STATE v. CHAUNCEY (2025)

Defendant, Jason J. Chauncey, has filed three separate appeals with this Court, two involving guilty pleas to felony charges and the instant matter, which involves his conviction and sentence for resisting an officer in violation of La. R.S. 14:108, a misdemeanor.¹ On October 31, 2024, the district court addressed defendant's cases jointly pursuant to a global plea bargain and sentence. In the instant matter, defendant was sentenced to six months to be served in the parish prison, to run concurrently with the sentences imposed in district court case numbers 23-5825 and 24-600. Defendant's appointed appellate counsel filed a brief asserting that after a review of the record, he found no appealable issues or defects in the plea procedure in this matter, but requests a review for errors patent. This filing is commonly referred to as an Anders brief. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). For the following reasons, we agree with counsel's assessment, and affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 18, 2023, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant with resisting an officer in violation of La. R.S. 14:108. Defendant pled not guilty on January 8, 2024.

On June 27, 2024, a Frye ² hearing was held where the State advised defendant of a plea offer of a “double bill” and an eight-year sentence, and the trial court informed him that if he proceeded with motions on August 8, 2024, the offer would no longer be available. Defendant indicated he understood. On August 8, 2024, the defense waived motions, including a challenge to the admissibility of defendant's statement at trial, and chose to proceed with a trial at a later date.

Defendant later agreed to accept the plea offer. On October 31, 2024, he withdrew his initial not guilty plea and pled guilty as charged. The trial court then sentenced him to parish prison for six months, to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed by the district court case numbers 23-5825 and 24-600. On December 2, 2024, the trial court granted defendant's Motion for Appeal and appointed the Louisiana Appellate Project as appellate counsel.

FACTS

Because defendant's conviction resulted from a guilty plea, the underlying facts were not fully developed at a trial. A factual basis was not provided during the plea colloquy as to the misdemeanor, nevertheless, the record shows that the State alleged in the bill of information that on or about November 29, 2023, defendant violated La. R.S. 14:108 “in that he did willfully and unlawfully commit any act of violence toward or any resistance or opposition to the arresting officers, D. Rees and/or A. Vigurie, of the Westwego Police Department, while being lawfully detained.” Also, as indicated by appellate counsel, defendant refused to sign his traffic ticket.

JURISDICTIONAL NOTE

This Court's appellate jurisdiction extends only to cases that are triable by a jury. La. Const. of 1974, art. 5 § 10; La. C.Cr.P. art. 912.1; State v. Chess, 00-164 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/00), 762 So.2d 1286, 1287. Unless the punishment that may be imposed exceeds six months of imprisonment or a fine in excess of one thousand dollars, a misdemeanor is not triable by jury. State v. Karim, 19-133 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/20), 302 So.3d 1200, 1203, writ denied, 20-1185 (La. 1/12/21), 308 So.3d 713. See also La. Const. of 1974, art. 1 § 17; La. C.Cr.P. art. 779.³

In the instant case, defendant pled guilty to resisting an officer in violation of La. R.S. 14:108, a misdemeanor. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:108(C) sets forth the penalty for resisting an officer as a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. Thus, resisting an officer is not triable by a jury.

The proper procedure for seeking review of a misdemeanor conviction is an application for writ of review asking this Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 912.1(C)(1); State v. Vaughn, 18-51 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/16/18), 248 So.3d 578, 582-83. Further, it is this Court's policy to dismiss such misdemeanor matters that are not appealable. However, dismissal may not be warranted in “exceptional cases, especially when there are misdemeanor and felony convictions intertwined to the point that the interests of justice are better served by considering the matters together.” Vaughn, 248 So.3d at 583. See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 16-599 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/8/17), 213 So.3d 486, 488 n.1 (finding the defendant's misdemeanor and felony convictions were so intertwined that considering the matters together better served the interest of justice); State v. Jones, 12-640 c/w 12-641 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/13), 128 So.3d 436, 441-43 (holding that when the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor and a felony in separate bills of information, judicial economy dictated considering the matters together because the two convictions were intertwined).

Here, defendant's felony drug offenses were charged in the same bill of information (25-KA-10), his felony theft offenses were charged in another bill of information (25-KA-11), and his misdemeanor resisting an officer offense was charged in a separate bill of information (25-KA-12). Defendant's guilty pleas and his sentencing in all three cases were part of a plea bargain which was effectuated on the same day. These three cases are companion cases pending before this Court on appeal. Here, although the misdemeanor offense and the felony drug offenses were charged in separate bills of information, they arose from the same incident on the same day. Thus, we conclude that judicial economy and the interests of justice are better served by considering defendant's misdemeanor conviction in conjunction with his felony drug offense conviction in 25-KA-10.

ANDERS BRIEF

Under the procedure adopted by this Court in State v. Bradford, 95-929 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d 1108, 1110-11,⁴ defendant's appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that after a review of the record, he could find no appealable issues or defects in the plea procedure, but requests an errors patent review by this Court. In its response, the State questions the depth of appellate counsel's review and takes no position on whether the brief filed on behalf of defendant complies with the procedure adopted by this Court in Bradford.

In Anders, the United States Supreme Court stated that appointed appellate counsel may request permission to withdraw if he finds his case to be wholly frivolous after a conscientious examination of it.⁵ The request must be accompanied by “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal” so as to provide the reviewing court “with a basis for determining whether appointed counsel have fully performed their duty to support their clients’ appeals to the best of their ability” and to assist the reviewing court “in making the critical determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 439, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988). Defendant's appellate counsel did not file a motion to withdraw as attorney of record in the instant case.

In State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241 (per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that an Anders brief need not tediously catalog every meritless pretrial motion or objection made at trial with a detailed explanation of why the motions or objections lack merit. The Supreme Court further explained that an Anders brief must demonstrate by full discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has cast an advocate's eye over the trial record and considered whether any ruling made by the trial court, subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, had a significant, adverse impact on shaping the evidence presented to the jury for its consideration.” Id.

When conducting a review for compliance with Anders, an appellate court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Bradford, 676 So.2d at 1110. Specifically, that review should include an examination of (1) the bill of information to ensure the defendant was properly charged; (2) all minute entries to ensure the defendant was present at all crucial stages of the proceedings, the jury composition and verdict were correct, and the sentence is legal; (3) all pleadings that are in the record; and (4) all transcripts to determine if any ruling provides an arguable basis for appeal. Id. at 1110-11. If, after an independent review, the reviewing court determines there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, it may grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence. Conversely, if the court finds any legal point arguable on the merits, it may either deny the motion and order the court-appointed attorney to file a brief arguing the legal point(s) identified by the court, or grant the motion and appoint substitute appellate counsel. Id. at 1110.

In this case, appellate counsel's brief sets forth the limited facts and the circumstances surrounding defendant's plea bargain. It states that this case is one of three which were consolidated for a plea bargain and sentencing, and that the transcripts of the sentencing hearing are identical. Counsel provides that in district court case number 23-5826, the instant case, defendant was charged with resisting an officer in violation of La. R.S. 14:108. He also provides defendant was charged in district court case number 23-5825 with possession of hydrocodone less than two grams and possession of methamphetamine less than two grams. The drugs were found pursuant to a traffic stop, during which officers observed readily available weapons. Officers also determined that defendant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The brief describes defendant reaching into his pocket to discard the drugs while handcuffed. Counsel also describes that following his arrest, defendant refused to sign his traffic ticket.

Appellate counsel also discusses that, while omnibus motions were filed by the defense, those motions were later waived, and the search was not challenged. The brief also points out that the instant conviction and sentence were part of a plea bargain resulting in a reduction from a possible third-felony offender multiple bill to a second-felony offender multiple bill and an eight-year sentence. Counsel states he reviewed all three records and found no appealable issues or defects in the plea procedure, pointing out that the defendant agreed in each written Boykin ⁶ form, also pointing out that during the plea and sentencing colloquy with the trial judge, defendant agreed that he was waiving his right to appeal his convictions. Lastly, counsel asks this Court for an errors patent review. Counsel concludes that by negotiating a plea bargain covering all his charges, defendant waived his right to appeal his conviction. We find appellate counsel's brief demonstrates a conscientious review of the limited record in this case.

Upon filing of this appeal, this Court sent defendant a letter by certified mail informing him that an Anders brief had been filed on his behalf and that he had until March 28, 2025, to file a pro se supplemental brief. The Anders letter dated February 26, 2025, was returned on April 2, 2025. Upon notice that defendant had been transferred to another facility, this Court remailed the letter to the updated facility on April 2, 2025. Defendant did not file a pro se brief in this matter.

ANDERS ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Anders, this Court has performed a thorough review of the record, including the pleadings, minute entries, charging instrument, and the Boykin transcript. Our independent review of the record supports appellate counsel's assertion that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal.

First, our examination shows defendant was properly charged in a bill of information which plainly and concisely stated the essential facts constituting the charged offense and sufficiently identified the defendant and the crime charged. See generally La. C.Cr.P. arts. 464 and 466. Also, the minute entries reflect that defendant was present and represented by counsel at all crucial stages of the proceedings against him, including his arraignment, guilty plea and sentencing. Thus, defendant's presence or lack thereof, does not present an issue for appeal.

The record also indicates that on March 18, 2024, defense counsel filed omnibus motions, which included a “motion to suppress the statement(s),” request for discovery and bill of particulars, motion for preliminary examination, motion for reasonable notice of return date, motion to suppress the evidence, motion to suppress the identification, and motion for discovery of defendant's statement. The record also reflects that on August 8, 2024, defense counsel waived those motions, stating there was no basis for objecting to defendant's statement being used as evidence and that defendant's constitutional rights were not violated with respect to his statement.⁷

Additionally, the record shows that defendant entered a guilty plea in this case. Generally, when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the guilty plea, and is precluded from review of such defects either by appeal or post-conviction relief. State v. Turner, 09-1079 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/10), 47 So.3d 455, 459. Also, once a defendant is sentenced, only those guilty pleas that are unconstitutionally infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or by an application for post-conviction relief. State v. McCoil, 05-658 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1120, 1124. A guilty plea is unconstitutionally infirm when it is not entered freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin colloquy is inadequate, or when a defendant is induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain, or what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain, and that bargain is not kept. Id.

As to the instant case, our independent review of the record reveals no constitutional infirmity or any irregularity in defendant's guilty plea that would render it invalid.

The plea colloquy held on October 31, 2024 pertained to defendant's felony cases and misdemeanor case. Our review shows that at the hearing, defense counsel stated he and the State had negotiated a plea agreement where defendant would be pleading guilty as charged to all counts in all three cases. He further stated he had a waiver of constitutional rights form, and the trial court allowed him to approach the bench. During the plea colloquy, the trial judge advised defendant that by pleading guilty, he was giving up the right to trial by judge or jury, to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to confront his accusers and cross-examine witnesses called to testify against him, to remain silent, to present witnesses who would testify on his behalf and present evidence that would be helpful or favorable to him, to the assistance of a lawyer, to appellate review of an adverse verdict at trial, and to a free court-appointed lawyer if he could not afford one. When the trial judge asked defendant if he understood these rights, defendant said, “I heard you sir.”

The trial court advised defendant that the sentence on the misdemeanor (23-5826) would be “six months” to run concurrently with the sentences in case numbers 24-600 and 23-5825. Defendant indicated he understood what his sentence would be, and he stated no one was forcing or threatening him to enter his plea. He understood that by pleading guilty to the felony charges in the companion cases, the pleas could be used to enhance a penalty of a future conviction. Defendant also understood his guilty pleas could affect other rights, including his right to vote, to bear arms, and to receive housing benefits. The trial judge further advised there would be fines, fees, and costs assessed, which defendant indicated he understood.

The trial judge pointed out he had the waiver of rights form with the initials “JC” and a signature, and defendant confirmed those were his initials and his signature. Defense counsel also confirmed he signed the form indicating defendant had been explained his rights, understood them, and was entering into the pleas freely and voluntarily. The State provided a factual basis for the pleas in 23-5825 and 24-600, but not for the misdemeanor plea in the instant case.⁸ Afterward, the trial judge said he was satisfied defendant understood the consequences of his plea and had entered into it freely and voluntarily. The trial judge then accepted the plea and sentenced defendant in the instant case (23-5826) to six months in the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center to run concurrently with the other sentences imposed that day.

Additionally, defendant, his attorney, and the trial judge signed Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights Plea of Guilty form in connection with the misdemeanor in the instant case. In that form, defendant was advised that he was pleading guilty to a violation of La. R.S. 14:108. Defendant was advised that by pleading guilty, he was giving up the right to a trial by the court; to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; to confront his accusers and cross-examine witnesses called to testify against him; to remain silent and not to be compelled to incriminate himself; to the assistance of a lawyer, and if he could not afford one, the right to have a free court-appointed lawyer; and to appellate review of an adverse verdict at trial. Defendant indicated that by entering a guilty plea, he was waiving and giving up these rights. He also indicated that he understood if he was arrested, charged, and convicted of a subsequent offense, this guilty plea may be used against him to enhance that penalty. He further indicated he understood that the Louisiana Department of Public Safety may suspend his driving privileges. Defendant acknowledged that his act of pleading guilty was a knowing, intelligent, free, and voluntary act on his part. He further acknowledged that no promises or threats were made to encourage him to enter a guilty plea to the above charge. Defendant understood that his sentence would be six months in parish jail to run concurrently with the sentences in district court case numbers 23-5825 and 24-600. He indicated his rights had been thoroughly explained to him by the court, he understood them, and he had no further questions. Defendant also initialed next to each of his rights.

And finally, our examination reveals that the sentence imposed does not present any issues for appeal. It is within the sentencing range prescribed by the statute. See La. R.S. 14:108. Further, defendant's sentence was imposed pursuant to, and in conformity with, the plea agreement. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2) precludes a defendant from seeking review of his sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement, which was set forth in the record at the time of the plea. State v. Surgi, 24-291 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 1214, 1219. As such, defendant's sentence does not provide a basis for appeal in this matter.

Based on the foregoing, we find that defendant's guilty plea and sentence imposed pursuant to the plea agreement present no issues for appeal. Appellate counsel's brief adequately demonstrates by discussion and analysis that he reviewed the proceedings and cannot identify any basis for a non-frivolous appeal. Our independent review of the record supports appellate counsel's assertion.

ERRORS PATENT DISCUSSION

Defendant requests an errors patent review, which this Court routinely performs on appellate review in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).Generally, an errors patent review is not conducted on misdemeanor convictions. Nevertheless, we have conducted an errors patent review in similarly situated matters. See Vaughn, 248 So.3d at 588. Our review reveals no errors patent in this case.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant had three pending cases in the 24th Judicial District Court, case nos. 23-5826 (instant matter), 23-5825, and 24-600. On October 31, 2024, he entered a plea of guilty as charged in all three cases. Defendant appealed each case and has two companion cases pending with this Court, case nos. 25-KA-10 (felony drug offenses) and 25-KA-11 (felony theft, burglary, and simple criminal damage offenses). This misdemeanor charge arose from the same incident from which the felony drug charges arose in case no. 23-5825 (25-KA-10).

2.   The purpose of a Frye hearing, which arose out of the case of Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), “is to make a record of the fulfillment of defense counsel's obligation to communicate favorable plea offers and to effectively assist the defendant in deciding whether to accept the State's offer or proceed to trial.” State v. Lucia, 18-37 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/18), 257 So.3d 1271, 1279 n. 10, writ denied, 18-1917 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So.3d 969.

3.   La. C.Cr.P. art. 779 provides the following:A. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor in which the punishment, as set forth in the statute defining the offense, may be a fine in excess of one thousand dollars or imprisonment for more than six months shall be tried by a jury of six jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.B. The defendant charged with any other misdemeanor shall be tried by the court without a jury.

4.   In Bradford, this Court adopted the procedures outlined in State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, 530 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990), which were sanctioned by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Mouton, 95-981 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176, 1177 (per curiam).

5.   The United States Supreme Court reiterated Anders in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000).

6.   Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

7.   Even if defense counsel had not waived the motions, by not objecting and by pleading guilty, the motions are considered waived. See State v. Corzo, 04-791 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/15/05), 896 So.2d 1101, 1102.

8.   Louisiana law does not require that a guilty plea be accompanied by a recitation of the factual basis for the crime. State v. Autin, 09-995 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/27/10), 40 So.3d 193, 196, writ denied, 10-1154 (La. 12/10/10), 51 So.3d 725. Due process requires a finding of a significant factual basis for a defendant's guilty plea only when a defendant proclaims his innocence or when the trial court is otherwise put on notice that there is a need for an inquiry into the factual basis. Autin, 40 So.3d at 196-197. A plea accompanied by a claim of innocence is an Alford plea and puts the trial court on notice that it must ascertain a factual basis to support the plea. State v. Orman, 97-2089 (La. 1/9/98), 704 So.2d 245 (per curiam). Here, defendant did not plead guilty pursuant to Alford, nor did he plead guilty because it was in his “best interest,” and therefore, a factual basis was not required.

MARCEL, J.