STATE v. COKER (2025)

A jury convicted Defendant, Matthew V. Coker, of second degree murder in the death of Floyd Coker. Defendant appeals both his conviction and his sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the morning of March 26, 2022, the Oakdale Police Department received a call from Tammy Monceaux, who reported receiving a Facebook message from her husband's uncle, Floyd Coker, asking her to call 911 on his behalf. Upon arriving at Floyd's residence, officers discovered sixty-one-year-old Floyd on the floor wearing only his undergarments. He explained to officers and paramedics at the scene that he had been beaten the night before by Defendant, a cousin who was staying in the home as a guest. Although Floyd initially expressed fear in making this identification, he claimed that Defendant prevented Floyd from calling for help by making him sleep upstairs with him and by confiscating his telephone and his emergency call button. Floyd complained of pain in his back, kidneys, ribs, and knees, said he thought he may have broken ribs and a broken hip, claimed that he had vomited blood the previous night, claimed that he could not move his left leg, and claimed that he was having trouble breathing. Floyd also claimed he had to crawl for three hours to get to his computer downstairs to call for help.

Paramedics transported Floyd from his home to St. Francis Cabrini Hospital in Alexandria, where he was triaged as a Level 1 trauma patient and stabilized. Nurse Wade Chatelain explained that Floyd was in “pretty horrific” condition and appeared to have been “beaten severely[.]” Dr. Louis Benjamin, the Medical Director of the emergency room at Cabrini Hospital, testified that Floyd presented with low blood pressure, no blood flow into the left leg, encephalomalacia in the brain, a punctured lung, fractures in the ribs, hip, jaw, and nose, and had vomited approximately 500 ccs of blood while in the care of paramedics. The punctured lung necessitated the placement of a chest tube while he was still at Cabrini. Requiring a higher level of care, Floyd was transferred to the trauma facility at Rapides Regional Medical Center.

Deputy Chief Grant Willis of the Oakdale Police Department interviewed Floyd later that day at Rapides Regional. Floyd reiterated details he provided at the scene and provided additional details of the attack, including that Defendant began beating him while he was sitting at his computer in the living room, that Defendant had punched and kicked him with his boots, that Defendant subsequently pulled out a knife and held it to Floyd's body, and that Defendant threatened to kill him, his daughter, and his grandson.

A search of the house revealed purported blood stains in numerous locations, bloody vomit beside the bed in Defendant's bedroom, two knives on a table in the living room, and a telephone located on a top shelf in the kitchen. Tasheena Coker, Floyd's daughter, later located Floyd's Life Alert button and another phone underneath a blanket on a high shelf in the closet of the bedroom where Defendant had been staying.

Floyd died on April 28, 2022, approximately one month after the offense. Forensic Pathologist Christopher Tape identified Floyd's cause of death as complications arising from blunt force injuries due to assault.

On May 25, 2022, the State charged Defendant with second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant entered a not guilty plea. A jury ultimately found Defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant appeals, assigning the following as error:

1. The trial court's ruling finding Floyd Coker's statements to police when he was initially found at his house to be a “dying declaration” was patently erroneous. The statement was given nearly 14 hours after being injured, it was testimonial and in response to investigatory questions by police, and, although he had serious injuries, there was no evidence that Floyd thought he was going to die at the time of the statement. This court's writ ruling finding no abuse of discretion should not bar review of this issue under the Law of the Case doctrine.

2. The trial court erred in finding that a second testimonial statement by Floyd Coker given to police at the hospital also constituted a dying declaration.

3. The trial court abused its discretion in allowing statements by the Penders regarding Floyd Coker's state of mind through body camera interrogations and testimony at trial.

4. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit a photo of a Facebook post allegedly made by Matthew Coker, taken by a police officer of the testifying witness’ mother's phone, when the witness was not friends with Matthew on Facebook. This was improper authentication of a social media post and erroneously admitted.

DISCUSSION

Errors Patent

Review for errors patent on the face of the record as required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 920 reveals no such errors.

Statement at Residence – Dying Declaration

Defendant first asserts that the trial court erred when it determined that Floyd's statements to the police at his residence, as captured on police body camera, were admissible as a dying declaration pursuant to La.Code Evid. art. 804(B)(2). Defendant maintains that although Floyd was injured and in pain when police arrived, there was no indication that he believed that his death was imminent, nor did his known injuries appear to be life-threatening at that time. He points out that “Floyd did not die for nearly 30 days after he was injured” and that he “had a plethora of comorbidities that contributed to his death[.]”

The question of whether Floyd's initial statements to the police constituted a dying declaration was previously considered by this court. After the trial court granted the State's Motion for Introduction of Deceased Victim's Statements in a pre-trial hearing, Defendant filed an application for supervisory writ as to whether the statements constituted a dying declaration as well as whether they constituted an excited utterance. This court denied the writ, stating:

WRIT DENIED: Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of the victim's statements as dying declarations, we deny Defendant's writ application.

State v. Coker, 24-39 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/26/24) (unpublished opinion).

Although the State maintains that the February 2024 writ ruling “establishes the law of the case[¹ ] and should not be disturbed on this appeal[,]” the principle is inapplicable in this instance. Rather, the supreme court has explained:

[O]nce a court of appeal declines to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction by denying the writ, the court was without jurisdiction to affirm, reverse or modify the judgment of the trial court. Thus, any language in the court of appeal's earlier writ denial purporting to find no error in the trial court's certification ruling is without effect.

Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., LLC, 03-276 (La. 6/6/03), 849 So.2d 497, 498 (per curiam). Although the February 2024 writ ruling indicated that the panel found no abuse of discretion, that expression followed the panel's earlier writ denial. Under the reasoning of Davis, the panel's further comment is without effect and does not constitute law of the case. See also State v. Ryder, 22-358 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/26/22), 353 So.3d 855; State v. Bryant, 21-240 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/22/21), 333 So.3d 495. We therefore consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding Floyd's statements in his home admissible. See State v. Wright, 11-141, pp. 10-11 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So.3d 309, 316 (“A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”).

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 804(B)(2) provides:

B. Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

․

(2) Statement under belief of impending death. A statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death.

Thus, the party seeking to introduce the declarant's statement must demonstrate two factors, “1) that the declarant believed his death was imminent/impending; and 2) that the declarant's statement concerned the cause or circumstances of his impending death.” Garza v. Delta Tau Delta Fraternity Nat., 05-1508, p. 11 (La. 7/10/06), 948 So.2d 84, 92 (footnote omitted).

Defendant's argument implicates the first factor. On this point, the supreme court has explained that “[d]ying declarations are admissible if made when the declarant is fully conscious of his condition and under a sense of impending death, after having abandoned all hope or expectancy of recovery.” State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074, 1077 (La.1989). The declarant need not express his belief in direct terms, but the necessary state of mind may be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances. State v. Verrett, 419 So.2d 455 (La.1982). See also State v. Plauche, 09-400 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/6/10), 32 So.3d 852, writ denied, 10-302 (La. 9/24/10), 45 So.3d 1070.

The video footage of the officer's body camera reflects sixty-one-year-old Floyd immobilized on the floor following a beating that caused him to vomit blood. Having suffered for hours after the beating with no medical attention, Floyd stated that his jaw, arm, and legs hurt. He had a headache and thought his left hip was broken. Floyd could not move his left leg. When asked whether he wanted to go to the hospital, Floyd replied, “yes, yes, yes.” After paramedics arrived, Floyd stated that he was hurting “extremely bad[.]” Although pain medication was administered, Floyd denied that it was working and remarked that he was “hurting so damn bad.” While Floyd did not articulate that his death was imminent, numerous circumstances established an inferential basis for finding that he believed that he was near death; the beating was severe, caused him to vomit blood, and resulted in significant injuries. Despite his condition, Floyd had remained without medical assistance for hours and, upon receiving assistance, expressed extreme, ongoing pain. We thus find that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence. We maintain the trial court's ruling.

This assignment lacks merit.

Statement at Hospital – Dying Declaration

Defendant next asserts that Floyd's statement to police at Rapides Regional was likewise inappropriately admitted as a dying declaration. The statement was made after Floyd was taken to Cabrini Hospital, preliminarily stabilized, and taken to Rapides Regional.

Defendant argues that Floyd could not have reasonably feared that his death was imminent since his condition had been semi-stabilized. Defendant asserts that Floyd responded quickly and specifically to all the questions that he was asked and that nothing in the recording otherwise conveys an ongoing emergency or fear of death. Although acknowledging that Floyd's voice on the recording was weak, Defendant asserts that this is adequately explained by the recent insertion of a chest tube as well as Floyd being a “frail and sick man before this.” Finally, Defendant asserts that the statement would not be admissible even if a valid dying declaration since the statement was testimonial and, thus, its admission would violate the Confrontation Clause.

In admitting the Rapides Regional statement as a dying declaration, the trial court referenced this court's prior determination that Floyd's initial statements to the police were dying declarations and reasoned that “I would think logically that this subsequent interview ․ or any other statements that Mr. Floyd gave prior to his death, was also a dying declaration.”

Contrary to the suggestion that a determination regarding one statement controls, the circumstances of Floyd's initial statements in the home are distinct from Floyd's statements at Rapides Regional. Not only were the statements separated by time, but medical intervention had removed Floyd from the immediacy and emergent encounter with the officers at the time of initial response.

During Floyd's initial interview, he expressed excruciating pain and had difficulty breathing after having sustained a beating severe enough to immobilize him and induce bloody vomiting. Since Floyd was aware of his injuries and aware of the length of time that he spent without necessary treatment, it would have been reasonable for him to infer that he was at risk of imminent death at that point in time.

By contrast, Floyd had begun receiving medical treatment at the time of his interview at Rapides Regional. According to Deputy Chief Willis, Floyd had already been initially stabilized at Cabrini Hospital, although there were limits to this stabilization. Deputy Chief Willis noted that doctors resumed treatment once his interview was over, and Dr. Matthew Linger, a trauma surgeon at Rapides Regional, testified that Floyd was never stabilized enough to consider operating on his left hip due to the issues with his lungs and heart. Nonetheless, Floyd was in no immediate danger during his subsequent interview. The audio recording indicates that Floyd was clear and articulate, and while his voice was weak, this weakness is difficult to separate from his age or existing frailty. Floyd's daughter, Tasheena, testified that Floyd was “doing okay,” but worried, the first night he was at Rapides Regional. Finally, while Floyd was admitted to Rapides Regional on March 26, the record indicates that medical personnel did not begin consulting Floyd until April about palliative care, in anticipation of a poor outcome.

Accordingly, although Floyd remained in pain and required continued medical intervention upon his arrival at Rapides Regional, the circumstances were not sufficient to establish an inferential basis to find that he believed himself to be near death. See, e.g., Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074 (while declarant was in great pain, there was no awareness of impending death). We therefore find that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Floyd's statement at Rapides Regional as a dying declaration.

Nonetheless, the supreme court has long held that the erroneous admission of hearsay testimony is harmless where the effect is merely cumulative or corroborative of other testimony at trial. See State v. Johnson, 389 So.2d 1302 (La.1980). Ultimately, Floyd's statement at Rapides Regional was simply a calmer, detailed retelling of what he had told officers on the body camera footage earlier that morning. Floyd's initial statement revealed what had happened and who he alleged was responsible, so while his subsequent statement provided additional details, it was merely corroborative of that identification. Accordingly, the admission of Floyd's subsequent statement was harmless error.

This assignment is without merit

Statements Imputed to Defendant

Defendant next assigns error in the trial court's admission of statements imputed to Floyd regarding his own mental state. The hearsay statements in question were relayed through body camera footage of police interviewing Floyd's neighbors, Mark and Pam Pender, as well as through Mr. Pender's courtroom testimony. Defendant argues there was no valid exception to the hearsay rules that would have permitted the imputed statements to be admitted. Further, Defendant contends that the contents of the statements wherein Floyd supposedly confided his intentions to imminently evict Defendant from his residence, were highly damaging as they allowed the State to establish a motive for the beatings.

When the State urged that Mr. and Mrs. Penders’ statements were admissible as Floyd, an unavailable witness, was “expressing his present sense impression of what he is about to do in the future[,]” the trial court replied: “Okay. That is the ruling of the Court.” The trial court subsequently expressed skepticism as to the applicability of the present sense impression exception and instead admitted Mr. Pender's live testimony regarding the hearsay statement pursuant to La.Code Evid art. 803(3)’s exception relating to a declarant's then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition.

Contemporaneous Objection

We first address the State's contention that Defendant failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to the portion of body camera footage containing the hearsay statement. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 841(A) states, in pertinent part:

An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence. A bill of exceptions to rulings or orders is unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 103(A) states, in pertinent part, that error may not be predicated on a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless “a timely objection or motion to admonish the jury to limit or disregard appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection[.]” In State v. Ruiz, 06-1755, p. 8 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 81, 87 (alteration in original), the supreme court stated:

Louisiana's contemporaneous objection rule provides “[a]n irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.” La.Code Crim. Pro. art. 841 A; State v. Knott, 05-2252, p. 2 (La. 5/5/06), 928 So.2d 534, 535. The contemporaneous objection rule has two purposes: (1) to require counsel to call an error to the judge's attention at a time when the judge may correct the error; and (2) to prevent defense counsel from “sitting on” an error and gambling unsuccessfully on the verdict, and later resorting to appeal on an error that might have been corrected at trial. Knott, 05-2252 p. 2, 928 So.2d at 535; State v. Arvie, 505 So.2d 44, 47 (La.1987).

Although a contemporaneous objection must generally be made immediately, there are instances where objections which come shortly thereafter will be considered timely. State v. Williams, 03-1773 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/04), 878 So.2d 765. This court has not found this to be the case when the objection is separated from the statement by substantial amounts of testimony, courtroom breaks, significant time gaps, or many pages of transcript. Id.

While footage of the police interview with Mr. and Mrs. Pender is on the same tape as the police interview with Floyd at his residence, the State's motion to admit the tape, which Defendant opposed at the time, was limited solely to the question of whether Floyd's own statements were admissible. Nonetheless, Defendant had receipt of the full tape prior to trial and was aware that the interview with Mr. and Mrs. Pender was on the same video. The State opted to play the full tape during the testimony of Officer Winston Lambright of the Oakdale Police Department. Defendant objected to the introduction of the video before it was played to the jury solely on the grounds that Floyd's statements to police were not a dying declaration, but the trial court allowed the State to play the tape since it was the same tape that the trial court previously held admissible.

While the video was played to the jury, Defendant objected again, this time in relation to Mr. and Mrs. Pender's statements. Although the State asserted that the video was already in evidence and thus the time for objections had passed, the trial court disagreed with the State because it too “had no idea what the contents of the video was [and Defendant] objected to it in the first place.” The trial court ordered that the video be paused while the court conducted a sidebar conference to determine the admissibility of the disputed portion of the tape.

Defendant therefore objected both to the initial introduction of the video and to the specific statements at issue in this assignment as they were introduced. This gave the trial court a fair chance to address Defendant's objections and provide an adequate remedy if needed. We do not find it appropriate to penalize Defendant for relying on the State's representation as to what it was intending to admit, particularly when the trial court itself was caught unawares. Since Defendant made a specific objection to the admissibility contemporaneous to the playing of Mr. and Mrs. Penders’ statements, and in a manner timely enough for the trial court to provide redress, we find that Defendant preserved this issue for appeal.

State of Mind Exception

Regarding the subject statements, Mr. Pender testified at trial that approximately one week before the incident, Floyd told him about an upcoming trip to Georgia. Mr. Pender recounted the conversation as follows:

A. Okay. He had called me to let me know that in the near future, he didn't give me a date, that he was gonna be going to his brother's house. And I said, well, what about your houseguest, you know, is he gonna remain in the house. He said, oh no, he said matter of fact I am thinking of a way I am gonna tell him that before I leave, you know. And left it at that. But he wanted me to keep an eye on the place while he was gone.

Q. Did he have any feelings regarding that?

A. Yes, he did. He told me that it was some things that had been going, and Matthew had brought some lady friends in there. And there was some things going on that he didn't approve of. He did not go into any kind of details with me of that. But, that it was like the beginning of the end of it - -

Q. Okay.

A. - - between him and Matthew's arrangement.

Mr. Pender made a similar statement on the body camera footage, with two notable distinctions. First, on the footage, Mr. Pender claimed the conversation occurred on March 21 and that Floyd stated that he intended to tell Defendant “tonight.” Second, Mr. Pender also claimed on the footage that Floyd seemed “scared of telling [Defendant]” about his upcoming eviction, with Mrs. Pender interjecting to reiterate that Floyd was “nervous[.]” In its closing argument, the State referenced the statements solely to establish Defendant's motive for the beating.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 803 provides in relevant part that:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

․

(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), offered to prove the declarant's then existing condition or his future action. A statement of memory or belief, however, is not admissible to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's testament.

The official comments to the exception provide, in pertinent part:

(b) This Paragraph, borrowing from the approach taken in Alaska in its Rule 803(3), adds the phrase “offered to prove the declarant's then existing condition or his future action.” The insertion is intended to clarify the ambit of the exception. It follows the pronouncement by the Louisiana Supreme Court that an out-of-court declaration by one person is inadmissible to show what another person did. State v. Weedon, 342 So.2d 642 (La.1977), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, “The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term, Evidence,” 38 La.L.Rev. 567, 584 (1978).

(c) For a declaration to come under this exception to show state of mind, the declarant's state of mind must be a fact in issue. See State v. Doze, 384 So.2d 351 (La.1980). It need not, however, be an ultimate issue, as, for example, insanity.

As noted in the commentary, the state-of-mind exception existed in Louisiana jurisprudence prior to its legislative enactment.

The relevant usage of the exception originated in State v. Weedon, 342 So.2d 642, 646 (La.1977) (footnote omitted), wherein the supreme court discussed the origins of the exception as follows:

Admitting that motive cannot be proved by hearsay, the state nevertheless contends that these out-of-court declarations were admissible to prove the existing state of mind of the declarant, a traditional exception to the hearsay rule. 6 Wigmore on Evidence, Sections 1714 et seq. (Chadbourn rev., 1976); 4 Weinstein's Evidence, Section 803 (1976); McCormick on Evidence, Sections 294—296 (2d ed. 1972). This exception includes within its scope such declarations to do an act, introduced to prove that the declarant subsequently did the act. Wigmore, Section 1725; Weinstein, Section 803(3)(04); McCormick, Section 295.

Upon this principle, two leading American decisions permitted admission of hearsay to prove that, shortly before his death, a decedent intended to go with a certain person (now suspected of killing him), a fact otherwise unproved by the evidence. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892); People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944). In each instance, the ultimate fact sought to be proved was that, if the victim had carried out his intention, the[n] it was possible that the suspected person had killed the victim because then the suspect was near the victim at the time of his death.

Commentators have suggested that, under, such circumstances, the reliability of the hearsay is decreased, because it involves not only an inference that the declarant carried out his intention but also that the declarant's hearsay-identified companion (i.e., the suspect) had also carried out an intention proved only by another's hearsay declaration. McCormick, pp. 698—99; Weinstein, p. 803—104. The effect of the admission of the hearsay is not only to prove that the declarant acted on his intention, but also that a nondeclarant likewise completed an intent ascribed to him by the out-of-court declarant upon some unknown basis.

Our leading Louisiana decision to the same effect is State v. Raymond, 258 La. 1, 245 So.2d 335 (1971). There, the victim's out-of-court declaration of revulsion to his suspected killer (because of the latter's homosexual advances) was admitted as nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of the victim's state of mind concerning the suspect, with whom the victim rode off shortly afterwards, never again to be seen alive. Professor Pugh has noted that the decision is questionable, since the relevant issue was the accused’s not the victim’s state of mind. 32 La.L.Rev. 353—55 (1972).

Essentially, if justifiable, admission of the out-of-court declaration of the victim (who by reason of his death cannot testify) in Raymond is based upon the expedient rule sometimes relied upon in homicide cases that “conduct or declarations of the decedent shortly before his killing may sometimes be admissible as tending to show the immediately antecedent circumstances explanatory of the killing and connecting the accused with it.” State v. Raymond, 245 So.2d at 342 (concurring opinion).

In Weedon, 342 So.2d 642, a wife told a friend the day before the wife's murder that she intended to leave her husband. While observing that existing jurisprudence prohibited the use of hearsay to prove motive, the supreme court reasoned that hearsay admitted to prove the wife's state of mind could be probative only if the facts allowed the factfinder to infer that: “(a) that the wife did some act the next morning in accordance with her declared intent or state of mind, (b) evidenced such state of mind or intention to her husband, and (c) the husband reacted to it.” Id. at 647.

The supreme court has thereafter applied the exception in two circumstances. The primary circumstance involves cases where the declarant's state of mind and subsequent actions are directly contested, such as in the context of a self-defense claim. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 458 So.2d 454 (La.1984); State v. Sheppard, 371 So.2d 1135 (La.1979). The second circumstance—relevant to Defendant's assignment—involves a victim-declarant's statement being used to prove a defendant's motive when the victim-declarant communicated his or her intentions to a defendant. See, e.g., State v. Doze, 384 So.2d 351 (La.1980). See also State v. Tucker, 604 So.2d 1320 (La.1992) (concurring opinion). In State v. Brown, 562 So.2d 868, 878 (La.1990), the supreme court explained that:

When there is no evidence showing the decedent communicated his or her intention to the defendant, hearsay evidence of decedent's declaration is not relevant and may not be introduced to prove defendant's motive. However, when the declaration of intent or state of mind is used to show the decedent's own subsequent acts, its relevance is not dependent on communication to the defendant.

In State v. Magee, 11-574, pp. 43-44, 48-49 (La. 9/28/12), 103 So.3d 285, 316–317, 319–20 (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted), cert denied, 571 U.S. 830, 134 S.Ct. 56, 187 L.Ed.2d 49 (2013), the court discussed the exception at length as follows:

As explained in Garza v. Delta Tau Delta Fraternity National, 05–1508, 05-1527 (La. 7/10/06), 948 So.2d 84, 89, the official comments to this exception point out that it clarifies prior Louisiana law and generally follows the federal rules, with one notable exception. In drafting the article, the legislature borrowed from the approach taken in Alaska and added the phrase “offered to prove the declarant's then existing condition or his future action.” This insertion was intended to clarify the limited scope of the exception as set forth in State v. Weedon, 342 So.2d 642, 646 (La.1977) (An out-of-court declaration by one person is inadmissible to show what another person did). Garza, 05–1508, 05–1527 at 21, 948 So.2d at 98.

The exception is based on the belief that a spontaneous expression of a declarant's condition at the time the statement is made is generally a reliable indicator of the declarant's state of mind. 2 McCormick On Evidence § 274 (6th ed. 2006) (“[T]he special assurance of reliability for statements of present state of mind rests upon their spontaneity and resulting probable sincerity.”) ․

․ As to those sections of the letter in which Adrienne expresses her then existing belief that the marriage was over and her desire to separate both physically and emotionally from the defendant, the statements are relevant and admissible under La. C.E. art. 803(3) to prove Adrienne's subsequent acts in the days leading up to her murder and to explain why the immediate antecedent circumstances of the murder unfolded in the way they did; i.e., why she obtained a tape recorder to memorialize the defendant's incessant calls to her telephone, hid her car, sought a restraining order, hired a police detail to watch over the daycare center where she worked, and opened a separate bank account, and why, just hours before her demise, she informed the defendant that she would see him in court on the restraining order, but would not interfere long-term with his weekend visitation with the children. See La. C.E. art. 803(3); State v. Martin, 458 So.2d 454, 461 (La.1984) (A hearsay statement establishing the speaker's then existing state of mind is admissible to prove the speaker's subsequent acts).

․

This court has recognized that extrajudicial statements of a decedent made shortly before the crime that are relevant to the circumstances immediately preceding the murder are admissible under the state of mind exception. Admission in this instance is “based upon the expedient rule sometimes relied upon in homicide cases that ‘conduct or declarations of the decedent shortly before his killing may sometimes be admissible as tending to show the immediately antecedent circumstances explanatory of the killing and connecting the accused with it.’ “State v. Weedon, 342 So.2d 642, 646 (La.1977), quoting State v. Raymond, 258 La. 1, 245 So.2d 335, 342 (1971) (Tate, J., concurring).

In this case, Adrienne's declaration to Tracy on Sunday night that she was afraid of the defendant was clearly part of the immediate antecedent circumstances of the homicide, “explanatory of the killing and connecting the accused with it.” Id. Those circumstances began with whatever happened between Adrienne and the defendant at the Abita Springs ballpark on that Sunday afternoon when the defendant delivered the children to Adrienne. It led to and explained the measures taken by Adrienne in the brief period which ensued, culminating in her death, including recording the defendant's voice messages, hiding her car, seeking the restraining order, and hiring a police detail to watch over the daycare center. Consistent with Raymond, the district court did not err in admitting Tracy's testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to La. C.E. art. 803(3).

See also State v. Koederitz, 14-1526, pp. 10 (La. 3/17/15), 166 So.3d 981, 987 (per curiam) (“[p]ortions of that letter [which was addressed to the defendant], in which the victim revealed her apparent resolve to end her relationship with defendant and to move on, are admissible as a matter of [La.Code Evid.] art. 803(3)”).

In State v. Smith, 11-91 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/11/12), 96 So.3d 678, writ denied, 12-2069 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 375, the fourth circuit determined that statements showing a declarant's state of mind are admissible to prove a defendant's motive when there is evidence showing that a declarant communicated his or her intentions to the defendant. See also State v. Plaisance, 00-1858 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/6/02), 811 So.2d 1172, writ denied, 02-1395 (La. 11/27/02), 831 So.2d 270, cert denied, 538 U.S. 1038, 123 S.Ct. 2084, 155 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2003). This court has made similar observation in the past, holding that a “victim's declaration of her intention to discontinue her relationship with defendant was admissible to establish defendant's motive because there was evidence to show that the intention was actually communicated to defendant.” State v. Trahan, 543 So.2d 984, 999 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Simpson, 551 So.2d 1303 (La.1989); State v. Pipkins, 628 So.2d 1242, 1246 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 637 So.2d 154 (La.1994).

By contrast, the fifth circuit in a line of cases starting with State v. DiLosa, 529 So.2d 14, 17 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So.2d 1010 (La.1989), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, 279 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 2002), stated that “hearsay evidence showing the victim's state of mind for the purpose of proving the motive of the defendant is inadmissible, since its prejudicial effect on the defendant far outweighs its probative value as to the victim's state of mind.” See also State v. Leonard, 05-42 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/26/05), 910 So.2d 977, writ denied, 06-2241 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So.2d 165, and State v. Parks, 08-423 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/08), 2 So.3d 470, writ denied, 09-142 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 101. The second and fourth circuits have also quoted this language. See State v. Brown, 52,266 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18), 256 So.3d 431, writ denied, 18-1797 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So.3d 597; State v. Williams, 19-186 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/25/19), 280 So.3d 1185, writ granted, judgment rev’d, 19-1690 (La. 6/12/20), 347 So.3d 632. Yet, neither the DiLosa case nor the subsequent cases citing it involved declarants who communicated their intentions to the defendant.

Although the State cites to other jurisdictions that would permit it to use the imputed statement, the laws of this state indicate that the statement constituted inadmissible hearsay. Namely, Louisiana's version of the exception was drafted to prevent the exception from being used to show what another person did. See Magee, 103 So.3d at 316; La.Code Evid art. 803(3) cmt. (b). Floyd's imputed statement is an unambiguous expression of his then-existing intent/plan to inform Defendant of his imminent eviction. Since it is offered by the State to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein, it is hearsay. Further, as the statement is a future plan of the declarant, it is valid to establish the declarant's state of mind. Floyd's state of mind, however, was not directly at issue in this case, and it is apparent from the State's brief and its closing arguments at trial that the primary purpose of introducing this statement was to establish Defendant's motive. We therefore conclude that the statement was not admissible in the absence of evidence that Floyd followed through on his intentions and informed Defendant that he was removing him from the home. See Brown, 562 So.2d 868, Smith, 96 So.3d at 687. The State's evidence is simply deficient in that regard.

Nonetheless, as with the prior assignment of error, this erroneous admission was ultimately harmless. “An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it is unimportant in relation to the whole, and the verdict rendered is surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Brown, 16-998, pp. 54-55 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 745, 791, cert denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 143 S.Ct. 886, 215 L.Ed.2d 404 (2023). Notably, Defendant did not make the victim's state of mind an issue in this case. In fact, during closing arguments, the defense focused most of its efforts on denying the connection between Defendant's beating of Floyd and his subsequent death and limited its attacks on Floyd's identification of Defendant to, “Floyd said what he said. I am not sure why Floyd would say what he said. But he said what he said.” Moreover, the State presented overwhelming evidence that Defendant was responsible for the offense.

Floyd's largely uncontested account was corroborated by evidence placing Defendant at the house at the time of the incident. Paul Coker, Defendant's brother, testified that Defendant primarily resided at Floyd's house and that he dropped Defendant off at Floyd's house on the night of the beating. Despite inconsistent statements to police, Cheyenne Coker, Defendant's niece and Paul's daughter, testified that Paul told her the night of the beating that he dropped Defendant at Floyd's house for the night. Mrs. Pender also testified that she saw a truck, which usually picked Defendant up from Floyd's house, stop at Floyd's house to pick somebody up the morning after the beating. Cheyenne testified that Defendant arrived at her residence later that morning in that same truck.

Further, Defendant's own statements indicate animus. Cheyenne testified that Defendant expressed a desire to hurt the person he was staying with and that he would “reap what they sow if I have anything to do with it.” Cheyenne also testified that Defendant seemed unusually happy the day after the beating and, later in the evening, expressed his feelings that “whoever did it should have finished the job.” Finally, forensic evidence tied Defendant directly to the murder since Floyd's blood was positively identified on Defendant's right boot.

Accordingly, we find that any error is harmless.

Facebook Post

In his final assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted a photograph of a Facebook post purportedly made by Defendant. The photograph, taken by a police officer, was of a testifying witness's mother's phone, despite the witness not being Facebook “friends” with Defendant. The post, timestamped as having been posted thirteen hours before the screenshot of it was taken on the morning of March 26, stated “RIP mother fucker you have bothersthqt think your trash in there eyes let them have there day they do perfect fuck them I want nothing to do with them bye Muirfield unhappy.” Defendant argues that the post was not properly authenticated and that there was no way to prove that the statement came from Defendant or that it came from his Facebook profile as opposed to a fake one.

In admitting the photograph of the post, the trial court reasoned that most of Defendant's concerns addressed the weight of the evidence and that the post itself was admissible so long as the witness could testify that she saw the post “with her own eyes[.]”

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 901(A) provides that authentication, as a prerequisite for admissibility, is satisfied by providing evidence that is “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 901(B) provides several, non-exhaustive examples of valid authentication methods. These include the testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be pursuant to Article 901(B)(1) and “distinctive characteristics and the like” pursuant to Article 901(B)(4). The latter includes “appearance ․, taken in conjunction with circumstances.” Id. Trial courts have great discretion in determining the sufficiency of the foundation necessary for the introduction of evidence. State v. Jones, 544 So.2d 1209 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989). Accordingly, “the burden of proof for authentication is low, and the standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion.” State v. Ryan, 24-434, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/26/25) (unpublished opinion), 2025 WL 908562.

In State v. Smith, 15-1359 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/20/16), 192 So.3d 836, 842, the fourth circuit addressed the authentication of evidence from social media and articulated a “reasonable juror” standard as follows:

Sufficient proof will vary from case to case, and “[t]he ‘proof of authentication may be direct or circumstantial.’ ” Id. at 716 (quoting [United States v.] Vayner, 769 F.3d [125] at 130 [(2d Cir. 2014)]). Consequently, the type and quantum of evidence will depend on the context and the purpose of its introduction. Evidence which is deemed sufficient to support a reasonable juror's finding that the proposed evidence is what it is purports to be in one case, may be insufficient in another.

See also State v. Groves, 20-450 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So.3d 957; and State v. Gray, 16-1195 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/28/17), 410 So.3d 163, writ denied, 17-1306 (La. 6/15/18), 257 So.3d 688.

In State v. Jones, 15-1931 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/16) (unpublished opinion), 2016 WL 3569911, the first circuit applied existing rules on authenticating evidence without creating a social media-specific standard and determined that the state presented sufficient evidence to authenticate screenshots of Facebook messages. The court observed that the victim testified that the messages came from an account she knew was the defendant's and testified that their contents “aligned with the state of their relationship and what the defendant told her in his motel room on the night of the incident.” Id at p. 11. See also State v. Wiggins, 24-196 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/28/25), 406 So.3d 1279 (wherein the first circuit concluded that the state presented sufficient evidence to authenticate Facebook and Snapchat messages where the victim testified that she communicated with the defendant through the messaging services for years, and the defendant had sent pictures of himself through the Snapchat account in question). In contrast, the first circuit in State v. Dillon, 18-27, p. 13 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/21/18) (unpublished opinion), 2018 WL 4520463, maintained a trial court's denial of introduction of a screenshot of a Facebook message because the only evidence offered to authenticate the evidence was a witness's “ ‘subjective perception of the origin of the message.’ ”

Following review, we conclude that the admission of the Facebook post was within the trial court's discretion. While the witness did not take the screenshot herself nor was the post on her phone, she testified that she saw the post herself. Further, despite the fact that the witness did not have specific knowledge that the post came from Defendant, the screenshot presented in court contained both a time stamp and a profile picture matching Defendant's appearance. Thus, a reasonable juror could have concluded that it was more likely than not that the post came from Defendant, considering his appearance and other circumstances. The time stamp indicated the post was made thirteen hours before the screenshot was taken on the morning of March 26, 2022, within the same timeframe as the beating. Although Defendant raised the specter of the use of a “fake profile,” the circumstances surrounding the time stamp in relation to the timeframe of the offense render any such alternative explanations dubious. As noted by the State, the jury, as factfinder, was able to consider the likelihood of such a conspiracy. And, as above, even had the evidence not been properly authenticated, any error would have been harmless given the overwhelming evidence supporting Defendant's conviction.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Cumulative Error

Finally, Defendant contends that the errors he complains of “both individually and collectively” contributed to his conviction. The supreme court, however, has “consistently found that harmless errors, however numerous, do not aggregate to reach the level of reversible error.” State v. Brown, 18-1999, p. 117 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 284, cert denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 1702, 212 L.Ed.2d 596 (2022).

This assignment lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Under the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court generally will not reconsider its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case. Pumphrey v. City of New Orleans, 05-979 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1202. See also State v. Dickerson, 14-170 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14), 140 So.3d 904, writ denied, 14-1466 (La. 3/13/15), 161 So.3d 638. Application of the doctrine “is applied merely as a discretionary guide: Argument is barred where there is merely doubt as to the correctness of the former ruling, but not in cases of palpable former error or so mechanically as to accomplish manifest injustice.” Day v. Campbell-Grosjean Roofing & Sheet Metal Corp., 260 La. 325, 333-31, 256 So.2d 105, 107 (1971) (footnote omitted).

STILES, Judge.