STATE OF LOUISIANA v. SCOTT ALLEN COOPER (2025)

The State of Louisiana seeks supervisory review of the trial court's judgment finding that evidence of other crimes was not admissible in its second degree murder prosecution against Defendant, Scott Allen Cooper. For the reasons set forth, we grant the writ, grant the relief requested by the State, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 24, 2021, a grand jury for the parish of Acadia indicted Defendant for the second degree murder of the victim, Garrison Gautreaux. This matter is set for a jury trial on October 27, 2025.

On October 3, 2025, the State of Louisiana filed notice pursuant to La.Code Evid. art. 404(B) of its intent to introduce evidence of Defendant's involvement in the 1997 murder of Earl Zenon.

Defendant was convicted on October 31, 2002, of being a principal to the second degree murder in that case, wherein he argued that he had no knowledge that the victim would be killed or the intent to kill him. This court affirmed the conviction, and the supreme court denied writs. State v. Cooper, 03-161 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/03), 862 So.2d 512, 524, writ denied, 04-236 (La. 6/4/04), 876 So. 2d 74.

Cooper then filed an application for post conviction relief, which was denied on April 19, 2005. He filed a second application for post conviction relief, which was granted, ordering a new trial, which was set for March 8, 2012. This court denied the State's writ application as to this ruling. State v. Cooper, 07-698 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07) (unpublished opinion). However, we note that the basis for the granting of the application and denial of the writ was related to a confrontation clause issue rather than a sufficiency issue:

WRIT DENIED: The statements asserted by the prosecutor as originating from Moore were hearsay, which were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and therefore, testimonial. Relator was not able to confront the prosecutor, who was alleging the statement. See La.Code Evid. art. 801(C); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004); State v. Weaver, 05-169 (La.App. 5 Cir. l l/29/05), 917 So.2d 600, writ denied, 06-695 (La. 12/12/06), 944 So.2d 1277. Accordingly, there was no error in the trial court's ruling.

Thereafter, Defendant pled guilty to obstruction of justice in the murder of Zenon and was sentenced to ten years and six months at hard labor.

The State filed its memorandum in support of its intent to introduce other crimes evidence on October 6, 2025. Defendant responded by filing a motion to exclude the other crimes evidence on October 8, 2025. During an October 10, 2025 hearing, both parties agreed to submit the matter on their briefs and exhibits. The State's exhibits consisted of the offense reports and trial transcripts from the 1997 murder trial and Defendant's conviction. On October 13, 2025, the State responded to Defendant's motion, indicating that the other crimes evidence was being introduced “to show the defendant's actions were not inadvertent or unintentional.”

The trial court rendered its written reasons and judgment on October 17, 2025, granting Defendant's motion to exclude the State's proposed evidence because the evidence was inadmissible. The State filed the instant writ application, posing the following two issue for this court, whether the trial court legally erred in ruling that the Defendant's involvement in the murder of Earl Zenon was inadmissible to prove his intent and knowledge in the murder of the victim and that the evidence's probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudice to Defendant.

DISCUSSION

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B)(1)(a) provides that generally, “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.” However, such acts may “be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident[.]” Id.

It is well settled that courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to show the defendant as a man of bad character who has acted in conformity with his bad character. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1); State v. Williams, 96-1023, p. 30 (La.1/21/98), 708 So.2d 703, 725; State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126, 128 (La.1973). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts committed by the defendant is generally inadmissible because of the “substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant.” Prieur, 277 So.2d at 128. However, the State may introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts if it establishes an independent and relevant reason such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1). The State must provide the defendant with notice and a hearing before trial if it intends to offer such evidence. Prieur, 277 So.2d at 130. Even when the other crimes evidence is offered for a purpose allowed under art. 404(B)(1), the evidence is not admissible unless it tends to prove a material fact at issue or to rebut a defendant's defense. State v. Martin, 377 So.2d 259, 263 (La.1979); Prieur, 277 So.2d at 130. The State also bears the burden of proving that defendant committed the other crimes, wrongs or acts. State v. Galliano, 2002–2849, p. 2, (La.1/10/03), 839 So.2d 932, 933 (per curiam).

Although a defendant's prior bad acts may be relevant and otherwise admissible under La. C.E. art. 404(B), the court must still balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effects before the evidence can be admitted. La. C.E. art. 403. Any inculpatory evidence is “prejudicial” to a defendant, especially when it is “probative” to a high degree. State v. Germain, 433 So.2d 110, 118 (La.1983). As used in the balancing test, “prejudicial” limits the introduction of probative evidence of prior misconduct only when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial. Id. See also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 650, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997)(“The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.”).

State v. Rose, 06-402, pp. 12–13 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1236, 1243–44 (footnote omitted).

“[T]he state is required to prove that the defendant committed the other crime by clear and convincing evidence.” State v. Scales, 93-03, p. 4 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 1326, 1330–31, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050, 116 S.Ct. 716 (1996). We review the trial court's decision to admit or deny other crimes evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Shelton, 11-22 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/28/11), 75 So.3d 512, writ denied, 11-2405 (La. 3/9/12), 84 So.3d 552.

In its judgment, the trial court held “that this Court finds in favor of the Defendant, Scott Cooper, and against the State of Louisiana and finds that the other crimes evidence offered by the State of Louisiana is hereby inadmissible and grants the Defendant's Motion to Exclude Other Crimes Evidence.” In its written reasons, it noted that the State sought to introduce the proposed evidence, regarding Defendant's involvement in Zenon's murder and subsequent plan to frame his co-defendant, to prove “preparation, plan, identify, knowledge, opportunity, and absence of mistake or accident.” It further noted that Defendant argued that the evidence was inadmissible as being speculative and prejudicial.

Although the trial court took issue with the State's failure to specify which exception under La.Code Crim.P. art. 404(B)(1) it was relying upon, it proceeded to review the merits given the State's specificity in its response mentioned above. The trial court relied exclusively on State v. Garcia, 09-1578 (La. 11/16/12), 108 So.3d 1, cert. denied, 570 U.S. 926, 133 S.Ct. 2863 (2013), which focused on the use of evidence of other crimes to prove identity/modus operandi. Applying Garcia, the trial court found that “there is not such a great degree of the similarity of the offenses as to make a finding that the evidence enhances the probability that the same person was the perpetrator.” For this reason, the trial court held that the probative value of the evidence would be outweighed by its prejudicial effect, further noting that Defendant's criminal history does not tend to prove he intended to manipulate the evidence in the present case.

In our view, the trial court was incorrect in focusing on the other crimes evidence only as proof of identity of the perpetrator and on the “similarity of the offenses[.]” As such, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the State's use of the other crimes evidence.

Although identity was a primary focus for the trial court, it is not at issue here. However, the State is required to prove that the victim was killed by a perpetrator who harbored specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. We note that Defendant and Robert Moreno were jointly indicted for the victim's murder, and there being no indication at present that the felony-murder provisions of La.R.S. 14:30.1 are at play, both are being charged as principals, making intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm a key issue. When intent is an essential element of the charged crime, a defendant's plea of not guilty automatically places his or her intent at issue. See State v. Williams, 23-506 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/24), 380 So.3d 192.

Additionally, in State v. Blank, 04-204, pp. 42–43 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, 125, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S.Ct. 494 (2007), the supreme court explained:

The state possesses the burden to prove every element of the crime, including specific intent, beyond a reasonable doubt. That being the case, because defendant maintained that he acted in self-defense in his confession, the state was entitled to present evidence to the contrary in support of its case. In a somewhat analogous situation, in United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, [sic] (7th Cir.1987), the defendant was accused of a child's murder and claimed that the victim's death was accidental. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence regarding the defendant's physical abuse of other children in her care was admissible to prove that the victim's death resulted from physical abuse. Id. at 1303; cf. United States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d 1322, 1329 (7th Cir.1986) (when a defendant is charged with a crime and specific intent is an essential element of that crime, the government may introduce evidence of prior or subsequent acts to establish the element of intent even if the defendant has not placed his intent into question).

The supreme court further set out three prerequisites that the State must establish before other crimes evidence can be found admissible as evidence of the defendant's intent: “(1) the prior acts must be similar; (2) there must be a real and genuine contested issue of intent at trial; and (3) the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.” Id. at 124; see also Williams, 380 So.3d at 206 (quoting State v. Randolph, 16-892, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/3/17), 219 So.3d 425, 431).

The facts presented here by the State are that the victim, who was shot in the chest, was found in the front driver seat of his vehicle, which was parked in the parking lot of a house. He was shot through his vehicle's open driver's side window. Video surveillance showed the victim being followed by a black Ford Expedition with a Texas license plate. Prior to the homicide, the Expedition was seen at a home in Duson, Louisiana, where Defendant was observed removing a firearm from the passenger seat. After the homicide, video surveillance from a bar showed Defendant manipulating something in his hands outside the Expedition's front passenger seat, and Moreno walking around the vehicle to help him. A jammed firearm was found on the Expedition's floorboard the following morning. Moreno was later stopped while driving the Expedition in Houston, Texas, and he advised that he and his family had spent the weekend at Defendant's home. Moreno called Defendant on his way to the Houston Police Department, and Defendant told him not to talk, to get a lawyer, and not to mention Defendant's name. Ballistics analysis performed on Moreno's gun matched the projectile found in the victim's body. While incarcerated, Defendant told another inmate that “he's not going to take this[,]” and “he would ‘give the loot to the mexican [sic] ․ his fall partner.’ ” Defendant also told the inmate that he knew his partner was “running his mouth[,]” and if his partner would shut up, they would get out of this. Additionally, the State indicates that there are jail calls in which Defendant said there was no evidence on him, with all of the evidence pointing to Moreno.

The 1997 murder involved Zenon being shot and killed by two assailants. He was shot through an open driver's side window while he was sitting in the driver's seat of his vehicle, which was parked in a parking lot. The vehicle was then driven to another parish where the victim's body was set on fire. Defendant had paged the victim from Vince Moore's house about purchasing marijuana, after which he and Moore rode with Daniel Smith to meet the victim in a store parking lot. After Defendant and Moore approached the victim's vehicle, Moore shot the victim. Defendant ran to Smith's vehicle, and Smith drove him to Moore's house. According to Defendant, Moore arrived later, stating that he had burned the victim's vehicle and the evidence. In a later interview, Defendant said that he was in victim's vehicle with Moore, and they returned to Moore's house, where Moore covered the victim with a blanket before driving the victim's vehicle, led by Smith and Defendant in Smith's car, to a rice field where he set the car on fire. Defendant returned home with Moore where they smoked the stolen marijuana.

We find that these crimes are very similar in that Defendant did not act alone, used co-defendant's vehicles, did not report the murders, and attempted to place the blame on others. Additionally, the victims were both shot through an open driver's side window while their vehicles were parked. This matter involves a genuine and contested issue of intent, particularly because Defendant places the blame on Moreno. In addition, the evidence is highly probative of proof of system and lack of mistake as to Defendant's involvement and knowledge. Given the similarities and the highly relevant nature of the evidence, the probative value outweighs the potential prejudicial effect, and we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the admissibility thereof.

DECREE

For the reasons set forth, we grant the State of Louisiana's writ application and grant the relief requested by reversing the trial court's ruling and rendering judgment in favor of the State of Louisiana, finding that the other crimes evidence regarding Defendant's involvement in the 1997 murder of Earl Zenon is admissible. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF GRANTED; AND REMANDED.

FITZGERALD, Judge.