GREEN ACRES FARMS LLC v. MOORE (2025)

This civil case concerns a dispute over the ownership of certain materials located on a piece of immovable property sold by the defendants to the plaintiff in this matter. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment that the materials at issue belong to the plaintiffs.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January of 2021, Plaintiff/Appellee Green Acres Farms, LLC (“Plaintiffs”), and Defendants/Appellants, Gerald and April Diane Moore (“Moore”),¹ entered into discussions regarding the sale of a 402-acre farm owned by Moore. The parties made an oral purchase agreement and then executed a cash sale on June 9, 2021, for $1.4 million for the property.² Most relevant to this appeal, at the time of the sale, two piles of bulldozed limestone, mixed with dirt and clay, as well as some concrete culverts, were located on the property. The limestone and culverts will be hereinafter referred to as “materials.” The act of sale of the property was silent as to the ownership of the materials.

On October 9, 2022, approximately sixteen months after the sale, Moore (via a third party) entered the property without permission and removed the limestone and culverts. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit to recover the value of the materials taken by Moore. On December 13, 2023, Moore answered Plaintiffs’ petition, wherein Moore admitted taking the materials, but denied Plaintiffs’ claims that the ownership of those materials was transferred to Plaintiffs as part of the purchase and sale of the farm. Moore also filed a reconventional demand, contending that Plaintiffs had used certain items located on the property, including various pipes, culverts, concrete poles and limestone without notice to him, and that Moore was entitled to the return of that property.

The case was tried on August 28, 2024. At the end of the trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On October 21, 2024, the trial court filed its written reasons for ruling awarding damages to Plaintiffs in the amount of $47,968.35, the stipulated value of these materials. The trial court further dismissed Moore's reconventional demand. On November 18, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and cast Moore with all court costs. From this judgment, Moore appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Moore asserts five assignments of error:

1. The trial court committed reversible error of law by failing to apply Louisiana Civil Code Article 1846, which requires a witness and other corroborating evidence to prove a contract with a value in excess of $500.00, in determining whether a contract existed between the parties hereto for the sale of the movable items at issue herein.

2. To the extent the trial court applied Louisiana Civil Code Article 1846 to the case at hand it committed reversible error by finding that there was sufficient corroborating evidence to prove an oral contract between the parties.

3. To the extent the trial court may have held the written Act of Sale of immovable property executed by the parties hereto affected a conveyance of the movable property made the subject hereof it committed reversible error insofar as the contract is clear and unambiguous and makes no mention of any conveyance of the movable property at issue to Petitioner/Appellee.

4. The trial court committed reversible error to the extent it may have held that the property at issue herein was a component part of the immovable property conveyed via the written Act of Sale executed by the parties hereto.

5. If ownership of the property at issue did not transfer to Green Acres, then the trial court committed reversible error in denying Moore's reconventional demand.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The party seeking to show a contract exists bears the burden of proof. FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Weaver, 10-1372 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 709. “The existence or nonexistence of a contract is a question of fact.” Crowe v. Homesplus Manufactured Hous., Inc., 38,382, p. 9 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/04), 877 So.2d 156, 161. Findings of fact are reviewed under the manifest error standard. Kite Bros. LLC v. Alexander, 19-488 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/18/19), 286 So.3d 1170.

DISCUSSION

At the trial, the total value of the removed materials was stipulated to be $47,968.35. The evidence shows that the bulldozed piles of limestone were on the property because Moore had previously leased twenty acres of the 402-acre tract of land to a construction company, which built a two-acre laydown yard on the leased portion. When the lease ended, prior to the June 9, 2021 sale, and while cleaning the laydown yard, the construction company bulldozed into a pile some of the limestone from the laydown yard, along with a mixture of dirt and clay from the property. The evidence shows that these piles of materials, and several concrete culverts, along with some used crawfish traps, pipes, and other used farm items (that were not part of this dispute) remained on the land at the time of the sale to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs presented the testimony of the owners of Green Acres Farms, LLC, namely Robert Sattler, John Brady Sattler, and Brandon Sattler. Defendants presented the testimony of a single witness, namely Defendant Gerald Moore. The parties and their witnesses testified as to discussions that occurred prior to and after the execution of the sale, including discussions about the retention of the rice crop and the materials at issue, as well as the circumstances of the removal of the materials from the property. The act of cash sale executed by the parties was also introduced into evidence at the trial.

Ultimately, the trial court reasoned that the materials removed by Moore belonged to Plaintiffs by virtue of an oral agreement reached between the parties prior to the sale. Specifically, the trial court found that two meetings occurred wherein the sale was discussed prior to the execution of the sale. At the first meeting, the parties discussed the sale price and determined that Moore would retain ownership of the materials, and that ownership of the rice crop would be conveyed to Plaintiffs as part of the sale. This meeting would have taken place in April or May of 2021, as electricity had been transferred into Plaintiffs’ name for the water wells that supplied water to the rice crop.

However, the trial court noted that the topic of discussion at the second meeting is in dispute and indeed is at the heart of this litigation. Plaintiffs alleged that at this second meeting, Moore renegotiated the terms of the sale wherein he requested that he be allowed to retain ownership of the rice crop but allowed Plaintiffs to retain ownership of all other items on the property, including the materials at issue. Moore, on the other hand, contended he did not agree at any point to transfer ownership of the materials to Plaintiffs.

Of importance in this matter, the trial court determined and found that “Moore's testimony was not credible,” citing the sixteen months that elapsed between the sale and the retrieval of the material, as well as the fact that Moore failed to request permission to remove the materials from the property. Additionally, the trial court found that no discussions regarding the ownership of the materials occurred after the execution of the sale.

Thus, as noted above, the trial court awarded damages to Plaintiffs in the amount of $47,968.35, the stipulated value of the materials. The court further dismissed Moore's reconventional demand.

ANALYSIS

We will examine the arguments of the parties and then evaluate Moore's assignments of error on the merits.

Moore's Argument

Moore maintains that at all times during negotiations for the sale of the property, he declared his intention to retain ownership of the materials. Moore argues that because some of the concrete culverts were never installed and the limestone was detached from the ground, the materials were not component parts of the immovable property. Thus, Moore contends that in order to transfer ownership of the materials to Plaintiffs, such would have had to be included in the act of sale of the farm or agreed to as part of a separate oral agreement. Moore underscores that the act of sale is silent regarding the materials and argues that Plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of an oral contract transferring ownership of the materials to them.

Moore also argues that to the extent that the trial court may have held that the written act of sale here conveyed the movable property at issue, it committed reversible error, and as the error involves a matter of contract interpretation, it is an issue subject to a de novo standard of review. Whitbeck v. Champagne, 14-245 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/14), 149 So.3d 372. Additionally, to the extent the trial court may have held that the materials were a component part of the property, Moore argues that the trial court committed reversible error, as the materials were not “[t]hings incorporated into a tract of land[.]” La.Civ.Code art. 465.

Because the contract had a value of over $500.00, Moore notes that in order to meet their burden of proof, Plaintiffs were required to produce at least one witness and corroborating evidence supporting the existence of a contract per La.Civ.Code art. 1846 (emphasis added):

When a writing is not required by law, a contract not reduced to writing, for a price or, in the absence of a price, for a value not in excess of five hundred dollars may be proved by competent evidence.

If the price or value is in excess of five hundred dollars, the contract must be proved by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances.

Furthermore, citing Suire v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't, 04-1459, p.29 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 58, Moore notes that the “other corroboration” required by La.Civ.Code art. 1846 “must come from a source other than the plaintiff.” Moore emphasizes that Plaintiffs only produced their own testimony and the act of sale. Thus, Moore contends this constitutes an error of law subjecting this matter to de novo review that requires this court to make its own factual findings, citing Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, in support.

Moore further contends that all of the parties agreed that the materials were originally supposed to go to him, and that as a result of subsequent negotiations, Moore would retain ownership of the rice crop, as well. Moore notes that Plaintiffs agreed to his retained ownership of the rice crop and amended the act of sale to reflect this agreement. On the other hand, the materials were not mentioned in this amended act of sale. Moore points to this absence to underscore that the testimony supports his contention that he did not agree to transfer ownership of the materials to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs’ Argument

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court correctly applied La.Civ.Code art. 1846 in finding that ownership of the materials was transferred to them as part of the cash sale and in awarding them damages for the removal of these materials.

Plaintiffs contend that they clearly met the burden required by La.Civ.Code art. 1846 through the testimony of their three witnesses, the testimony of Moore, and the uncontested facts, stipulations, and other evidence and exhibits. Plaintiffs further underscore that the trial court found that Moore's testimony was not credible, and that, regardless, his testimony in fact corroborates much of Plaintiffs’ testimony. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court made no determinations of the classifications of the material (i.e., as movable or immovable) in reaching its ruling. Rather, the trial court found that an oral agreement was reached as to the ownership of these materials. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court correctly denied Moore's reconventional demand.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE AND TWO

In his first assignment of error, Moore argues that the trial court committed reversible error of law by failing to correctly apply La.Civ.Code art.1846, which requires a witness and other corroborating evidence to prove a contract with a value in excess of $500.00, in determining whether a contract existed between the parties hereto for the sale of the disputed movable items. In a related second assignment of error, Moore argues that to the extent the trial court applied La.Civ.Code art. 1846 to the case at hand, it committed reversible error by finding that there was sufficient corroborating evidence to prove an oral contract between the parties. Because these two assignments of error are interrelated, we will review them under one heading.

After a thorough review of the record, we find Plaintiffs met the burden set forth in La.Civ.Code art. 1846 regarding the existence of the contract, including the required showing of corroborating circumstances:

In a suit to recover additional wages in excess of $500.00 under an oral contract of employment the basic rule governing proof is the second paragraph of La. C.C. art. 1846, which requires that plaintiff prove his case by one credible witness “and other corroborating circumstances.” Fox v. Don Siebarth Pontiac, Inc., 458 So.2d 575 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 461 So.2d 314 ([La.]1984); La. C.C. art. 1846. The plaintiff may be the one credible witness. Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 27,241 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/23/95), 660 So.2d 182, writ denied, 95-2579 (La. 12/15/95), 664 So.2d 444; Samuels v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 342 So.2d 661 (La.1977). “Other corroborating circumstances” need only be general in nature; independent proof of every detail of the agreement is not required. Id.; Miller v. Harvey, 408 So.2d 946 (La.App. 2 Cir.1981).

Smith v. Dishman & Bennett Speciality Co. Inc., 35,682, p. 3-4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/23/02), 805 So.2d 1220, 1223 (emphasis added).

There was no dispute among the parties that a second meeting had been held in which the terms of the property sale were renegotiated, and the trial court was not clearly wrong in determining that ownership of the materials was transferred to Plaintiffs as a result of this second meeting. The strongest corroborating evidence is Moore's testimony, wherein he admitted that the terms of the agreement had been renegotiated prior to the sale:

Q. And that's whenever the terms of the agreement were changed one or two days before the sale was signed?

A. ․ [Y]es.

Though he testified that he did not agree to transfer ownership of the materials to Plaintiffs at this meeting, Moore does agree that changes were made to the terms of the sale after the second meeting. Furthermore, Moore admitted that he waited for sixteen months before retrieving the materials from the property:

Q. Now, sixteen months after the sale, you hire Willie Gary you said to come remove the material, and it took three days?

A. That's correct.

Finally, Moore testified that he failed to request permission from Plaintiffs before removing the material:

Q. Okay. So they were not included in the sale, but, I mean, at some point, do you think, hey, it's been sixteen months since I talked to the Sattlers about this, maybe I should give them a call before I do this on this property[?] You ever – did that ever cross your mind?

A. No, it didn't. No, it didn't.

Additionally, the trial court determined that no discussions were held between the parties regarding the ownership of these items prior to their removal. Further, as noted by the trial court in its reasons for ruling, the record shows that Plaintiffs presented other corroborating evidence in that the electricity on the property was put into Plaintiffs’ name prior to sale, indicating that ownership of the rice crop had originally been anticipated to be transferred to Plaintiffs with the farm. However, as a result of later negotiations, the ownership of the rice crop was retained by Moore, and the ownership of these materials was transferred to Plaintiffs. Finally, there was testimony that the rice crop and the materials were roughly equal in value. Thus, when viewing the entire record, we find that it was not clearly wrong for the trial court to accept the Plaintiffs’ testimony that at a second meeting, Moore chose to retain ownership of the rice crop instead of the materials.

We find that the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the trial court's finding of corroborating circumstances as required by La.Civ.Code art. 1846. As noted above, whether the party has satisfied his burden of proof is a question of fact subject to the manifest error rule. Crowe, 877 So.2d 156. Therefore, we find there is adequate evidence in the record, along with the trial court's credibility determinations, to support the court's ruling. Accordingly, we find that there is no merit in these assignments of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

In his third assignment of error, Moore argues that to the extent the trial court may have held the written act of sale of immovable property executed by the parties hereto effected a conveyance of the movable property made the subject hereof, it committed reversible error insofar as the contract is clear and unambiguous and makes no mention of any conveyance of the movable property at issue to Plaintiffs.

We find that the trial court declined to make a determination regarding the classification of the materials, i.e., whether it is movable property. It further did not find that the written act of sale conveyed the materials to either party. Instead, it held that the parties had renegotiated the terms of the written agreement, which allowed Plaintiffs to retain the materials on the property and allowed Moore to retain ownership of the rice crop. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

Moore argues that the trial court committed reversible error to the extent it may have held that the property at issue herein was a component part of the immovable property conveyed via the written act of sale.

As with assignment of error three, above, we find that the trial court did not make an explicit finding that that the materials were a component part of the immovable property. The trial court's judgment instead turns on the finding that the terms of the sale were renegotiated, and that ownership of the materials was conveyed as part of the amended purchase agreement as a result of the second meeting. However, and though it is not strictly relevant to the trial court's ruling, Brandon Sattler did testify that the piles of limestone were “almost like concrete” and that Plaintiffs’ 75-horse Kubota front end loader, as well as a Ford backhoe, were unable to move the pile. Thus, we find that this assignment of error is moot, as we upheld the trial court's finding that the material did transfer to Plaintiffs in the sale.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FIVE

Moore argues that if ownership of the materials at issue did not transfer to Plaintiffs, then the trial court committed reversible error in denying Moore's reconventional demand.

For the reasons stated above, we find that this assignment of error moot, as we upheld the trial court's finding that the material did transfer to Plaintiffs in the sale.

DECREE

The judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee, Green Acres Farm, LLC, is affirmed in its entirety. Costs of these proceedings are assessed to Defendants/Appellants, Gerald E. Moore and April Diane Moore.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We will refer to Defendants as “Moore” for simplicity's sake, as Gerald Moore was the primary actor in the events that precipitated this litigation.

2.   In the record and testimony of Brandon Sattler, it was noted that although the price is listed as $1.1 million in the Clerk of Court, with an additional $300,000.00 being paid in cash for the total price of $1.4 million.

ORTEGO, Judge.