STATE v. CHAUNCEY (2025)

This appeal is one of three appeals filed by defendant, Jason J. Chauncey.¹ In this matter, defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for theft of an HVAC unit and parts valued between $1,000 and $4,999 in violation of La. R.S. 14:67(B)(3) (count one), simple burglary of a business in violation of La. R.S. 14:62 (count two), theft of HVAC units valued at between $5,000 and $24,999 in violation of La. R.S. 14:67(B)(2) (count three), and simple criminal damage to HVAC units and parts with the damage amounting to from $1,000 to less than $50,000 in violation of La. R.S. 14:56(B)(2) (count four).² On October 31, 2024, defendant pled guilty as charged to all counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to imprisonment at hard labor for five years each on counts one through three and imprisonment at hard labor for two years on count four, with all the sentences to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed in case numbers 23-5825 and 23-5826 (defendant's additional cases pending in the 24th Judicial District Court). Defendant's appointed appellate counsel filed a brief asserting that after a review of the record, he found no appealable issues or defects in the plea procedure in this matter, but requests a review for errors patent. This filing is commonly referred to as an Anders brief. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). For the following reasons, we agree with counsel's assessment, and affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 2, 2024, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant with theft of an HVAC unit and parts valued between $1,000 and $4,999 from Lauricella Land Company in violation of La. R.S. 14:67(B)(3) (count one), simple burglary of a business belonging to Louisiana Newpack Shrimp Company in violation of La. R.S. 14:62 (count two), theft of HVAC units valued between $5,000 and $24,999 from Right Touch Barber in violation of La. R.S. 14:67(B)(2) (count three), and simple criminal damage to HVAC units and parts with the damage amounting to $1,000 to less than $50,000 belonging to Lauricella Land Company in violation of La. R.S. 14:56(B)(2) (count four). Defendant was arraigned on February 9, 2024, and pled not guilty to all counts.

On June 27, 2024, a Frye ³ hearing was held during which the State advised defendant of a plea offer of a “double bill” and an eight-year sentence, and the trial court informed him that if the defense proceeded with motions scheduled for hearing on August 8, 2024, the offer would no longer be available.⁴ Defendant indicated he understood.

Defendant accepted the plea offer on October 31, 2024. He withdrew his initial not guilty plea and pled guilty as charged to all counts. The trial court then sentenced defendant to imprisonment at hard labor for five years each on counts one through three and imprisonment at hard labor for two years on count four, with all the sentences to be served concurrently with each other, and with the additional sentences imposed on that day. The trial judge decided not to assess any fines, fees, or court costs in the instant case.

Thereafter, on the same date, defendant stipulated to the State's multiple offender bill of information on count one, alleging defendant to be a second-felony offender. The trial court then vacated the original sentence on count one and resentenced defendant as a second-felony offender to imprisonment at hard labor for five years without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, ordering the second-felony offender sentence to run concurrently with the sentences on counts two through four, and with defendant's additional sentences imposed that day. On December 2, 2024, the trial court granted defendant's Motion for Appeal and appointed the Louisiana Appellate Project as appellate counsel.

FACTS

Because defendant's convictions resulted from guilty pleas, the underlying facts were not fully developed at a trial. However, during the plea colloquy, the prosecutor indicated that if this matter were to proceed to trial, the State would prove that on or about October 8, 2023, defendant violated La. R.S. 14:67(B)(3) in that he did commit theft of an HVAC unit valued between $1,000 and $4,999 from Lauricella Land Company (count one). The prosecutor stated the State would also prove that on November 6, 2023, defendant violated La. R.S. 14:62 in that he did commit a simple burglary of a business belonging to Louisiana Newpack Shrimp Company (count two). Additionally, the prosecutor indicated the State would prove that on or between November 1 and 2, 2023, defendant violated La. R.S. 14:67(B)(2) in that he did commit theft of HVAC units valued between $5,000 and $24,999 from Right Touch Barber (count three). Lastly, he stated the State would prove that on October 8, 2023, defendant violated La. R.S. 14:56(B)(2) in that he did commit simple criminal damage to property to an HVAC unit and parts with the damage amounting to $1,000 to less than $50,000 belonging to Lauricella Land Company (count four).

ANDERS BRIEF

Under the procedure adopted by this Court in State v. Bradford, 95-929 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d 1108, 1110-11,⁵ defendant's appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that after a detailed review of the record, he could find no appealable issues or defects in the plea procedure but requests an errors patent review by this Court. In its response, the State questions the depth of appellate counsel's review and takes no position on whether the brief filed on behalf of defendant complies with the procedure adopted by this Court in Bradford.

In Anders, the United States Supreme Court stated that appointed appellate counsel may request permission to withdraw if he finds his case to be wholly frivolous after a conscientious examination of it.⁶ The request must be accompanied by “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal” so as to provide the reviewing court “with a basis for determining whether appointed counsel have fully performed their duty to support their clients’ appeals to the best of their ability” and to assist the reviewing court “in making the critical determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 439, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988). Defendant's appellate counsel did not file a motion to withdraw as attorney of record in the instant case.

In State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241 (per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that an Anders brief need not tediously catalog every meritless pretrial motion or objection made at trial with a detailed explanation of why the motions or objections lack merit. The Supreme Court further explained that an Anders brief must demonstrate by full discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has cast an advocate's eye over the trial record and considered whether any ruling made by the trial court, subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, had a significant, adverse impact on shaping the evidence presented to the jury for its consideration.” Id.

When conducting a review for compliance with Anders an appellate court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Bradford, 676 So.2d at 1110. Specifically, that review should include an examination of (1) the bill of information to ensure the defendant was properly charged; (2) all minute entries to ensure the defendant was present at all crucial stages of the proceedings, the jury composition and verdict were correct, and the sentence is legal; (3) all pleadings that are in the record; and (4) all transcripts to determine if any ruling provides an arguable basis for appeal. Id. at 1110-11. If, after an independent review, the reviewing court determines there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, it may grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence. Conversely, if the court finds any legal point arguable on the merits, it may either deny the motion and order the court-appointed attorney to file a brief arguing the legal point(s) identified by the court, or grant the motion and appoint substitute appellate counsel. Id. at 1110.

In this case, appellate counsel asserts that after a detailed review of the record, he could find no appealable issues or defects in the plea procedure. Counsel's brief sets forth the limited facts and circumstances surrounding defendant's plea bargain. He states the instant case is one of three which were consolidated for a plea bargain and sentencing, pointing out the transcripts of the sentencing hearing were identical.

Appellate counsel asserts defendant has waived his right to appeal by negotiating and entering into a plea bargain covering all his charges. In his brief counsel points out that the convictions and sentences were part of a plea bargain resulting in a reduction from a possible third-felony offender multiple bill to a second-felony offender multiple bill and an eight-year sentence. Counsel also states he reviewed the records in the instant case and in the companion cases, and found no appealable issues or defects in the plea procedure, pointing out that the defendant agreed to each written Boykin ⁷ form and also pointing out that during the plea and sentencing colloquy with the trial court, defendant agreed that he was waiving his right to appeal his convictions. Lastly, counsel asks this Court for a review of errors patent. We find appellate counsel's brief demonstrates a conscientious review of the limited record in this case.

Upon receipt of the counselled appellant brief, this Court sent defendant a letter by certified mail informing him that an Anders brief had been filed on his behalf and that he had until March 28, 2025, to file a pro se supplemental brief. The Anders letter dated February 26, 2025, was returned on April 2, 2025. Upon notice that defendant had been transferred to another facility, this Court remailed the letter to the updated facility on April 2, 2025. Defendant did not file a pro se brief in this matter.

ANDERS ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Anders, this Court has performed a thorough review of the record, including the pleadings, minute entries, charging instrument, and the Boykin transcript. Our independent review of the record supports appellate counsel's assertion that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal.

First, our examination shows defendant was properly charged in a bill of information which plainly and concisely stated the essential facts constituting the charged offenses and sufficiently identified defendant and the crimes charged. See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 464 and 466. Also, as reflected by the minute entries, defendant and his counsel were present at all crucial stages of the proceedings against him, including his arraignment, guilty plea proceedings, multiple offender adjudication, and sentencing. Defendant's presence does not present any issues that would support an appeal. Additionally, defense counsel did not file any pretrial motions in the instant case.

The record indicates that defendant pled guilty as charged to two counts of theft, one count of simple burglary, and one count of simple criminal damage as set forth in the bill of information in the instant case. He also stipulated to being a second-felony offender. Generally, when a defendant pleads guilty, he normally waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the guilty plea and precludes review of such defects either by appeal or by an application for post-conviction relief. State v. Turner, 09-1079 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/10), 47 So.3d 455, 459. Also, once a defendant is sentenced, only those guilty pleas that are unconstitutionally infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or by an application for post-conviction relief. State v. McCoil, 05-658 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1120, 1124. A guilty plea is unconstitutionally infirm when it is not entered freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin colloquy is inadequate, or when a defendant is induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain, or what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain, and that bargain is not kept. Id. Additionally, an unconditional plea, willingly and knowingly made, waives any and all non-jurisdictional defects and bars a defendant from later asserting on appeal that the State failed to produce sufficient proof at the habitual offender hearing. State v. Surgi, 24-293 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 1181, 1187. Here, the defendant entered an unqualified guilty plea, and therefore, all non-jurisdictional defects are waived.

Next, our examination reveals no unconstitutional infirmity or any irregularity in defendant's guilty pleas that would render them invalid. The transcript of the colloquy shows that defense counsel stated that he and the State had negotiated a plea agreement through which defendant would be pleading guilty as charged to all counts in all three cases. During the plea colloquy, the trial judge advised defendant that by pleading guilty, he was giving up the right to trial by judge or jury, to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to confront his accusers and cross-examine witnesses called to testify against him, to remain silent, to present witnesses who would testify on his behalf and present evidence that would be helpful or favorable to him, to the assistance of a lawyer, to appellate review of an adverse verdict at trial, and to a free court-appointed lawyer if he could not afford one. When the trial judge asked defendant if he understood these rights, defendant said, “I heard you sir.”

The trial judge advised defendant that in the instant case, the sentencing range was zero to five years on count one, zero to twelve years on count two, zero to ten years on count three, and zero to two years on count four. The trial judge also advised that if he accepted defendant's guilty pleas, he was going to sentence defendant to imprisonment at hard labor in the Department of Corrections for five years on count one, after which he would resentence defendant as a second-felony offender. The trial judge stated that he would sentence defendant to imprisonment in the Department of Corrections for five years on count two, imprisonment in the Department of Corrections for five years on count three, and imprisonment in the Department of Corrections for two years on count four.⁸ He said that all of these sentences would run concurrently with each other, and with the sentences imposed in case numbers 23-5825 and 23-5826, defendant's additional cases.

Defendant indicated he understood what his sentences would be, and he stated no one was forcing or threatening him to enter his pleas. He understood that by pleading guilty to the felony charges, the pleas could be used to enhance a penalty of a future conviction. Defendant also understood his guilty pleas could affect other rights, including his right to vote, to bear arms, and to receive housing benefits. The trial judge further advised there would be fines, fees, and costs assessed, which defendant indicated he understood.

The trial judge pointed out he had the waiver of rights form with the initials “JC” and a signature, and defendant confirmed those were his initials and his signature. Defense counsel also confirmed he signed the form indicating defendant had been explained his rights, understood them, and was entering into the pleas freely and voluntarily. The State then provided a factual basis for the pleas. Defendant agreed it was correct. Afterward, the trial judge said he was satisfied defendant understood the consequences of his pleas and had entered into them freely and voluntarily. The trial judge then accepted the pleas and sentenced defendant in the instant case to imprisonment at hard labor for five years each on counts one through three and imprisonment at hard labor for two years on count four. He ordered those sentences to run concurrently with each other, and with the additional sentences imposed that day.

Afterward, the State filed a multiple offender bill of information alleging defendant to be a second-felony offender. An independent review of the record reveals no unconstitutional infirmity in defendant's stipulation to the State's multiple bill. Defense counsel said the State had prepared a multiple bill reciting that defendant was convicted of unauthorized use of a movable in Jefferson Parish in docket number 21-6464 on February 1, 2022. The trial judge informed defendant that stipulation to the multiple bill would constitute a waiver of the right to “plead not guilty” as a multiple offender. The trial judge also informed defendant that he was also giving up the right to have a hearing, during which the district attorney would be required to prove he was the same individual who had a prior felony record, to prove that the time period between the listed prior felony and the date of the crime for which he was convicted was five years or less, and to prove that he was properly advised at the time of his prior plea of his right to a trial by jury, to cross-examination, and to remain silent. Defendant indicated he understood all of these rights.

The trial judge informed defendant that the sentencing range as a multiple offender in this case was three and a third to twenty years, his actual sentence would be five years at hard labor to run concurrently with the other sentences imposed that day in the instant case and in case numbers 23-5825 and 23-5826, and he would receive credit for time served.⁹ The trial judge pointed out he had been provided forms with the initials “JC” and what appeared to be defendant's signature. Defendant confirmed those were his initials and his signature, and he indicated no one was forcing him to stipulate to being a multiple offender. Defense counsel also indicated he had signed the forms establishing defendant had been explained his rights and that defendant understood his rights as a multiple offender. The trial judge thereafter accepted defendant's plea as a multiple offender, vacated the original sentence on count one, and resentenced defendant as a second-felony offender to imprisonment at hard labor for five years without probation or suspension of sentence to run concurrently with the other sentences imposed that day.

Further, the waiver of rights form reflects that defendant stipulated to being a second-felony offender. It indicates that defendant was advised of his rights and the actual sentence. The waiver of rights form reflects that defendant placed his initials next to the individual advisals of his rights and that he placed his signature at the end of the waiver of rights form, thus indicating that he understood he was waiving those rights. The trial judge found that defendant made a knowing, intelligent, free, and voluntary act of stipulating to the multiple bill.

And finally, our examination reveals that defendant's original and enhanced sentences do not present any issues for appeal. The record shows that they are within the sentencing ranges prescribed by the statutes. See La. R.S. 14:67(B)(2) and (3); La. R.S. 14:62; La. R.S. 14:56(B)(2); La. R.S. 15:529.1. Further, defendant's sentences were imposed pursuant to, and in conformity with, the plea agreements. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2) provides that a defendant cannot appeal or seek review of a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement, which was set forth in the record at the time of the plea. Likewise, this Court has consistently recognized that La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2) precludes a defendant from seeking review of an enhanced sentence to which the defendant agreed. Surgi, 406 So.3d at 1189.

Based on the foregoing, we find that defendant's guilty pleas and sentences imposed pursuant to the plea agreement present no issues for appeal. Appellate counsel's brief adequately demonstrates by discussion and analysis that he reviewed the proceedings and cannot identify any basis for a non-frivolous appeal. Our independent review of the record supports appellate counsel's assertion.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

Defendant requests an errors patent review. We routinely review the record for errors patent in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). Our review reveals no errors patent in this case.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant has two companion cases, 25-KA-10 (district court case no. 23-5825) and 25-KA-12 (district court case no. 23-5826), pending with this Court.

2.   In connection with a plea bargain, defendant entered a plea of guilty as charged in district court cases numbers 23-5825, 23-5826 and 24-600 (instant case).

3.   The purpose of a Frye hearing, which arose out of the case of Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), “is to make a record of the fulfillment of defense counsel's obligation to communicate favorable plea offers and to effectively assist the defendant in deciding whether to accept the State's offer or proceed to trial.” State v. Lucia, 18-37 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/18), 257 So.3d 1271, 1279 no.10, writ denied, 18-1917 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So.3d 969.

4.   Omnibus motions were filed in case numbers 23-5825 and 23-5826 and were set for hearing on August 8, 2024.

5.   In Bradford, this Court adopted the procedures outlined in State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, 530 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990), which were sanctioned by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Mouton, 95-981 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176, 1177 (per curiam).

6.   The United States Supreme Court reiterated Anders in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000).

7.   Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

8.   The trial court did not state that the sentence was to be served at hard labor, but it committed defendant to the Department of Corrections. This Court has previously held that when the trial judge states that the defendant is sentenced to the “Department of Corrections,” the sentence is necessarily at hard labor. State v. Jamison, 17-49 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So.3d 908, 909 n.2. See also La. R.S.15:824(C)(1), which states, “Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, only individuals actually sentenced to death or confinement at hard labor shall be committed to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.” But see La. R.S.15:824(C)(2), which provides exceptional circumstances.

9.   The sentencing range under La. R.S. 14:67(B)(3) was with or without hard labor for not more than five years. Therefore, the sentencing range as a second-felony offender with an underlying offense of La. R.S. 14:67(B)(3) was one and two-thirds years to ten years. As such, it appears the trial court gave the wrong sentencing range. In any event, the trial court sentenced defendant as a second-felony offender to a five-year hard labor sentence, which was within the sentencing range under La. R.S. 15:529.1. This Court has held that an advisement of the agreed-upon sentence is sufficient for compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1. State v. Hardouin, 17-452 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/18), 242 So.3d 795, 799.

MARCEL, J.