SUCCESSION OF HUTCHENS v. << (2025)

This civil matter involves the administration of a married decedent's succession, who died intestate with no descendants. After extensive and contentious litigation over the classification of assets as either separate or community property, decedent's surviving spouse was replaced as administrator of the succession by agreement between the surviving spouse, decedent's sibling, and decedent's surviving parent.

Thereafter, and upon motion of the replacement administrator, the trial court authorized the replacement administrator to receive $105,000.00 as an advance of her $250,000.00 administration fee and to use succession funds to pay the attorney's fees and litigation expenses incurred by the replacement administrator in seeking the administrative fee. From this judgment the surviving spouse appeals, seeking reversal of the trial court's $250,000.00 amount set as the administrator's fee, the authorization of an advance payment of $105,000.00 towards the replacement administrator's fee, and the authorization of payment, with succession funds, of the replacement administrator's attorney's fees and litigation expenses incurred in seeking the replacement administrator's fee.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of the administration of the succession of Paul Edwards Hutchens (decedent) who died intestate on May 3, 2020. Decedent was married to Lori Hutchens (Mrs. Hutchens). Decedent and Mrs. Hutchens lived together, unmarried, for thirteen years until their marriage in 2010. Before the marriage, decedent purchased several assets, including a family home. Those assets were eventually determined to be decedent's separate property.

Decedent died with no descendants. Therefore, his separate property devolved to his brother, Warren Hutchens, with a usufruct in favor of his mother, Constance Hutchens, pursuant to La.Civ.Code arts. 889 and 891.

On August 17, 2020, Mrs. Hutchens filed an affidavit of death and heirship with a petition for appointment of administrator, requesting she be appointed as administrator of decedent's succession. On September 29, 2021, Mrs. Hutchens was removed as administrator after Warren and Constance Hutchens filed a petition to terminate Mrs. Hutchen's administration, to have Mrs. Hutchens turn over separate property and funds, to have Mrs. Hutchens provide an accounting, and to be placed in possession of decedent's separate property.

By agreement of all the parties, Leslie Knox (“Ms. Knox”) was appointed as administrator of the succession. Following Mrs. Hutchen's removal, Warren Hutchens and Constance Hutchens, the heirs of decedent's succession, and Mrs. Hutchens engaged in extensive litigation over the classification of assets as either separate or community property.

On May 13, 2024, the heirs of the succession and Mrs. Hutchens negotiated a resolution of their competing claims, wherein the family home and $237,500.00 was turned over to Warren and Constance Hutchens. Following this settlement by all parties, on October 4, 2024, Ms. Knox sought payment for the administration of the succession. She filed a motion for judicial determination of administrator's fee and requested a fee of $250,000.00, with an advance of $105,000.00, for her administration of the roughly $3,000,000.00 estate. Ms. Knox also filed a petition to homologate the Fifth Tableau of Distribution seeking court approval for payment, from succession funds, for her attorney's fees and litigation expenses she incurred in seeking to obtain the administration fee.

On December 4, 2024, Mrs. Hutchens propounded written discovery on Ms. Knox seeking accounting information and records, as well as any time sheets or documents which detailed Ms. Knox's time spent and work done on the succession. Mrs. Hutchens also served Ms. Knox with a Subpoena Duces Tecum seeking production of her time and task records as administrator, and for the separate production of her attorney's same records. Ms. Knox filed a motion to quash this request, alleging that the documents were privileged.

The trial court granted Ms. Knox's motion to quash and awarded Ms. Knox the requested fee of $250,000.00. Mrs. Hutchens sought review of those rulings in a previous writ application to this court, Succession of Hutchens, 25-116 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/24) (unpublished opinion), wherein this court declined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Mrs. Hutchens now appeals alleging three assignments of error.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred in homologating the Fifth Tableau of Distribution, authorizing the Administratrix, Leslie Knox, the pay herself an “advance” of $105,000.00, an amount well in excess of the statutory fee for administration of a succession, when Ms. Knox failed to present evidence to prove that the statutory fee was inadequate.

2. The trial court erred in homologating the Fifth Tableau of Distribution, authorizing the Administratrix, Leslie Knox, to pay using succession funds attorney fees of $19,825.00 to Stutes & Lavergne, attorneys retained to represent Leslie Knox to assert a personal claim against the Succession of Paul Hutchens and its only heir, Lori Hutchens.

3. The trial court erred in homologating the Fifth Tableau of Distribution, authorizing the Administratrix, Leslie Knox, to pay with succession funds court reporter expenses in connection with Leslie Knox's personal claim against the Succession of Paul Hutchens and its only heir, Lori Hutchens.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of the trial court's judgment homologating the tableau of distribution is subject to the manifest error rule. Succession of Mouton, 20-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/17/20), 300 So.3d 430. As such, if the record reveals a reasonable factual basis for the decision, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Id. However, legal errors occur if a party is deprived of substantial rights when a trial court applies legal principles erroneously and said errors affect the outcome of a case. Id.

Likewise, whether an attorney's work benefits the succession is a question of fact that cannot be set aside absent manifest error. In re Succession of Brazan, 07-566 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/27/07), 975 So.2d 53.

Finally, a trial court has much discretion in setting a succession administrator's fee, and the fee award can be disturbed only if that discretion has been abused. Succession of Lasyone, 395 So.2d 413, (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1981); In re Succession of Horrell, 11-194 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/11), 79 So.3d 1162, writ denied, 12-180 (La. 3/23/12), 85 So.3d 96.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Mrs. Hutchens’ first assignment of error is that the trial court erred in authorizing Ms. Knox to pay herself an advance of $105,000.00 towards her $250,000.00 administration fee granted by the trial court. While the assigned error only references Ms. Knox's request for the $105,000.00 advance, in brief, Mrs. Hutchens also asserts error by the trial court in granting Ms. Knox a $250,000.00 administrative fee. Ms. Knox's entitlement to the $105,000.00 advance hinges on her entitlement to the $250,000.00 fee as no such advance is necessary if no fee exists.

Here, Mrs. Hutchens makes the same argument against both the advance and the fee, that Ms. Knox failed to prove entitlement to any fee in excess of that provided by La.Code Civ.P. art. 3351. Therefore, we will adjudicate the merits regarding the administrative fee amount and the propriety of the advance.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3351 states, in pertinent part:

In the absence of a provision in the testament or an agreement between the parties, the administrator or executor shall be allowed a sum equal to two and one-half percent of the amount of the inventory as compensation for his services in administering the succession. The court may increase the compensation upon a proper showing that the usual commission is inadequate.

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The compensation of a succession representative shall be due upon the homologation of his final account. The court may allow an administrator or executor an advance upon his compensation at any time during the administration.

Mrs. Hutchens asserts that the proper statutory administration fee for the instant succession is two and one-half percent (2.5%) of the succession inventory in the amount of $63,724.60. Mrs. Hutchens bases this assertion by alleging that Ms. Knox has not submitted any evidence that the statutory administration fee is inadequate, nor has she submitted any evidence showing how she merits the granted administration fee of $250,000.00.

Mrs. Hutchens supports her argument with Matter of Succession of Breen, 22-1232, (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/10/23), 370 So.3d 1107, which affirmed the decision of a trial court to approve unusual commission fees for a succession administrator where she was required to perform duties that “extended far beyond those anticipated in a simple succession.” In support of her request, the administrator in Breen submitted an agreement between the parties to pay an agreed upon fee and multiple invoices. Mrs. Hutchens argues that Ms. Knox has submitted no such agreement between the parties or invoices.

Mrs. Hutchens further supports her argument with Succession of Dorand, 94-1627, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/26/95), 659 So.2d 523, 526-27, which stated:

The costs incurred in defending a testament from attack, including attorney fees, should generally be borne by the testator's succession. Succession of Bradford, 130 So.2d 702 (La.App. 2d Cir.1961). The trial court obviously recognized this principle or it would not have awarded appellants any fees for the defense of the testament․ Appellants presented itemized lists detailing the number of hours and type of work performed by them in defending the testament from attack. Based on the total amount of the fees listed in the tableau of distribution, the attorney fees were at the rate of $111.50 per hour for 91.25 hours, including 13 hours in court, and the executor fees were at the rate of $100.00 per hour for 78 hours. As previously stated the number of hours appears reasonable. The rates also appear reasonable. Considering this, and the absence of any reasons given by the trial court for the reduction of the fees, we find the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the amount of attorney and executor fees listed in the tableau of distribution.

Mrs. Hutchens asserts Ms. Knox has not submitted such detailed bills as referenced in Dorand. Moreover, Mrs. Hutchens argues Ms. Knox was required to show a quantum meruit basis for an unusual compensation request.

Mrs. Hutchens maintains Ms. Knox was not required to blindly search for assets, because Mrs. Hutchens filed a detailed descriptive list of assets that listed every known property and account owned by Mrs. Hutchens and decedent. However, Ms. Knox testified that she had to recreate the detailed descriptive list from scratch because the document filed by Mrs. Hutchens did not include supporting documentation.

Mrs. Hutchens further maintains that Ms. Knox did not manage the estate assets for more than two years after her appointment as administrator. Mrs. Hutchens alleges that Ms. Knox did not begin performing any of her duties for the succession until 2023. Mrs. Hutchens alleges that, prior to that point, she handled the administration of the estate and paid the estate expenses from her own pocket. Further, Mrs. Hutchens asserts Ms. Knox was not involved in the litigation between the heirs, because each party was represented by their own attorney. Mrs. Hutchens further notes that in her testimony, Ms. Knox stated:

Q: Okay. Have you, as an attorney, kept track of your time that you spent as the administrator of this succession?

A: Not –well, you said, “as an attorney,” but “I'm not—I've never represented that I'm in an attorney in the succession, but I have generally kept records. Not great records. But after it became clear that it wasn't just going to be we're just going to wrap this up quickly. I did start making attempts to keep time records.

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Q: Do you have a contemporaneous record of what you did in this case as administrator and how much time it took you to do it?

A: I have a partial record.

Thus, Mrs. Hutchens argues there has not been a proper showing that Ms. Knox is entitled to an unusual commission fee. As such, according to Mrs. Hutchens, the decision of the trial court granting Ms. Knox a $250,000.00 administration fee should be reversed as well as the $105,000.00 advance toward that fee. Further, Mrs. Hutchens suggests this court render that Ms. Knox is entitled to an administration fee equal to two and one-half percent (2.5%) of the succession inventory, the sum of $63,724.60.

Contrarily, Ms. Knox argues the unusual commission fee was warranted. Ms. Knox relies on In re Succession of Abdalla, 99-979 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/28/00), 764 So.2d 362, writ denied, 00-2287 (La. 10/27/00), 772 So.2d 657, for the proposition that the fee in La.Code Civ.P. art. 3351 is the minimum compensation due. Ms. Knox asserts that the minimum statutory percentage would be inadequate compensation in consideration of the extensive efforts taken by her in administering the instant succession. Ms. Knox testified that she had to recreate the detailed descriptive list from scratch because the document filed by Mrs. Hutchens did not include supporting documentation.

Further, Ms. Knox testified that Mrs. Hutchens diverted $600,000.00 in funds from a shared investment account to her own personal accounts. Ms. Knox argues this action by Mrs. Hutchens and other similar actions forced her to exert more effort in this succession than an administrator would in a normal, simple succession. Ms. Knox further asserts that the administration of the instant succession has been ongoing since 2021 because the succession was highly contested by the heirs. Ms. Knox maintains the trial court was keenly aware of the high number of hearings, conferences, and filings in this case. Thus, Ms. Knox argues a proper showing was made, and the trial court did not err in approving the requested compensation.

Analysis

We find merit as to Ms. Knox's assertion that the trial court decision to increase the statutory compensation fee was reasonable. The record is replete with evidence of Ms. Knox's extensive efforts, and that the fiercely contested nature of these proceedings required her to perform duties that “extended far beyond those anticipated in a simple succession.” Succession of Breen, 370 So.3d at 1114. Evidence of such includes Ms. Knox's submission of a written summary of her actions taken in the succession. It also includes Ms. Knox's testimony taken on November 20, 2024, and December 17, 2024, at two separate contradictory hearings. Ms. Knox testified that although she did not provide representation to any heir during the contestation of the succession, she “scheduled, and conducted meetings, prepared and provided each party and the court with correspondence supporting documentation, account statements, and other information related to this Succession.” Moreover, Mrs. Hutchens's own actions, such as removing and hiding $600,000.00 in estate funds, and Mrs. Hutchens’ constant, wasteful litigation, directly led to this succession being more involved than necessary.

Regarding an Alabama condominium, Ms. Knox testified that she communicated regularly with the Alabama ancillary administrator and filed a petition for declaratory judgment in Louisiana to determine which state's law would rule the classification of the condominium. Further, Ms. Knox testified that she had to research historical investment account information to discover which funds belonged to the community property regime after the diversion of those funds by Mrs. Hutchens. These efforts were made necessary by Mrs. Hutchens’ determination to make finding estate assets difficult.

Here, the trial court considered the testimony of Ms. Knox, had knowledge of the intense litigation history of the succession, and reviewed the supporting documentation in making its determination. The trial court specifically acknowledged the difficulty of this succession, specifically noting the “lack of true cooperation” from Mrs. Hutchens and indicating that most of the fighting was “unnecessary” and concerned what should have been small, easy issues.

Given the above, we find that the trial court had ample support for its findings and, therefore, did not err in finding that Ms. Knox's efforts in administering the estate were so extensive to set her administration fee in excess of the statutory minimum two and one-half percent of the inventory. While $250,000.00 is on the higher end of reasonable in this matter, and this court likely would have awarded a lesser amount, we are mindful that the trial court is in a superior position and afforded great discretion in determining the amount of an administrator's fee.

The record before us, coupled with the applicable standard of review, dictates that this court uphold the trial court's determination of both the $250,000.00 fee and grant of the $105,000.00 advance of the upheld administration fee. Thus, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS TWO AND THREE

Mrs. Hutchens’ second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in authorizing Ms. Knox to pay Stutes & Lavergne attorney's fees of $19,825.00 from succession funds when those attorneys were retained by Ms. Knox to assert her claim for her administrator's fee against the succession. In her final assignment of error, Mrs. Hutchens argues that the trial court erred in authorizing Ms. Knox to pay litigation expenses from succession funds in connection with Ms. Knox's claim for her administrator's fee against the succession. Each of these assignments hinge on whether Ms. Knox's action to obtain her administrator's fee was properly ordered to be funded by the succession. As such, we will address them under one heading.

An estate is liable for attorney's fees incurred on behalf of the estate, as attorney's fees incurred in administering the succession “are clearly legitimate succession debts.” Succession of McLean, 26,566, p. 20 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/1/95), 651 So.2d 920, 929. When an administrator hires counsel to carry out duties and/or to defend the succession against adverse claims made against it, the costs of such legal representation may be charged to the succession. See Succession of Weed, 56,061 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 408 So.3d 311, writ denied, 25-566 (La. 9/16/25), 416 So.3d 480; In re Succession of Brazan, 975 So.2d 53; Succession of Haydel, 606 So.2d 42 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992); and Atkins v. Roberts, 561 So.2d 837, (La.App. 2 Cir. 1990). The courts have made the distinction, however, that where the legal representation is primarily for the personal benefit of the administrator and not the estate, such fees may not be paid from the property of the succession. Id.

Mrs. Hutchens argues that Stutes & Lavergne's representation of Ms. Knox was primarily for Ms. Knox's benefit, not the estate. As such, Mrs. Hutchens argues that the trial court erred in authorizing Ms. Knox to pay attorney's fees owed to Stutes & Lavergne and litigation costs associated with that representation using succession funds.

Mrs. Hutchens cites numerous cases to support her argument. See Succession of Randazzo, 23-715 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/6/24), 400 So.3d 197; In re Succession of Dysart, 50,927 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/28/16), 206 So.3d 357; In re Succession of Reno, 15-854 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/12/16), 202 So.3d 1147, writ denied, 16-2106 (La. 2/10/17), 215 So.3d 701; Succession of Sporl, 04-1373 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/6/05), 900 So.2d 1054; and Succession of Haydel, 606 So.2d 42.

Ms. Knox asserts that the cases relied on by Mrs. Hutchens are not applicable to the instant case because those cases involved representation of an individual who was both an heir and administrator with a direct personal interest in the succession. Here, dual representation is not present as Ms. Knox has no personal interest in this succession as she is not an heir, legatee, trust beneficiary, relative, spouse, or co-owner of estate property.

In looking at the matter, Ms. Knox is correct that the cases cited by Mrs. Hutchens involve dual representation. Here, none of the attorney's fees or litigation expenses incurred by Ms. Knox were for her own personal benefit as an heir or party otherwise interested in the estate itself. Moreover, the record suggests that much of the expenses came in direct response to filings and objections by Mrs. Hutchens.

However, the result reached by the courts in the jurisprudence cited by Mrs. Hutchens does not depend on whether dual representation was present or on whether the expenses were incurred due to an opposing party's filings. Rather, the jurisprudence universally reiterates that attorney's fees and expenses can be paid by succession funds when they are incurred for the benefit of the succession.

As to this issue, we note the case of Succession of Weed, 408 So.3d 311. There, the trial court denied an administrator's request to have succession funds pay a law firm's attorney's fees for legal work that benefited the administrator, an attorney in the law firm, and not the succession. The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings asserting that those attorney's fees are not the responsibility of the succession.

In Succession of Weed, like the case before us, the administrator had no personal interest in this succession as an heir, legatee, trust beneficiary, relative, spouse, or co-owner of estate property. On appeal, the administrator in Succession of Weed argued, as does Ms. Knox, that the cases cited by an heir to the succession were not applicable as dual representation was not present. The court seemingly viewed this as a distinction without a difference and based its decision on a finding that the attorney's fees charged were for litigation of the administrator's fee, which is for the benefit of the administrator, not the benefit of the succession. The Succession of Weed court noted that the fees requested were neither a debt incurred by the decedent nor an administration expense “incurred in the collection, preservation, management, and distribution of estate of the decedent.” La.Civ.Code art. 1415.

Here, Ms. Knox acquired representation by Stutes & Lavergne after Warren Hutchens, Constance Hutchens, and Mrs. Hutchens had settled their dispute(s) as to this entire estate/succession. After a review of the entire record, we find that Ms. Knox's purpose in hiring Stutes & Lavergne was to establish and collect her administration fee. We agree with the reasoning in Succession of Weed and find that litigation determining an administrator's fee benefits the administrator not the succession. We find the attorney's fees and litigation costs incurred by an administrator of this estate in pursuit of the administration fee is not a debt of the estate and does not benefit an estate. Thus, Stutes & Lavergne's attorney's fees of $19,825.00 and Ms. Knox's litigation expenses were erroneously authorized by the trial court to be paid with succession funds. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's authorization of Ms. Knox to pay Stutes & Lavergne's attorney fees of $19,825.00 and her litigation expenses associated with their representation in establishing and seeking her administration fee with succession funds.

DISPOSITION

Lori Hutchens raises three assignments of error alleging error by the trial court in homologating the Fifth Tableau of Distribution, authorizing the Administrator, Leslie Knox, to pay herself an advance of $105,000.00 toward a $250,000.00 administrative fee, to pay, using succession funds, attorney's fees of $19,825.00 to Stutes & Lavergne, and to pay, with succession funds, litigation expenses in connection with Leslie Knox's claim against the Succession of Paul Hutchens for her administration fee.

We find no merit in the assigned error regarding Leslie Knox's $250,000.00 administration fee or her $105,000.00 advance of that fee. We do find merit in the assigned errors regarding use of succession funds to pay Leslie Knox's attorney's fees owed to Stutes & Lavergne and litigation costs associated with adjudication of her administration fee.

DECREE

The portion of the judgment of the trial court granting Leslie Knox's $250,000.00 administration fee and her $105,000.00 advance, using succession funds, is affirmed. The portion of the judgment granting Leslie Knox's use of succession funds to pay Leslie Knox's attorney's fees owed to Stutes & Lavergne and litigation costs associated with adjudication of her administration fee is reversed and vacated. Costs of these proceedings are assessed to Lori Hutchens.

AFFIRMED, IN PART AND REVERSED, IN PART.

ORTEGO, Judge.