STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DETRICK NETHANIEL GUILLORY (2025)

Defendant, Detrick Nathaniel Guillory, appeals his convictions for the first degree murders of John Guillory and Lois Guillory. Defendant asserts three assignments of error he claims invalidate those convictions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Defendant's convictions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On the evening of May 18, 2020, Nickie Miller was on a walk in her neighborhood in Acadia Parish and found a wallet near a ditch. She brought it home, where she and her husband, Charles Miller, Jr., looked at the enclosed driver's license and determined that the wallet belonged to John Guillory. When the Millers went to the Guillory home to return the wallet, Charles discovered John's body lying in a breezeway. The body of John's sister-in-law, Lois, was lying nearby in the yard. Both victims had suffered multiple stab wounds. The Millers alerted the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Office, whose personnel initiated an investigation.

Detectives found no sign of forced entry, leading them to believe that the perpetrator was known to the victims. John had spoken by phone with a friend that morning. This call ended at 7:14 a.m. His phone evidenced missed calls beginning at 8:03 a.m. John's bloody walking cane was found in the trashcan of Lois's house. Trash had been picked up that morning. Authorities theorized that John and Lois had been killed between 7:14 and 8:03 a.m.

Members of the family were interviewed and gave DNA samples. Surveillance videos showed Defendant's car, being driven by a male in a white tank top, traveling to and from the vicinity of the Guillory home in the time frame of the crime. Also, besides the victims’ blood, some blood found in the home was determined to contain Defendant's DNA. His DNA was also found on Lois's purse. Defendant's white Impala contained blood stains that matched Defendant, John, and Lois.

Defendant spoke with investigators on three occasions. He initially told them that he had last seen John, his grandfather, on the Friday before the murders.

On June 3, 2020, Defendant voluntarily accompanied Detectives Nick Miller and Chris Roberts to the sheriff's office, ostensibly to discuss getting his car and some personal effects back. There, he was Mirandized and interviewed. He was not told that he was detained or under arrest at that time. When detectives confronted Defendant with the evidence they had gathered, he changed his story and told the detectives that he had witnessed John's neighbor, Mr. Handy, murder John and Lois. He explained that his blood was found in the residence because Lois had administered first aid to him for a nosebleed. After the murders, Defendant became scared and disposed of the wallet en route to his mother's home. The detectives took a photograph of Defendant's right hand, which bore what they thought was a recent cut.

In a third account, Defendant related that a relative, Telly Guillory, and Defendant's mother, Alicia Gallow, had committed the crimes. Investigators searched Alicia's home and found a large knife, drops of blood leading from the porch into the house, and cleaning supplies. Only Alicia's DNA profile was obtained from the knife blade. The detectives ruled Telly out as the driver of Defendant's Impala.

A search warrant was obtained for Defendant's cell phone. That search revealed internet searches the morning of the murders such as “What is the fastest way to kill someone?” At 9:54 a.m. on the morning of the murders, Defendant left suspicious posts on his Facebook page that depicted the horror-film character Michael Myers with a knife; a picture with Defendant and his girlfriend that identified him as “Detrick Assassination. You're the quickest and most ruthless killer out there, making you the most wanted on the market[,]” beside which was what appeared to be a “click to play” symbol; and a picture of a suspension bridge captioned, “Kill House.”

On August 14, 2020, an Acadia Parish grand jury indicted Defendant with two counts of first degree murder, violations of La.R.S. 14:30. The State filed notice that it was not seeking the death penalty in the case.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he gave to investigators. He asserted that a warrant for his arrest had been issued on June 2, 2020, one day before he accompanied detectives to the sheriff's office. He was not advised that he was being detained or was under arrest before he gave his statements. Defendant argued that because he was never advised of the reason for his detention or arrest, the questioning violated La.Const. art. I, § 13 and La.Code Crim.P. art. 218.1.

The trial court found that Defendant was not detained at the time he gave his statement; therefore, the requirement that he be apprised of the reason for his detention was not implicated.

Defendant's jury trial began on March 18, 2024.

During trial, the State sought to introduce the Facebook posts. Defendant objected to these on grounds of relevance and creative or artistic expression pursuant to La.Code Evid. art. 404(B). The trial court, citing State v. Moran, 54,281 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 338 So.3d 1229, writ denied, 22-935 (La. 10/12/22), 348 So.3d 75, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 815 (2023), ruled in favor of the State and admitted the evidence.

On the day of the trial, Defendant's attorney issued a subpoena for Detective Tyler Broussard of the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Office. Detective Broussard was out of the state, and, according to assertions by the prosecutor, had been “for quite some time.” The availability of Detective Broussard was of potential import because Ms. Cindy Hulin of the Acadiana Crime Lab stated in proffered testimony that the detective had told her that video showed Alicia driving Defendant's Impala on the morning of the murders. This testimony was excluded on the basis that it constituted hearsay. Defendant moved for a continuance to secure Detective Broussard's attendance. The trial court refused to continue the matter.

The jury unanimously convicted Defendant of the murders of John and Lois. He filed a motion for new trial and for acquittal, which the trial court denied. Defendant appeals those convictions and asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of the Facebook posts; that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to timely seek a subpoena of Detective Broussard; and the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 920 requires that we review all appeals for errors that are patent on the face of the record. We find one such error.

The trial court sentenced Defendant shortly after denying his motion for new trial and acquittal. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 873 requires that at least twenty-four hours after overruling a motion for new trial must pass before sentencing.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the terms of Article 873 must be expressly waived. State v. Kisack, 16-797 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1201, cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1160, 138 S.Ct. 1175 (2018). However, the court has noted:

Since Kisack, courts have continued to find harmless error where a mandatory life sentence is imposed or when the defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal and does not claim prejudice due to the lack of the delay. See State v. Deville, 22-317 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/19/22), 349 So.3d 1158; State v. Williams, 20-605 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/21), 329 So.3d 938, writ denied, 21-1798 (La. 4/12/22), 336 So.3d 85; and State v. Chester, 19-363 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/3/21), 314 So.3d 914, writ denied, 21-350 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d 321. In the present case, Defendant neither challenges the sentences imposed nor claims he was prejudiced by the lack of a delay. Thus, we conclude the error to be harmless under these circumstances.

State v. Toby, 22-386, pp. 24–25 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/8/23), 358 So.3d 289, 304, writ denied, 23-491 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So.3d 714.

Because mandatory life sentences were imposed and Defendant does not challenge his sentences on appeal, we find that the failure to delay Defendant's sentencing represents harmless error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1:

In his first assignment of error, Defendant argues the district court erred in allowing Defendant's Facebook posts to be admitted into evidence. At trial, the State moved to introduce snapshots that a detective had taken of pictures Defendant had posted on Facebook. The State argued that the Facebook posts were relevant as to Defendant's intent, his state of mind, his motive, and his method of operation.

On appeal, Defendant urges that the State's failure to provide him notice pursuant to La.Code Evid. art. 404(B) precluded the trial court from admitting the evidence. However, Defendant did not lodge a contemporaneous objection at trial and did not raise the notice issue. Thus, the issue was not preserved for review. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841. In addition, Louisiana courts generally do not review an issue that was not brought to a district court's attention at trial. State v. Ruiz, 06-1755 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 81; State v. Willis, 05-218 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 915 So.2d 3651, writ denied, 06-186 (La. 6/23/06), 930 So.2d 973, cert denied, 549 U.S. 1052, 127 S.Ct. 668 (2006).

In ruling that the Facebook posts were admissible, the trial court relied on Moran, 338 So.3d at 1244, which held that Facebook posts were admissible that demonstrated:

that Moran was in a mindset to kill various individuals, including the police, or incite others to do his dirty work for him, in the days leading up to the murder of Johns. They showed Moran had the intent to kill and did not act in self-defense. The posts are certainly relevant under these circumstances when Moran asserts it was necessary for him to kill Johns in order to save his own life. Moreover, their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Defendant distinguishes Moran because the defendant in that case made explicit threats in his Facebook posts. The posts by Defendant were relevant given their nature and timing, suggestive of murder and in close temporal proximity to the murders of two close relatives. Further, in light of the cumulative evidence adduced at trial, these posts did not unduly prejudice Defendant's case. We find that this error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2:

In his second assignment of error, Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely subpoena Detective Broussard, who may have testified that Alicia was depicted driving Defendant's Impala at John's home around the time of the murders. He recognizes that an ineffective assistance claim is usually most effectively addressed in the post-conviction relief process, when the record can be further developed with pertinent information. However, in cases containing sufficient information to address the arguments, the claims may be addressed on appeal. State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La.1993).

For a defendant to show his counsel was ineffective, he must show first that said counsel's performance was deficient and second that the deficiency prejudiced his case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

In the present matter, Defendant's counsel filed a motion to appoint a private process server to obtain service on Detective Broussard and Ms. Hulin. Service was obtained on Ms. Hulin. While Ms. Hulin's testimony on the subject was proffered, this court cannot take for granted that Detective Broussard would corroborate it. Whether counsel should have subpoenaed Broussard earlier or anticipated his unavailability and whether he would testify that Alicia was seen driving Defendant's car are factual matters not addressed in the record before us and would be better assessed in the post-conviction relief process.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3:

In his third assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not suppressing his statements given at the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Office. Defendant maintains that he was detained or arrested at the time; thus, pursuant to La. Const. art. I, § 13 and La.Code Crim.P. art. 218.1, his questioning was unlawful.

Louisiana Constitution Article 1, § 13, in pertinent part, and La.Code Crim.P. art. 218.1 both provide:

When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel.

The trial court hears the testimony and observes the demeanor of the witnesses; thus, its ruling on a motion to suppress is accorded deference. State v. Diaz, 23-1297 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/24), 392 So.3d 381. The trial court's factual findings and determinations of credibility are within its sound discretion and will only be reversed when they are clearly contrary to the evidence. State v. Vessell, 450 So.2d 938 (La.1984).

During the hearing on the motion to suppress, counsel for Defendant questioned Detective Miller about the circumstances of the questioning at the sheriff's office. Detective Miller acknowledged that an arrest warrant for Defendant had already been issued by the court. He also acknowledged that he had spoken to Defendant about getting Defendant's car and some other property back to him. When the detectives arrived in Basile to pick Defendant up, they did not inform him that an arrest warrant had been issued or that he was a suspect in the murders of John and Lois. Defendant was not Mirandized before he was taken to the sheriff's office. Detective Miller could not recall whether they told Defendant that they wanted to question him about the murders.

On the drive to the sheriff's office, Defendant was not in handcuffs. He rode in the front seat of the vehicle driven by Detective Roberts. Detective Miller agreed that the reason for picking Defendant up was to question him. After being Mirandized and signing a waiver of rights form, Defendant spoke to detectives and did not ask for an attorney. When asked whether Defendant was going to be placed in custody after the questioning, Detective Miller replied, “Well, that really depends on what he was going to say.”

On re-direct, the detective stated that it is common practice in his office to obtain an arrest warrant for a suspect before interviewing him. Depending on how the interview develops, investigators will either execute the warrant or request its recall. In the present case, detectives asked Defendant to come with them to give a statement, he did so voluntarily, and they did not handcuff him. Also, the detective had spoken to Defendant on a couple of prior occasions about the progress of the investigation.

As previously noted, the trial court found that Defendant was not detained or under arrest when he gave this statement. Our supreme court has stated:

In determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), courts must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). This determination “depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officer or by the person being questioned.” Id. That an individual is a suspect of the police conducting a criminal investigation therefore does not determine whether the interrogation occurs in a custodial context for purposes of Miranda, and “[e]ven a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest.” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 114 S.Ct. at 1530. Accordingly, “an officer's views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual being questioned, may be one among many factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in custody, but only if the officer's views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.” Id.

In the present case, the defendant went to the Office of Child Services voluntarily, and he was not arrested or otherwise restrained until after the interview ended and the detective formally placed him under arrest. Any reasonable person in defendant's position would have realized that he was the focus of a criminal investigation when the child protection investigators cajoled him to stop lying after he initially denied any misconduct. However, when the defendant asked the detective whether he was going to jail, and the officer replied he would talk to him at the end of the interview with the child protection investigators, defendant failed to ask if the detective meant that he was not free to leave and was therefore in custody. In fact, the detective testified at the suppression hearing that at this point the defendant had been free to walk out of the office because he “hadn't admitted to anything yet.” The detective's subjective determination that defendant “probably would not have been free to go” after he then began making inculpatory admissions to the child protection investigators, i.e., that the officer had decided to make an arrest, was not communicated to the defendant until the end of the interview, when Miranda warnings and formal arrest followed.

Under these circumstances, the defendant was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes at the time he made his first set of inculpatory statements and the trial court therefore correctly denied the motion to suppress his initial statements and the videotaped statement which followed his formal arrest and transportation to the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office.

State v. Saltzman, 03-1423, pp. 1–3 (La. 4/8/04), 871 So.2d 1087, 1088–89 (per curiam)(alteration in original).

The circumstances in the present matter are substantially similar to those in Saltzman: whether Defendant was going to be arrested would be determined by the outcome of the interview. Unlike Saltzman, though, Defendant had been Mirandized before the interview, which adds an indicium that one in Defendant's position should reasonably have understood that he was a focus of the investigation. Further, Defendant's car and personal effects were in the detectives’ possession by virtue of the investigation into John and Lois's murders. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.

DECREE

Defendant's convictions are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED.

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE