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Paulita SWEEZY v. LAKE CHARLES HEALTHCARE, LLC
Paulita Sweezy, a Licensed Practical Nurse, alleges she injured her back during the course and scope of her employment with Lake Charles Healthcare, LLC d/b/a Landmark of Lake Charles. She filed suit to recover workers’ compensation benefits from her employer and its insurer, the Louisiana Healthcare Self-Insurance Fund.1 The workers’ compensation judge found Ms. Sweezy met her burden of proving a work-related accident and awarded reimbursement of medical expenses, supplemental earnings benefits, temporary total disability benefits, penalties, and attorney fees. Landmark appeals that decision, claiming Ms. Sweezy sustained no injury related to her employment and is not entitled to compensation benefits.
FACTS
Ms. Sweezy's original claim stated she injured her back when she helped a co-worker lift a patient on October 30, 2023. Medical records established that the correct date was October 26, 2023, as shown on Ms. Sweezy's amended claim for benefits.
Ms. Sweezy reported for work at 3:00 p.m. on that date. Even though her job was distributing medication, she was helping Certified Nurse Assistant Elizabeth Metoyer reposition a patient because Landmark was short-staffed and busy. Ms. Sweezy and Ms. Metoyer grabbed the draw sheet to pull the resident toward the head of the bed. Ms. Sweezy felt a pop, “excruciating pain,” and “immediate burning” in her lower back and a burning sensation down her right leg like she had never experienced. The intensity of the pain made Ms. Sweezy start to sweat and brought her to tears.
Although Ms. Sweezy did not recall any specific conversation with Ms. Metoyer at the time, she thought Ms. Metoyer saw what happened. She believed she told Ms. Metoyer she was hurt. In contrast, Ms. Metoyer testified she did not see Ms. Sweezy grab her back, cry, or seem to be injured. She said Ms. Sweezy mentioned nothing about a work-related accident. She did see Ms. Sweezy sweating, but she attributed that to “normal work sweat.” Ms. Metoyer agreed that Ms. Sweezy helped her lift a patient, but she could not say Ms. Sweezy was hurt during that incident. Landmark's administrator and assistant administrator spoke to Ms. Metoyer about that situation “months after” the accident. They took no recorded statement from her, and Ms. Metoyer never talked to an insurance adjuster or anyone else.
On the night of the accident, Ms. Sweezy attempted to contact her supervisor, Veronica Johnson, Landmark's Director of Nursing, for permission to leave early to seek medical treatment. She could not reach her. Ms. Sweezy put ice on her back and finished her shift. She completed a handwritten incident report describing her pain and placed it in Ms. Johnson's mailbox before she left.
Ms. Sweezy tried to call Ms. Johnson several times after she left work but again was unable to reach her. She did not leave any phone messages for Ms. Johnson, but she texted her and asked to speak with her the next day. When Ms. Sweezy returned to work, she attempted to talk to Ms. Johnson, but she never had the opportunity. Ms. Johnson never responded to any of Ms. Sweezy's missed calls or to her text message.
At home on the night of the accident, Ms. Sweezy could not tolerate her pain. She went to the emergency room but left after waiting four to five hours without being seen. Ms. Sweezy contacted Wendi Konomos, the nurse practitioner for her primary care physician, the next morning and advised that she had hurt her back at work. Ms. Konomos would not provide a work excuse because Ms. Sweezy had never previously complained of back pain. Ms. Konomos scheduled an appointment for October 30. Notes from that visit state that Ms. Sweezy complained of coccyx pain, caused by lifting patients, that radiated into her right leg. She was diagnosed with lumbosacral radiculopathy on that date. Medical records of October 31 indicate Ms. Sweezy's straight leg raising test was positive, and she had tenderness to her lower back and paraspinal muscles. Ms. Konomos issued a work excuse until November 6 and an additional work excuse on November 7 stating Ms. Sweezy could not return to her current position because she could not push, pull, or lift more than ten pounds. The period of time to which the excuse would apply would be determined later based on a neurosurgeon's recommendation.
On advice from her doctor's office, Ms. Sweezy inquired about Family Medical Leave Act benefits. Ms. Johnson advised Ms. Sweezy that she was ineligible for those benefits, and Ms. Sweezy would have to resign because of her work restrictions. Ms. Sweezy understood she would no longer have health insurance if she did not work, and she could not afford the COBRA insurance payments. She had not considered a workers’ compensation claim until then because she had thought she could work on light duty.
At the time of trial, Ms. Sweezy had not worked since November 6, and she was still experiencing back pain and burning and tingling in her right leg. She had two spinal injections by Dr. Burton, a neurosurgeon. When her insurance lapsed, she could not afford another injection, a chiropractor, or physical therapy.
Two other LPNs, Laura Stoker and Danielle Antoine-Parker, confirmed that Ms. Sweezy complained about her back pain that night. They saw a knot on her back and indicated the area had started to swell. Ms. Stoker thought, based on Ms. Sweezy's other symptoms, that Ms. Sweezy had a urinary tract infection. Ms. Stoker recalled physically observing Ms. Sweezy's back that day and found it discolored and swollen around the kidneys. She explained that someone with a UTI would need treatment with antibiotics. She would agree with a neurosurgeon (such as Dr. Burton) who said Ms. Sweezy's pain resulted from a back issue rather than from a UTI.
The workers’ compensation “[c]ourt found Ms. Stoker's testimony both credible and compelling.” Ms. Stoker was unaware that Ms. Sweezy had filed a claim until she received a subpoena for trial. The trial court found her to be “the most independent witness to testify[.]”
Victoria Friesner, Ms. Sweezy's daughter, testified Ms. Sweezy called her on October 26 about the accident and injury and said she was going to the emergency room. The next morning, Ms. Friesner found Ms. Sweezy in pain in her bed at home and observed swelling on her mother's back. Ms. Sweezy showed Ms. Friesner where her lower spine and back hurt. Ms. Friesner testified Ms. Sweezy had never complained of chronic back pain. Christian Sweezy testified his mother advised him on October 27 of her accident and injury. He advised her to see a doctor. A few days later, he saw her, and she was “stuck in bed ․ in significant pain[.]”
When Ms. Sweezy saw Dr. Burton on November 13, he noted she had been off work and “should remain off work.” Ms. Sweezy experienced “tremendous relief” for about ten days after an epidural steroid injection on November 15, but she was still having back pain on January 17, 2024. Her physical examination, her history, her MRI, and the injections Dr. Burton administered were consistent with a finding at the L3-4 level as the source of her problem. Dr. Burton stated she was not at maximum medical improvement as of January 17.
Landmark's defense interpreted Ms. Sweezy's situation quite differently. Ms. Johnson received a rather cryptic text message from Ms. Sweezy at 12:22 p.m. on October 27 stating:2
I do not get good service in here I was having such severe back pain I could not handle it. I ended up having my daughter bring me to Saint Pats last night. I have a white blood cell count of 19.4. Needless to say I am getting IV anabiotic's. This is out of my control. I will have all paperwork on Monday when I return you could ask anybody and everyone I worked last night I was hurting and sweating but I will bring my lab work and I can't come In tonight and right now I have one more for reception and I'm doing talk to text. I'm trying to call Laura [Stoker]. She can come up here if she wants to.
A second, equally confusing text message to Ms. Johnson at 1:49 p.m. on October 27 stated:
Veronica I'm have been at st pats FOR almost 11 hours I went last I could not handle the pain in my back anymore and every nurse I worked with seem mean sweating because I was in so much pain. I never one time said I was not planning on coming. Only thing I said to them is I was upset how that went down when I got here I had a white blood cell count of 19.2. I never said that I will bring lab work and paperwork and I do not get good reception in the ER, I did not say I was not coming in. Everybody kept telling me to go to the hospital last night. I was sick and I still don't feel good and of course you would believe that but I will bring lab work and excuse I made sure I can get one.
Another text to Ms. Johnson on October 30 at 3:05 p.m. explained:
The biologic infusion I take for my autoimmune disease caused biologic induced renal disorder GNSV I will bring my excuse or send you a picture my rheumatologist only checked my BUN/creatinine one time and I had 6 infusions I was getting infections and mouth ulcers the last months and never thought
It had anything to do with the infusions, but the pain was so bad the other night I could not take it another minute and that's when they found out what was going on.
Hopefully this medicine will work and my creatinine will go down. I was hurting so bad I've never felt pain like that in my life.
Ms. Sweezy could not explain these text messages at trial. She testified that those conditions – high white blood cell count, biologic infusions, renal problems – were related to her mother, not to her. She had no idea how or why the texts to Ms. Johnson said “I” when referring to those problems, and not “my mother.” She testified she used “talk to text” to create the messages.
Ms. Johnson said Ms. Sweezy never mentioned anything about a work-related accident. Ms. Johnson denied receiving Ms. Sweezy's handwritten report. When Ms. Johnson learned of Ms. Sweezy's work excuse with restrictions, she advised Ms. Sweezy that she had no available work for her. She further told Ms. Sweezy she did not qualify for FMLA benefits and would need to resign. If Ms. Sweezy had been injured at work, Ms. Johnson testified, Landmark would have accommodated her. But without a work-related injury, Landmark was not required to continue her employment.
Ms. Johnson never asked Ms. Sweezy about the cause of her back pain; she thought it involved Ms. Sweezy's white blood cell count. She did not know why Ms. Sweezy went to the emergency room. She never spoke with Ms. Sweezy's co-workers, and she testified, “it was not her job to ask employees if they were injured at work when they complained of pain.” Ms. Johnson did not know Ms. Sweezy had complained of back pain to a co-worker until the trial. She communicated with Ms. Sweezy only through text messages.
Ms. Johnson testified that Landmark's policy regarding work-related injuries was for the employee to immediately report the accident to her supervisor, who would initiate an incident report. The employee would undergo a drug screen and be given necessary medical attention. The incident report was to be completed on Landmark's computer system and printed.
Ms. Sweezy's accident was never reported to anyone. Had Ms. Sweezy completed the computerized report, it would still be in Landmark's “HT system under [its] risk management.” Landmark had no such report. In contrast, Ms. Sweezy consistently testified that she had completed an incident report, left it in Ms. Johnson's mailbox, and texted her requesting an opportunity to talk to her.
Ms. Sweezy asked if Ms. Johnson had seen her incident report, and she thought Ms. Johnson said she had not even looked in her mailbox that day. Ms. Johnson denied Ms. Sweezy telling her about going to the emergency room and about her co-workers seeing her in pain and maintained she never found an incident report in her mailbox, even though she checked it throughout the course of every day. She would have known about an incident report left there. Ms. Sweezy testified that she did not realize Landmark did not have her incident report and that Landmark contended it did not exist until she heard that testimony at trial.
Had Ms. Sweezy completed an accident report, Ms. Johnson would have taken witness statements. She did not do so because she was unaware of any reported accident until Landmark's administrator, Bart Pugh, received correspondence from Ms. Sweezy's attorney. Ms. Johnson did not know what Mr. Pugh did to investigate.
Text messages between Ms. Sweezy and Ms. Antoine-Parker add to the confusion about Ms. Sweezy's medical condition. On August 9, approximately two-and-a-half months before the alleged accident, Ms. Sweezy texted Ms. Antoine-Parker:
I had lab work done Monday and they called me this morning that I had a critical iron level and had to get a iron transfusion unexpectedly. I got my lab work and my excuse for her and sent it to her so she would see it was unexpected. It took 3 1/212 hours to get that infusion I hated missing my money I wanted to come in when I was finished, but she said no.
And on October 28, the second day after the alleged accident, Ms. Sweezy wrote to Ms. Antoine-Parker:
I'm still processing everything and I can't keep it to myself anymore. Dr. [Shamat] is going to try me on medicine but is setting up an appointment for me to get a shunt My creatinine was 5.4 my kidneys are shutting down. It's hard for me to even say it, but I'm not telling my kids, my mama or anything I'm not getting on no f***ing dialysis but you're my best friend so far you're the only one that knows but I couldn't keep it to myself anymore
Ms. Sweezy could not explain these texts just as she could not explain those to Ms. Johnson. She did not recall sending those texts to Ms. Johnson and Ms. Antoine-Parker on her phone and said she did not put them there. She did let her mother use her phone at times. Ms. Sweezy admitted none of the text messages referred to a work-related accident. Ms. Antoine-Parker testified that Ms. Sweezy never told her about a work-related accident.
Ms. Antoine-Parker did recall a night when Ms. Sweezy lifted her shirt and had swelling in her back, but she could not say that was on October 26. She was surprised to hear that Dr. Shamat, referenced in the text messages from Ms. Sweezy, had no medical records for her. Ms. Antoine-Parker testified she received a text message from Ms. Sweezy on November 7 saying she got results from her MRI and needed spinal surgery.
Ms. Antoine-Parker testified Mr. Pugh and Ms. West questioned her about Ms. Sweezy's accident and told her they were investigating whether an accident occurred. Ms. Antoine-Parker said Ms. Sweezy complained of back pain “quite a lot,” and she told Ms. Sweezy she should “go get it checked out.” Had Ms. Sweezy told her about an accident while lifting a patient, Ms. Antoine-Parker would have had a duty to notify her administrators, complete the appropriate paperwork, and start an investigation. She said that was the co-workers’ duty, not the obligation of the injured person.
Mary Duhon, Landmark's HR manager, testified Ms. Sweezy called her to see if she was eligible for FMLA benefits. Ms. Duhon explained Ms. Sweezy had to work for a year before eligibility. Ms. Sweezy never mentioned a work-related accident.
Mr. Pugh testified he learned of Ms. Sweezy's accident upon receipt of her attorney's November 10 letter advising of the accident and the claim. He began Landmark's normal protocol by preparing a first report of injury. Based on his initial inquiries after receiving the letter, he saw no need for additional investigation. He had no written statements involving this case.
Macy West, Landmark's assistant administrator, testified she also learned of the claimed accident through the attorney's letter. She said Ms. Sweezy told her she was not injured at work. Although Ms. West knew Ms. Stoker said she had seen and touched Ms. Sweezy's back, she did not know Ms. Stoker had also seen swelling and discoloration until Ms. Stoker testified at trial. Ms. West also explained that, after she and Mr. Pugh prepared the incident report, they “did not know where to start.” They would not question other employees because of privacy issues.
Before her accident, Ms. Sweezy had consulted Dr. Basra, a rheumatologist, with complaints including low back pain and back stiffness that “hardly improves throughout the day.” Dr. Basra noted swelling in a nodule near the tailbone and oral ulcers during flare-ups of Ms. Sweezy's symptoms. X-rays of the sacroiliac joint on July 27, 2023, were described as “[n]egative plain x-rays.” Laboratory tests showed BUN and creatinine levels within normal limits but a high BUN/creatinine ratio. Ms. Sweezy's diagnosis was polyarthralgia. Dr. Basra's records were consistent with Ms. Sweezy's testimony at trial.
Based on Landmark's cursory investigation, it concluded Ms. Sweezy could not establish causation for a work-related injury and intentionally misrepresented her purported injury to her doctor. It denied Ms. Sweezy's claim for medical and indemnity benefits.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Landmark argues the trial court erred in finding Ms. Sweezy proved the occurrence and causation of an accident and erroneously awarded penalties and attorney fees.
DISCUSSION
Landmark's assignments of error involve questions of fact regarding whether a work-related accident occurred and caused injury to Ms. Sweezy and whether she is entitled to an award of penalties and attorney fees. We review the trial court's decision under the manifest error/clearly wrong standard and determine whether the trial court's conclusion was a reasonable one. Schouest v. Acadian Const. Servs., 15-921 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/8/16), 193 So.3d 595.
Accident and causation
Our workers’ compensation law defines an accident as “an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.” La.R.S. 23:1021(1). The definition of “injury” includes “injuries by violence to the physical structure of the body ․” La.R.S. 23:1021(8)(a). The employer bears the burden of proving it is not liable for “paying compensation because of injury sustained by an employee for any cause or reason set forth” in the workers’ compensation statutes. La.R.S. 23:1081(2). An employee who shows an accident exacerbated a pre-existing medical condition and produced a compensable injury carries the burden of causation. Lenox v. Cent. La. Spokes, LLC, 18-556 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/13/19), 265 So.3d 834. And “[b]ecause an employer takes his employee as he finds him, a preexisting condition does not prevent recovery through workers’ compensation.” Tate v. Cabot Corp., 01-1652, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/3/02), 824 So.2d 456, 461, writ denied, 02-2150 (La. 11/22/02), 829 So.2d 1044; see also Ceaser v. Lake Charles Care Ctr., 22-572 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/26/23), 365 So.3d 859.
Ms. Sweezy felt a painful pop in her back as she helped Ms. Metoyer lift a patient, and her co-workers saw swelling at the site of her pain. Medical records show she had pre-existing occasional back pain that became significant after an injury. Her neurosurgeon diagnosed asymptomatic degenerative lumbar disease exacerbated by her injury. While that diagnosis depends on the truthfulness of Ms. Sweezy's report of her alleged accident, Landmark has not offered sufficient evidence to challenge her credibility about her previous condition or the details of her injury. Although Ms. Sweezy says she completed an incident report and left it in Ms. Johnson's mailbox, Ms. Johnson maintains she never received the report. This discrepancy offers no proof that Ms. Sweezy did not sustain an injury, particularly considering the testimony at trial and the medical records.
Medical records verify Ms. Sweezy's version of events. She called her nurse practitioner, Ms. Konomos, the day after her accident to request a work excuse based on back pain. She had not previously complained about her back, even during her routine visit on October 25, one day before the accident. Medical records of October 30 reported an exacerbating incident that aggravated Ms. Sweezy's discomfort, resulting in complaints of coccyx pain radiating to her right leg and a lump in the lower back/coccyx area. Although Ms. Stoker and Ms. Johnson testified they thought Ms. Sweezy was suffering from a UTI, we note she was never diagnosed with, treated for, or prescribed medications to treat that ailment. She was, however, treated for a back injury.
Landmark relies on a statement in the medical records to argue no incident occurred that would constitute an accident as defined by statute. That statement refers to “lifting patients” instead of lifting “a” particular patient. But this note, prepared for medical, not legal, purposes, does not disprove Ms. Sweezy's claim that lifting a certain patient caused a pop in her back, swelling, and resulting pain. If anything, it verifies that some type of injury occurred.
Landmark's position further suggests Ms. Sweezy somehow massaged her medical history to support the occurrence of an accident only after she hired an attorney. It bases this argument on a note in the nurse practitioner's record mentioning that Ms. Sweezy hurt her back at work without including any details of how the accident occurred. That note was made in response to Ms. Sweezy's voice mail message requesting a work excuse for the day after the accident. It has no bearing on the issue of whether or how an accident occurred. Such a note merely documents the medical issue; its focus is not on providing details for legal action.
At trial, Ms. Sweezy's counsel introduced correspondence from Connie Freese, identified only as “the vice president of claims,” referencing a call to Mr. Pugh on November 13, the same day he received the letter about the accident. The exhibit relates a number of facts Mr. Pugh provided her with on that date. Yet Mr. Pugh testified he did not know any of those facts on November 13. The trial court noted it “did not find [Mr. Pugh] to be very prepared.”
We find Ms. Sweezy's description of what she experienced on October 26, 2023, sufficiently describes an accident and injury sustained on her job that led to her current compensable disability. The trial court's conclusion was reasonable based on the testimony and evidence at trial. We will not disturb those “reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact[.]” Ryan v. Cajun Indus., L.L.C., 20-617, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/21), 330 So.3d 324, 330 (quoting Dow v. Chalmette Restaurant, Ltd., 15-336, p. 17 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/18/16), 193 So.3d 1222, 1232).
Penalties and attorney fees
A trial court's award for penalties and attorney fees is proper absent evidence contradicting the facts, medical testimony, and records adduced at trial. “The unambiguous language of La. R.S. 23:1201 clearly establishes that penalties and attorney fees for failure to timely pay benefits shall be assessed unless the claim is reasonably controverted or such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or insurer had no control.” Brown v. Texas-LA Cartage, Inc., 98-1063, p. 8 (La. 12/1/98), 721 So.2d 885, 890. “[T]he test to determine whether an employee's right to benefits has been reasonably controverted turns on whether the employer or his insurer had sufficient factual information to reasonably counter the factual information presented by the claimant.” Thibodeaux v. L.S. Womack, Inc., 94-1375, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/95), 653 So.2d 123, 125. The employer “has a continuing duty to investigate the employee's claim and to assess factual information before the denial of benefits.” Pete v. Quality Const. Specialists & Bridgefield Cas. Ins. Co., 09-642, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 25 So.3d 241, 245, writ denied, 10-41 (La. 3/12/10), 28 So.3d 1029.
Landmark knew Ms. Sweezy had gone to the emergency room with severe back pain on the day after the accident, but it asked Ms. Sweezy's co-workers only cursory questions about a possible incident. Employees on duty with Ms. Sweezy said she exhibited evidence of an injury, i.e., swelling and discoloration.
Landmark denied the claim because it had no injury report from that night, and medical notes did not describe a particular accident. Based on Ms. Stoker's opinion that Ms. Sweezy had a UTI and a confusing text message referring to kidney issues, Landmark dismissed Ms. Sweezy's complaints, even after it received medical records supporting her claim and did not receive records supporting kidney problems. It denied her claim without sufficient investigation despite medical records showing at the very least the possibility of a work-related accident.
Landmark simply concluded, without any evidentiary support, that Ms. Sweezy sustained no work-related injury and denied her claim without justification. Such an unsupported conclusion subjects Landmark to the penalties and attorney fees the trial court correctly awarded.
Attorney fees for appeal
Ms. Sweezy answered Landmark's appeal seeking an additional award of attorney fees for work performed in defense of this appeal. Such an award “is warranted when the claimant successfully defends its judgment.” Thomas Med. Grp., APMC v. Stine, LLC, 10-580, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/10), 52 So.3d 993, 997. We find such an award is proper here.
For twenty plus years, this court has settled on $5,000 as the appropriate amount to award for fees incurred by a successful claimant at trial who also prevails on appeal. See Dubois v. La. Forest Indus., Inc., 98-895 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/98), 722 So.2d 409, writ denied, 99-49 (La. 2/26/99), 738 So.2d 586. We agree with counsel for Ms. Sweezy that it is time to adjust that amount to reflect the value in today's dollars. We find that $7,500 is a more appropriate amount for an additional fee here.
CONCLUSION
Evidence supported Ms. Sweezy's claim of a work-related accident that caused her present disability. The trial court correctly awarded her reimbursement of medical expenses, supplemental earnings benefits, temporary total disability benefits, penalties, and attorney fees. Because Ms. Sweezy prevailed in this appeal, she is further entitled to an award of additional attorney fees necessitated to defend her judgment in the trial court.
DECREE
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and amend it to award additional attorney fees of $7,500 for work performed on appeal in favor of Paulita Sweezy and against Defendants/Appellants, Lake Charles Healthcare, LLC d/b/a Landmark of Lake Charles and the Louisiana Healthcare Self-Insurance Fund. All costs of this proceeding are assessed against Lake Charles Healthcare, LLC d/b/a Landmark of Lake Charles and the Louisiana Healthcare Self-Insurance Fund.
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
FOOTNOTES
1. We refer to the defendants collectively as “Landmark.”
2. We quote the text messages “as is,” without the usual “[sic]” notations, to preserve the tone and flavor of the messages and to avoid distractions from the subject matter.
DAVIS, Judge.
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Docket No: 25-122
Decided: September 10, 2025
Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
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