STATE v. HATEN (2025)

Defendant, Darnell C. Haten, appeals his sentence for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, arguing on appeal that the sentence imposed is excessive and the trial court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences, except that we vacate the portion of defendant's sentences that imposed a financial obligation. We remand this matter to the trial court for compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 29, 2024, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant with aggravated flight from an officer in violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1 (count one), and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in violation of La. R.S. 14:68.4 (count two). Defendant pled not guilty to both charges at his arraignment on May 31, 2024.

On July 1, 2024, the case proceeded to trial before a twelve-person jury, and on the same day, the jury unanimously found defendant guilty as charged as to both counts.

On July 22, 2024, defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment at hard labor and a two thousand dollar fine as to count one (aggravated flight from an officer), and two years imprisonment at hard labor and a five thousand dollar fine as to count two (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle). The sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other.¹ Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence on the same day, which was denied. Also on July 22, 2024, defendant filed a motion for appeal, which was granted on July 24, 2024.

FACTS

Around daybreak on May 4, 2024, defendant was driving his mother's black Toyota Camry—which he did not have permission to drive—eastbound on Interstate 10 (“I-10”) on the Bonnet Carre Spillway in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana. At the same time, Louisiana State Trooper Cory Castin was traveling in a marked police vehicle eastbound on I-10 in St. Charles Parish with the flow of traffic in the left lane at 75 miles-per-hour. Trooper Castin testified that the black Camry sped past him in the right lane going approximately 80 miles-per-hour. Though the Camry had tinted windows, Trooper Castin could see someone looking directly at him as the Camry passed him by. Trooper Castin proceeded after the Camry, activated his radar, and paced the Camry at 122 miles-per-hour in a 60 miles-per-hour zone. He notified dispatch of the license plate number of the Camry. He also activated his vehicle's overhead lights and sirens in an attempt to pull the Camry over; instead, a pursuit ensued.

Upon activating the sirens, the dash camera in Trooper Castin's unit began recording. The video footage from the dash camera was played for the jury, as Trooper Castin narrated. The video first showed a black vehicle pass by Trooper Castin's vehicle on the right going fast. The trooper then moved his unit behind the black vehicle, a Toyota Camry, and the two vehicles passed several other vehicles at high speeds. Trooper Castin described that he was trying to catch up to the Camry and began doing so at 122 miles-per-hour. In the video, the trooper's sirens can be heard and the reflections from his vehicle's emergency lights can be seen off of the back of the Camry. The video showed the Camry and the trooper's vehicle continuing to pass other vehicles on I-10 at high speeds. Continuing eastbound on I-10, they soon entered Jefferson Parish. During the pursuit through Jefferson Parish, the Camry drove several times on the left shoulder of I-10 around other vehicles. The speed limit on I-10 in Jefferson Parish is 60 miles-per-hour. Their speed varied from 90 miles-per-hour to up to 130 miles-per-hour in light to moderate traffic.

At the Interstate 10/Interstate 610 split just inside of Orleans Parish, the Camry illegally drove over the gore—a stripped area of the roadway that separates the main roadway from an entrance or exit. At that point, the Camry took the right exit at the split and continued eastbound on I-10 towards downtown New Orleans. As they proceeded through Orleans Parish on I-10, defendant continued driving the Camry between 90 and 100 miles-per-hour in a 60 miles-per-hour zone. The Camry continued weaving through traffic at high speeds and soon was on the Crescent City Connection bridge heading to the Westbank. Trooper Castin stated that the speed limit becomes 50 miles-per-hour on the Crescent City Connection. As they crossed the bridge and re-entered Jefferson Parish and drove on the elevated Westbank Expressway, a 65 miles-per-hour zone, the Camry continued speeding at over 90 miles-per-hour. At one point, the Camry weaved around traffic on the elevated expressway at a speed described over the radio as 115 miles-per-hour.

As the Camry left the elevated portion of the expressway onto the “lower level,” its speed was conveyed over the radio as 130 miles-per-hour. Once off of the elevated expressway, the Camry then drove over the gore again and proceeded through a red light. For safety reasons, Trooper Castin slowed down at the light, resulting in there being some distance between his vehicle and the Camry, causing him to briefly lose sight of the Camry. As he tried to catch up with the Camry, Trooper Castin visually observed the Camry flip in the air after hitting another vehicle. The dash camera video did not record the actual crash, but as Trooper Castin caught up to the crash site, the video shows the Camry upside down in the roadway and the vehicle that it struck in the median to the left of the roadway. Trooper Castin did not see anyone flee the Camry.

Because it was a pursuit, Trooper Castin treated this as a felony stop and called out to the occupant. Upon receiving no response, he and other officers approached and saw defendant, the only occupant, lying on the inside roof of his overturned vehicle. They gave several commands for defendant to exit his vehicle, but defendant was non-responsive. They then broke a window, unlocked the door, and assisted defendant out of his vehicle. Defendant appeared to be in pain and was non-verbal. Defendant was brought to University Medical Center, where Trooper Castin later spoke to him.

Trooper Castin testified that the vehicle's license plate was checked and the car was registered to an owner in the Westwego area. A deputy contacted the owner, who turned out to be defendant's mother. She went to the scene of the accident and advised Trooper Castin that defendant did not have permission to use her vehicle. She completed a Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office auto theft affidavit and provided a voluntary written statement.

Karen Heisser, defendant's mother, testified that her son lived in Alexandria and would stay with her when he came to Westwego. She owned a 2018 Toyota Camry that she allowed defendant to use after he obtained her permission. On May 4, 2024, after being notified of the accident, Ms. Heisser went to the scene of the accident, but her vehicle had already been removed. She explained that the vehicle was at her house when she went to bed on the previous night (May 3) and she did not give defendant permission that night to take her vehicle. Ms. Heisser acknowledged that since birth, defendant suffered from sickle cell disease and had memory issues. Prior to this incident, defendant had not used her vehicle without first asking for permission. Ms. Heisser stated that defendant was not a listed user on her vehicle's insurance policy.

At the hospital, Trooper Castin advised defendant of his Miranda ² rights and defendant agreed to speak to him. In body-camera footage of defendant's conversation with Trooper Castin at the hospital, defendant was asked why he ran, and he indicated he was trying to get to his daughter at his mother's house. Defendant admitted he knew he was being chased by the police. Trooper Castin got no response when he asked defendant where he was coming from.

In a second video statement from the hospital, defendant mentions “attachments.” He said, “No, I wasn't about to stop.” When Trooper Castin asked if he was saying he did not stop because he had attachments, defendant replied that he did not stop because he knew how the police work. Trooper Castin asked if defendant saw his car and knew that it was a police car. Defendant answered, “It's obvious what a police car looks like.” According to Trooper Castin, it seemed like defendant was trying to excuse his actions, but that in continuing to speak with him, it became clear to him that defendant was aware of what was going on.

The next day, Trooper Castin called the child's mother, who said the child was never in danger and was in either her custody or the custody of family members.

Darryl Cuquet testified that he was driving his 2019 Dodge Ram westbound on the Westbank Expressway in Westwego around 6:35 a.m. on May 4, 2024 when he was involved in a wreck. When he changed from the middle to the left lane, he saw a vehicle in his rearview mirror that appeared far away. That vehicle, a black Camry, ended up striking the rear driver-side corner of his vehicle, forcing it over a curb and approximately sixty feet into the median. In the accident, Mr. Cuquet hit his head, re-aggravated a prior wrist injury, and suffered from soft tissue damage and a mild whiplash. His vehicle was totaled. He estimated that he had about $79,000 in losses as a result of the accident.

Defendant, who had a suspended driver's license, was booked on charges of driving under suspension, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, reckless operation, negligent injuring, and aggravated flight from an officer.

On appeal, defendant does not challenge his convictions, nor his sentence on the aggravated flight from an officer charge (count one). Rather, he challenges his sentence on the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle charge (count two), and argues the court erred in imposing the maximum sentence on that charge and in denying his motion for reconsideration of sentence. Defendant asserts that the court did not articulate reasons for imposing the sentence in compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, or order a presentence investigation (“PSI”) report.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendant was convicted of aggravated flight from an officer (count one) and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (count two). Prior to imposing the sentences on said charges, the judge stated that he watched the dash camera video of the chase and described it as “frightening” to watch. He summarized that defendant was involved in a chase with the police in St. Charles Parish and drove 123 miles-per-hour. The judge stated that defendant hit someone in Westwego who had to go to the hospital. The judge opined that it was good that there were no children involved because the children might have died. Defendant's car flipped over and the victim's car was pushed into the median. The judge recalled that defendant's mother testified against him and confirmed that the vehicle belonged to her. The judge stated that defendant participated in a very dangerous chase and was lucky to be alive.

The judge said that he looked at the factors under Article 894.1, watched the trial, heard the testimony, and viewed the dash camera and body camera videos admitted into evidence. The judge then sentenced defendant to three years imprisonment at hard labor and a two thousand dollar fine as to count one (aggravated flight from an officer), and two years imprisonment at hard labor and a five thousand dollar fine (the maximum sentence) as to count two (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle). The sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other. Defense counsel objected to the sentences.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(B) provides that a motion for reconsideration of sentence “shall be oral at the time of sentence or shall be in writing thereafter and shall set forth the specific grounds on which the motion is based.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E) provides that “[f]ailure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.” This Court has held that when the specific grounds for objection to the sentences, including alleged non-compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, are not specifically raised in the trial court, then these issues are not included in the bare review for unconstitutional excessiveness, and the defendant is precluded from raising these issues on appeal. State v. Robertson, 23-525 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/23/24), 398 So.3d 767, 775.

Here, defense counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence wherein he generically asserted that “the sentence imposed is excessive, that the sentence imposed be reconsidered, and that a lower sentence more in keeping with fairness and state and federal constitutional standards be imposed.” The motion for reconsideration of sentence was denied. Because defense counsel failed to specifically raise the issue of the trial court's lack of compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, we find that defendant is not entitled to a review of such issue in this appeal and is limited to a review of his sentence for unconstitutional excessiveness.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Article 1, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution also prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, but further explicitly prohibits excessive punishment. State v. Rogers, 23-558 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/28/24), 398 So.3d 209, 226, writ denied, 24-1195 (La. 12/27/24), 397 So.3d 1217. A sentence is considered excessive, even when it is within the applicable statutory range, if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is nothing more than the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Id. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. Id.

A trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case, and therefore, is given broad discretion when imposing a sentence. State v. Fuentes, 23-502 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/31/24), 392 So.3d 1167, 1172. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. Id. The review of sentences under La. Const. art. 1, § 20 does not provide an appellate court with a vehicle for substituting its judgment for that of a trial judge as to what punishment is most appropriate in a given case. Id.

The appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D); State v. Stewart, 24-50 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/24), 398 So.3d 812, 824, writ denied, 24-1445 (La. 2/19/25), 400 So.3d 931. In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, the reviewing court shall consider the crime and the punishment in light of the harm to society and gauge whether the penalty is so disproportionate as to shock the court's sense of justice, while recognizing the trial court's wide discretion. State v. Short, 23-473 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/10/24), 398 So.3d 235, 240-41.

In reviewing a trial court's sentencing discretion, three factors are considered: 1) the nature of the crime; 2) the nature and background of the offender; and 3) the sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts. Stewart, 398 So.3d at 824. However, there is no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. Robertson, 398 So.3d at 775. The trial judge is granted great discretion in imposing a sentence, and sentences will not be set aside as excessive absent clear abuse of that broad discretion. State v. Gassenberger, 23-148 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/23), 378 So.3d 820, 841. Generally, maximum sentences are reserved for cases involving the most serious violations of the offense charged and the worst type of offender. Short, 398 So.3d at 241.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:68.4, whoever commits the crime of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than two years or both. Here, defendant was sentenced as to count two (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle) to two years imprisonment at hard labor and a five thousand dollar fine—the maximum sentence.

Considering the nature of the crime, the record reflects that defendant used his mother's vehicle without her permission. In that vehicle, he was seen speeding by a state trooper. When the trooper attempted to pull him over, instead of stopping, he increased his speed and led officers on a chase through multiple parishes. He drove and weaved through traffic at excessively high speeds and left the roadway several times. Ultimately, he crashed his mother's vehicle into another vehicle, flipping the vehicle, and injuring both himself and the other driver. Defendant's actions put many people's lives in danger.

Prior to imposing the sentence, the trial judge described the video of the pursuit as “frightening.” He further opined that if children had been involved in the accident, they likely would have died. The judge stated defendant was lucky to be alive. Additionally, the judge provided that defendant was uncooperative after the pursuit and defendant's mother testified against him.

The record provides scant information on defendant's background. The record reflects that defendant was approximately thirty-eight years old at the time of the offense and had children. While defendant mentions that the judge did not order a PSI, the law does not provide a defendant with an absolute right to a PSI report. Rather, a PSI report is an aid to the trial court and is ordered at its discretion. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 875; Rogers, 398 So.3d at 229. As to defendant's nature, we find that his actions in this incident reflect an indifference for the safety of the public, a disregard for the authority of law enforcement officers, and a contempt of the law.

Lastly, this Court previously upheld a similar sentence. In State v. Barber, 19-235 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/23/19), 282 So.3d 404, 415, this Court upheld a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment at hard labor for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Although the defendant in Barber had a long criminal history and was found with a knife, the defendant only endangered one victim. In the present case, defendant endangered many people. Unlike in the instant matter, a fine was not imposed in Barber.

As explained in Barber, 282 So.3d at 415, La. R.S. 14:68.4 was amended by 2017 La. Acts No. 281 § 1, effective August 1, 2017 to reduce the maximum term of imprisonment from ten years to two years. As such, there are few cases addressing whether a sentence is excessive under the lower sentencing scheme. Under the previous sentencing statute, the Second Circuit upheld a sentence of ten years imprisonment at hard labor for the subject offense, which was then the maximum sentence. See State v. Banks, 41,274 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/20/06), 940 So.2d 111, 114-15.³

Here, in light of the foregoing, we conclude that the record supports the sentence imposed for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle conviction. The challenged sentence was also ordered to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for the aggravated flight from an officer conviction, which is longer than the challenged sentence. We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing the challenged sentence or err in denying the motion for reconsideration of sentence. As such, the assignments of error are without merit.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

The record was reviewed for errors patent according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975), and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).

La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1 requires the court to conduct a hearing to determine whether payment of any fine, fee, cost, restitution, or monetary obligation would cause substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his dependents. The judge here imposed a fine as to each count. There is no indication in the record that the trial court conducted such a hearing or that defendant waived this judicial determination. Accordingly, due to the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1, we vacate the financial obligations imposed on defendant as part of his sentences, and order that, on remand, the trial court is to comply with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1. State v. Chest, 24-199 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 684, 701, writ denied, 25-387 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 222.

Additionally, the sentencing minute entry reflects that “[t]he Court informed the Defendant he has ․ two (2) years after judgment of conviction and sentence has become final to seek post-conviction relief.” However, the transcript does not show such an advisal. The transcript prevails. See State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La 1983). If a trial court fails to advise, or provides an incomplete advisal, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the appellate court may correct this error by informing the defendant of the applicable prescriptive period for post-conviction relief by means of its opinion. State v. Little, 24-82 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/24), 398 So.3d 846, 858. Accordingly, we advise defendant by way of this opinion, that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. See Little, supra.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions and his sentences are affirmed, except that the portions of defendant's sentences that imposed financial obligations are vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

FOOTNOTES

1.   At that time, defendant was also sentenced for several misdemeanors that were tried simultaneously with this case by bench trial. The sentences for the misdemeanors were ordered to run concurrently with the sentences for the felonies in this case. Defendant's misdemeanor convictions are not involved in this appeal.

2.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

3.   Unlike in the instant case, a fine was not imposed in Banks.

GRAVOIS, J.