CALCASIEU PARISH POLICE JURY v. PETERSON (2025)

In this zoning matter, the plaintiff, Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, appeals from a trial court judgment denying its request for penalties and a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant, Adam Kraig Peterson, to cease the operation of a short-term rental on property not zoned for that use. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 7, 2024, the Calcasieu Parish Police Jury (CPPJ) filed suit against Mr. Peterson, alleging that he was unlawfully operating a “Bed and Breakfast and/or an Air BnB” on property located in the unincorporated area of Calcasieu Parish, at 3620 Lakeview Drive. Because the property is zoned R-2, mixed residential, CPPJ alleged that it is unlawful for Mr. Peterson to operate a bed and breakfast and/or Air BnB without first obtaining the approval of the Calcasieu Parish Planning and Zoning Board (the Board). CPPJ alleged that it notified Mr. Peterson about the violation on November 13, 2023, and assessed him with a $300.00 civil penalty. It further informed him that he would be assessed an additional $100.00 civil penalty for every day he remained in non-compliance with Calcasieu Parish Code of Ordinances (CPCO) Sec. 26-35. CPPJ noted that Mr. Peterson had sought a zoning variance for his property on January 24, 2024, which was denied. CPPJ alleged that despite this denial, Mr. Peterson has continued to operate a bed and breakfast and/or Air BnB on the property. As a result, it requested the issuance of an injunction enjoining Mr. Peterson from violating CPCO Sec. 26-35 and an award of penalties, costs, and attorney fees.

In his answer, Mr. Peterson admitted that he owns the property located at 3620 Lakeview Drive and that the property is zoned R-2. However, he denied that it is unlawful to operate an Air BnB/VRBO or that the R-2 zoning classification applies to an Air BnB/VRBO. He further denied that he is operating a bed and breakfast. Mr. Peterson also filed a reconventional demand, seeking a judgment declaring CPCO Sec. 26-35, which establishes the R-2 zoning district's minimum requirements, and CPCO Sec. 26-4, which defines “bed and breakfast home,” as “unconstitutionally vague and overbroad such that the penalty ascribed in [CPPJ's] alleged violation constitutes a taking of property without due process of law.”

Following a December 12, 2024 hearing, the trial court orally denied CPPJ's request for injunctive relief and penalties but did not address Mr. Peterson's reconventional demand. Judgment was rendered on March 3, 2025.¹ It is from this judgment that CPPJ appeals.

On appeal, CPPJ raises three assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in failing to find that the use of the Property at 3620 Lakeview Drive, Lake Charles, LA 70605, as an Airbnb/short-term rental does meet the definition of “bed and breakfast” found in the Calcasieu Code of Ordinances § 26-4.

2. The trial court erred in finding that the Appellee is not violating the Calcasieu Parish Ordinance § 26-34 and § 26-35 and should be enjoined from continuing to use the dwelling as a short-term rental, and penalties should be enforced.

3. The trial court erred in failing to find that even if the use of the property does not meet the definition of “bed and breakfast,” that the actions and use of the Property should still be enjoined.

Mr. Peterson, in brief, requests that we find CPCO Sec. 26-4's definition of “bed and breakfast home” unconstitutional. However, because he did not file an answer to CPPJ's appeal, he is precluded from seeking a modification of the trial court judgment on appeal. La.Code Civ.P. art. 2133(A). Accordingly, we will not address this issue.

OPINION

Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3601(A), an injunction shall only be issued “in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the applicant.” Injunctions are classified as either prohibitory or mandatory, which in turn, determines whether the matter proceeds by summary or ordinary procedure and the applicant's burden of proof. A preliminary injunction is prohibitory in nature and “is essentially an interlocutory order issued in summary proceedings incidental to the main demand for permanent injunctive relief. It is designed to and serves the purpose of preventing irreparable harm by preserving the status quo between the parties pending a determination on the merits of the controversy.” La. Convenience & Vape Store Ass'n v. Legier, 24-730, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), 404 So.3d 1018, 1022. To successfully obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of irreparable injury, loss, or damage. Id.

A mandatory injunction, on the other hand, “is one that commands the doing of some action, and cannot be issued without a hearing on the merits.” Cantrelle v. Lafourche Par. Council, 21-678, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/1/22), 340 So.3d 1059, 1068. As it is akin to a permanent injunction, a mandatory injunction is tried by ordinary procedure and requires of the applicant proof “by a preponderance of the evidence at an evidentiary hearing[.]” Mayo v. Lagniappe Willow Lake, LLC, 23-326, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/24/24), 387 So.3d 773, 780. Although not specified, we recognize that CPPJ seeks a mandatory injunction ordering Mr. Peterson to “cease activities not allowed by the zoning classification governing the Property.”

The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 grants parishes the power to “adopt regulations for land use, zoning, and historic preservation, which authority is declared to be a public purpose[.]” La.Const. art. 6, § 17. Thus, CPPJ, as the governing authority for the unincorporated area of Calcasieu Parish, has the authority to regulate “the location and use of the buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.” La.R.S. 33:1236(36)(a); La.R.S. 33:4780.40. This includes the authority to divide the parish into districts that “regulate and restrict the erection, construction, alteration, or use of buildings, structures, or land.” La.R.S. 33:4780.41. Through this means, the parish promotes “the health, safety, morals, or general welfare” of its community. La.R.S. 33:4780.40.

In Arcuri v. Stevens, 23-422, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/29/23), 370 So.3d 794, 798, the fifth circuit set forth the standard of review applied on the appeal of a trial court judgment involving statutory interpretation and application:

Statutory interpretations are a question of law. Shell v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 00-0997 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/21/01), 782 So.2d 1155, writ denied, 01-1149 (La. 6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1244. When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the application of the statute does not lead to absurd consequences, the statute must be applied as written. Smith v. St. Charles Par. Pub. Sch., 17-475 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/1/18), 246 So. 3d [sic] 821, 826, writ denied, 2018-1001 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d [sic] 802. Appellate review regarding questions of law is simply a review of whether the trial court was legally correct or incorrect. Anderson v. Dean, 22-233 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/25/22), 346 So.3d 356, 364. On legal issues, the appellate court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court, but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law de novo and renders judgment on the record. Id. Concerning the assigned errors of fact, factual determinations are reviewed by the appellate court under the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. Quintanilla v. Whitaker, 21-160 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/1/21), 334 So.3d 892, 893.

Assignment of Error Number One

Regarding its first assignment of error, CPPJ poses the following question as an issue presented for review: “Does renting the property out as short-term rental or renting out through Airbnb meet the definition of ‘bed and breakfast’ found in the Calcasieu Parish of [sic] Ordinances § 26-4[.]” We find that it does.

Property located in the unincorporated area of Calcasieu Parish is subject to the zoning ordinance found in CPCO Sec. 26-30, which “[f]or the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the communities,” establishes twelve zoning districts, including the R-2, mixed residential district. Pursuant to CPCO Sec. 26-34, the only uses allowed for property located in a specific zoning district are those identified as “permitted uses” and which are deemed to be the minimum requirements for that district. CPCO 26-35. As of December 14, 2023, CPCO Sec. 26-34 allows the following permitted uses for zoning district R-2:

Accessory uses; churches; community homes; duplexes (one (1) per lot); home occupations; low-intensive recreational facilities; manufactured home (one (1) per lot); manufactured home subdivisions (lots for sale); modular home (one (1) per lot); museums; ponds; public uses; single family detached dwellings (one (1) per lot); and temporary building used in connection with construction for a period of six (6) months.

However, the CPCO allows certain other non-permitted property uses in each zoning district upon the property owner's successful request to the Board for an exception to the permitted uses. CPCO Sec. 26-123. As of September 19, 2019, the following exceptions to the permitted uses for zoning district R-2 are:

Bed and breakfast homes; borrow-pits; communication towers; day cares; detached barber/beauty shops; fourplexes (one (1) per lot); institutions; public and private schools; railroads; temporary commercial amusements; and triplexes (one (1) per lot).

“Bed and breakfast home” is specifically defined by CPCO Sec. 26-4 as “a dwelling in which overnight accommodations are provided or offered for transient guests for compensation.”

There is no dispute that Mr. Peterson's property is zoned R-2. In support of its exception, CPPJ introduced Mr. Peterson's responses to its requests for admissions wherein he denied that he was operating his property as a bed and breakfast but admitted that he was operating a short-term rental. He further denied that his use of the property as a short-term rental qualified as a bed and breakfast because no meals were included in the rental agreement. Mr. Peterson also admitted that the photographs attached to CPPJ's requests for admissions showed his property and on-line reviews that were submitted by guests that had rented the property through Airbnb. His responses also included a copy of a sales tax registration certificate from the Louisiana Department of Revenue and a copy of a sales and use tax registration certificate from the Calcasieu Parish School Board, both of which were issued for 3620 Lakeview Drive. Based on the foregoing, CPPJ argues that Mr. Peterson's use of the property, albeit as a short-term rental, qualifies as “a bed and breakfast home” as it is a dwelling that provides accommodations for compensation.

Mr. Peterson disagrees, arguing that the definition of “bed and breakfast home” found in CPCO Sec. 26-4 is obsolete as it was adopted in 1997, prior to the explosion of the short-term-rental industry. He further argues that the definition should be read in pari materia with definitions of “bed and breakfast” found elsewhere in Louisiana law. La.R.S. 15:541.1(A)(5)(d) (“a lodging facility having no more than ten guest rooms where transient guests are fed and lodged for pay[ ]”); La.Admin.Code tit. 51, Pt. XXIII, § 101 (“a privately owned house where rooms are let and a breakfast is included in the rent[ ]”). In comparison, he argues that it is generally understood that a “bed and breakfast” offers lodging and breakfast, whereas a “short-term rental” “provides self-contained accommodations” without meals. Thus, Mr. Peterson argues that because his short-term rental did not include meals, the application of CPPJ's 1997 definition is inconsistent with the present-day meaning of “bed and breakfast.”

However, under the general rules of interpretation applicable to the Calcasieu Parish Zoning Ordinance, “[e]xcept where specifically defined herein, all words used shall carry their customary meanings.” CPCO Sec. 26-29. CPPJ's definition of “bed and breakfast” accommodations set out in CPCO Sec. 26-4 does not require or mention that meals are to be provided as part of the accommodation. Thus, we are bound by CPPJ's definition as it is the legislative body responsible for enacting the zoning regulations applicable to the unincorporated area of Calcasieu Parish. As the definition is clear and unambiguous and does not lead to absurd consequences, we find that it should be applied as written. La.Civ.Code art. 9.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that Mr. Peterson's use of his property did not meet the CPCO definition of “bed and breakfast home.” By admitting that he operated a short-term rental at 3620 Lakeview Drive, Mr. Paterson admitted that he offered overnight accommodations to transient guests for compensation. This satisfies CPCO Sec. 26-4's definition of “bed and breakfast home.” Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court finding that Mr. Peterson's use did not meet the CPCO definition, is reversed. However, because CPPJ's request for an injunction depends on the outcome of Mr. Peterson's pending constitutional claim, we find that its remaining assignments of error are rendered moot at this time. Therefore, the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. The costs of this appeal are assessed to Adam Kraig Peterson.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The hearing was held before Judge Robert Wyatt. Following Judge Wyatt's December 31, 2024 retirement, judgment was rendered by Judge Hope Buford.

KYZAR, Judge.