STATE v. GUIDRY (2025)

Defendant appeals his sentence following a guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement to the crime of indecent behavior with a juvenile. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the conviction and the sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, Robert James Guidry, was originally charged by bill of information with the crime of molestation of a juvenile, in violation of La.R.S. 14:81.2.¹ The facts of the case leading to the formal charge are sparsely developed as the ultimate conviction was the result of a guilty plea. However, the record reflects that on July 25, 2022, Defendant, who was eighty-one years old at the time of the offense, engaged in lewd and/or lascivious acts with his nine-year-old great-granddaughter, G.F., who, at the time of the offense, was spending the summer in Louisiana with her great-grandparents.²

Defendant was arraigned and pled not guilty to the original charge on February 27, 2023. On September 18, 2023, counsel for Defendant moved for the appointment of a sanity commission, asserting that a question existed as to Defendant's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. The motion was granted, and a sanity commission was appointed. The report of the sanity commission was homologated on December 14, 2023, after which the trial court found Defendant capable of assisting his counsel and understanding the nature of the proceedings. Both physicians on the sanity commission opined that Defendant was able to assist in his defense and understand the proceedings, while one also opined that Defendant was sane at the time of the offense.

On May 22, 2024, pursuant to a plea agreement, the State amended the original charge to indecent behavior with a juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:81, and Defendant entered a guilty plea. As the plea agreement did not specify a recommended sentence, the trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and set sentencing for a later date.

On September 23, 2024, Defendant was sentenced to serve ten years with the Louisiana Department of Corrections, with two years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. He was given credit for time previously served and ordered to register as a sex offender for fifteen years. A motion to reconsider the sentence was filed on October 3, 2024, and was denied without reasons that same day.³

On October 3, 2024, Defendant filed this appeal, asserting as his sole assignment of error that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive, and thus, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and La.Const. art. 1, § 20.⁴

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are no errors patent.

DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts that his ten-year hard-labor sentence amounts to nothing more than cruel and unusual punishment in light of the facts of the offense and the offender, and thus, is excessive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment and La.Const. art. 1, § 20.⁵ He argues that his advanced age, eighty-three at the time of sentencing, his lack of any criminal record, and his medical condition prior to and after the offense, are significant factors reflecting the excessiveness of the sentence and support a reversal and remand for resentencing.

This court, in State v. Soileau, 13-770, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005-06 (alteration in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261, laid out the following guidelines regarding excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La. 1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La. 1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99) 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00) 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96) 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant's sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La. 1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96) 674 So.2d 957, 958.

In imposing Defendant's ten-year sentence, the trial court set forth extensive reasons:

Mr. Guidry, you stand before the court today for sentencing after having previously pled guilty to the crime of indecent behavior with a juvenile. The Court ordered a Presentence Investigation, which has now been received and carefully studied. The Court has considered the following factors, as well as the nature of the present offense, in determining and [sic] appropriate sentence. The Court makes the following findings concerning sentencing.

All right. Indecent behavior with a juvenile carries with it a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two nor more than 25 [sic] years, at least two years of which must be imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

The Presentence Report indicates that you're 83 [sic] years of age. You are currently married and have two adult children. You attended school in Hathaway and later graduated from Hathaway High School. You enlisted in the army and was [sic] honorably discharged. You have worked as a helper in the rice fields and have sold cars at dealerships previously. You were employed by Entergy for approximately 15-and-a-half years [sic]. Prior to your arrest, you were last employed as a mechanic in 2004.

Now, the Presentence Report states that you do not have a juvenile or an adult criminal history. The instant offense is your first felony conviction.

In the instant offense, Detective Lemelle with the Jefferson Davis Parish Sheriff's Office was informed of a complaint from [K.B.] That's K -- sorry, K.B., that -- I mean, [K.B.] that her nine-year-old daughter had been touched inappropriately by an adult. [K.B.] said that her daughter, G.F., had told her that her grandfather [sic] had touched her. [K.B.] stated the grandmother Katherine told her that her grandfather [sic] had dementia and blamed his actions on -- on a change of medication. The victim had been spending time with her great-grandparents when the incident occurred. Both you and Katherine stated that it only happened once; however, after interviewing the victim, G.F., [sic] stated that you had touched her on four separate occasions. You were then arrested and booked into the parish jail.

Now, in reviewing the Presentence Investigation, the Court takes note of the fact that you are 83 [sic] years of age and that this is your first felony conviction. However, the Court cannot find any other mitigating factors. The Court's concern was the guardianship that you had over your granddaughter [sic] and that you -- for whatever reason, you felt you could do what you did to your own great-granddaughter is very concerning to the Court.

I have read the victim's impact statement, and the young lady is affected by your actions, and, therefore, at this time, the Court's going to sentence you to serve ten years with the Department of Corrections. Credit for time previously served. Two years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. You'll have to register as a sex offender. This is 15 [sic] years[.]

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:81(H)(2) imposes the following sentence for the offense of indecent behavior with a juvenile, when the victim is under the age of thirteen:

Whoever commits the crime of indecent behavior with juveniles on a victim under the age of thirteen when the offender is seventeen years of age or older, shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two nor more than twenty-five years. At least two years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

We note that the sentence imposed by the trial court is well within the statutory range of potential sentences for the crime, while acknowledging that this, in and of itself, does not end our inquiry. However, we find that the trial court adequately considered the serious nature of the crime and noted that the maximum penalty for the offense is twenty-five years at hard labor, with at least two years to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Not mentioned, however, is the benefit Defendant received in exchange for his guilty plea from the amendment of his original molestation-of-a-juvenile charge to a charge of indecent behavior with a juvenile.

The penalty provision applicable to La.R.S. 14:81.2 is imprisonment “at hard labor for not less than twenty-five years nor more than ninety-nine years[ ]” with “[a]t least twenty-five years of the sentence” to “be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.” La.R.S. 14:81.2(D)(1). Thus, Defendant benefited significantly from the plea agreement. We note that the facts of Defendant's offense, as gleaned from the record, support a conviction for the more serious original offense of molestation of a juvenile. This factor is appropriate for consideration in an excessive-sentence review. State v. Fontenot, 09-1044 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/12/10), 38 So.3d 1122, writ denied, 10-1758 (La. 8/19/11), 67 So.3d 1257; State v. Gilmore, 10-709 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/10), 54 So.3d 146. Where a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a straight-up plea agreement that significantly reduces the defendant's sentencing exposure, “the trial court has great discretion in imposing the maximum sentence for the pled offense.” State v. Modisette, 50,846, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/28/16), 207 So.3d 1108, 1111. Here, the sentence imposed was less than half the maximum potential sentence allowed under La.R.S. 14:81(H)(2).

Contrary to Defendant's argument, the trial court fully considered Defendant's background, including his advanced age, his military and work history, as well as his lack of a criminal record. However, the trial court concluded that these factors did not mitigate the seriousness of the crime and the circumstances surrounding it. We agree.

Regarding aggravating factors, the trial court considered the extreme young age of the victim, nine years, and the reporting by the victim that the improper touching occurred not once but four times. These incidents occurred while the victim was under the care and supervision of Defendant, who violated the trust placed in him by the victim's parents. “[J]urisprudence indicates that maximum, or nearly maximum[,] terms of imprisonment may not be excessive when the defendant has exploited a position of trust to commit sexual battery or indecent behavior with a juvenile.” State v. Bridgewater, 22-517, p. 20 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/26/23), 362 So.3d 998, 1012 (citing State v. Badeaux, 01-406 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/25/01), 798 So.2d 234, 239, writ denied, 01-2965 (La. 10/14/02), 827 So.2d 414). Further noted was the emotional effect of the incident on the victim.

Finally, we consider a comparison of sentences imposed for the same or similar crimes for insight as to whether the sentence may be excessive. First, in Modisette, 207 So.3d at 1110, the second circuit held that a twenty-five-year sentence, without benefit of parole, probation, of suspension of sentence, for indecent behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen was not constitutionally excessive for a defendant who was “68 years old, has no prior felony convictions, is an Army veteran, cares for his elderly mother, needs treatment for substance abuse and has taken responsibility for his actions.” The defendant did have a prior criminal record in that he had previously pled guilty to a reduced charge of simple battery from an original charge of indecent behavior with a juvenile.

In State v. Vasquez-Ramirez, 16-325 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/28/16), 210 So.3d 521, writs denied, 17-351, 17-188 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So.3d 1234, 1236, the defendant was sentenced to twenty years for indecent behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted the vulnerable age of the seven-year-old victim and that the defendant and victim were members of the same household. The defendant was twenty-five years old and married, with two daughters. He had moved to Louisiana from Guatemala in order to work and support his family. This court affirmed, finding that the sentence was not excessive.

In State v. Sanders, 49,241 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/22/14), 151 So.3d 160, writ denied, 14-2536 (La. 1/16/15), 157 So.3d 1133, the defendant pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of indecent behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen. He was sentenced to twenty years at hard labor, with the first two years being served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and ordered to register as a sex offender. Contrary to the instant case, the defendant was a youthful twenty-one years of age, which was argued to be a mitigating factor along with his lack of any criminal record and positive work history. While acknowledging that it was at the upper end of the sentencing range, the second circuit affirmed the sentence, finding that it was not excessive. In so doing, the court considered the victim's age at the time of the offense, twelve, and the significant advantage the defendant received from the plea agreement considering he was originally charged with aggravated rape, which imposed a sentence of either life imprisonment at hard labor or the death penalty.

Considering the aggravating and mitigating factors present here, the significant benefit Defendant received from his plea agreement, and other significantly longer sentences imposed for the same offense in similar cases, we affirm the sentence imposed, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

DECREE

Defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While not specified in the bill of information, the facts of the case indicate that Defendant was charged under La.R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1).

2.   Initials are being used in this case to protect the identity of the victim in accordance with La.R.S.46:1844(W)(1)(b).

3.   While the order was filed on October 3, 2024, it was signed by the trial court on September 30, 2024.

4.   In brief, appellate counsel notes that Defendant's trial counsel filed a Petition to Resentence on December 27, 2024, which was heard and denied on February 19, 2025. However, this information is outside the record of this appeal, and any action by the trial court on the petition came after it was divested of jurisdiction by this appeal. Accordingly, we do not consider this filing or the asserted trial court ruling. Bandaries v. Cassidy, 11-1267 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/12), 86 So.3d 125, writ denied, 12-780 (La. 5/25/12), 90 So.3d 412; State v. Stanley, 35,830 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/3/02), 815 So.2d 383.

5.   The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Section 20 of Article 1 of the Louisiana Constitution provides, in part, that “[n]o law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.”

KYZAR, Judge.