STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF v. << (2025)

In this appeal, the mother and biological father of the minor child appeal the judgment terminating their parental rights. Finding no error in the trial court judgment, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 25, 2023, N.M. was born premature at twenty-seven weeks, weighing only 1 pound, 15 ounces.¹ A.M. was the infant's mother and was married to G.M. at the time of the conception and birth. G.M. was the son of T.M. DNA testing performed later conclusively proved that T.M., and not G.M., was the biological father of N.M.²

Following the birth, it was determined that N.M. was born drug exposed and the mother was unable to care for the baby. The nursing staff found the mother to be unresponsive and unable to stay awake. The child was observed to nearly fall out of the mother's arms. The rooming process was then discontinued by hospital staff and the baby moved to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU). While N.M. was in NICU, the mother did not visit the child for nearly two weeks and often did not answer her phone to receive updates as to the baby's progress when called daily by the nursing staff.

It was established that during her pregnancy A.M. tested positive for amphetamines. Later drug screens showed she tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, ecstasy and Suboxone (a pain pill). A.M. admitted to using methamphetamines only a few days before N.M. was born. A.M. also acknowledged in later interviews that she suffered from anxiety and depression and had a history of drug abuse.

T.M., the biological father, worked offshore and was not present at the time of the birth. The record is not clear when T.M. became aware he was the biological father of N.M. A.M. later stated that T.M. was unaware of her drug problems, though others testified A.M. often discussed her need to get help and that T.M. was well aware of her drug addictions.

Due to the fact N.M. was born drug exposed and A.M. was unable to care for the child due to her condition, N.M. was placed in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) following birth. DCFS subsequently instituted an investigation. On May 10, 2023, an oral instanter order was issued removing N.M. from the custody of A.M. and T.M. and placed officially into DCFS's custody. A continued custody hearing was held on May 15, 2023. DCFS filed a petition to adjudicate N.M. as a child in need of care. A hearing was held on May 26, 2023, and on June 13, 2023, N.M. was adjudicated a child in need of care. Following this, multiple case review hearings were conducted.

Eventually, on June 20, 2024, DCFS filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Certification of Adoption. An answer hearing was conducted on July 3, 2024. The matter was initially scheduled for trial on September 3, 2024, was continued to November 21, 2024, then January 2, 2025, and lastly until March 5, 2025. Following trial on the merits, the trial court took the matter under advisement, and on April 2, 2025, issued a “Judgment Terminating Parental Rights” and accompanying written reasons for judgment. In relevant part, the written reasons for judgment provided:

Concerning the mother, [A.M.], at the time of trial she had not improved her condition in the least and had failed to [complete] most, if not all, of her case plan. Evidence showed that she left the home of [T.M.] in September 2024 to go to rehab for a month and that since leaving rehab early she had been basically homeless, living with friends she met at rehab. She still has no job, no income or revenue, and her counseling and parenting classes remain incomplete. Case worker, Cheryl Doyle, says that [A.M.] is still looking for work but cannot find a job or secure revenue to take care of herself, much less her child. She also failed to visit with the child regularly, attending only about 1/3 of the visits, and continued to use drugs. Unfortunately, the Court cannot see that [A.M.’s] situation will improve anytime soon. As the case [law] and evidence pertains to [A.M.], the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is warranted and in the best interest of the minor child.

[T.M.] has always lived with his mother in her home in Oberlin. She passed away during these proceedings and [T.M.] remains in the house. With his mother's passing and [A.M.] leaving the house, [T.M.] can find no one who is not a drug user to provide support or to help him care for a toddler. He has had a career working on tug boats, often for weeks at a time. When the child was removed by the State, [T.M.] was working this schedule. [T.M.] is 60 years old and has fathered many children, but has strictly relied on the mothers of his children to do all the child rearing. He earlier admitted he has no business or desire to do these things and intended for [A.M.] to get sober to do the child caring. [T.M.] felt it was his job to bring finances into the home claiming that he was “old school” in that way. At the time of the trial, he said he was disabled and pursuing a lawsuit. He says he was receiving workers compensation benefits for now.

For a year and one-half, while the child was in State's custody, [T.M.] did virtually nothing toward completing his case plan and likewise regularly failed to visit with his child. It was only after [A.M.] left the home that [T.M.] began to take steps to work his case plan, which remains substantially incomplete at the time of trial. The Court is concerned with this behavior as it reveals that [T.M.’s] heart is not in caring for his infant child. In the Court's opinion, considering the tender age of the child, the length of time the child has been in State's care, and the need for the child to have a stable loving home, the Court finds that the State met its legal burden to prove termination of parental rights as it related to the acknowledged father, [T.M.].

Additionally, the State has shown that the minor child is currently residing in a wonderful prospective adoptive home, cared for by loving and caring foster parents who were willing to continue to love and care for this child and provide the child with the means of having a great future that would alternatively not be available if parental rights are not terminated. Thus, termination of parental rights are in the best interest of the minor child.

Judgment in accordance with the written reasons was signed. Both A.M. and T.M. filed Motions for New Trial, which were denied. They both then filed an appeal, wherein they assert three assignments of error:

1) The trial court manifestly erred in terminating parental rights when the record fails to show there was ever a case plan approved by the court;

2) The trial court manifestly erred in finding termination was warranted based on the grounds that appellants failed to provide substantial support for the child for a period in excess of six months pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4);

3) The trial court manifestly erred in finding the grounds for termination based on a failure to substantially complete their case plan.

ANALYSIS

This court in State in Interest of J.A., 17-500, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/4/18), 237 So.3d 69, 72, discussed the law and standard of review applicable to a judgment involving the termination of parental rights:

A parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in establishing and maintaining a meaningful relationship with his or her children. State in Interest of A.C., 93-1125 (La. 1/27/94), 643 So.2d 719. This parental interest includes the “care, custody, and management of their child.” State ex rel. J.M., 02-2089, p. 7 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1247, 1252. Consistent with the parental interest, the state has a legitimate interest in limiting or terminating parental rights under certain conditions. Id. Because termination of parental rights is a severe action, the state bears the burden of establishing each element of a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. La.Ch.Code art. 1035; State ex rel. B.H. v. A.H., 42,864 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/24/07), 968 So.2d 881. The statutory grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are found in La.Ch.Code art. 1015, although “only one ground need be established.” State ex rel. B.H., 968 So.2d at 885. Once a ground for termination has been established, the parental rights may be terminated by the trial court if it is in the child's best interest. Id; La.Ch.Code art. 1037. [1]> [2]The trial court's judgment terminating parental rights is reviewed under a manifest error standard of review. > State in the Interest of M.J.F., 18-584 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/18), 261 So.3d 879.

The trial court's judgment terminating parental rights is reviewed under a manifest error standard of review. State in the Interest of M.J.F., 18-584 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/18), 261 So.3d 879. “A trial court's factual determinations as to whether there has been substantial compliance with a case plan, whether a significant indication of reformation has been shown, and whether the parent is likely to reform will not be set aside unless the record reflects that the trial court is clearly wrong.” State ex rel. G.O., 10-571, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/8/11), 68 So.3d 636, 640, writ denied, 11-1512 (La. 7/21/11), 67 So.3d 479.

The state alleged the basis for terminating parental rights were found under La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4) and 1015(5), which state:

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:

․

(4) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid parental responsibility by any of the following:

․

(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to provide significant contributions to the child's care and support for any period of six consecutive months.

(c) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to maintain significant contact with the child by visiting him or communicating with him for any period of six consecutive months.

(5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent's custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child's age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

Louisiana Children's Code Article 1036(C) and (D) provides the grounds for lack of parental compliance with a case plan, stating:

C. Under Article 1015(5), lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

(1) The parent's failure to attend court-approved scheduled visitations with the child.

(2) The parent's failure to communicate with the child.

(3) The parent's failure to keep the department apprised of the parent's whereabouts and significant changes affecting the parent's ability to comply with the case plan for services.

(4) The parent's failure to contribute to the costs of the child's foster care, if ordered to do so by the court when approving the case plan.

(5) The parent's repeated failure to comply with the required program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case plan.

(6) The parent's lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing reunification.

(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions.

(8)(a)The parent's failure to provide a negative test result for all synthetic or other controlled dangerous substances, except for any drug for which the parent has lawfully received a prescription, at the completion of a reasonable case plan.

(b) For purposes of this Article, “controlled dangerous substance” shall have the meaning ascribed in R.S. 40:961.

D. Under Article 1015(6), lack of any reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's conduct in the near future may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

(1) Any physical or mental illness, mental deficiency, substance abuse, or chemical dependency that renders the parent unable or incapable of exercising parental responsibilities without exposing the child to a substantial risk of serious harm, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

(2) A pattern of repeated incarceration of the parent that has rendered the parent unable to care for the immediate and continuing physical or emotional needs of the child for extended periods of time.

(3) Any other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that the parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

Assignments of Error

In their first assignment of error, A.M. and T.M. argue the record lacks a proper, court approved case plan. They maintain DCFS case worker Cheryl Doyle “indicated the first case plan ever to be filed in this matter was filed on June 27, 2024, which was 7 days after the petition for termination was filed.” They further maintain the only other case plan approved by the court was filed on September 3, 2024, and approved that same day. In brief, T.M. and A.M. argue La.Ch.Code art. 674 requires that the case plan be filed at least 10 days prior to the hearing when it is approved. Louisiana Children's Code Article 674 reads as follows:

A copy of the case plan shall be filed with the court ten days before any scheduled disposition, permanency, or case review hearing. Upon filing, the department shall provide a copy of the case plan to counsel of record either by mail or electronic mail and shall mail a copy by certified mail to any unrepresented parent at his last known address or send the copy by electronic mail at the electronic mail address expressly designated by the parent in a pleading, at the continued custody or continued safety plan hearing, or at any other hearing at which the parent personally appeared before the court, unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause.

Appellants’ contention that “at the time the petition to terminate was filed, no case plan had ever been filed into the record of this matter nor was one ever approved by the court” is not supported by the record. The record includes a “Court Report” dated 08/24/23, wherein it is stated “The most recent Family Team Meeting (FTM) was held on 7/19/23 and the case plan is attached for your review.” The “Court Report” also specifically stated in its “Recommendations for Case Review Hearing” that the trial court “[a]pproves the case plan (including the YTP if applicable) dated 06/20/23, as presented by DCFS.” At the Case Review Hearing held on September 20, 2023, the trial court specifically held “It is FURTHER ORDERED that with no objection by the father, the court accepts the recommendation of the State and orders that the child remain in the custody of the State with a primary goal of reunification. The court also orders that the DCFS report be filed into the record.” This order “accepting the recommendation of the State” is an approval of the 06/20/23 case plan.

Further, on March 1, 2024, there was an initial Permanency Hearing, after which a Permanency Hearing Order was rendered. In that order, the trial court found that the State “provided case plan to parents, completed monthly visits with parents and child, made referrals for parenting classes, provided resource information for parents to complete case plan action steps.” Later in the Order, it specifically stated “that the case plan, submitted by the Department and dated 11/06/23 is approved as it is consistent with the health and safety of the child[ren] and in the best interests of the child[ren], and all parties ordered to comply therewith.” A copy of the 11/06/23 case plan, signed by the mother and father, is found in the record of the proceedings.

In addition, appellants acknowledge there was a case plan filed in this matter on June 27, 2024. That case plan was dated May 17, 2024 and was signed by T.M. on May 17, 2024 and by A.M. on June 11, 2024. Clearly this was well in advance of the September 3, 2024 case review hearing. There also was no objection filed by either parent as to any untimely submission or failure to receive the May 17, 2024 case plan. This indicates the parties had possession of a court-approved case plan, at least ten months prior to the March 5, 2025 trial seeking to terminate parental rights.

The record also establishes that A.M. and T.M. attended Family Team Meetings which involved discussion of the case plan components and requirements. Their action in commencing at least some of the case plan components, however sporadically, is clear evidence of their knowledge of the case plan requirements.

Appellants argue that the State violated La.Ch.Code art. 674 but fail to identify the alleged violation. As DCFS notes, with respect to the May 17, 2024 case plan, it was filed of record on June 27, 2024 and signed by the parents prior to that date. Thus, it would have been disseminated well in advance (clearly more than ten days) of the September 3, 2024 case review. Which would be in accordance with La.Ch.Code art. 674.

Therefore, we find no merit in the assignment of error that the record lacks a proper, court-approved case plan.

In their second assignment of error, both A.M. and T.M. aver that the trial court manifestly erred in finding termination was warranted based on the grounds that they failed to provide substantial support for the child for a period in excess of six months pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4). A review of the arguments reveals both A.M. and T.M. focus solely on La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4)(b), which deals with the failure “to provide significant contributions to the child's care and support for any period of six consecutive months.” They do not address La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4)(c), which sets forth as a ground for termination a parent's failure “to maintain significant contact with the child by visiting him or communicating with him for any period of six consecutive months.”

The trial court specifically noted in its written reasons for judgment that A.M. “failed to visit with the child regularly, attending only about 1/3 of the visits.” The State further notes in brief that from July 4, 2024, until the date of trial, March 5, 2025 (a period of eight months), A.M. only visited the child one time, on November 16, 2024. This certainly does not amount to “significant contact” with the minor child and constitutes abandonment of the child under La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4)(c). The trial court did not manifestly err in so finding.

As to T.M., in its written reasons for judgment, the trial court noted that T.M. “regularly failed to visit with this child.” The State notes in brief that from July 4, 2024 until the time of trial (approximately 8 months), T.M. only visited the minor child three times. Again, three visits in eight months is not “significant contact.” Thus, the trial court did not manifestly err in concluding T.M. was guilty of abandonment under La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4)(c).

In their last assignment of error, A.M. and T.M. aver that the trial court manifestly erred in finding termination was warranted based on the grounds that they failed to substantially complete their case plan pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5). As stated above, “[w]hether termination of parental rights is warranted is a question of fact, and a district court's determinations will not be set aside in the absence of manifest error.” State ex rel. H.A.B., 10-1111, p. 31 (La. 10/19/10), 49 So.3d 345, 368.

A review of the record reveals the trial court did not manifestly err in finding both A.M. and T.M. failed to substantially comply with their case plans.

As to A.M., as noted above, she failed to regularly visit and communicate with the minor child. A.M. continued to have no regular source of employment or income. She also depended on others for a place to live. A.M. had not completed recommended intensive outpatient (IOP) substance abuse treatment and left same against staff advice. She also did not complete scheduled domestic violence classes or parenting education classes. Lastly, and although not a component of her case plan, A.M. attended the termination hearing yet chose not to make any attempt to argue her case before the judge, essentially acquiescing to the termination of her parental rights. The record supports the trial court's finding that A.M. was not in compliance with her case plan and there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement.

As to T.M., his testimony throughout these proceedings showed he is only interested in being a father if there is a woman to do the child rearing. The trial court specifically noted in his written reasons that T.M. “has no business or desire to do these things and intended for [A.M.] to get sober to do the child caring.” T.M. also acknowledged he can find no one who is not a drug user to provide support or to help him care for a toddler. His plan seemingly was to try to get A.M. drug free so she could care for the child, which obviously is problematic considering A.M.’s inability and/or desire to get her life straight. For over a year, the trial court noted that T.M. “did virtually nothing toward completing his case plan.” He also failed to regularly visit the child, only visiting the child three times in an eight-month period. T.M. has also had his own battles with drug abuse and mental problems. He tested positive for methamphetamines. He subsequently did complete some lower-level substance abuse treatment, but he did not complete the recommended mental health counseling, and his case was closed for non-compliance. Despite substance abuse treatment and being a recovering alcoholic, he tested positive for alcohol as recently as January 14, 2025. In late September of 2024, T.M. sought additional mental health treatment with Vermilion Behavioral Health for major depression and suicidal ideations. At discharge, it was recommended he complete outpatient care and continue taking the depression and anxiety medications he was prescribed. He was also to follow up with therapy and medication management but failed to do so. In January of 2025, he presented to Allen Parish hospital due to suicidal thoughts. Following a brief stay, it was recommended he engage in intensive outpatient therapy. As of the time of trial, T.M. had not yet completed all recommended substance abuse treatment and mental health therapy. T.M. also had begun anger management/domestic violence classes, but his attendance was sporadic and at the time of trial was incomplete.

Considering the above, the trial court cannot be said to be manifestly erroneous in finding T.M. was not in compliance with his case plan and there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement.

Lastly, although not addressed in the brief of either party, we will address the best interest of the child. The law and jurisprudence is clear the paramount consideration in determining whether to terminate a parent's rights is whether that would be in the best interest of the child. State in Interest of J.A., 237 So.3d 69. Cheryl Doyle, the case worker, testified N.M. had been with the same foster parents for 22 months, with all her needs being exceedingly met, and with the desire of the foster parents to legally adopt the child if possible. Therefore, we find the record establishes the termination of parental rights and the certification of N.M. for adoption is in the best interests of the child.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we find no manifest error in the trial court's judgment terminating the parental rights of A.M. and T.M., and declaring N.M. eligible for adoption, and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We use the initials of the minor child and the parent to protect the minor's identity and ensure the parties’ privacy. See Rule 5-2, Uniform Rules--Courts of Appeal.

2.   G.M., as the presumptive father, appeared in earlier proceedings involving the custody of N.M., but when DNA testing conclusively proved T.M. to be the biological father, G.M. no longer participated in these proceedings.

LEDRICKA J. THIERRY JUDGE