STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ERNEST MILLS IN RE STATE OF LOUISIANA (2025)

The Relator, the State of Louisiana, seeks review of the January 15, 2025 district court ruling that determined the Respondent, defendant Ernest Mills’, second application for post-conviction relief was timely pursuant to La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.8. The district court also rejected the Relator's procedural objections to the Respondent, defendant Ernest Mills’, application for post-conviction relief. The Relator's writ application is denied.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 25th day of March, 2025.

JUDGE RACHAEL D. JOHNSON

JUDGE JOY COSSICH LOBRANO

JUDGE TIFFANY GAUTIER CHASE

I respectfully dissent from the majority's denial of the State's writ, which seeks supervisory review of the district court's erroneous ruling denying the State's procedural objections to the successive application for post-conviction relief filed by Ernest Mills (“Defendant”). The State correctly asserts that Defendant's application is untimely, repetitive, and procedurally barred under La. C.Cr.P. arts. 930.8 and 930.4.

Moreover, I agree with the State's argument that Defendant's claim fails as a matter of law because it does not state a valid ground for relief.¹ I find that Defendant's claim is legally meritless, as his application does not allege a claim which, if established, would entitle him to relief. It is this fundamental error that I address in my dissent.

Once an evidentiary hearing is ordered for his post-conviction application, the defendant is afforded the opportunity to present evidence and subpoena witnesses, including the now-adult victim, to testify about her past fears and uncertainties about testifying. Such a hearing not only undermines the finality of convictions but also makes the post-conviction process a tool for abuse, subjecting the survivor to unnecessary retraumatization.

Louisiana law strongly protects victims of sexual abuse, especially children, from repeated litigation that would retraumatize them and undermine the finality of their cases. Courts recognize that subjecting victims to unnecessary and prolonged court proceedings perpetuates psychological harm and contravenes the legislative intent behind laws designed to safeguard their well-being. See Folse v. Folse, 98-1976, pp. 16-17 (La. 6/29/99), 738 So.2d 1040, 1049 (noting that “[c]hildren ․ are more likely to be traumatized by the courtroom experience”). To allow post-conviction challenges to proceed based solely on allegations that a child victim hesitated or was reluctant to testify would create an untenable precedent, incentivizing endless collateral attacks on final convictions and discouraging victims from coming forward at all.

Defendant argues that his guilty plea should be revisited based on the alleged nondisclosure of two letters indicating that the child victim was reluctant to testify. This argument is legally flawed. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not require disclosure of impeachment evidence prior to a guilty plea. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2457, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002); see also Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 392 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting Supreme Court's holding in Ruiz that “the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant”); Mansfield v. Williamson Cnty., 30 F.4th 276, 280 (5th Cir. 2022) (noting that “Brady focuses on the integrity of trials and does not reach pre-trial guilty pleas”); United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting argument that exculpatory evidence must be turned over before entry of a plea); Orman v. Caine, 228 F.3d 616, 617 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that “Brady requires disclosure only to ensure a fair trial, which is not implicated when a defendant waives trial and pleads guilty”); Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361-62 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that failure to disclose exculpatory evidence does not violate the Constitution when the defendant waives trial).

Thus, under well-settled precedent, Defendant's Brady claim fails because he pleaded guilty. A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects, including the right to contest pretrial discovery violations. See, e.g., Conroy, 567 F.3d at 178 (“[A] guilty plea precludes the defendant from asserting a Brady violation.”); United States v. Meza, 843 F. App'x 592, 599 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2021) (“It is well-settled that a defendant's guilty plea waives his pre-plea rights to Brady material.”).

Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant's claim were not procedurally barred by his guilty plea, his argument still fails under the required elements of a Brady violation. To make out a successful Brady claim, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999).

In the case sub judice, Defendant does not explicitly state whether the alleged letters are exculpatory or merely impeachment evidence. However, his argument that knowledge of the victim's reluctance “would have influenced his decision to go to trial” suggests that the letters are, at most, impeachment evidence rather than direct exculpation. Ruiz makes clear that the prosecution's duty to disclose impeachment evidence does not extend to the plea-bargaining stage. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633, 122 S.Ct. at 2457.

The prosecution is not required to disclose every fluctuation in a victim's willingness to testify, particularly when a defendant has already made the strategic choice to plead guilty rather than risk a life sentence. The issue is not whether the victim expressed fear or uncertainty about testifying, but whether Defendant's guilty plea was lawfully entered in accordance with constitutional and legal standards. Defendant has failed to demonstrate how this evidence would have rendered his plea involuntary, unreliable, or otherwise invalid.

The district court erred in allowing this successive post-conviction application to proceed. Defendant's claim is procedurally barred under La. C.Cr.P. arts. 930.8 (untimely) and 930.4 (repetitive and successive claims); precluded by his guilty plea, which waived any Brady claim; and substantively meritless, as Brady does not apply to impeachment evidence in the plea-bargaining context. For these reasons, I would grant the State's writ, reverse the district court's ruling, and dismiss Defendant's post-conviction application.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See La. C.Cr.P. art. 927 (“If an application alleges a claim which, if established, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the court shall order the custodian, through the district attorney in the parish in which the defendant was convicted, to file any procedural objections he may have, or an answer on the merits if there are no procedural objections, within a specified period not in excess of thirty days․ In any order of the court requiring a response by the district attorney pursuant to this Article, the court shall render specific rulings dismissing any claim which, if established as alleged, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, and shall order a response only as to such claim or claims which, if established as alleged, would entitle the petitioner to relief.”); La. C.Cr.P. art. 928 (“The application may be dismissed without an answer if the application fails to allege a claim which, if established, would entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

LOBRANO, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGN REASONS