencing discretion, a reviewing court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the defendant, and the sentence imposed for similar crimes. State v. Greene, 12-649 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 126 So.3d 839.

At the plea hearing in the case before us, the State set forth the factual basis for the plea agreement:

Your Honor, this offense happened on April 29, 2022. As to the second degree murder, [Defendant] did commit the murder of Mr. Stephen Wayne Sturlese.

As to Count II, attempted second degree murder, that was an attempted murder on Mr. Kenny Jewels [sic] Sturlese. This offense happened at around the 1000 Block of McCall Street in Lake Charles, Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. There were three houses there at issue, one of those being [Defendant's].

After spending some time together with the Sturleses, [Defendant] left a bar they were at called On the Rocks, which was a very short distance away from the residences on McCall Street. They went back to [Defendant's] house where he committed the murder of Stephen Sturlese and the attempted murder of Mr. Kenny Sturlese. 9-1-1 was called and officers responded shortly thereafter.

In between when the shots were fired and when officers arrived [Defendant] had attempted to gain entry into his neighbor's home and had contact with some of his neighbors. At least one of those, when the responding officers arrived, he falsely identified as his uncle and had been pulling on door handles trying to get in and was secreting himself in that gentleman's parking -- covered parking attached to his house.

When officers initially arrived he was seen coming from the area where the bodies were and he was unresponsive to officers’ commands to stop and very deliberately went and hid himself inside that carport I was talking about.

When approached by officers, although it was only minutes after shots were fired, he initially denied hearing the shots and then he made statements that were progressively more incriminating, including that he was the one that fired the shots. He then confected a poorly constructed claim of self-defense and he maintained that statement throughout his contact with law enforcement.

There was no evidence of any conflict of any kind in the way of physical injuries that were documented on [Defendant's] body and there was no evidence of any conflict other than the gunshot wounds on the victims’ body, and that part could not be substantiated at all.

One of the defenses, in addition to self-defense, is also intoxication and I would inform the Court that [Defendant] had metabolites for different controlled substances in his blood at the time. The biggest reading he had was for PCP. He was very obviously intoxicated at the time of his contact with the police, and throughout all my analysis of the case I could not see where that eviscerated his intent in any way and it seemed evident to me that based on his statements and his attempted defenses to the case that the jury would have agreed. Thank you.

Then, at Defendant's sentencing hearing, two family members of the deceased victim, Stephen Sturlese, provided statements to the court. Andrew Scott Jr., the deceased victim's father, testified that Stephen left behind six children, all of whom were under the age of fifteen. He described Stephen as a very good young man and a loving father. He requested that the trial court sentence Defendant according to the requirements set by law. Stephen's eldest daughter, Brianna Sturlese, testified next. She also talked about the tremendous loss of her father.

The trial court then addressed the sentencing statute for manslaughter, La.R.S. 14:31(B), which provides that a defendant “shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years.” Similarly, the sentencing statute for attempted manslaughter, La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3), provides that “[w]hoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished ․ in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” Hence, the maximum sentence for attempted manslaughter is twenty years.

As stated earlier, the trial court ultimately sentenced Defendant to thirty years for manslaughter and fifteen years for attempted manslaughter. And five years of the sentence for attempted manslaughter were ordered to run consecutively to the sentence for manslaughter.

After imposing its sentence, the trial court noted that it had considered all of the aggravating and mitigating factors of La.Code Crim.P. art 894.1.

So did the trial court abuse its sentencing discretion? Defendant thinks so. On appeal, Defendant argues that his manslaughter sentence is near the maximum sentence, that he “will likely be over sixty years of ages before he is eligible for release[,]” that he is not the “worst of offenders,” and that “this was not the worst of offenses.”

On the other hand, the State argues that Defendant's sentences are not excessive. After all, Defendant killed one person and attempted to kill another. The State points out that Defendant was aware of the possible sentencing ranges when he pled to the reduced charges, that Defendant's sentences were mid-range, and that Defendant received “ample benefit” by the reduction of the charges. We agree.

Initially, the trial court considered Defendant's reduced penalty exposure when it crafted Defendant's sentences. The trial court stated on the record that the original charge of second degree murder had “a mandatory life sentence ․ no maximums, just one penalty, mandatory life imprisonment ․ and ․ the attempted second degree murder charge[ ] ․ carrie[d] up to 50-years imprisonment ․” The trial court also noted that the State dismissed a weapons charge that carried a maximum sentence of twenty years.

As stated in State v. Wortham, 47,431, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/14/12), 107 So.3d 132, 136, “When a defendant has received a significant reduction in potential exposure to confinement through a plea bargain, the trial court has great discretion in imposing even the maximum sentence possible for the pled offense.” And here, the trial court imposed far less than the maximum possible sentences.

Turning now to the nature of the offenses. Manslaughter is statutorily defined as a “crime of violence.” La.R.S. 14:2(B)(4). “By its very nature, manslaughter is one of the worst offenses in our criminal code[.]” State v. Ponthieux, 20-317, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/21), 319 So.3d 460, 465. At sentencing, the trial court noted that Defendant's actions left a man dead, left the deceased victim's six children without a father, and left the surviving victim with serious and irreparable injuries.

As to Defendant's nature and background, the trial court noted that Defendant had a history of domestic violence—he was initially charged with possession of a weapon by a person convicted of domestic abuse battery, fourth offense. On the night of the shootings, Defendant tested positive for various drugs, including PCP. At the time of sentencing, Defendant was a thirty-nine-year-old high school graduate.

Now to a comparison of similar cases. In State v. Tutson, 18-738 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/19), 270 So.3d 684, writ denied, 19-540 (La. 10/1/19), 280 So.3d 167, this court affirmed the maximum sentence of forty years for manslaughter. In that case, the defendant was a twenty-one-year-old first offender. He was charged with second degree murder for intentionally shooting the victim in the back. He was ultimately convicted by a jury of manslaughter.

Similarly, in State v. Soriano, 15-1006 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 192 So.3d 899, writ denied, 16-1523 (La. 6/5/17), 219 So.3d 1111, the defendant, a twenty-five-year-old first offender, was charged with second degree murder for fatally stabbing the victim. The defendant in that case was convicted by a jury of manslaughter. He was sentenced to a maximum sentence of forty years. And his sentence was affirmed on appeal.

Likewise, in State v. Rouser, 14-613 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/7/15), 158 So.3d 860, the defendant was charged with one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of the responsive verdicts of manslaughter and attempted manslaughter. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to thirty years at hard labor for manslaughter. In affirming the sentences, the fourth circuit provided the following comparison of similar case:

In State v. McGhee, 10-583 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/10), 52 So.3d 318, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to forty years at hard labor. During an altercation at a bar, the defendant shot and killed a bystander. The defendant was twenty-six years old at the time of the offense and had prior convictions for possession of cocaine and domestic abuse battery. The appellate court upheld the defendant's forty-year sentence.

In State v. Lewis, 09-1404 (La. 10/22/10), 48 So.3d 1073, a sixteen-year-old male watched a fight between friends, Bush and Crain, as a bystander. During the fight, he picked up a gun that had fallen out of Bush's pocket and fired a single shot into Crain's temple. The sixteen-year-old was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to thirty years at hard labor. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed defendant's sentence.

In State v. Osborn, 13-697 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/13), 127 So.3d 1087, the defendant, who was charged with second degree murder, went to a nearby vehicle to retrieve a gun and fired it to break up a fight, resulting in the death of the victim, who was also trying to break up the fight. He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to thirty years at hard labor. The appellate court upheld the defendant's thirty-year sentence.

․ In State v. Maze, 09-1298 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 36 So.3d 1072, the court held that a twenty-year sentence for attempted manslaughter was not constitutionally excessive. See also State v. Willis, 36,198 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/14/02), 823 So.2d 1072 (fifteen-year sentence for attempted manslaughter not excessive); State v. Dubroc, 99-730 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/15/99), 755 So.2d 297 (twelve-year sentence for attempted manslaughter and three-year sentence for aggravated battery, to be served consecutively, not excessive even though imposed on forty-five-year-old first offender who was married, a father and grandfather, and had always been gainfully employed.

Rouser, 158 So.3d at 873–74.

To sum up, Defendant here was facing a mandatory life sentence for second degree murder and up to fifty years for attempted second degree murder. By pleading to manslaughter and attempted manslaughter, Defendant received a significant reduction in criminal penalties. And the sentences imposed by the trial court were far less than maximum sentences.

In short, the record here contains a sufficient factual basis to support the sentences that were imposed. The sentences are not constitutionally excessive. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

DISPOSITION

For the above reasons, Defendant's sentences for manslaughter and attempted manslaughter are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

CHARLES G. FITZGERALD JUDGE