CRAWFORD v. TRAN (2025)

Ashla Tran, an employee of Innovative Air Solutions, LLC, was driving from her home in Orange, Texas, to Lake Charles, Louisiana, when she collided with a vehicle driven by Andrey Crawford. Mr. Crawford sued his own auto insurer; Ms. Tran; IAS; and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, for his alleged injuries and damages. He also filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging Ms. Tran was in the course and scope of her employment with IAS when the accident occurred. IAS and Liberty Mutual filed their own motion for summary judgment seeking the opposite ruling: that Ms. Tran was not acting on behalf of her employer but was on a personal mission. The trial court granted Mr. Crawford's motion, denied the motion of IAS and Liberty Mutual, and found Ms. Tran in the course and scope of her employment with IAS at the time of the accident. IAS and Liberty Mutual appeal, claiming the trial court erred when it found Ms. Tran in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident.¹

The appeal by IAS and Liberty Mutual asks this court to reverse the entire judgment. The denial of their motion is not a final, appealable judgment. Ordinarily, we would not consider that interlocutory judgment on appeal. However, when the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment on the same issue, as they did here, we may review the denial of the IAS/Liberty Mutual interlocutory ruling as we address the grant of Mr. Crawford's motion, which is a final judgment. La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B)(1)² ; Susano v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 24-320, 24-321 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/14/25), 409 So.3d 1103, writ denied, 25-629 (La. 9/24/25), 417 So.3d 51.

FACTS

At the time of the accident, Ms. Tran lived in Orange and worked at the IAS office there as the marketing coordinator/manager. IAS is an HVAC company based in Texas. It also has an office in Lake Charles, but that office is not staffed. The address is used as a marketing effort to show a Lake Charles presence. Ms. Tran was always based out of the Orange office. She typically worked forty hours a week, Monday through Friday, primarily at that office.

On the Friday morning of the accident, Ms. Tran was traveling from her home in Orange to Lake Charles to meet the two owners of IAS, Robert and Mindy Currie, and attend a networking breakfast. Ms. Tran was dressed in a shirt bearing the IAS logo “so people would know what company [she] worked for.” Had Ms. Tran not been going to Lake Charles that day, she would have been at the Orange office. She was paid on an hourly basis, and she had not clocked in on the date of the accident. In her deposition, Ms. Tran testified she “wasn't really working” and would not be paid, but she “was going to get PTO time” as compensation. IAS payroll records do not specifically show which days Ms. Tran worked. However, they do indicate Ms. Tran was paid for thirty-two hours that week, suggesting she was not paid for that Friday and did not use her “paid time off” benefit.

Ms. Tran testified the breakfast was organized by the Lake Charles chapter of Business Network International. Ms. Tran was a BNI member on behalf of IAS, and IAS paid her dues. She testified in her deposition that her participation in the “BNI Networking Group ․ was just one of the things that I did to get to know people over there, more business individuals to kind of group my network in that area since our company was new.” Ms. Tran was also using the “opportunity to put [her]self out there as an individual[.]” She invited the Curries to the breakfast, and they planned to attend the event.

Ms. Currie testified as the IAS corporate representative. She explained Ms. Tran was the Lake Charles BNI member for IAS. Ms. Tran had to apply for membership and pay dues to the organization. IAS paid those dues. Ms. Currie recalled the breakfast event was not organized by BNI; rather, it was “some kind of politic meeting.” However, she and Mr. Currie planned to attend, at Ms. Tran's invitation, on behalf of IAS “because we had just opened a business in Lake Charles[,] and they were talking about expansion of different businesses.” IAS was trying to gain a foothold for the Lake Charles office.

While Ms. Currie did not know why Ms. Tran chose to go to the breakfast that day, she testified Ms. Tran “takes a vested interest” in the business. She believed Ms. Tran's purpose in attending the meeting was geared toward being part of the community and learning how to further the presence of the Lake Charles IAS office. IAS was looking to benefit from her attendance at the meeting in some fashion. Ms. Currie agreed Ms. Tran's presence could potentially benefit IAS.

Ms. Currie testified Ms. Tran was paid mileage for “consistent meetings” she attended, such as weekly BNI meetings in Lake Charles. However, the breakfast on the morning of the accident was not a weekly meeting. Although Ms. Tran's paycheck for the period covering the accident date included an amount for unspecified mileage, Ms. Currie said Ms. Tran was not paid mileage to Lake Charles that day. After the accident, the Curries came to the scene and went to the emergency room with Ms. Tran instead of going to the breakfast.

Absent the accident, Ms. Tran would have returned to Orange after the breakfast for a regular workday. She did not receive workers’ compensation benefits as a result of the accident, and neither IAS nor its workers’ compensation insurer paid her medical expenses.

The IAS marketing job was created to manage IAS internet advertising, manage mailouts, and work with its outside marketing company to measure how its marketing efforts perform. Ms. Tran was the first person to fill the newly-created marketing coordinator position for the company, and she was later promoted to the management position. Her job as marketing coordinator/manager is to “just really help grow [the] company[.]”

STANDARD OF REVIEW/BURDEN OF PROOF

In Guillory v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 24-571, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/9/25), 408 So.3d 628, 632, writ denied, 25-595 (La. 9/16/25), 416 So.3d 479, 25-596 (La. 9/16/25), and 25-601 (La. 9/16/25), 416 So.3d 475, and we set out the standard of review for appeals of summary judgment:

Summary judgments are reviewed de novo using the same criteria as that of the trial court in adjudicating the appropriateness of the summary judgment. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880. Summary judgments are granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P.art. 966(B).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(D)(1) explains the shifting burden of proof in summary judgment motions:

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Here, the burden of proof at trial belongs to IAS. Thus, Mr. Crawford's motion must show a lack of factual support for IAS's defensive claim. If he does, the burden shifts to IAS to show the existence of an issue of fact that will preclude summary judgment. Accordingly, we review the record de novo to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ms. Tran was in the course and scope of her employment with IAS at the time of the accident. Guillory, 408 So.3d 628.

DISCUSSION

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320 states in part: “Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.” In Reed v. House of Decor, Inc., 468 So.2d 1159, 1161 (La.1985), our supreme court set out factors to determine whether an employee is in the course and scope of her employment that include:

payment of wages by the employer, the employer's power of control, the employee's duty to perform the particular act, the time, place and purpose of the act in relation to service of the employer, the relationship between the employee's act and the employer's business, the benefits received by the employer from the act, the motivation of the employee for performing the act, and the reasonable expectation of the employer that the employee would perform the act.

In Orgeron on Behalf of Orgeron v. McDonald, 93-1353, p. 4 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 224, 226–27 (citations omitted), the supreme court explained:

Generally speaking, an employee's conduct is within the course and scope of his employment if the conduct is of the kind that he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer.

An employer is responsible for the negligent acts of its employee when the conduct is so closely connected in time, place, and causation to the employment duties of the employee that it constitutes a risk of harm attributable to the employer's business.

Additionally, an employee on a special mission can be in the course and scope of employment even when the facts do not fit the traditional standards. In McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc., 02-1539 (La. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1135, the supreme court held an employee was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits when he was involved in an accident after a required safety meeting that he was not paid to attend. The accident occurred as he drove his personal vehicle home after the meeting. His employer denied his workers’ compensation claim because he was not in the course and scope of his employment. The supreme court recognized the traditional rule that an employee traveling to and from the workplace is not in the course and scope of employment. However, it also examined the definition of the “special mission (or ‘special errand’) exception”:

When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course and scope of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself.

McLin, 851 So.2d at 1141, (quoting 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers’ Compensation Laws § 14.05 (2002)).

The McLin court found the employee was “clearly on a mission for his employer.” Id. at 1142. He was required to attend the meeting but was not compensated for his time. The meeting was not on his work premises, so “travel was an indispensable part of attending the meeting.” Id.

Applying these standards to the facts here, it does not appear that Ms. Tran was paid for the date of the accident. She had no duty to attend the breakfast, but she did so by her own choice. She was not in her usual place of employment, or even her usual town, at the time of the accident. The facts do not suggest that IAS expected or required Ms. Tran to attend the event.

However, when considering the time, place, and purpose of Ms. Tran's attendance, she admitted her purpose and motivation in attending the breakfast was designed not only to “put [her]self out there” but also to serve IAS. She was traveling to the event to meet and network with business people in hopes of benefiting the new IAS office in Lake Charles. “It was just one of the things” she did to network for the benefit of IAS. She and Ms. Currie wore IAS shirts that identified both of them with the company. Ms. Currie anticipated that IAS would potentially benefit from Ms. Tran's participation. As in McLin, 851 So.2d 1135, travel was an essential part of the networking service Ms. Tran would provide to IAS by attending the event.

Ms. Tran's job was to market IAS. The facts show the breakfast was in some way associated with BNI, an organization for which IAS paid Ms. Tran's membership dues and mileage when she attended meetings. Ms. Tran's intention was to be present with the owners of IAS at the breakfast and present a positive image of IAS. She had a vested interest in doing so.

CONCLUSION

Ms. Tran's conduct on the date of the accident (attending the breakfast) was of the kind she was employed to perform. It occurred close to her regular work hours in a location where IAS had an office that she intended to promote at the event. Her attendance at the breakfast was primarily to serve IAS. Travel was essential to the networking opportunity attendance at the event would provide. Our de novo review of the facts shows Ms. Tran was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of this accident.

DECREE

We affirm the trial court's amended judgment granting the partial motion for summary judgment filed by Andrey Crawford finding Ashla Tran was acting in the course and scope of her employment with Innovative Air Solutions, LLC and denying the motion of IAS and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. All costs of this proceeding are assessed against IAS and Liberty Mutual.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Neither the summary judgment motions nor the trial court's judgment and amended judgment address or resolve Mr. Crawford's claims that IAS negligently hired, supervised, screened, and trained Ms. Tran as set out in his First Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages.

2.   We note the 2025 revision to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(C), effective August 1, 2025, would consider the rulings on both motions for summary judgment to be interlocutory judgments not subject to an immediate appeal. The pre-revision article applies here because the hearing on these motions took place on January 31, 2025, and the judgment and amended judgment were signed before the revision took effect.

DAVIS, Judge.