MARCUS HEBERT v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL (2025)

Plaintiffs-in-Intervention, Miller & Associates; Michael B. Miller; and Jackie Becker (collectively “Miller”), appeal the judgment of the trial court dated May 13, 2024, ordering Defendant-in-Intervention Bart Bernard Personal Injury Law Firm (BBPILF) to pay $25,000.00 to Miller for attorney fees it incurred while representing Marcus Hebert. Both sides appealed the judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises out of a contentious attorney fee dispute between Miller and Defendants-in-Intervention Bart Bernard and BBPILF (collectively “Bernard”). This case previously came before this court on appeal regarding pretrial discovery issues in Hebert v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., et al, 22-55 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/14/22), 354 So.3d 194. We summarized the underlying facts as follows:

Marcus Hebert was involved in an automobile accident on July 1, 2015. Mr. Hebert sought to retain legal counsel to pursue both personal injury and worker's [sic] compensation claims stemming from the injuries he sustained. According to Mr. Hebert, he hired Bart Bernard Personal Injury Law Firm on July 16, 2015[,] to represent him in pursuing his personal injury case. On June 10, 2016[,] a “Petition for Damages” was filed on behalf of Mr. Hebert by the Bart Bernard Personal Injury Law Firm.

Mr. Hebert testified he was called on July 16, 2015 (the same day he hired the Bart Bernard firm) by Jacqueline Becker of Miller & Associates, who offered to represent him in pursuing his personal injury and worker's [sic] compensation claims. Mr. Hebert maintained he told Ms. Becker that the Bart Bernard firm was handling his personal injury claim, but he would consider letting Miller & Associates handle his worker's [sic] compensation claim. According to Mr. Hebert, he agreed to let Miller & Associates handle his worker's [sic] compensation claim and executed paperwork reflecting that on August 13, 2015. However, on that date Mr. Hebert also signed a “Retainer Contract” with Miller & Associates for the claim “arising out of [the] automobile accident of July 1, 2015.” The Retainer Contract provided Miller & Associates was to receive thirty-three and one-third (33 1/3%) of whatever gross amount is collected” as well as an “additional ten (10%) percent of whatever gross amount is collected by settlement or judgment.” Mr. Hebert stated on that date he simply signed whatever paperwork Miller & Associates asked him to sign, maintaining he never willingly or knowingly agreed to allow Miller & Associates to represent him on his personal injury claim.

Miller & Associates insist Mr. Hebert retained it to represent him in pursuing both his personal injury and worker's [sic] compensation claims arising out of the July 1, 2015 accident. Miller & Associates maintain it represented Mr. Hebert until July 6, 2016, when he terminated the firm as his legal representative in his pending personal injury suit. According to Miller & Associates, this was the first time it received notice that Bart Bernard's firm had been retained to represent Mr. Hebert. Miller & Associates also noted it was eventually terminated as well from representing Mr. Hebert on his worker's [sic] compensation claim on July 13, 2020.

Claiming to possess a legal interest in the subject matter of the pending personal injury litigation, Miller & Associates filed a Petition for Intervention on January 16, 2020. Specifically, Miller & Associates maintained it was entitled to a “lien on the case and on any settlement proceeds from [the] personal injury claim, ․ attorney's fees pursuant to La.R.S. 37:218 for the work done on the personal injury claim, ․ [and] reimbursement of advances and expenses made on behalf of Marcus Hebert.” In February 2020, an Answer to the Petition of Intervention was filed on behalf of defendants Brad Person (the driver of the negligent vehicle), Gulf South Pipeline Company (the employer) and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (the insurer).

On July 30, 2020, Miller & Associates filed a First Supplemental and Amending Petition for Intervention adding Marcus Hebert as a defendant in intervention. On October 7, 2020, Marcus Hebert, through his counsel, the Bart Bernard firm, filed an answer to the First Supplemental and Amending Petition for Intervention, asking that it be dismissed because “Miller & Associates never represented Marcus Hebert in any personal injury matter.” Attached to the Answer was an affidavit from Marcus Hebert. In it, Mr. Hebert attested he “hired Bart Bernard on July 16, 2015 to handle my third-party claim resulting from the July 1, 2015 accident.” He further stated:

I was called by Miller & Associates on my way home from signing the Bart Bernard contract to represent me for my third-party claim on July 16, 2015, and was asked by Jacqueline Becker to let Miller & Associates represent me in both my personal injury case and worker's [sic] compensation case. On that phone call, I told her that Bart Bernard was handling my third-party claim, and not them, but I would consider letting them handle my worker's [sic] compensation claim. After meeting with Chris Phillip, a worker's [sic] compensation lawyer, and after further contact from Miller & Associates, I decided to let Miller & Associates handle only my worker's [sic] compensation claim, instead of Chris Phillip.

While at Miller & Associates, they had me sign several documents. I never knew until much later that I signed a document to allow Miller & Associates to represent me in my third-party claim. Miller & Associates never gave me copies of any of the paperwork that I signed that day, nor did they explain to me that I was signing a third-party contract, if I did, because I never would have signed it.

Pursuant to the Petition for Intervention, Miller & Associates propounded discovery, requesting a copy of Mr. Hebert's file from the Bart Bernard firm. In conjunction with this request, Miller & Associates filed a Motion to Compel on September 23, 2020. Mr. Hebert opposed the Motion to Compel and requested that the court dismiss the Motion for Intervention. A hearing on the Motion to Compel was held on November 2, 2020. After a hearing with exhibits and testimony, the trial court granted the Motion to Compel, ordering Mr. Hebert to produce any requested documents within thirty days. Mr. Hebert filed a Notice of Intent to Apply for Supervisory Writs. He did not request a stay of the proceedings. When no documents were produced, Miller & Associates filed a Motion for Sanctions.

On November 30, 2020, Mr. Hebert filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims against defendants Brad Person, Gulf South Pipeline Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, indicating a settlement had been reached between the parties. Despite its standing as an intervenor, Miller & Associates was not involved, nor notified, of any aspect of the settlement reached between Mr. Hebert and the named defendants. An Order granting the Motion to Dismiss was signed by the trial court on December 1, 2020.

While the Motion for Sanctions was pending, the prior trial judge (Judge Edwards) retired and a new trial judge (Judge Garrett) began presiding over the case. The Motion for Sanctions was reset and the trial court fixed a status conference for June 17, 2021.

On March 9, 2021, Mr. Hebert filed a Peremptory Exception of No Right of Action, contending Miller & Associates has no right of action against him because no attorney-client relationship ever existed between the two on any personal injury claim. An order was signed by the trial court on May 3, 2021[,] directing Miller & Associates to show cause why the exception of no right of action should not be sustained.

After Mr. Hebert settled his personal injury claims against defendants and the settlement funds were disbursed, Miller & Associates filed a “Second Supplemental and Amending Petition of Intervention and Motion for Leave to Amend Petition to Join Indispensable Party” on July 11, 2021, seeking to add Bart Bernard as an indispensable party since the tort case had been settled and the settlement funds received were in the possession of Bart Bernard. The trial court signed the Motion to Amend on July 14, 2021, adding Bart Bernard as a party to Miller & Associates’ attorney fee intervention claim. Bart Bernard filed an Answer to the Petition of Intervention and Exceptions.

On August 2, 2021, Miller & Associates again requested a hearing on its pending Motion for Sanctions because of the failure to comply with the court ordered discovery. A hearing was set for September 27, 2021. After the attorneys appeared before the trial court on that date, without evidence introduced or briefs filed in opposition, the trial court in a judgment rendered on October 6, 2021, vacated the previous discovery order and struck the previously signed motion for leave to amend that added Bart Bernard as an indispensable party. The trial court's judgment stated in pertinent part:

Intervenors were before the court on November 2, 2020[,] on a Motion to Compel Responses to Discovery. A Judgment on the Rules was granted by Judge Jules Edwards, III, ordering the requested documents be granted within 30 days. This ruling is improper as Intervenor's request were for the entirety of Plaintiff's personal injury file from his attorney at the time, Bart Bernard.

After hearing the testimony of the parties and the evidence presented,

IT IS ORDERED that the Judgment signed on November 2, 2020[,] is hereby vacated as it was improperly granted. When a ruling is granted improperly the court has the authority and is obliged “to correct his previous error by vacating and recalling the previous order.” Templet v. Johns, [417 So.2d 433 (La.App. 1 Cir.1982), writ denied, 420 So.2d 981 (La.1982)] Intervenors are not entitled to the entirety of Plaintiff's file in as such it would [violate] attorney-client privilege and it was too broad a request.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the “Motion for Leave to Amend Petition to Join Indispensable Party,” signed on July 14, 2021[,] is hereby stricken from the record in as such it was inadvertently signed by this Court. Pursuant to [La.Code Civ.P.] art. 1041 the motion for leave to amend petition to join Bart Bernard as an indispensable party has prescribed as more than 90 days had passed since the filing of Intervenors “Petition of Intervention on January 1, 2020.

Hebert, 354 So.3d at 196–98 (sixth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth alterations in original).

In the previous appeal, we reversed, concluding the trial court erred in finding Miller's Motion for Leave to Amend was prescribed. The case was remanded, and the trial court ordered to add Bart Bernard and BBPILF as indispensable parties to the lawsuit. This court also reversed Judge Garrett's judgment which vacated Judge Edwards’ November 2, 2020 grant of the discovery order. The trial court was instructed to hold a full hearing on Miller's Motion for Sanctions against Bernard. Finally, this court ordered Bernard to comply with the November 2, 2020 discovery order within thirty days of the appellate court opinion.

The matter came before this court again on pretrial matters in the form of a writ filed by Miller on March 24, 2023. With the trial date set for March 28, 2023, the motion for sanctions still had not been heard, even though this court ordered that there be a full hearing on the motion before the trial date. The writ was granted and made peremptory, with this court ordering the trial scheduled for March 28, 2023, stayed and rescheduled to a date after a judgment on the motion for sanctions was rendered.

The motion for sanctions was finally heard on September 28, 2023, at which time the motion was denied. A bench trial on the merits was held on November 21–22, 2023, after which the matter was taken under advisement. Judgment was rendered on May 13, 2024, wherein the trial court ordered Bernard to pay Miller $25,000.00, representing the attorney fees it incurred while representing Marcus Hebert. Both sides appealed the judgment.

ANALYSIS

I. Was the judgment against Bernard proper?

Bernard argues that Miller lacked standing to add Bernard as a party to this lawsuit, and, consequently, he is not bound by the judgment. This issue has previously been reviewed by this court in Hebert, 354 So.3d 194. Miller filed a motion for leave to amend the petition to join Bernard as an indispensable party to the lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion, finding that it was prescribed. On appeal, this court reversed the judgment.

The appellate court noted that the failure to join an indispensable party may be noticed by either the trial court or the appellate court on its own motion. Id. (citing La.Code Civ.P. art. 645). In finding that Bernard was an indispensable party, this court discussed Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc., 373 So.2d 102 (La.1979)(on rehearing). This court explained:

[In Saucier, 373 So.2d 102,] a client discharged his attorney before a case was settled and subsequently hired another attorney. The discharged attorney filed a Petition for Intervention based on a written contract between he and the client for legal representation. Relevant to this case is the court's holding that the non-discharged attorney was an indispensable party who must be joined in the proceedings. The Saucier court remanded the case to the trial court to join the non-discharged attorney as an indispensable party for a proper adjudication of the matter.

Hebert, 354 So.3d at 201.

This court found Saucier, 373 So.2d 102, was applicable and ruled “that the Bart Bernard firm and Bart Bernard, as the parties in possession and control of the settlement funds, are indispensable parties in this case.” Hebert, 354 So.3d at 202. The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling on Miller's motion for leave to amend to add Bernard and remanded with instructions requiring the trial court to join Bernard as indispensable parties.

We agree with the previous decision by this court that Saucier requires Bernard be added as an indispensable party to this lawsuit. As such, Miller did have standing to add them as a party.

Bernard further contends that no amendment was made and neither Bernard nor the Bernard Law Firm were served or answered the intervention after the appellate court ruling. While the trial court was ordered to add Bernard to the proceedings, no such order can be found in the record; however, the result of the reversal on the motion to amend means that the amendment was granted.

Additionally, we note that Bernard filed into the record on February 28, 2023, an objection to Miller and Associates third supplemental petition. It specifically states, “NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes Defendants-in-Intervention, Bart Bernard and Bart Bernard Personal Injury Law Firm[.]” While Bernard may not have been served with the amended petition, Bernard did file pleadings, answer pleadings, and was represented throughout the attorney fees dispute in this case and to its conclusion, including trial on the merits and on appeal.

[A]lthough the waiver through a general appearance has been eliminated from our law by the repeal of LSA-C.C.P. art. 7, a party can nevertheless waive an objection to the jurisdiction by an appearance of record. Sam [v. Feast, 00-1163 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/28/01)], 802 So.2d [680,] at 683. Appearance of record includes filing a pleading, appearing at a hearing, or formally enrolling as counsel of record. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1671, Comment--1997.

Thurman v. Aguilar, 21-1514, p. 17 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/22/22), 343 So.3d 784, 798, writ denied, 22-1110 (La. 11/1/22), 349 So.3d 7.

Therefore, we find that Bernard made a general appearance in this suit, waiving any objection to jurisdiction and subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.

II. Motion for Sanctions

Miller first complains that Judge Garrett erred in refusing to give them a hearing on the motion for sanctions for over two years. They further argue that she erred in finding they were not entitled to sanctions.

As stated previously, the motion to compel was ordered by Judge Edwards on November 2, 2020. Bernard did not comply with the order, and a motion for sanctions was filed. Thereafter, Judge Edwards retired, and Judge Garrett was elected to the bench. Judge Garrett vacated the order to compel discovery and found the motion for sanctions moot at that time. Miller appealed. An appellate opinion was rendered on December 14, 2022, reversing the trial court, reinstating the order on the motion to compel, and ordering a full hearing on the motion for sanctions. Miller received the documents at issue on January 12, 2023. Trial on the merits was set for March 28, 2023; however, a sanctions hearing had yet to be held. Consequently, Miller filed a supervisory writ with the appellate court. This court granted the writ, stayed the trial, and ordered a hearing on the sanctions motion prior to trial. The trial court ultimately heard the motion for sanctions on September 28, 2023, denying the motion.

Miller has not cited any law in support of the contention that Judge Garrett erred because she did not hear the motion for sanctions in a timely fashion. We point out that, between the time the motion for sanctions was filed and then heard, the sitting trial judge retired, and the current judge was elected to succeed him. The discovery and sanctions issue was the subject of an appeal to this court and then subsequently the subject of a writ. All of this took time to work its way through court to be litigated. The motion was ultimately heard, and it was done prior to the trial. As such, we do not find any error in the timing of the sanctions motion.

Next, Miller complains that the trial judge erred in refusing to order sanctions against Bernard for refusal to comply with discovery. First, we note that the ruling on the motion for sanctions is an interlocutory judgment. “It is well-settled that although an interlocutory judgment may not itself be immediately appealable, it is nevertheless subject to review by an appellate court when a judgment is rendered in the case which is appealable.” Elysian, Inc. v. Neal Auction Co., Inc., 20-674, 20-675, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/21/21), 325 So.3d. 1075, 1083.

When determining whether La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 has been violated, a trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a manifest error standard. Miller v. Aymond, 24-226 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/24), 396 So.3d 1013. “ ‘The discovery articles grant the trial court the power to compel discovery and the discretion to impose various sanctions on a party or his attorney for unjustified failure to comply with the statutory scheme or to obey an order compelling discovery.’ ” Hardee v. City of Jennings, 10-1540, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/11/11), 65 So.3d 266, 269 (quoting Garza v. International Maintenance Corp., 97-317, pp. 2–3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 1021, 1023), writ denied, 11-1190 (La. 9/23/11), 69 So.3d 1158. The judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

The trial court may order sanctions if it finds the failure to obey an order to compel was unjustified. In this case, the trial court did not find that sanctionable conduct existed. Specifically, the order of the court states, “This court does not find that sanctionable conduct exists, and thus shall not award any sanctions in this matter at this time.”

In coming to this conclusion, the trial court agreed with Bernard that the appellate court was given “a deficient set of facts” when it reinstated the order compelling the requested discovery. The trial court found that “Miller and Associates maintained to the [appellate] court that they currently held a signed waiver of the attorney client privilege.” However, Marcus Hebert testified at the hearing that Miller was never his attorney of record in his tort case. The trial court further found “Mrs. Becker testified that she was in receipt of the revocation [of the authorization or waiver of attorney client privilege] signed by Mr. Hebert” on September 17, 2020. This testimony supported the statement by Mr. Hebert that he had revoked any and all waivers of the attorney-client privilege between himself and Miller.

Based on the evidence, the trial court found that Bernard was bound by the laws surrounding discovery and attorney-client privilege. The trial court determined that Bernard was upholding his client's wishes when he refused to comply with the discovery order until after the ruling by the appellate court. For these reasons, the trial court found no sanctionable actions existed.

The trial court determined that Bernard was justified in failing to produce the documentation based on the testimony of Mrs. Becker. We find the record supports this ruling. As such, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award sanctions in this matter.

III. Attorney Fees Dispute

The issue in this case is what amount, if any, does Bernard owe to Miller for the work they completed on Marcus Hebert's tort case.

First, we will address Miller's argument that the discovery violations prejudiced their trial preparations. Miller spends a good amount of its brief rehashing the facts leading up to the first appeal in this case. Specifically, assigning as error that the trial court erred in finding that Bernard was entitled to withhold attorney-client privileged information; erred in refusing to enforce the November 20, 2020 discovery judgment; and erred in reversing the November 2, 2020 discovery judgment without a hearing. All of these issues have already been addressed by this court in Hebert, 354 So.3d 194. We agreed with Miller and granted relief in their favor. Consequently, the requested discovery was produced to Miller on January 12, 2023. Miller now complains that 29,000 files produced to them were so voluminous as to prejudice their trial preparations. They argue they did not have enough time to review all of the evidence. The trial in this matter was held over a two-day period between November 21–22, 2023. This occurred nearly a year after the documents were produced. Therefore, we disagree that Miller was prejudiced in their trial preparations.

Moving on to the merits, the facts of this case are undisputed. Marcus Hebert was injured in an accident on July 1, 2015. He testified that he retained the services of Bernard on July 16, 2015, approximately two weeks after the accident. Marcus Hebert further testified that Miller contacted him on the same day and offered to represent him in both his workers’ compensation claim and his tort claim. Marcus Hebert has been consistent throughout this case that he did not hire Miller to represent him in his tort case, only on his workers’ compensation claim, and he explained this to Mrs. Becker at the time. However, when he signed the Retainer Contract with Miller, it included the tort case as well as the workers’ compensation claim. Mr. Hebert testified that he did not realize the paperwork included an agreement that Miller would represent him in his tort claim. The trial court noted:

After reviewing the demeanor and verbal testimony of Marcus Hebert, the Court finds it imperative to note that Marcus Hebert is a simple working man with limited education who trusted these lawyers to honor their oath. He testified in open court that he trusted Miller and Associates to do what he asked of them, represent him in worker's [sic] compensation; he further testified that he signed whatever forms they put in front of him. He also testified that he trusted [Bernard] to represent him in tort; similarly, signing whatever forms they put in front of him.

As such, Mr. Hebert had simultaneous representation in his tort case for approximately a year, when Mr. Hebert discovered what he signed and fired Miller from his tort suit.

Bernard filed the underlying tort suit, eventually achieving a favorable settlement in the amount of $1,261,340.00 for Marcus Hebert. We note that Miller complains about the fee contract between Mr. Hebert and Bernard and alleges that Bernard overcharged Mr. Hebert. We find these claims personal to Mr. Hebert, not Miller. The record is devoid of any evidence that Mr. Hebert was unhappy with his fee contract or that he felt he was overcharged by Bernard. On the contrary, Mr. Hebert seemed happy with his representation and content with the amount he received in the settlement. Certainly, Mr. Hebert has not alleged such a claim and that issue is not before us.

In Town of Mamou v. Fontenot, 01-1622, pp. 12–13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/02), 816 So.2d 958, 966 (alteration in original), writ denied, 02-1566 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1162, this court explained:

Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5(a) provides that “[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable” and sets forth a number of factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee. These factors are:

(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Further, lawyers are prevented from charging excessive or unreasonable fees in contingency fee contracts. Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElligott and Swift v. Brodhead, 613 So.2d 1038 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 616 So.2d 703 (La.1993).

This court discussed how to determine the reasonableness of a contingency fee in Town of Mamou, 816 So.2d at 966–67, stating:

[T]he reasonableness of a contingent fee cannot be determined by simply multiplying the hours worked by an hourly rate customary in the legal community. To do so would be both overly simplistic and destructive of the whole contingent fee concept. “A contingent fee contract is a contract for legal services in which the attorney's fee depends upon success in the enforcement of the client's claim. The attorney bears the risk of loss insofar as his legal services are concerned. Such contracts promote the distribution of needed legal services by reducing the risk of financial loss to clients and making legal services available to those without means.” Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 373 So.2d 102, 105 (La.1978) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) ․

Saucier is the seminal case cited by most opinions evaluating the reasonableness of attorney fees, particularly contingent fees. Yet, that opinion addressed only the question of how to compensate an attorney who had entered into a contingent fee contract with a client and was later discharged without cause. Initially, the supreme court concluded that the attorney was entitled to the percentage provided for in the contingent fee contract. However, on rehearing, the supreme court recognized that such a decision would subject the client to the payment of two separate percentages—one to the discharged attorney and another to the replacement attorney, leaving the client in that particular case with only one-third of the money recovered. The supreme court resolved this inequity by concluding that the total recovery was subject to only one contingent fee and remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of how to divide that single fee between the attorneys involved, taking into consideration the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility then in effect.

Attorney fees were paid to Bernard out of a settlement reached between Marcus Hebert and the original Defendants. Pursuant to Saucier, the court must determine how to divide that single contingency fee between the attorneys involved.

Miller argues that, in furtherance of the tort case, they requested the accident report from July 1, 2015. They also requested Marcus Hebert's automobile insurance information for the purpose of determining whether there was uninsured motorist coverage or med pay. Miller referred Mr. Hebert for medical treatment. Miller filed a lawsuit on behalf of Marcus Hebert. This put Bernard on notice of the situation, and Marcus Hebert terminated Miller's representation on the tort suit shortly thereafter. Much of the work discussed by Miller in its brief pertains to the workers’ compensation case and not the tort case. In fact, when asked at trial whether the work they performed on the tort case was work Miller would have completed anyway in furtherance of the workers’ compensation case, Mrs. Becker answered, “More than likely, yes. Yes.”

In the May 13, 2024 judgment, the trial court stated:

[T]his Court finds that although Marcus Hebert did not intend to hire both firms to represent him in his tort case, he did. During trial, Miller and Associates showed through the testimony of Ms. Becker and Mr. Miller that Mrs. Becker provided legal services to Marcus Hebert for both his tort suit and his worker's [sic] compensation suit. Mrs. Becker was employed by Miller and Associates wherein she and Mr. Miller held a fee sharing agreement on all cases that she worked on. Both Mrs. Becker and Mr. Miller testified that Mrs. Becker completed the legal work for Marcus Hebert. The work completed by Miller and Associates, inclusive of reviewing accident reports and referring Marcus Hebert to medical treatment, helped build a foundation for both the tort suit and the worker's [sic] compensation suit.

The trial court did note that a letter of representation was never sent to the Defendant insurance company in the tort suit. While Miller argued this was done as a strategic move, the trial court questioned whether counsel did not want “to raise any red flags as to dual representation.”

We find this case is distinguishable from other attorney fee disputes. Typically, the first attorney is hired and does work in furtherance of the case. The first attorney and client part ways and, thereafter, the client retains a new attorney. In Matter of Trichell, 23-22 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/27/23), 381 So.3d 791, the court was tasked with adjudicating an attorney fee dispute. In discussing the factors used to determine allocation of attorney fees, the appellate court explained that the supreme court in Saucier, 373 So.2d 102, “advised courts to consider the following factors ․ to make a reasonable apportionment of attorney fees recovered among successive attorneys handling a case.” Id. at 798 (emphasis added). In the present case, unbeknownst to each other, the attorneys were working contemporaneously.

Ultimately, the trial court found Miller to be entitled to $25,000.00 in attorney fees “based on the time, knowledge, and skill used when reviewing this matter.” The trial court also took into account Mrs. Becker's experience. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court's award of $25,000.00 was an abuse of discretion. While Marcus Hebert did not intend to hire Miller as his tort lawyers, he did sign a contract retaining them as such. Even so, Miller only represented him for a short time, and it is clear from the record that Bernard performed most, if not all, of the work, done in the underlying tort case. As the trial court stated, Miller did perform foundational work on Mr. Hebert's tort case for which it believed he was their client. We find $25,000.00 is a reasonable attorney fee based on the amount of work completed and time spent by Miller on the tort case.

DECREE

The trial court's judgment is affirmed. Costs of these proceedings are to be split equally between the parties.

AFFIRMED.

GUY E. BRADBERRY JUDGE