JERRILYN LANCLOS v. STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL (2025)

Plaintiff, Jerrilyn Lanclos, appeals the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment finding that UM coverage under the policy of Ms. Lanclos’ employer was prohibited by the anti-stacking statute, La.R.S. 22:1295. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter is again before this court addressing an appeal by Ms. Lanclos of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer's insurer, Capitol Specialty Insurance Company (CapSpecialty).¹ As set forth in our May 10, 2019 opinion, Ms. Lanclos was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by Angelica Lezcano-Murgas (“Ms. Lezcano-Murgas”). Ms. Lanclos, a home health nurse employed by Health Systems 2000, Inc. (“Health Systems”), was driving her personal vehicle en route to a patient's home when she was rear-ended by the vehicle being driven by Ms. Lezcano-Murgas. Both Ms. Lanclos and Ms. Lezcano-Murgas were insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”).

On March 20, 2020, Ms. Lanclos filed suit to collect damages she allegedly sustained in the accident, naming as defendants Ms. Lezcano-Murgas and State Farm, as Ms. Lezcano-Murgas’ liability insurer and in its capacity as her own uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) insurance carrier. In an amended petition, Ms. Lanclos added CapSpecialty as a defendant.² Therein, Ms. Lanclos alleged that at the time of the accident at issue, CapSpecialty provided a policy of general liability insurance to Health Systems, which included an endorsement for hired and non-hired vehicles driven in the course and scope of Health Systems’ business. Thus, Ms. Lanclos alleged entitlement to UM coverage under the policy issued by CapSpecialty to Health Systems in effect at the time of her accident.³

AIG Property Casualty Company (“AIG”), as the workers’ compensation carrier for Health Systems, filed a Petition of Intervention, naming Ms. Lanclos, Ms. Lezcano-Murgas, State Farm, and CapSpecialty as defendants-in-intervention. Therein, AIG sought to recover workers’ compensation and medical benefits paid to or on behalf of Ms. Lanclos.

Ms. Lanclos settled her claim with State Farm in its capacity as her UM insurer. Pursuant to a joint motion, State Farm was dismissed from the lawsuit in its capacity as UM carrier by order of the court signed December 6, 2022. In April 2023, CapSpecialty filed a motion for summary judgment on Ms. Lanclos’ claims based on the anti-stacking provision set forth in La.R.S. 22:1295.⁴ Therein, CapSpecialty argued the anti-stacking provision limits a person who is driving their own vehicle to the UM benefits of a single policy; thus, Ms. Lanclos could not access the UM coverage under her employer's policy with CapSpecialty.

The trial court ruled in favor of CapSpecialty, barring Ms. Lanclos from recovering UM benefits under CapSpecialty's policy. Judgment was signed June 19, 2023, granting CapSpecialty's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Ms. Lanclos's claim for UM coverage against CapSpecialty, with prejudice.

Ms. Lanclos’ appeal to this court was dismissed without prejudice because the judgment was not a final judgment under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(A), as it did not dispose of all of the claims against CapSpecialty or all of the claims involving Ms. Lanclos. These additional active claims involved those asserted by AIG against Ms. Lanclos, Ms. Lezano-Murgas, State Farm, and CapSpecialty. Additionally, the judgment had not been designated as a final judgment by the trial court. This court advised that Ms. Lanclos was free to file an appeal once all of the outstanding claims had been adjudicated.

Subsequent to the grant of summary judgment in favor of CapSpecialty, Ms. Lanclos and AIG settled their claims against Ms. Lezcano-Murgas and State Farm as liability insurer for Ms. Lezcano-Murgas, with the judgment of dismissal being signed on October 13, 2023. CapSpecialty filed a peremptory exception of no right of action as to AIG's intervention claims against it. A judgment sustaining the exception and dismissing AIG's claims against CapSpecialty was signed on December 10, 2024. In that this resulted in an adjudication of all outstanding claims, Ms. Lanclos has now refiled her appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in granting CapSpecialty's motion for summary judgment.

OPINION

In Reed obo Cope v. Black Star Energy Servs., LLC, 23-148, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/22/23), 374 So.3d 419, 422, this court addressed appellate review of summary judgments:

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that governed the trial court's consideration of whether or not summary judgment was appropriate. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La. 1991). Summary judgment is proper if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue of as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966 charges the moving party with the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. In doing so, the moving party's supporting documentation must be sufficient to establish that no genuine issue of material fact remains at stake. Townley v. City of Iowa, 97-493 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 323. Once the mover makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that summary judgment should be granted, the burden shifts to the non-mover. Id.

The threshold question in reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment is whether a genuine issue of material fact remains. Kumpe v. State, 97-3 86 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 701 So.2d 498, writ denied, 98-50 (La. 3/13/98), 712 So.2d 882. We must then determine whether reasonable minds could conclude, based on the facts presented, that the mover is entitled to judgment. Id. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate when all relevant facts are brought before the court, the relevant facts are undisputed, and the sole issue remaining is the conclusion to be drawn from the relevant facts. Id. If the mover's supporting documentation is sufficient to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden of proving the existence of a genuine issue of material fact shifts to the nonmoving party. To satisfy her burden of proof, the nonmoving party must not rely on the mere allegations or denials of her pleadings, but her response must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. La.Code Civ.P. art. 967.

Here there is no material issue of fact. It is undisputed that Ms. Lanclos was in the course and scope of her employment with Health Systems when she was involved in the automobile accident caused by Ms. Lezcano-Murgas. At the time of the accident, Ms. Lanclos was driving her personal vehicle. Both Ms. Lanclos and Ms. Lezcano-Murgas were insured by State Farm. Ms. Lanclos settled for full policy limits with State Farm both as the liability insurer for Ms. Lezcano-Murgas and as Ms. Lanclos’ UM insurer. Ms. Lanclos now seeks UM benefits against CapSpecialty under the policy CapSpecialty issued to her employer, Health Systems.

The trial court held that the anti-stacking law, La.R.S. 22:1295(1)(c), prevented the stacking or collection of multiple UM benefits in this case. The question we must address is whether the trial court correctly interpreted this statute.

In Johnson v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance. Company, 21-552, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/27/22), 338 So.3d 109, 112, this court stated:

Statutory interpretations are questions of law. Shell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 00-997 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/21/01), 782 So.2d 1155, writ denied, 01-1149 (La. 6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1244. Being a question of law, which is not governed by the manifest error standard, an appellate court's review of statutory interpretatio [sic] presents a legal issue and hinges on whether the trial court's decision is legally correct or incorrect. Ducote v. City of Alexandria, 95-1269 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/17/96), 677 So.2d 1118. A question of law is reviewed by the appellate court under the de novo standard of review. La. Mun. Ass'n v. State, 04-227 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809.

Clesi v. Rayford, 24-401 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 1190, writ denied, 25-402 (La. 6/3/25), 410 So.3d 784, dealt with an identical situation to the present one, where the plaintiff was involved in a car accident while operating his personal vehicle in the course and scope of his employment. The plaintiff collected the tortfeasor's liability insurance limits, as well as the UM policy limits on his personal vehicle. The plaintiff then attempted to collect from his employer's UM insurer. In holding that La.R.S. 22:1295(1)(c) precluded the stacking of the employer's UM coverage, the court explained:

In 1977, the Louisiana Legislature passed an anti-stacking law, La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c), which prohibits insureds from combining or stacking UM benefits, providing:

(c) If the insured has any limits of uninsured motorist coverage in a policy of automobile liability insurance, in accordance with the terms of Subparagraph (l)(a) of this Section, then such limits of liability shall not be increased because of multiple motor vehicles covered under such policy of insurance, and such limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall not be increased when the insured has insurance available to him under more than one uninsured motorist coverage provision or policy; however, with respect to other insurance available, the policy of insurance or endorsement shall provide the following with respect to bodily injury to an injured party while occupying an automobile not owned by said injured party, resident spouse, or resident relative, and the following priorities of recovery under uninsured motorist coverage shall apply:

(i) The uninsured motorist coverage on the vehicle in which the injured party was an occupant is primary.

(ii) Should that primary uninsured motorist coverage be exhausted due to the extent of damages, then the injured occupant may recover as excess from other uninsured motorist coverage available to him. In no instance shall more than one coverage from more than one uninsured motorist policy be available as excess over and above the primary coverage available to the injured occupant.

In Boudoin, supra, Ms. Boudoin was injured in an accident while driving her car. She brought an action against her personal insurer, her umbrella insurer, and her employer's excess insurers to recover UM benefits. Boudoin, 375 So.3d at 539-40. Specifically, at the time of the accident, Ms. Boudoin personally maintained a policy with Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company that provided $250,000 in UM coverage and a $1,000,000.00 personal umbrella policy with RLI Insurance Company. Id. at 539. The plaintiff's employer, Eatelcorp, LLC, also maintained a commercial automobile policy through The Phoenix Insurance Company, a Travelers Company with $1,000,000.00 in UM coverage, an excess third-party liability policy with Continental Casualty Company with limits of $25,000,000.00, and a commercial excess/umbrella policy with Rural Trust Insurance Company providing $10,000,000.00 in coverage. Id. at 539-40. Ms. Boudoin settled with Allstate for its UM policy limits; the court dismissed Allstate with prejudice. Id. at 540. Thereafter, Continental filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the anti-stacking provision contained in La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c) prohibited Ms. Boudoin from recovering against multiple UM policies because she owned the vehicle she was operating at the time of the accident. Id. Continental argued that Ms. Boudoin could only recover from her personal UM policies issued by Allstate and RLI. Id. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 540.

In reversing the trial court's ruling based on the anti-stacking provision of La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c), this Court noted that Louisiana public policy strongly favors UM coverage and liberal interpretation of statutes regarding UM coverage but stated:

This anti-stacking law prohibits recovery against multiple UM coverages available to the same insured, except under the limited circumstances prescribed in the anti-stacking provision. See La. Civ. L. Treatise, Insurance Law & Practice, McKenzie & Johnson, § 4.27, Stacking of multiple coverages - The 1977 anti-stacking provision. Under the first section of the statute, an insured seeking to recover under multiple UM policies ‘is limited to recovery under only one policy and may not combine or stack coverages.’ Boullt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 99-942 (La. 10/19/99), 752 So.2d 739, 743. In Boullt, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that under the second part of the anti-stacking law, an exception to the stacking prohibition is permitted if: (1) the injured party is occupying an automobile not owned by the injured party, resident spouse, or resident relative; (2) the UM coverage on the vehicle in which the injured party was an occupant is primary; and (3) the primary UM coverage is exhausted due to the extent of damages. Id.

Therefore, a person insured under the UM provisions of several different policies, and occupying a vehicle owned by the insured at the time of the accident, may recover under one, and only one, of the policies. See Pitts v. Fitzgerald, 01-543 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 847, 853. Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, recovery under more than one policy is prohibited, except when the injured party is ‘occupying an automobile not owned by the injured party, resident spouse or resident relative.’ If the injured party is in a non-owned vehicle, then the statutory exception permits the injured party to recover under the UM coverage on the vehicle in which she is riding (statutory primary coverage) and also under one of the other UM policies available to her (statutory excess coverage). See La. Civ. L. Treatise, Insurance Law & Practice, McKenzie & Johnson, § 4.27, Stacking of multiple coverages - The 1977 anti-stacking provision. Id. at 541-42.

Id. at 1192–93.

In Irvin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 03-717 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/10/03), 867 So.2d 777, writ denied, 03-3537 (La. 3/26/04), 871 So.2d 347, this court addressed another situation identical to the present one where the plaintiff was struck from behind by an underinsured motorist while driving her own vehicle while in the course and scope of her employment. State Farm provided liability insurance to the defendant and also provided auto liability and UM coverage to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, and State Farm in its capacity as the defendant's liability insurer and as plaintiff's uninsured/underinsured insurer. The plaintiff also filed suit against State Farm in its capacity as her employer's uninsured/underinsured insurer. State Farm, in its capacity as the UM insurer for the plaintiff's employer, filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that their policy did not provide coverage for this accident. The plaintiff asserted that she was provided coverage under her employer's UM policy because it provided UM coverage for non-owned vehicles used in the employer's business. This court noted that it need not reach the question of insurance coverage because the anti-stacking statute prevented the plaintiff from receiving benefits from her employer's UM policy. We explained:

In Pitts v. Fitzgerald, 01–0543, pp. 7–8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 847, 852–53 (citations omitted), the court explained stacking of insurance policies as follows:

Stacking of UM coverages occurs when the amount available under one policy is inadequate to satisfy the damages alleged or awarded the insured and the same insured seeks to combine or stack one coverage on top of another for the same loss covered under multiple policies or under multiple coverages contained in a single policy.

․

The language of the anti-stacking statute limits the insured to recovery under only one policy, not allowing the insured to combine or stack coverages. The question of stacking only arises once it is determined that the person seeking to cumulate benefits on two or more uninsured motorist coverages is an “insured” under the terms of those policies.

Ms. Irvin's accident falls clearly under the anti-stacking provision. Ms. Irvin herself has UM insurance. Even if she were insured under her employer's policy as she argues here, under the language of the statute, she cannot increase her limits of UM coverage because she has insurance available to h[er] under more than one uninsured motorist coverage provision or policy. See La.R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(c)(i).[5]

Id. at 779 (alterations in original).

Ms. Lanclos asserts that although the anti-stacking statute precludes the stacking of multiple coverages on multiple vehicles, it does not “preclude an insured from recovering layers of primary and excess UM coverage purchased for the same vehicle.” In support of her position, Ms. Lanclos cites Capone v. King, 467 So.2d 5 74 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writs denied, 468 So.2d 1203, 1205, (La. 1985); Pardue v. Dean, 515 So.2d 543 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1987); and Fay v. Willis, 577 So.2d 1147 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writs denied, 584 So.2d 1159 (La. 1991).

Ms. Lanclos’ reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Boudoin v. Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon, 23-65, pp. 9–12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/25/23), 375 So.3d 537, 544–46 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted), writ denied, 23-1708 (La. 3/19/24), 3 81 So.3d 706, and writ denied, 24-8 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 709, the fifth circuit not only discussed their earlier Capone holding, but also discussed the first circuit's holding in Pardue, stating:

In reaching its decision to treat all of the policies at issue as “primary,” the trial court relied on several older decisions, including this Court's decision in Capone v. King, 467 So.2d 574, 579 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1203 and 468 So.2d 1205 (La. 1985), as well as the First Circuit's decision in Pardue v. Dean, 515 So.2d 543 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987). Neither case, however, supports the trial court's departure from the plain language of La. R.S. 22:1295(l)(c) in this case.

We first find that the trial court erred by relying on Capone, supra, because the injured plaintiff in that matter was a passenger and did not own the vehicle she occupied at the time of the accident. As discussed in detail above, the applicable prohibitions set forth in the anti-stacking law differ greatly depending on whether or not the plaintiff owned the occupied vehicle. In analyzing whether the plaintiff could recover against various UM policies covering the vehicle, the Capone court analyzed the second portion of the anti-stacking provision containing the exception that only applies to non-owner occupants:

The statute states that primary coverage is coverage on the “vehicle in which the injured party was an occupant”, La.R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(c)(i). Section 1406(D)(1)(C)(ii) (sic) states that once primary coverage is exhausted, the injured party may then reach one other non-primary policy. Because the Allstate, Aetna and Chicago policies all covered the car in which Capone was a passenger, they are all primary, and therefore available without reference to the above rule on stacking.

Id. at 579-80.

These provisions are not applicable to the analysis in the current matter because Ms. Boudoin was not a non-owner occupant who falls within the exception to the stacking prohibition. The primary/excess issue does not arise under the anti-stacking provision unless the injured party is occupying a vehicle that is not owned by the injured party, resident spouse, or resident relative. See 15 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Insurance Law & Practice, § 4.31, fn. 4.

The trial court also erred by relying on the First Circuit's decision in Pardue, supra. Despite the apparent distinction between owned and non-owned vehicles when analyzing the anti-stacking provisions, the First Circuit incorrectly utilized the reasoning in Capone, supra, in a case involving a plaintiff who was injured in his own vehicle while driving in the course and scope of his employment. The plaintiff had a personal UM policy with Hanover Insurance Company and his employer had a UM policy with Aetna Casualty and Insurance Company. The plaintiff settled with Hanover and the trial court granted a summary judgment motion in favor of the employer's insurer, Aetna, finding that the anti-stacking law prohibited plaintiff from recovering additional UM proceeds. The First Circuit reversed based on its incorrect reliance on Capone and the anti-stacking exception as follows:

The anti-stacking law seems at first blush to limit UM recovery to one policy for a person injured in his own car, and, under a limited exception, to two policies for one injured in a car he does not own. Yet the rule and the exception must be read in pari materia with the entire UM law. LSA–C.C. art. 17. The exception defines primary coverage as that coverage on the vehicle in which the person was injured. In Breaux v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 413 So.2d 988, 994 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 420 So.2d 453 (La. 1982), involving a plaintiff injured in his own vehicle, this court held that the coverage on that vehicle was his exclusive UM coverage. If, however, that vehicle has more than one UM policy on it, then for purposes of the statute, all such policies are primary. Capone v. King, 467 So.2d 574, 579-80 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 So.2d 1203, 1205 (La. 1985). And, according to the statute “other uninsured motorist coverage available to [the insured]” is excess insurance. LSA–R.S. 22:1406 D(1)(c).

Pardue, 515 So.2d at 544-45.

The Pardue court even conceded that its decision was inconsistent with the plain language of the anti-stacking law, but nevertheless ruled inapposite, reasoning that “simple fairness dictates this interpretation of the anti-stacking law.” Id. at 545. The court also expressed concerns that if the employer's policy did not provide coverage for an employee driving her own vehicle, it was pointless for the employer to pay for employee coverage. Id. at 545. However, this position overlooks the scenario where the employer's policy provides coverage to an employee that does not have UM coverage on her owned vehicle. In that instance, a stacking issue does not arise because it does not involve multiple policies bought by different insureds. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La. C.C. art. 9.

Further, the continued validity of the reasoning in Pardue in the First Circuit is in question because in its more recent decisions, Pitts, supra, and Green v. Johnson, 16-1525 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/18), 241 So.3d 1188, 1194, the First Circuit has come full circle and recognized that the plain language of La. R.S. 22:1295(l)(c) limits an insured to recover under only one policy unless the insured is occupying a non-owned vehicle at the time of the accident. The Green court explained as follows:

Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1295(1)(c), known as the “anti-stacking” provision, limits an insured to recovery under only one policy and prohibits an insured from combining or stacking coverage, except when the insured is injured “while occupying an automobile not owned by said injured party, resident spouse or resident relative.” (Emphasis added.) See also Pitts v. Fitzgerald, 01-0543, p. 8 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 847, 852-853. A person who is insured under the UM provisions of several different insurance policies may recover under one, and only one, of the policies. Pitts, 01-0543 at p. 8, 818 So.2d at 853; see also McKenzie & Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice, 15 La. Civ. Law Treatise § 4:27 (4th ed. 2012) (noting that the main theme of the provision is that a person can recover under only one UM policy).

Id.

Accordingly, we find that La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c), the anti-stacking provision, applies in this case and Ms. Boudoin is limited to recovery under only her personal line of coverage, similar to the plaintiffs in Irvin and Rowe, supra, because she owned the vehicle she occupied at the time of the accident.

Likewise, the Fay case is inapposite to the present situation. In Fay, the survivors of a motorist killed while operating his own vehicle attempted to stack the UM insurance on the motorist's vehicle with that of the employer's UM insurance. The employer's insurer paid its UM limits, and the survivors made a claim against the UM insurer of the motorist's vehicle. The court permitted the motorist's survivors to stack the motorist's personal UM coverage on that of her employer's UM policy. In the present case, Ms. Lanclos is attempting to stack her employer's UM policy on her personal insurance policy. Additionally, the Fay court referenced both the Capone and Pardue decisions, which the Boudin court called into question.

Ms. Lanclos attempts to distinguish the first circuit decisions in Pitts and Green by pointing out that both of those cases involved attempts by the plaintiff to stack coverages with UM insurance policies covering other vehicles not involved in the accidents, whereas in the present case there were two UM policies covering Ms. Lanclos’ vehicle. In Boudoin, 375 So.3d at 542, the court explained:

Therefore, a person insured under the UM provisions of several different policies, and occupying a vehicle owned by the insured at the time of the accident, may recover under one, and only one, of the policies. See Pitts v. Fitzgerald, 01-543 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 847, 853. Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, recovery under more than one policy is prohibited, except when the injured party is “occupying an automobile not owned by the injured party, resident spouse or resident relative.” If the injured party is in a non-owned vehicle, then the statutory exception permits the injured party to recover under the UM coverage on the vehicle in which she is riding (statutory primary coverage) and also under one of the other UM policies available to her (statutory excess coverage). See 15 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Insurance Law & Practice, McKenzie & Johnson, § 4.27, Stacking of multiple coverages – The 1977 anti-stacking provision. (“The main theme of the provision is that a person can recover under only one UM policy.”)

Therefore, Ms. Lanclos’ argument that the anti-stacking statute, La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c) does not “preclude an insured from recovering layers of primary and excess UM coverage purchased for the same vehicle” is without merit.

Finally, Ms. Lanclos makes the argument that based on this court's holding in Vincent v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 526 So.2d 818 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 532 So.2d 150 (La. 1988), she is entitled to deselect her personal UM benefits and select the CapSpecialty UM benefits. In Vincent, the parents of a motorist killed when his motorcycle was involved in a collision attempted to recover uninsured motorists benefits from insurance policies that insured the parent's vehicles and which listed the motorist as an omnibus insured. The parents had collected the policy limits from the UM insurer for the motorist's motorcycle. This court held that although the parents could not stack two separate UM policies, they were not precluded from selecting which UM policy to recover due to the fact that they had conditionally accepted payment under the motorist's own policy while continuing to litigate the right to recover under their own policies.

We are, however, not called upon to decide whether this argument is valid as it was not made by Ms. Lanclos in the trial court. This court will not consider an issue or argument not made in the trial court and presented for the first time on appeal. Goff v. Yue, 22-78 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/22), 362 So.3d 855, aff'd, 23-121 (La. 10/20/23), 379 So.3d 651.

We hold that based on the anti-stacking statute, La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c), Ms. Lanclos’ claim against CapSpecialty was properly dismissed by the trial court via the motion for summary judgment.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting CapSpecialty's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Ms. Lanclos’ case is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Ms. Lanclos.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Lanclos v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 23-575 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/24), 386 So.3d 1143.

2.   Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company (“Progressive”) was also added as a defendant for UM coverage under an automobile policy issued to Health Systems in effect at the time of the accident at issue herein. The record reflects Ms. Lanclos dismissed without prejudice her claims against Progressive in December 2022.

3.   The CapSpecialty non-owned liability endorsement provided that the coverage was excess over any primary insurance covering the non-owned auto. Although the endorsement excluded UM coverage, Health Systems did not execute a formal waiver of UM coverage for non-owned vehicles pursuant to La.R.S. 22:1295. The parties entered into a Consent Judgment on April 19, 2023, reflecting that UM coverage is “read into” the insurance policy issued by CapSpecialty to Health Systems pursuant to La.R.S. 22:1295. The judgment provided that the terms, content and limitations of the CapSpecialty policy, along with Louisiana law and the facts of the case still applied to determine if Ms. Lanclos was entitled to recover UM benefits.

4.   The Louisiana anti-stacking law provides in pertinent part in La.R.S. 22:1295(c) as follows: “If the insured has any limits of uninsured motorist coverage in a policy of automobile liability insurance, in accordance with the terms of Subparagraph (1)(a) of this Section, then such limits of liability shall not be increased because of multiple motor vehicles covered under such policy of insurance, and such limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall not be increased when the insured has insurance available to him under more than one uninsured motorist coverage provision or policy[.]”

5.   2003 La. Acts No. 456 § 3 redesignated La.R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(c) to La.R.S. 22:680(1)(c), and 2008 La. Acts No. 415, § 1, effective January 1, 2009, redesignated La.R.S. 22:680 to La.R.S. 22:1295.

VAN H. KYZAR JUDGE