STATE v. SIMMONS (2025)

The State of Louisiana appeals from the trial court judgment quashing the bill of information against Defendant, Frank Simmons, Jr., on grounds that the State failed to commence trial within two years of the institution of prosecution as required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 578. For the reasons set forth, we reverse, render, and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 19, 2021, Defendant was charged by bill of information with the offense of illegal possession of alprazolam, a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance, in violation of La.R.S. 40:969(C), and with illegal possession of MDMA/ecstasy, a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966(C). On May 25, 2023, the State moved to amend the bill of information to charge Defendant with “Possession of CDS II: Methamphetamine in violation of” La.R.S. 40:967(C) in lieu of possession of MDMA/ecstasy. In all other respects, the original bill of information remained unchanged.¹ Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the amended bill of information, and trial was set for December 4, 2023. After a number of delays and hearings, some of which will be discussed in greater detail below, Defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information on February 21, 2025, alleging that the time delay in which the State had to bring his case to trial had expired. On February 24, 2025, the date set for Defendant's trial, the State moved for a continuance in order to respond in writing to the motion to quash. Defendant objected, and after hearing argument, the trial court granted Defendant's motion and quashed the bill of information against him. The State appeals from this judgment, assigning as error that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. Although, the present appeal was filed by the State and seeks review of the trial court's grant of Defendant's motion to quash, “[t]his court has found that an error patent review is required in such cases.” State v. Powell, 19-696, p. 1 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/25/20), 297 So.3d 841, 842. After reviewing the record in this case, we find no errors patent.

DISCUSSION

The State asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Defendant's motion to quash. It argues that given the series of events that occurred prior to the filing of Defendant's February 21, 2025 motion, the State had until April 1, 2025, to commence trial, and thus, Defendant's motion should have been denied. Our standard of review on the appeal of the grant or denial of a motion to quash is set forth by the supreme court in State v. Gray, 16-687, pp. 3-4 (La. 3/15/17), 218 So.3d 40, 43:

Because the complementary role of trial courts and appellate courts demands that deference be given to a trial court's discretionary decision, an appellate court is allowed to reverse a trial court judgment on a motion to quash only if that finding represents an abuse of the trial court's discretion. State v. Love, 00-3347, pp. 9-10 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1206. However, the trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. State v. Hamdan, 12-1986, p. 6 (La. 3/19/13), 112 So.3d 812, 816; State v. Smith, 99-0606, p. 3 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501, 504.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 578(A)(2) provides that in non-capital felony cases, no trial shall commence nor bail obligation be enforced “after two years from the date of institution of prosecution[,]” except as otherwise provided by law. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 579 provides, in part, that the following situations will interrupt the two-year prescriptive period:

A. The period of limitation established by Article 578 shall be interrupted if:

(1) The defendant at any time, with the purpose to avoid detection, apprehension, or prosecution, flees from the state, is outside the state, or is absent from his usual place of abode within the state; or

(2) The defendant cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond the control of the state; or

(3) The defendant fails to appear at any proceeding pursuant to actual notice, proof of which appears of record.

B. The periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall commence to run anew from the date the cause of interruption no longer exists.

In addition, La.Code Crim.P. art. 580 sets forth the causes under which the two-year limitation for trial will be suspended:

A. When a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea, the running of the periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall be suspended until the ruling of the court thereon; but in no case shall the state have less than one year after the ruling to commence the trial.

B. The periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall also be suspended if the court grants a continuance in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph B of Article 709.

In State v. Romar, 07-2140, p. 3 (La. 7/1/08), 985 So.2d 722, 725 (alterations in original), our supreme court set out the purpose behind this statutory scheme:

As a general matter, the state has two years from the institution of prosecution to begin trial of a non-capital felony. La.C.Cr.P. art. 578(A)(2). The statutory periods of limitation “enforce the accused's right to a speedy trial and ․ prevent the oppression caused by suspending criminal prosecutions over citizens for indefinite periods of time.” State v. Rome, 93-1221 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1284, 1286; see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322, 92 S.Ct. 455, 464, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)(statutes imposing time limits on trial “provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.”). That period may be enlarged as the result of suspension, La.C.Cr.P. art. 580, or interruption, La.C.Cr.P. art. 579, but in either case, the state “bears the heavy burden of showing that it is excused from trying the accused on a charge later than the period mandated by [La.C.Cr.P. art.] 578.” State v. Chadbourne, 98-1998, p. 1 (La. 1/8/99), 728 So.2d 832 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In State v. Rome, 93-1221 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1284, 1287 (footnote omitted), the supreme court explained the difference between an interruption of the delay to bring a criminal defendant to trial as provided for in La.Code Crim.P. art. 579 versus a suspension of that delay as provided for in La.Code Crim.P. art. 580:

An interruption of prescription occurs when the state is unable, through no fault of its own, to try a defendant within the period specified by statute, in this case two years. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 579(A)(2) provides in pertinent part that the two-year period of limitation will be interrupted if the defendant “cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond the control of the state.” Once the cause of interruption disappears, the two-year time limit begins anew. See La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 579(B). In contrast, the prescriptive period is merely suspended, until the trial court rules on the filing of preliminary pleas. The relevant period is simply not counted, and the running of the time limit resumes when the motions are ruled on. Note, however, that “in no case shall the state have less than one year after the ruling to commence the trial.” La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 580.

“A preliminary plea is any plea filed after the prosecution is instituted and before the trial that causes the trial to be delayed, including motions to quash, motions to suppress, or motions for continuance, as well as applications for discovery and bills of particulars.” State v. Joseph, 25-206, p. 1 (La. 6/25/25), 412 So.3d 216, 218 (per curiam). “Joint motions to continue are also included as preliminary pleas, while motions to reduce bond, motions for speedy trial, and motions to continue status conferences that do not affect the trial date are not.” State v. Stevens, 24-552, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/25), 416 So.3d 574, 579. “When the defendant shows the State has failed to bring him to trial within the time specified by Article 578, the State bears a heavy burden of demonstrating either an interruption or a suspension of the time limit extended the time to commence trial.” Joseph, 412 So.3d at 218–19. We find that the State has met its burden by establishing that the time limitation for trial had not expired.

The initial period in which the State had to bring Defendant to trial expired on October 19, 2023, as the original bill of information was filed on that same date two years prior thereto. We now look to the pertinent events occurring in the trial court to determine whether any of the preliminary motions, pleas, hearings, and or rulings thereon caused either an interruption or a suspension of the two-year period in which the State had to bring Defendant to trial.²

On May 25, 2023, both Defendant and the State were in court when the State orally amended the bill of information, and Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the amended charge. During the hearing, potential trial dates were suggested by the State and defense counsel. Although the State agreed to an October 16, 2023 trial date, counsel for Defendant had a conflict with that date. Counsel for Defendant then suggested, and the State agreed to, a trial date of December 4, 2023. After the trial court agreed to the date, trial was fixed for December 4, 2023. As this was a preliminary motion made by Defendant that extended the trial date beyond the original two-year time delay, it had the effect of suspending the delay to try Defendant's case until May 25, 2024. See State v. Fish, 05-1929 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So.2d 493 (when a defendant proposed a trial date outside the prescription period, the State had one year from the date of the hearing to commence trial).

The parties appeared in open court again on December 4, 2023, with Defendant, his counsel, and counsel for the State all present. The State moved to continue the trial to April 1, 2024, which was granted.³ The reset date for trial was within the new May 25, 2024 time delay for Defendant to be tried. However, on April 1, 2024, Defendant did not appear for trial. His attorney advised the trial court that Defendant was not present, that he had moved to Atlanta, Georgia, and that he was unable to return to Louisiana for trial. While the State argues that this event, and the continuance it caused, suspended the time delay and gave the State until April 1, 2025, to bring Defendant to trial, we find that it interrupted the time delay and extended the date by which the State had to commence trial to April 1, 2026.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 579(A)(3) provides that the two-year limitation for trial “shall be interrupted” if “[t]he defendant fails to appear at any proceeding pursuant to actual notice, proof of which appears of record.” (Emphasis added.) The record reflects that although the April 1, 2024 trial date was requested by the State, Defendant was present in the courtroom with his counsel when the trial date was set. As a result, notice cannot be disputed and is not an issue. Article 579(A)(3) is couched in mandatory language, using the words “shall be interrupted.” Pursuant to the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure's rules of construction, “the word ‘shall’ is mandatory and the word ‘may’ is permissive.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 5. “It is well established that the task of statutory construction begins with an examination of the language of the statute itself[,]” and “[w]hen the law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written, and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” State v. Barbier, 98-2923, p. 3 (La. 9/8/99), 743 So.2d 1236, 1238.

Applying these tried and true rules of statutory construction, it matters not if counsel for the State was participating in the hearing via Zoom video conferencing and was not physically present in the courtroom. The language of La.Code Crim.P. art. 579(A)(3) provides that a defendant's absence at a hearing, when proper notice has been given, shall result in an interruption of the two-year limitation for trial. “The two-year limitation can be interrupted by the absence of the defendant, which causes the time limitation to recommence once the defendant becomes available.” State v. Bessard, 20-84, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/18/20), 307 So.3d 1158, 1164. This interruption, even if the period was recommenced immediately, gives the State an additional two years to bring the case to trial, and in this instance, gave the State until April 1, 2026, to try Defendant. Thus, at the time of the filing of the motion to quash on February 21, 2025, the State still had ample time in which to try Defendant.

Even assuming arguendo that this event resulted in only a suspension of the time delay, as counsel for the State participated in the hearing electronically and was not able to immediately commence trial, the time delay for commencing trial was extended to April 1, 2025. Even in its worst light for the State, this event amounted to a joint continuance, a suspending preliminary plea as per La.Code Crim.P. art. 580. Thus, the State was still within its rights to bring Defendant to trial at the time of the filing of the motion to quash and the hearing thereon on February 24, 2025. Accordingly, we find that the trial court legally erred in granting the motion to quash. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the trial court, deny the motion to quash, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

DECREE

The judgment of the trial court, granting Defendant's motion to quash, is reversed, and judgment is rendered denying the motion to quash. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED; RENDERED; AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As the sole issue before us relates to the procedural question of whether the time delays for institution of prosecution had expired, the substantive facts leading to the filing of the initial and amended charges are not relevant here.

2.   While there are numerous motions, hearing dates, and rulings occurring during the course of this matter, we address only those necessary to resolve the issue presented herein.

3.   While the State argues that Defendant did not object, amounting to an acquiescence and a reset of the delay as per La.Code Crim.P. art 578, we need not decide the merits of the argument here, as it does not affect the outcome.

KYZAR, Judge.