GSS HOLDINGS LA LLC v. MANHATTAN HSI INVESTMENTS LLC (2025)

Relator, Manhattan HSI Investments, LLC, seeks supervisory review of the trial court's judgment of eviction, rendered in open court on July 17, 2025, and reduced to writing and entered on August 1, 2025 (the “eviction judgment”). The Eviction Judgment ordered the eviction of GSS Holdings LA, LLC (“GSS”) and its sub-sub-tenant, Manhattan Food Mart, LLC (“MFM”) (and/or other GSS-related occupants), and granted them 120 days within which to vacate the premises located at 1600 Manhattan Boulevard, Harvey, Louisiana (“1600 Manhattan”). Relator asserts the trial court abused its discretion to the extent it allowed GSS 120 days to vacate the premises.

BACKGROUND

Manhattan is the owner of commercial real estate located at 1600 Manhattan. This property has been leased and operated as a Brothers Food Mart and gas station. In 2021, Mountain Express Oil Company (“MEX”) purchased various Brothers Food Mart businesses, including the one operated at 1600 Manhattan. The MEX acquisition made MEX the prime tenant at 1600 Manhattan under the lease, which was to run through July 2027. In February 2023, MEX entered into a sublease with GSS.

Shortly after MEX and GSS entered into the sublease for 1600 Manhattan, MEX declared bankruptcy. On August 24, 2023, the bankruptcy court terminated MEX's unexpired leases with property owners, which includes the prime lease and sublease of 1600 Manhattan.

The day after the bankruptcy court's order, Manhattan attempted to evict GSS by giving it the required 5-day notice to vacate. GSS filed suit in the 24th Judicial District Court seeking an injunction and temporary restraining order, which was granted. The trial court subsequently enjoined Manhattan from interfering with GSS's possession. Thereafter, GSS has delayed eviction through numerous proceedings until the trial court's eviction judgment in August 2025. Neither GSS nor Manhattan have appealed the eviction judgment. In addition, according to the writ application, since the bankruptcy court's lease termination order in August 2023, GSS has not paid rent or taxes at 1600 Manhattan, does not insure the location like it should, and does not properly maintain the property.

DISCUSSION – Proper Jurisdiction for Review and Merits

Upon review of the writ application, attachments thereto, and the law, we believe this court can and should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in the interest of justice in this case. We therefore grant this writ and order GSS to immediately vacate 1600 Manhattan Blvd., Harvey, Louisiana.

Exercise of Supervisory Jurisdiction

An appellate court in its discretion may grant meritorious applications for supervisory writs when the action is dictated by considerations of efficient judicial administration and fundamental fairness to litigants. Mangin v. Auter, 360 So.2d 577, 578 (La. Ct. App. 1978). The exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by appellate courts is within their plenary power. La. Const. 1974 Art. 5, Sec. 10. Appellate courts generally will not exercise such jurisdiction unless an error in the trial court's ruling will cause the relator irreparable injury or when an ordinary appeal does not afford an adequate remedy. [Emphasis added.] Guidry v. Shelter Ins. Co., 535 So.2d 393, 395 (La. Ct. App. 1988). When the trial court's ruling is arguably incorrect, when a reversal will terminate the litigation, and when there is no dispute of fact to be resolved, judicial efficiency and fundamental fairness to the litigants dictates that the merits of an application for supervisory writs should be decided in an attempt to avoid the waste of time and expense of a possibly useless future trial on the merits. Guidry, 535 So.2d at 395, citing Herlitz Construction Company, Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 (La. 1981).

In this case, an ordinary appeal does not afford an adequate remedy. The trial court acted contrary to the general swift handling of evictions as contemplated and provided in La. C.C.P. arts. 4731 and 4732. La. C.C.P. art. 4732 B provides:

B. If the court finds the lessor or owner entitled to the relief sought, or if the lessee or occupant fails to answer or to appear at the trial, the court shall render immediately a judgment of eviction ordering the lessee or occupant to deliver possession of the premises to the lessor or owner. The judgment of eviction shall be effective for not less than ninety days. [Emphasis added.]

Instead, the trial court permitted GSS an additional 120 days, until November 14, 2025, to vacate the premises. GSS has now avoided eviction for over two years. According to the writ application, since the bankruptcy court's lease termination order in August 2023, GSS has not paid rent at 1600 Manhattan, has not paid taxes, do not insure the location, and do not properly maintain the premises.

The criteria for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction discussed in Mangin, Guidry, and Herlitz, supra (which are also raised in the dissent), have been clearly satisfied here. Firstly, the trial court's ruling is more than just “arguably incorrect.” A portion of the trial court's ruling is clearly in error, specifically, the additional 120-day delay granted by the judgment is in disregard of La. C.C.P. art. 4732 B, which requires immediate eviction when the court has determined that the lessor is entitled to eviction. Secondly, there is no dispute of facts to be resolved here. Thirdly, judicial efficiency and fundamental fairness dictate that the merits of an application for supervisory writs should be decided in an attempt to avoid the waste of time and expense.

Moreover, there is little possibility of a future trial on the merits of eviction; the trial court has decided the case on the merits, i.e., that relator is entitled to the eviction, which was granted. The eviction itself, sought by relator, was not appealed. We are merely exercising our supervisory jurisdiction to correct one purely legal error that does not affect the main thrust of the judgment, which was the granting of eviction. This exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is within the requisites set forth in Mangin, Guidry, and Herlitz, supra.

The dissent cites La. C.C.P. art. 4735 in support of the position that appeal is relator/lessor's exclusive means of review herein. La. C.C.P. art. 4735 states:

Art. 4735. Appeal; bond

An appeal does not suspend execution of a judgment of eviction unless the defendant has answered the rule under oath, pleading an affirmative defense entitling him to retain possession of the premises, and the appeal has been applied for and the appeal bond filed within twenty-four hours after the rendition of the judgment of eviction. The amount of the suspensive appeal bond shall be determined by the court in an amount sufficient to protect the appellee against all such damage as he may sustain as a result of the appeal.

La. C.C.P. art. 4735, however, only deals with determination of when a suspensive appeal may be obtained, which requires that “the defendant has answered the rule under oath, pleading an affirmative defense entitling him to retain possession of the premises, and the appeal has been applied for and the appeal bond filed within twenty-four hours after the rendition of the judgment of eviction.” It does not mandate or suggest that the sole means of review of an eviction judgment or related ruling is by appeal. La. C.C.P. art. 4735 determines only whether and when an appeal may suspend execution of a judgment of eviction, and applies only to a defendant/lessee, who in this case, did not appeal the eviction judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 4735 does not contemplate an appeal by a lessor who sought and was granted an eviction. Thus, Article 4735 is not authoritative to this jurisdictional issue.

Furthermore, an interlocutory judgment, such as this, is appealable only when expressly allowed by law. La. C.C.P. art. 2083 C. La. C.C.P. art. 4735 does not expressly allow for the eviction judgment to be appealed.

Regarding the applicability of La. C.C.P. art. 4735 to this case, the dissent cites Yancy v. Womack, 203 So.2d 846 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967) to be instructive. We disagree. In Yancy, the evicted lessee filed the writ application which was the quickest way to obtain review of the eviction, but the First Circuit ultimately refused to exercise supervisory jurisdiction, stating that “The defendant has a right of appeal as long as he can meet the requirements of La. C.C.P. Art. 4735.” As explained above, La. C.C.P. art. 4735 applies only to the lessee, GSS, who has not sought an appeal. Regardless, no party in this case has met all requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 4735, and therefore, under the rule of Yancy, La. C.C.P. Art. 4735 has no arguable application here.

The dissent also cites Mercadel v. New Orleans Jazz & Heritage Festival and Foundation, Inc., 22-242 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/22), 338 So.3d 589, in which the Fourth Circuit exercised supervisory jurisdiction to review the district court's judgment granting a preliminary injunction. The court held that it was proper for an appellate court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction although Article 3612 B provides for an appeal of right from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary injunction. The court, interpreting La. C.C.P. art. 3612 B, found that:

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3612 uses the word “may” rather than “shall” indicating that [an] appeal is permitted, but not mandated to seek review of judgments relating to injunctions. ․ In interpreting La. C.C.P. art. 3612, this Court has explained that although the granting of [a] preliminary injunction is an appealable judgment, it does not preclude a litigants timely and proper resort to our discretionary plenary supervisory power ․

Mercadel 338 So.3d at 595 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Earlier, in In re Harrier Trust, 18-667 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/17/18), 259 So.3d 402, 408, stating the same reasons, the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion:

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3612 uses the permissive “may” rather than “shall” indicating [that] an appeal is permitted, but not mandated, to seek review of judgments relating to injunctions.” [Internal quotations and citations omitted.]

Thus, because the law relative to judicial review of judgments involving preliminary injunctions is not mandated, a litigant may choose whether to appeal or file an application for supervisory writs. Mercadel, 338 So.3d at 595; Harrier, 259 So.3d at 408.

In this case, the fourth decree of the August 1, 2025 eviction judgment includes the trial court's ruling granting and extending in part, and dissolving in part, the injunction relief granted. Injunctive relief is directly related to and extended until the November 14, 2025 deadline, which is the subject of this writ application. Thus, the conclusion reached in both Mercadel and In re Harrier, supra, that La. C.C.P. art. 3612 B is permissive, but not mandatory, applies equally in this case.

Similarly, the statute cited in the dissent as mandating appellate jurisdiction, La. C.C.P. art. 4735, contains no provision mandating judicial review of an eviction judgment by appeal. It merely sets the several prerequisites for suspensive appeal by a defendant/lessee, and no more. Further, in this case, relator does not even seek review of the actual eviction judgment, only the part of the judgment allowing GSS 120 additional days to vacate the premises.

The Eviction Judgment Is Not Final and Appealable

In the absence of an applicable specific provision of law providing for appeal, the remaining question is whether the judgment is now final and appealable. The eviction judgment in this case did not dispose of all claims. The writ application shows that claims by both parties remain which are not yet adjudicated and remain to be litigated, such as several damages claims. Nor has either party been dismissed from the case.

La. C.C.P. art. 1915 A lists six categories of judgments rendered by a trial court which constitute final judgments, although they do not adjudicate all of the issues in the case. The eviction judgment in this case does not fall into any of the article 1915 A categories. La. C.C.P. art. 1915 C provides:

C. Except as otherwise provided by law, when a court grants a judgment or summary judgment, or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories by or against a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, that judgment is an interlocutory judgment.

The eviction judgment herein grants a judgment as to several, but not all claims, demands, theories, etc., and is therefore an interlocutory judgment. An interlocutory judgment is only appealable when expressly allowed by law. La. C.C.P. art. 2083 C. As explained above, the eviction judgment is not made appealable expressly by law, and is therefore reviewable only by a writ application under the appellate court's supervisory jurisdiction.

La. C.C.P. art. 1915 was recently amended by Act 250, Section 3, of the 2025 ordinary session of the legislature, effective August 1, 2025. The change deleted the former Article 1915 B, which allowed the trial court to designate a partial judgment as final and appealable after an express finding that there is no just reason for delay of an appeal. It cannot be determined with certainty from the writ application whether the trial court made that designation. However, Section 6 of Act 250 made the amendment which deleted the former Article 1915 B apply prospectively to appeals and writ applications filed on or after the effective date of August 1, 2025. Because this writ application was filed after August 1, 2025, the Article 1915 B designation, if made, was rendered without effect by this change in the law.

Merits of the Writ Application

As discussed above in the context of the jurisdiction, the trial court found that relator/lessor was entitled to an eviction and part of the injunctive relief for which it prayed. Having found the lessor to be entitled to the eviction it sought, La. C.C.P. art. 4732 B requires that trial court order eviction immediately. We therefore find on the merits, and the dissent agrees, that the trial court erred by granting an additional 120 days for the defendant/lessees to vacate. Defendant/lessees were initially given five days to vacate, which was exceeded long ago, and must be evicted immediately.

In other substantially similar cases involving evictions pursuant to this same bankruptcy court's lease termination order, the trial courts have ordered the premises vacated in seven to fifteen days. For example, see LHJ Property, L.L.C. v. GSS Holdings LA, L.L.C. and Manhattan One Stop, L.L.C., 24-67 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/28/24) (unpublished writ disposition). Moreover, under La. C.C.P. art. 4702, when an owner of immovable property seeks to evict an occupant therefrom, after the purpose of the occupancy has ceased, the owner, or his agent, shall first cause a written notice to vacate the property to be delivered to the occupant, the owner “shall allow the occupant five days from its delivery to vacate the premises.”

Even if appellate jurisdiction did exist here, relator/lessor chose to file a writ application justifiably requesting this court to invoke its supervisory jurisdiction to grant immediate relief, which is clearly an appropriate and fair request. We see no reason that we should not, and we see no legal impediment thereto.¹ While appellate jurisdiction is of right, it is not necessarily mandatory in all cases. Neither party has sought an appeal. If we would require this review to proceed as an appeal instead of addressing this writ application now, we would prolong and extend the status quo, which is the opposite of what we believe justice requires. This matter would be, at best, moot by the time it could be addressed on appeal.²

Accordingly, upon review of the writ application and the law, we find that the trial court's granting of 120 days to the lessees to vacate the property after a judgment of eviction and over two years of litigation is excessive, and that it disregards the mandate of La. C.C.P. art. 4732 B.

DECREE

The provision in the trial court's judgment rendered on July 17, 2025 and signed on August 1, 2025, which granted GSS Holdings LA, LLC, until November 14, 2025 to return possession of the property, is vacated. We grant this writ and render judgment ordering GSS Holdings LA, LLC, to immediately vacate the property at 1600 Manhattan Blvd., Harvey, Louisiana and return possession of that property to Manhattan HSI Investments, LLC.

WRIT GRANTED

I respectfully dissent. In my opinion this Court lacks supervisory jurisdiction in this matter to review a final judgment of eviction. Here, the majority cites La. Const. 1974 Article 5, Section 10 for the proposition that appellate courts in this state have supervisory jurisdiction over cases that arise within their circuits, even in the face of jurisdiction on direct appeal. Specifically, the majority opines that in a case in which the Relator has a statutory right to seek appellate review through suspensive or devolutive appeal, an appellate court may – in the exercise of the plenary power granted to it by Article 5, Section 10 – exercise its discretion to grant a meritorious application for supervisory writs in order to review a final judgment when, in the court's opinion, supervisory review is dictated by considerations of judicial efficiency and fundamental fairness to litigants, where irreparable harm will result, or where an ordinary appeal does not afford an adequate remedy. The majority cites Mangin v. Auter, 360 So.2d 577, 578 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), and Guidry v. Shelter Ins. Co., 535 So.2d 393, 395 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1988), in support of this premise.

Mangin and Guidry, however, are distinguishable from the matter at hand as they both involved supervisory review of interlocutory judgments in cases in which appellate review was not immediately available. In each of those cases, the appellate court pointed out, first, that the only available current remedy was an application for supervisory review. Also, in each case, the appellate court discussed the frequently repeated policy that, while

[t]he exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by appellate courts is within their plenary power. La. Const. 1974 Art. 5, Sec. 10. Appellate courts generally will not exercise such jurisdiction unless an error in the trial court's ruling will cause the relator irreparable injury or an ordinary appeal does not afford an adequate remedy. Stevens v. Patterson Menhaden Corporation, 191 So.2d 692 (La. App. 1 Cir.1966), writ den., 250 La. 5, 193 So.2d 524 (1967). When the overruling of an exception or motion is arguably incorrect, when a reversal will terminate the litigation, and when there is no dispute of fact to be resolved, judicial efficiency and fundamental fairness to the litigants dictates that the merits of an application for supervisory writs should be decided in an attempt to avoid the waste of time and expense of a possibly useless future trial on the merits. Herlitz Construction Company, Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 (La.1981).

Guidry, 535 So. 2d at 395.

The Mangin court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to review an interlocutory judgment denying an exception of prescription. As stated above, because the judgment was interlocutory, the only avenue for review was through a supervisory writ. The Fourth Circuit reiterated there that appellate courts do not normally exercise their supervisory jurisdiction to review the denial of exceptions, but found that under the facts presented, the exercise of the court's supervisory jurisdiction was warranted in order to end the litigation, prevent the waste of judicial resources, and save the litigants the expenses of a trial and appeal.

In Guidry, the appellate court found that the factors set out in Stevens and Herlitz – as set forth in the quoted language above – were present. The court therefore found it appropriate to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to review an interlocutory judgment denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Again, however, the only path available to the defendant was to seek supervisory writs, as there was no final judgment from which to perfect an appeal.

After exhaustive research I find only one case on point addressing this issue. Although the case is not of recent vintage and has not been reviewed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, I nevertheless find Yancy v. Womack, 203 So.2d 846 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967) to be instructive.

Yancy involved an eviction proceeding in which the trial court ordered the tenant to vacate the premises without delay and to deliver possession to the property owner. On the same day, the tenant filed a notice of intention to apply for supervisory writs, in light of which, the trial court suspended the execution of the eviction ruling for five days. The First Circuit Court of Appeal stayed further trial court proceedings and granted a writ of certiorari. Subsequently, the First Court reconsidered and recalled its writ of certiorari, finding that the defendant's remedy was by appeal, not by a Writ of Certiorari. The court stated that “[t]he defendant has a right of appeal as long as he can meet the requirements of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 4735, and the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is not to be utilized as a substitute for the ordinary appellate process.” Id. at 846-47. (Emphasis added).

Further, after an extensive search for any case law supporting the right of a litigant to choose whether to proceed via appeal or an application for supervisory writs, the only instances I have found in which appellate courts have supported such a choice arise in the context of preliminary injunctions. Those cases specifically turn on the language of La. C.C.P. art. 3612(B), which provides that:

An appeal may be taken as a matter of right from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary or final injunction, but such an order or judgment shall not be suspended during the pendency of an appeal unless the court in its discretion so orders. (Emphasis added).

In Mercadel v. New Orleans Jazz & Heritage Festival and Foundation, Inc., 22-242 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/22), 338 So.3d 589, the defendant filed an application for supervisory writs seeking review of the district court's judgment granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant argued that it was improper for the appellate court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction where Article 3612(B) provides for an appeal of right from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary injunction. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that:

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3612 uses the word “may” rather than “shall” indicating that [an] appeal is permitted, but not mandated to seek review of judgments relating to injunctions. ․ In interpreting La. C.C.P. art. 3612, this Court has explained that [a]lthough the granting of [a] preliminary injunction is an appealable judgment, it does not preclude a litigants timely and proper resort to our discretionary plenary supervisory power ․

Id. at 595 (Internal quotations and citations omitted). See also In re Harrier Trust, 18-667 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/17/18), 259 So.3d 402, 408 (“Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3612 uses the permissive ‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ indicating [that] an appeal is permitted, but not mandated, to seek review of judgments relating to injunctions.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted)).

Thus, because the law relative to judicial review of judgments involving preliminary injunctions is permissive, a litigant may choose whether to appeal or file an application for supervisory writs. However, if the litigant opts to seek supervisory relief, the writ application must be filed within the 15-day time period for filing an appeal. Mercadel, 338 So.3d at 595; Harrier, 259 So.3d at 408.

The judgment in this case does not involve injunctive relief; nor is the judgment of eviction an interlocutory judgment as was the judgment denying an exception of prescription in Mangin and the judgment denying a motion for summary judgment in Guidry. A judgment of eviction is a final, appealable judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1841, which provides that “[a] judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment.” La. C.C.P. art. 2083(A) provides that a final judgment is “appealable in all cases in which appeals are given by law.”

Title IX of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, entitled “Eviction of Tenants and Occupants,” consists of two Chapters. The first sets out general dispositions relative to the required notice that must be provided by the lessor to the lessee as a prerequisite to the filing of any eviction proceeding. Article 4701 provides, in pertinent part:

When a lessee's right of occupancy has ceased because of the termination of the lease by expiration of its term, action by the lessor, nonpayment of rent, or for any other reason, and the lessor wishes to obtain possession of the premises, the lessor or his agent shall cause written notice to vacate the premises to be delivered to the lessee. The notice shall allow the lessee not less than five days from the date of its delivery to vacate the leased premises.

***

A lessee may waive the notice requirements of this Article by written waiver contained in the lease, in which case, upon termination of the lessee's right of occupancy for any reason, the lessor or his agent may immediately institute eviction proceedings in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title IX of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.

In this case, the lessees’ right of occupancy ceased on August 24, 2023, when the bankruptcy court rejected and terminated the Primary Lease and rejected all subleases, including the sub-sub lease to GSS/MFM. Even though GSS/MFM's sub-sub lease contained a waiver of notice of termination, Relator nevertheless complied with Article 4701 by giving GSS a five-day notice to vacate. GSS received the notice and then, together with MFM, successfully embarked on a course of action which appears to have been designed to delay the eviction.³ Indeed, GSS/MFM managed to delay the eviction hearing for nearly two years, during which time, GSS/MFM continued to occupy the Premises without paying rent to Relator or procuring any insurance to cover property and casualty losses at the Premises during their occupancy.

Chapter 2 of Title IX sets forth the procedure for eviction if the lessee, as occurred in this case, fails to vacate the leased premises within the time provided in the notice to vacate. Article 4731(A) states:

If the lessee or occupant fails to comply with the notice to vacate under this Title or if the lessee has waived his right to notice to vacate by written waiver contained in the lease, and has lost is right of occupancy for any reason, the lessor or owner, or agent thereof, may cause the lessee or occupant to be cited summarily by a court of competent jurisdiction to show cause why he should not be ordered to deliver possession of the premises to the lessor or owner. The rule to show cause shall state the grounds upon which eviction is sought.

Article 4732 provides:

A. The court shall make the rule returnable not earlier than the third day after service thereof, at which time the court shall try the rule and hear any defense which is made.

B. If the court finds the lessor or owner entitled to the relief sought ․ the court shall render immediately a judgment of eviction ordering the lessee or occupant to deliver possession of the premises to the lessor or owner. The judgment of eviction shall be effective for not less than ninety days.

(Emphasis added).

Article 4733 provides that if the lessee or occupant “fails to comply with the judgment of eviction within twenty-four hours after its rendition, the court shall issue immediately a warrant directed to and commanding the sheriff, constable, or marshal to deliver possession of the premises to the lessor or owner.” (Emphasis added). Article 4735 of Chapter 2 of Title IX provides for an appeal of a judgment of eviction and states that an appeal will not suspend the execution of the judgment of eviction unless the appellant complies with the provisions of that article within twenty-four hours after the rendition of the judgment of eviction.

The provisions of Title IX are mandatory, not permissive. A judgment of eviction is a final, appealable judgment; it is not an interlocutory judgment that may be reviewed only through the filing of an application for supervisory writs.

Relator complied with the provisions of Article 4731(A) and caused both GSS and MFM to be ruled into court to show cause why they should not be ordered to vacate the premises and turn the premises over to Relator. After numerous lengthy delays, the district court conducted an eviction hearing on July 17, 2025, after which it entered a judgment of eviction. According to Article 4733, GSS/MFM then had twenty-four hours to vacate the premises.

I agree with the majority that, under the circumstances presented in this case, upon granting the judgment of eviction, the trial court had no discretion to do other than order immediate eviction – within twenty-four hours of its judgment. The trial court clearly erred as a matter of law. I also agree that this case presents a unique set of facts in which suspensive appeal does not prevent harm to Relator. However, that harm does not, in my opinion, permit this court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction when none exists. Further, Relator may seek to be made whole by filing an ordinary action seeking damages for unpaid rent, damage to the Premises, and any other damages allowable by law.

For the reasons thoroughly discussed herein, I disagree that this Court may exercise its supervisory discretion to review the judgment of eviction in this case, which is a final, appealable judgment

We are a court of facts and law. While I am extremely sympathetic to Relator's difficult situation, it is my opinion that this Court is constrained – by the specific statutory language of La. C.C.P. arts. 1841, 2083 and the provisions of Chapter IX, as well as the decision in Yancy – from exercising our supervisory jurisdiction in this instance. Without specific guidance from the Louisiana Supreme Court, it is my opinion that Relator's sole avenue to seek appellate review of the eviction judgment is through the appeal process, not supervisory review. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In Barnett & Associates, LLC., et al v. Bates Whiteside, et al, 20-CA-362 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/2020), 308 So.3d 1218, the trial court had denied exceptions of prescription and peremption, and movers appealed. Clearly there was no appellate jurisdiction, but appellants had missed the 30-day time limit for applying for a writ. The appeal asked for both supervisory and appellate review in the same brief, and alternatively, that the appeal be converted to a writ application. We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and declined to invoke supervisory jurisdiction. In that opinion we wrote that appellate and supervisory review could not be exercised simultaneously, specifically, that “The exercise of appellate jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction by a court of appeal are mutually exclusive,” Id. at 1221. [Emphasis added.] By that it was meant because the two kinds of jurisdiction are distinct and procedurally different, they could not be invoked and exercised simultaneously. It did not mean both jurisdictions could not exist simultaneously.

2.   Complicating this matter somewhat is that a motion to recuse the trial judge was filed on August 18, 2025. On August 27, 2025, the Louisiana Supreme Court appointed an ad hoc judge to hear the motion to recuse, which is pending.

3.   The first notice to vacate was given to GSS. Subsequently, GSS filed pleadings stating that it was not in possession of the Premises; rather it had entered into a sub-sub-lease with MFM. Thereafter, MFM was joined in the action and was provided with a separate notice to vacate.

WINDHORST, J.,