STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHRISTOPHER DUGAS JR CHRISTOPHER WJ DUGAS CHRISTOPHER DUGAS (2025)

Following a trial by jury, Christopher W.J. Dugas, Jr. (Defendant), was convicted of possession with intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. For possession with intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids, he was sentenced as a habitual offender and ordered to serve twenty-five years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Defendant was sentenced to serve fifteen years without benefits, to run concurrently with his other sentence. Defendant appeals.

I.

ISSUES

Defendant asserts the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence and statements because the police officers did not have probable cause to suspect the presence of illegal drugs. Thus, the district court's denial of the motion to suppress was manifest error.

2. At trial, the prosecution failed to [present] sufficient evidence to show that Dugas knew or should have known of the presence of synthetic marijuana in the console and the firearm in the trunk of the vehicle. S.G., the driver of the vehicle, specifically told the police that she transferred her items to the vehicle before the couple was stopped by the police. Therefore, the verdict against Dugas was improper because the prosecution failed to establish that Dugas had actual or constructive knowledge of the illegal items in the vehicle before the traffic stop.

II.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we review all appeals for errors patent on the face of the record. In this case, there are three errors patent.

First, the trial court erred in denying parole eligibility. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(G) states that any habitual offender sentence must be served “at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.” The restriction on parole eligibility, however, is that which is provided for in the referenced statute. State v. Ford, 16-869 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/19/17), 217 So.3d 634, writ denied, 17-936 (La. 4/6/18), 239 So.3d 829. As there is no denial of parole eligibility required for possession with the intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoid, the trial court erred in denying it, and we amend the sentence to delete the denial of parole eligibility.

Second, Defendant was improperly advised regarding the time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief. At sentencing, the judge informed Defendant: “And I will remind you that you have two (2) years post-conviction relief, two (2) years from the date this judgment becomes final in order to appeal anything done here today.” Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8(A), however, states that: “No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922[.]” This opinion can and will serve as notice of the time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Mason, 24-407 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/25), 407 So.3d 822, writ denied, 25-270 (La. 4/29/25), 407 So.3d 620; and State v. Washington, 24-308 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/25), 406 So.3d 579.

Finally, although the penalty for possession with the intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids is determined by the weight possessed, the charging instrument failed to specify the weight of the synthetic cannabinoids possessed in this case. When the charge was read to the jury at the close of trial, no mention was made of the weight of the synthetic cannabinoids. In its verdict, the jury made no finding as to the weight of the synthetic cannabinoids possessed by Defendant.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:966(B) provides the following penalties for possession with the intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids:

(2) A substance classified in Schedule I which is marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or chemical derivatives of tetrahydrocannabinols, or synthetic cannabinoids for an amount of:

(a) An aggregate weight of less than two and one half pounds, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor more than ten years, and pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars.

(b) An aggregate weight of two and one half pounds or more, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one year nor more than twenty years and pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 470 provides: “Value, price, or amount of damage need not be alleged in the indictment, unless such allegation is essential to charge or determine the grade of the offense.” Since the penalty for possession of synthetic cannabinoids is dependent on the weight of the substance possessed, the weight should have been charged in the bill. But this error is harmless.

This court addressed a similar error patent in State v. Bruner, 23-35 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/23) (unpublished opinion). Bruner was charged with two counts of distribution of methamphetamine, and the bill of information did not specify the weight of the methamphetamine. This court found that the error was harmless:

In State v. Carr, 52,273 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18), 256 So.3d 470, writ denied, 18-1815 (La. 4/8/19), 267 So.3d 611, the defendant asserted on appeal that his bill of information was defective because it did not allege the amount of cocaine he possessed. After noting that the defendant did not complain of the alleged error before his conviction, the second circuit explained that he failed to demonstrate “how the omission misled him to his prejudice as required by La.C.Cr.P. art. 464.” Carr, 256 So.3d at 477.

․

Unlike Carr, Defendant here fails to allege any error in the bill of information and fails to allege that he was prejudiced by the failure of the bill of information to state the weight of the methamphetamine distributed. Defendant also did not raise any objection or lack of notice in the trial court.

․

In summary, even though the bill of information failed to state the weight of the methamphetamine distributed by Defendant, the error in our view was harmless.

Bruner, 23-35, pp. 3–4.

In the present case, Defendant failed to allege any error in the bill of information or that he was prejudiced by the failure of the bill of information to state the weight of the synthetic cannabinoids. Defendant did not raise any objection to lack of notice in the trial court. Considering that the trial court referred to the lower of the two penalty ranges in imposing Defendant's original sentence, it is clear that the lower-weight penalty provision was used. Since Defendant does not complain of the error or allege prejudice, the State's failure to give the weight of the synthetic cannabinoids in the charging instrument was harmless.

III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 25, 2021, Sergeant Jonathan Morgan (Sergeant Morgan), a K-9 handler with the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Office (APSO), observed a tan Chrysler 200 with darkly tinted windows and a tinted license plate cover. Earlier in his shift, he received information that a vehicle matching that description would possibly be transporting narcotics. Sergeant Morgan initiated a traffic stop. Defendant was a passenger in the front seat of the vehicle, which was being driven by his girlfriend, Shontanna Guillory (Ms. Guillory). During the stop, Sergeant Morgan retrieved the canine from his police car, and the canine indicated an odor response. Officers then searched the vehicle and found drugs and drug paraphernalia in the interior of the vehicle and a firearm in the trunk.

In docket number 93350 of the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Defendant was originally charged with eight separate offenses, including count one, possession with the intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966; count three, illegal possession of a stolen firearm, a violation of La.R.S. 14:69.1; and count five, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. The State filed two amended bills of information, resulting in five of the charges being dropped.

Prior to the amended bills of information, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and statements. He alleged that, during the traffic stop, the police unlawfully obtained physical evidence and incriminating oral statements. The motion was denied, and Defendant filed a notice of intent to seek writs from this court. However, the writ was denied as untimely filed. State v. Dugas, 23-89 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/13/23) (unpublished writ decision).

The jury found Defendant guilty on the counts of possession with intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and not guilty on the count of possession of a stolen firearm. Defendant's motion for new trial was denied, and Defendant was sentenced to five years at hard labor for possession with intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids and fifteen years at hard labor for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The State then filed a bill of information under a separate docket number, 97789, charging Defendant as a multiple offender. Defendant was adjudicated a habitual offender, and the trial court vacated his original five-year sentence and imposed a sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor without benefits.

Defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions but amend the habitual offender sentence for possession with the intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids to delete the denial of parole eligibility. We further instruct the trial court to make a minute entry to reflect this change. Additionally, this opinion serves to advise Defendant that no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence is final under the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 914 or 922.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

“When issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La.1992). Accordingly, we first address Defendant's second assignment of error wherein he contends that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence showing that he knew or should have known that synthetic marijuana and a firearm were present in his vehicle.

The analysis for insufficient evidence claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute synthetic marijuana, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966, which provides that it is unlawful for a person to possess with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule I, which includes synthetic marijuana. See La.R.S. 40:964.

“The offense of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance is comprised of two elements: (1) a knowing and intentional possession of the substance (2) with a specific intent to distribute it.” State v. Taylor, 16-1124, 16-1183, p. 16 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So.3d 283, 295. A controlled substance can be physically or constructively possessed, and determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction of possession depends on the facts of each case. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983).

In State v. Magdaleno, 03-618, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/03), 856 So.2d 1246, 1249–50, writ denied, 03-3342 (La. 3/26/04), 871 So.2d 347, this court explained constructive possession of a controlled substance:

Regarding the charge of possession, the State is not required to prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the cocaine; instead, the defendant may be found to have been in constructive possession. State v. Scott, 00-113 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 768 So.2d 112, citing State v. Montgomery, 98-775 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/27/99), 734 So.2d 650. If the State's case is premised upon constructive possession, the State must prove that the controlled dangerous substance was within the defendant's dominion and control or in his joint possession. Scott, 768 So.2d 112, citing State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983), and State v. President, 97-1593 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/15/98), 715 So.2d 745, writ denied, 98-2115 (La.12/11/98), 729 So.2d 590. Joint possession is described in State v. Segura, 546 So.2d 1347 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989), as two people willingly and knowingly sharing a direct right in the thing and an ability to exercise control over it. Constructive possession is established by reference to the factors set forth in State v. Toups, 01-1875 (La.10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, in an examination of the facts at hand: for example, the defendant's knowledge that illegal drugs are in the area; the defendant's relationship with the person who has physical possession of the drugs; the defendant's access to the area where the drugs were found; evidence of recent drug use by the defendant; and the defendant's physical proximity to the drugs. A sixth factor given parenthetical reference in Toups is “evidence that the area was frequented by drug users.” Toups, 833 So.2d at 913, citing Bujol v. Cain, 713 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1049, 104 S.Ct. 726, 79 L.Ed.2d 187 (1984). In addition, the State must prove the defendant's guilty knowledge. Toups, 833 So.2d at 913. However, the mere presence of someone in the area where the controlled dangerous substance is located or mere association with the person found to be in possession of the controlled dangerous substance does not constitute constructive possession. Id.; see also State v. Walker, 369 So.2d 1345 (La.1979), State v. Cann, 319 So.2d 396 (La.1975).

As for the specific intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, intent “may be inferred from the circumstances.” State v. Credeur, 11-234, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/23/11), 81 So.3d 741, 743. Factors that may be considered include:

(1) the defendant's previous attempts to distribute; (2) whether the drugs are packaged in a form consistent with distribution; (3) the amount of the drugs seized; (4) expert testimony indicating [that] the amount of the drugs recovered is not consistent with personal use; and (5) paraphernalia evidencing an intent to distribute.

State v. Henry, 08-658, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/27/09), 27 So.3d 935, 943, writ denied, 09-2485 (La. 4/23/10), 34 So.3d 269. Scales and plastic bags, as well as the possession of large sums of cash, may indicate the intent to distribute. Id. And, “[i]n the absence of these circumstances from which an intent to distribute may be inferred, the mere possession of drugs does not evidence intent to distribute, unless the quantity is so large that no other inference is possible.” Id.

Defendant was also convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1.

To convict Defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the possession of a firearm; (2) a previous conviction of an enumerated felony; (3) absence of the ten-year statutory period of limitation; and, (4) general intent to commit the offense.

State v. Recard, 97-754, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/26/97), 704 So.2d 324, 329, writ denied, 97-3187 (La. 5/1/98), 805 So.2d 200.

This court has determined that actual possession of a firearm is not necessary to satisfy the possession element; constructive possession is sufficient. See State v. Edwards, 12-891, (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/13), 107 So.3d 883. Constructive possession occurs when “a thing [is] subject to [the defendant's] dominion and control.” Id. at 888 (quoting State v. Lee, 02-704, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/30/02), 836 So.2d 589, 593, writ denied, 03-535 (La. 10/17/03), 855 So.2d 755 (footnotes omitted)). Even when dominion over a weapon is temporary or control is shared, constructive possession of the weapon can still be found if evidence supports “the offender was aware that a firearm was in his presence, and that he had the general criminal intent to possess the weapon.” Id.

“Guilty knowledge is an essential element in proving constructive possession [of a firearm] and may be inferred from the circumstances.” State v. Fobb, 11-1434, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 91 So.3d 1235, 1244 (quoting State v. Brooks, 99-478, pp. 4-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/99), 756 So.2d 336, 339, writ denied, 00-1492 (La. 5/25/01), 792 So.2d 750). “ ‘Constructive possession entails an element of awareness or knowledge that the firearm is there and the general intent to possess it.’ ” Fobb, 91 So.3d at 1244 (quoting State v. McKinney, 44,269, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/13/09), 12 So.3d 422, 426). “ ‘[M]ere presence of a defendant in the area of the contraband or other evidence seized alone does not prove that he exercised dominion and control over the evidence and therefore had it in his constructive possession.’ ” State v. Johnson, 03-1228, p. 6 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 995, 998-1000 (quoting State v. Walker, 369 So.2d 1345, 1346 (La.1979)).

The supreme court has broadly interpreted constructive possession. In Johnson, a handgun was found on the floorboard of a vehicle where Johnson's feet had been before he was removed from the car. Testimony revealed that no one saw Johnson with the gun and the vehicle did not belong to Johnson. Additionally, another occupant of the vehicle claimed ownership of the gun and testified that she attempted to hide the gun before exiting the vehicle. The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision to overturn Johnson's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, stating:

The evidence presented by the State was sufficient to prove that the defendant was in fact in possession of the weapon and that this possession was enough to sustain a conviction on the charge of a felon in possession of a firearm, La. R.S. 14:95.1․ In this matter, the jury made a credibility determination and found [two witnesses’] accounts unconvincing. Consequently, it was inappropriate for the court of appeal to impinge on the fact finder's discretion to rely instead on the testimony of [a third witness] absent a showing that the defendant was not granted the fundamental due process of law.

Johnson, 870 So.2d at 998-1000 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). General intent “is a fact question which ‘may be inferred from the circumstances of a transaction.’ ” Edwards, 107 So.3d at 888 (quoting State v. Johnson, 09-862, (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 28 So.3d 1263, 1267).

State v. OBrien, 17-922, pp. 12–13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/18), 242 So.3d 1254, 1264–65 (alterations in original), writ denied, 18-663 (La. 2/18/19), 265 So. 3d 769.

As stated above, Sergeant Morgan testified that on March 25, 2021, he stopped Defendant's vehicle for its tinted windows and license plate cover. Noting that the front windows of a vehicle can be no less than forty percent, Sergeant Morgan testified that Defendant's front window tint was twelve percent. Moreover, earlier in his shift, the APSO received information that a vehicle matching the description of Defendant's vehicle might be transporting narcotics. When Sergeant Morgan stopped the vehicle, the driver, Ms. Guillory, appeared nervous, and Defendant was sitting in the passenger seat, asking “to leave the traffic stop.” Sergeant Morgan testified that he ran Ms. Guillory's driver's license, checked the insurance and registration, and pulled her out of the vehicle to speak with her. He testified that he asked her the questions which he often asks people “when they're nervous.” He asked whether there were any weapons, meth, heroin, weed, or pills in the vehicle. Ms. Guillory responded that there were not. Then Sergeant Morgan requested consent to search the vehicle, and she told him to ask Defendant, the passenger, since it was his car.

After Defendant and Ms. Guillory exited the vehicle, Sergeant Morgan retrieved the canine from his unit. Starting at the back of the driver's side of Defendant's vehicle, the canine sniffed up to the front bumper and across to the passenger side, until Sergeant Morgan directed it towards one of the seams closer to the front of the passenger door. At that moment, the dog closed its mouth, indicating an odor response. Sergeant Morgan testified that the dog then “came up, he put his feet in the passenger window and came down to a final response.” Sergeant Morgan rewarded the dog and put him back in the unit.

Thereafter, Sergeant Morgan and other officers searched Defendant's vehicle. Two grinders containing marijuana residue, ammunition, and pistol magazines were found in the console. A Ziploc bag containing roughly 489 grams of supposed synthetic marijuana was found in the backseat. After the discovery of the drugs and paraphernalia, Sergeant Morgan searched the trunk, where he found a Glock semiautomatic pistol “all the way in the front right of the trunk compartment, against the seat.” After finding the firearm, Sergeant Morgan arrested Defendant. Sergeant Morgan testified that: “As we were handcuffing him, [Defendant] looked in the trunk and, excuse my language, Your Honor, he said, ‘Fuck, my gun is in the car. Fuck.’ ” Sergeant Morgan acknowledged that these were not Defendant's exact words.

Corporal Kade Patin (Corporal Patin) was a narcotics agent for the APSO. He testified that he arrived at the traffic stop shortly after Sergeant Morgan initiated it. Defendant was standing at the vehicle's passenger side when Corporal Patin met him. Corporal Patin testified that a moment later, Sergeant Morgan's canine sniffed the vehicle and sat down, signaling that it detected narcotics. Corporal Patin searched the vehicle, beginning at the front passenger side. He searched the center console between the two seats and then moved to the rear of the vehicle. Corporal Patin testified that he found some grinders in the center console and a black plastic bag containing a large amount of suspected marijuana on the floorboard behind the driver's seat. When asked “who would have access to the illicit substance you found in the vehicle,” Corporal Patin responded that “[e]ither one could have had access to it.”

After discovery of the drugs, Corporal Patin patted down Defendant. Like Sergeant Morgan, Corporal Patin testified that once the firearm was found, Defendant exclaimed that he left his gun in the trunk. Corporal Patin testified that he asked Officer Nick Spencer (Officer Spencer) whether he had Mirandized Defendant, to which Officer Spencer replied yes. Corporal Patin then brought Defendant to the rear of his patrol car to speak with him. The interaction was captured on his bodycam, and the recording was entered into evidence and played for the jury. Corporal Patin's bodycam shows that at 14:50 (2:50 p.m.), he found the bag of synthetic marijuana on the floor behind the driver's seat. At 14:55 (2:55 p.m.), Corporal Patin asks Defendant whether the drug found in the car was marijuana. Defendant corrects the officer, saying it was synthetic marijuana, and shortly thereafter, Defendant admits that he knew it was in the backseat because he sold synthetic marijuana.

Special Agent Kyle Seaux (Agent Seaux) was working for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) at the time of Defendant's trial. However, on the day of Defendant's arrest, he was employed with the APSO as a sergeant and supervisor of its Narcotics Division. Agent Seaux testified that he arrived at the traffic stop shortly after Sergeant Morgan made contact with Defendant and, as supervisor, managed the scene. Agent Seaux first checked Defendant's front window tint, taking a photo of the tint meter's result, which the State offered into evidence. Explaining why Defendant's window tint was illegal, Agent Seaux testified that in Louisiana, forty percent is the legal limit for front window tint. “The lower the number, the darker the tint,” he testified, and the meter showed that Defendant's window tint was twelve percent. After testing the window, Agent Seaux ensured the collection of the evidence. He testified to seeing marijuana, synthetic marijuana, a firearm, and currency, all of which he photographed once he returned to his office. These photographs, including photographs of a black scale and a box of ammunition, were introduced as evidence and presented to the jury.

Agent Seaux admitted that he could only recall “bits and pieces” of the conversations that he had with Ms. Guillory and Defendant. Agent Seaux testified that post-Miranda, Ms. Guillory advised him that she had marijuana and currency in the vehicle. Defendant was already in Corporal Patin's patrol vehicle by the time Agent Seaux spoke with him. Agent Seaux testified that during their conversation, he first advised Defendant of his rights even though Defendant told him that he had already been advised of them. Thereafter, Defendant said that the synthetic marijuana and firearm belonged to him. Specifically, Defendant said that he sought to “stunt” and “sell” the synthetic marijuana and that he bought the firearm from a young male named T-Kale. These events were captured by Agent Seaux's bodycam, and its footage was entered into evidence and played for the jury. At 15:11 (3:11 p.m.), Agent Seaux's bodycam footage shows Defendant explaining how he had yet to pay for the synthetic drug since it was “fronted” to him by a dealer. “Y'all caught me at the right time,” he also says, noting that he lost the opportunity to sell the drug. When Agent Seaux says to him that the bag of synthetic marijuana looks like it weighs a pound, Defendant corrects him and says that it was more like eight to nine ounces.

Amanda Hebert (Ms. Hebert), a forensic chemist with over twenty years of experience who was working at the Acadiana Crime Lab at the time of this incident, was accepted as an expert in forensic drug chemistry. Ms. Hebert testified that on April 23, 2021, she received the evidence package from Defendant's traffic stop. It contained two plastic bags of “green vegetable material.” Ms. Hebert generated and signed a certificate detailing the results of her testing of the material. She testified that one bag contained 408 grams of synthetic cannabinoid, and the other contained five grams of marijuana. Both of these are controlled in Louisiana Schedule I. She testified that there were no problems with the testing equipment or with the storage facility.

Officer Spencer was the defense's only witness. Like the other officers, he testified that a firearm was found in the trunk of Defendant's vehicle and that suspected marijuana was also found. While acknowledging that he spoke with Defendant that day, Officer Spencer testified that he could not recall whether he had questioned or Mirandized him. He testified that his bodycam was on during the encounter, and its footage was uploaded to the APSO's server. However, Officer Spencer could not give any explanation as to why his bodycam footage was missing. The defense asked Officer Spencer: “Did you tell [Defendant] as he was sitting in the back of Mr. Patin's vehicle, that if he don't [sic] tell you if the gun belongs to him or the marijuana belongs to him that you're charging everyone with that crime?” Officer Spencer responded: “I do not recall.”

Defendant notes that the vehicle's window tint was the stated reason for the traffic stop; but rather than issue a citation for the dark window tint, Sergeant Morgan chose to conduct an exterior canine search of the vehicle, ignoring Defendant's request to leave so that he and Ms. Guillory could pick up their child from school. Defendant rejects Sergeant Morgan's testimony that Ms. Guillory appeared nervous, and Defendant maintains that the bodycam footage does not support this statement.

Defendant points out that the alleged drug paraphernalia was found in the console of the car and that the synthetic marijuana and cash were found in a bag on the floorboard in the backseat. He argues that none of these items were readily visible to him and that it is highly probable that he would not have known of the presence of these items because of where they were positioned in the vehicle. Defendant argues that Ms. Guillory “had possession of marijuana in her purse” and “admitted to knowing that there was marijuana and currency ․ in the vehicle.” Therefore, according to Defendant, she was the one “who had the knowledge and awareness of the drugs and large amounts of cash in the vehicle.” Defendant contends that the failure to show that he had the necessary intent to possess the firearm and the synthetic marijuana requires that his guilty verdict be reversed.

Defendant notes that “[d]uring the trial, the prosecution introduced statements that he allegedly admitted to owning the handgun that was discovered in the trunk of the vehicle.” However, Defendant asserts that:

[b]oth officers who testified to allegedly hearing [this] statement indicated that [Defendant] appeared surprised by the presence of the handgun. Even if the prosecution's use of the statement was its method of getting the statement admitted into evidence, [his] surprise is an indication of his lack of knowledge or awareness that the handgun was in the vehicle.

Defendant contends that the prosecution did not present any evidence indicating how long the handgun was in the trunk and that its evidence did not exclude the possibility that it was Ms. Guillory who transferred the handgun to the vehicle before the couple was stopped. Defendant emphasizes that he was the passenger and argues that while it is true that the vehicle belonged to him, Ms. Guillory was driving. He argues that Ms. Guillory's saying that she moved items inside the car before the traffic stop shows that he did not have exclusive use of the vehicle.

The State maintains that Defendant had control of the car at the time of the stop, even though Ms. Guillory carried the insurance. The State points to Sergeant Morgan's testimony that when he requested permission to search the vehicle, Ms. Guillory told him to ask Defendant since it was his car. According to the State, this response establishes that Defendant controlled his vehicle.

The State notes that among the items recovered in the search, synthetic marijuana was located on the floorboard of the back seat near the center console, easily accessible to the passenger. The synthetic marijuana weighed 469 grams, and a scale, baggies, and a large amount of cash were found in the search. Defendant told Agent Seaux that the synthetic marijuana belonged to him, explaining that he was going to “stunt” and “sell” it. For these reasons, the State maintains that it proved the elements of the crime of possession with the intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids.

As for Defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State acknowledges that the firearm was found in the trunk of the car and that Ms. Guillory indicated that she had moved some of her possessions into the car. However, the State reiterates that Ms. Guillory denied having any weapons or drugs and also denied that she had authority to give permission to search the vehicle. The State also points to Sergeant Morgan's testimony that when the firearm was located, Defendant said “they put my gun in the trunk,” or at least “something along those lines.” The State additionally notes that Defendant later explained that he had purchased the gun for $400.00. Based on these things, the State argues that “[a] reasonable trier of fact could find that Defendant [ ] had the requisite intent to possess the firearm.”

After reviewing the record and evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

As for whether Defendant was in constructive possession of the pistol found in the trunk, Defendant said the gun belonged to him. Moreover, when a firearm is found in a vehicle that the defendant owns, courts have often determined the weapon was under the defendant's dominion and control. In State v. Jones, 09-688 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/9/10), 33 So.3d 306, the defendant did not even own the vehicle in which a gun was concealed under the hood. Although no evidence proved that the defendant outright owned the gun, the fifth circuit found that a traffic citation issued to the defendant while he was driving the car five months earlier and a receipt indicating that the defendant paid over $1,100.00 for the vehicle's repair sufficiently proved his dominion and control of the vehicle and, therefore, his constructive possession of the firearm. Id.

In State v. St. Cyre, 19-34 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/19/19), 292 So.3d 88, writ denied, 20-142 (La. 5/26/20), 296 So.3d 1063, after an agent found a gun beneath the driver seat of the defendant's vehicle, the defendant explained that his aunt purchased the weapon and gave it to him for protection. Additionally, three witnesses testified that they heard the defendant say that he was using the gun for his safety or protection, and, prior to the weapon's discovery, the defendant texted his wife, who was in the car, to “[g]et that gun” before the agent could find it. Id. at 97. Based on these facts, the first circuit found that any fact finder could have rationally concluded that the defendant was in constructive possession of the firearm.

In State v. Blount, 01-844 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/26/01), 806 So.2d 773, an officer testified to finding a loaded gun clip in the defendant's pocket after patting him down during a traffic stop. While searching the defendant's vehicle, the officer “found a .380 handgun in the vehicle under the driver's seat towards the rear.” Id. at 775. The clip fit the gun. Additionally, the officer testified that the defendant admitted that he bought the gun from a friend. The officer conducted a computer search, revealing that the defendant was a convicted felon and that the gun was stolen. Ultimately, even though the testimony of the defendant and his wife contradicted some of the detective's statements, the fifth circuit upheld the defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm and noted that it is the role of the trier-of-fact, not the appellate court, to assess the credibility of a witness.

Defendant's contention is not that the car and pistol belonged to someone else. He contends that he did not know his pistol was in his car because he did not have exclusive use of his vehicle. His hypothesis is that when Ms. Guillory put her things in his car, she also put his gun there. Even though Defendant looked genuinely surprised when his gun was discovered in the trunk, his hypothesis is unpersuasive when faced with the totality of the circumstances. Defendant owned the car, over 400 grams of synthetic marijuana were found in it, he bought the gun, and his vehicle's center console contained a box of 9mm ammunition and a thirty-round pistol magazine, which he apparently knew was in the vehicle since he showed no surprise when these items were discovered. Neither the record nor the testimony given at trial support Defendant's claim that the gun was put in the car by Ms. Guillory. Consequently, Defendant's hypothesis does not create reasonable doubt. We find that the jury properly and rationally found that Defendant constructively possessed the firearm.

Regarding whether Defendant constructively and knowingly possessed synthetic marijuana with the intent to distribute, the remarks that Defendant made to police that were captured on camera, the amount of synthetic marijuana seized, and its proximity to Defendant, along with the scales, baggies, pistol magazines, and ammunition, were sufficient evidence for a fact finder to reasonably conclude that Defendant constructively possessed the synthetic marijuana with intent to distribute.

Motion to Suppress

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the evidence was not seized incidentally to a valid stop, search and seizure, or arrest since the officers lacked probable cause to extend the traffic stop into a search for illegal drugs. While he acknowledges that in Louisiana it is well-settled that a dog's sniff test of a vehicle's exterior surface does not constitute a search, Defendant contends that, in his case, the drug detection dog breached the interior of the vehicle and that regardless of whether the dog did so on its own or by instruction from its handler, the exterior search of the vehicle became a search of its interior, which Defendant did not authorize. He contends that “while the automobile exception eliminates the need for a search warrant, it does not eviscerate the need for probable cause.” According to Defendant, since Sergeant Morgan did not testify to smelling or seeing marijuana in the vehicle prior to searching the exterior of the vehicle, “there was no probable cause to justify bringing the drug detection dog to the scene of the traffic stop.”

Defendant argues that “the stated intent for the traffic stop was only a pretext the officers used to stop and search [his] vehicle” for illegal drugs and that “[t]he officers had always intended to prolong the time required for this minor traffic infraction because their agenda was to find something, anything unlawful, in the vehicle.” Defendant asserts that a stop's “tolerable duration is determined by the seizure's ‘mission,’ which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.” See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005). Defendant suggests that a dog sniff is a measure beyond the mission of a traffic stop, and he emphasizes that there was no reasonable cause to search his vehicle because it was only after the dog breached the interior of the vehicle that it alerted Sergeant Morgan that it detected drugs.

Defendant also notes that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the traffic stop and that he did not have marijuana on his person at the time he was questioned by the police. The handgun was found inside the trunk, and Defendant asserts that he did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the presence of these items inside the vehicle because, as Ms. Guillory told the police, she had used the vehicle prior to the stop and had transferred her items to the vehicle.

Lastly, Defendant claims that Officer Spencer talked to him without reading him his Miranda rights. Officer Spencer testified that his bodycam was not activated at the time he spoke with Defendant. Defendant contends that Officer Spencer did not dispute that he may have threatened to charge Ms. Guillory with the drugs and firearm found in the vehicle if Defendant did not admit to owning the items. “It was shortly after speaking with [Officer] Spencer,” argues Defendant, “that [Defendant] quickly admitted to Sergeant Morgan that the drugs and the firearm belonged to him.” Defendant alleges that this supposed admission occurred immediately after Officer Spencer spoke to Defendant off camera. However, we need not consider this claim as Defendant's motion to suppress did not assert it; and after reviewing the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress and the record for the sufficiency analysis, we find no evidence indicating that Defendant had been coerced.

When a trial court rules on a defendant's motion to suppress, the appellate court must look at the totality of the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The appellate court should not overturn a trial court's ruling, unless the trial court's conclusions are not supported by the evidence, or there exists an internal inconsistency in the testimony of the witnesses, or there was a palpable or obvious abuse of discretion.

State v. Bargeman, 98-617, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/28/98), 721 So.2d 964, 967, writ denied, 99-33 (La. 5/28/99), 743 So.2d 658.

In State v. Washington, 96–656, pp. 7–8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/15/97), 687 So.2d 575, 580, this court stated:

Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. IV; La. Const. art. I, § 5. A warrantless search and seizure is unreasonable unless the search can be justified by one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Tatum, 466 So.2d 29 (La.1985). One such exception, the “automobile exception,” has developed because of the time problems associated with obtaining a search warrant and the mobility of automobiles. This exception to the warrant requirement is based on probable cause and exigent circumstances which render it impractical to secure a search warrant and has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

Additionally, this court noted in State v. Cortes, 11-794, p. 19 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/12), 84 So.3d 733, 745–46:

Law enforcement officers have the authority to stop anyone if the officers have a reasonable suspicion that that person committed a crime. “A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 215.1(A). This also applies to traffic stops:

As a general matter, “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (citations omitted). The standard is a purely objective one that does not take into account the subjective beliefs or expectations of the detaining officer. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. at 1774 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). Although they may serve, and may often appear intended to serve, as the prelude to the investigation of much more serious offenses, even relatively minor traffic violations provide an objective basis for lawfully detaining the vehicle and its occupants.

State v. Waters, 00–356, p. 4 (La.3/12/01), 780 So.2d 1053, 1056. Furthermore, “even if a stop is pretextual, the actual motives of the police are irrelevant if the police do ‘no more than they would be authorized to do.’ ” State v. Morris, 03–269, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/10/03), 854 So.2d 989, 995, writ denied, 03–2853 (La.10/15/03), 855 So.2d 743 (quoting Waters, 780 So.2d at 1056).

In this case, Defendant was stopped due to his vehicle's illegally tinted windows, which is a violation of La.R.S. 32:361.1(C)(1). A traffic stop on this basis is a valid stop. Cortes, 84 So.3d 733. Even though a traffic stop may be valid, La.Code Crim.P. art. 215.1(D) provides in pertinent part:

During detention of an alleged violator of any provision of the motor vehicle laws of this state, an officer may not detain a motorist for a period of time longer than reasonably necessary to complete the investigation of the violation and issuance of a citation for the violation, absent reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity.

Lastly, in Louisiana it is well-settled that a “dog's sniff test of the vehicle's exterior surfaces [does] not itself constitute a search[.]” State v. Kalie, 96-2650, p. 4 (La. 9/19/97), 699 So.2d 879, 881, citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (1983).

On September 19, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress and heard the testimony of Sergeant Morgan and Agent Seaux. Sergeant Morgan recounted the initiation of the stop as follows:

So we were patrolling in Crowley, in the area of Western and 11th Street. I observed a tan Chrysler 200 pass in front of me on Western with extremely dark window tint. When I turned out behind the vehicle, I observed that they had a tinted license plate cover. I initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle. The vehicle turned eastbound onto 11th Street[ ] and then pulled into a driveway.

He explained that if a license plate is not visible from fifty feet away, it is illegal, and he could not see Defendant's license plate until he was “right up on it.” Though acknowledging he received some “details on a color and a model of a vehicle” prior to the stop, Sergeant Morgan testified that the window tint and the license plate cover was the probable cause for stopping Defendant's car.

Sergeant Morgan testified that after stopping Defendant's vehicle and speaking with the driver, Ms. Guillory, he deployed his canine because she seemed nervous, and her hands were shaking. Moreover, both she and Defendant denied his request to search the vehicle. He explained that generally during a sniff test, he walks the dog around the vehicle, and it is not allowed to enter, search, or sniff inside. If this occurs, the dog “does it under his own free instinct.”

When reviewing his bodycam footage with defense counsel, Sergeant Morgan was asked: “So at this point, fourteen minute forty-eight seconds (14:48), you deployed your K-9?” He responded: “Correct.” However, bodycam footage shows that the stop began at approximately 14:44 (2:44 p.m.), the dog was retrieved at approximately 14:48 (2:48 p.m.) not fourteen minutes and forty-eight seconds into the stop, and the open-air sniff was completed at approximately 14:49 (2:49 p.m.). Therefore, Sergeant Morgan deployed his canine less than five minutes into the stop.

While reviewing the footage of the canine's search, Sergeant Morgan acknowledged that the canine's head went into the vehicle when it jumped up on the open driver-side window. He denied directing his dog towards it. Also, when his dog's nose breached the window, it did not sit down signifying a response. The dog made its response on the passenger side.

Agent Seaux testified that he and other officers observed the illegal window tint and license plate cover. Agent Seaux was certified in using the window tint meter. He testified that he and the other officers, based on their training and experience, could tell through visual observation alone when windows on a vehicle may violate the statute. Agent Seaux indicated that his initial visual inspection of the tinting on Defendant's vehicle showed it to be inappropriate, which was later confirmed by a tint meter.

The trial court stated its reasons for denying the motion:

Well, I do find there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, of course the window tint and the license plate are reasonable suspicion for the stop. Obviously, they had some other ulterior motive in addition to that information about the stop, but obviously, someone spoke to something. I guess it was a stolen gun maybe they were looking for or something, I don't know, but the stop was valid, and any search after that, since the dog hit on it, I find it is valid. So, I'm denying your Motion to Suppress.

․

I would find that the dog intruded upon the space of the car. I mean, he did jump up on the window which was open․

․

You're saying he's directing his hand towards the window. I mean, he does the same motion on both sides to go look at the car kind of thing, so I don't know what that means. The dog searched around the outside of the car as he was supposed to do.

Sergeant Morgan testified to receiving information about Defendant's car prior to making the stop, and his bodycam footage shows the officers speaking of the tip they received. While Sergeant Morgan may have stopped Defendant for reasons other than his vehicle's window tint, as noted in Cortes, 84 So.3d 733, relatively minor traffic violations provide an objective basis for lawfully detaining the vehicle and its occupants, regardless of whether the stop was pretextual. Defendant's windows were undoubtedly illegally tinted. While the police had an objective reason to stop the vehicle, they were only authorized to do what was necessary to investigate the supposed violation and to issue a citation if necessary. To extend the stop, they had to have a “reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 215.1(D). In this regard, Defendant contends that the police did not have any probable cause to extend the traffic stop to conduct a canine search. However, since a canine's sniff of a vehicle is not considered a search, probable cause is not an issue. Place, 462 U.S. 696. What matters is whether Defendant's traffic stop was unduly prolonged by the canine sniff.

In State v. Prince, 50,548, p. 10 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 195 So.3d 6, 13, an officer conducting a traffic stop observed the driver “acting nervous, stuttering, and talking fast,” and additionally smelled the odor of marijuana. After the defendant refused to consent to a search of his car, the officer called a canine unit. It arrived about five minutes later. The defendant had been detained only about fifteen to twenty minutes at the time the sniff test was conducted, which, as noted the second circuit, is “within the time generally allotted for a routine traffic stop.” Id. at 14. Ultimately, the second circuit found that the traffic stop was not unduly extended. Id.

In this case, Sergeant Morgan was able to retrieve his dog immediately. From the moment Defendant was stopped to the moment the dog detected drugs, approximately five minutes had passed. The traffic stop was not unduly extended.

Defendant contends that once the canine stuck his nose inside the open window of the driver's side door, the sniff became invalid. There are no Louisiana cases on point. However, in State v. Mumford (Iowa 2024), 14 N.W.3d 346, 352–53,¹ the Iowa Supreme Court concluded “that a drug dog's momentary breach into the cabin of a vehicle through an open window of a legally stopped vehicle does not require the suppression of evidence under the Fourth Amendment[.]”

The State cites United States v. Shen, 749 Fed.Appx. 256 (5th Cir. 2018), a dog sniff case where the dog did not come to a final response. In that case, the appellant contended “that it [was] unconstitutional for the dog's nose to break the plane of a vehicle's open window before probable cause exist[ed].” Id. at 262. Additionally, the appellant argued that the canine's handler “placed his arm into the driver-side window and commanded [the dog] to get up on that open window, thereby facilitating, encouraging, and prompting [the dog] to enter it.” Id. at 262. The Fifth Circuit determined that the appellant failed to show that the search became unlawful because the officer directed the dog using standard hand gestures (“high and low” pass procedures) and because the window was already down when the dog entered it without any command. Id. at 262. The dog in Prince, 195 So.3d at 13, also jumped at the driver's door during its sniff of the car.

Sergeant Morgan's bodycam footage shows that the dog, of its own volition, jumped up to the open window and that the force of the jump caused its nose to briefly breach the windowpane. Though Sergeant Morgan gestured to the car, his hand movements did not direct the dog to jump, and the dog did not signal that it detected anything after jumping. Instead, it continued to the passenger side of the vehicle. Once at the front passenger door, the dog jumped again but without breaching the windowpane. Then, after returning to the ground and sniffing along the bottom of the door, it sat down giving its final response. Again, the windows were opened by Defendant and Ms. Guillory prior to the dog's sniff test.

Looking at the totality of the evidence, we find that the stop was valid and that the search was lawfully conducted. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

V.

CONCLUSION

We affirm Defendant's convictions and his sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant's habitual offender sentence for possession with the intent to distribute synthetic cannabinoids is hereby amended to delete the denial of parole eligibility. The trial court is instructed to make an entry in the court minutes to reflect this change. Additionally, in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, Defendant is advised that no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence is final under the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 914 or 922.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED, WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Petition for certiorari was docketed on April 21, 2025.

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE