STATE IN THE INTEREST OF v. << (2025)

B.A.M.¹ , a juvenile, appeals the trial court ruling which found the evidence sufficient to find he violated La.R.S. 14:40.1(B)(1), menacing, and adjudicated him delinquent. We affirm the trial court's adjudication of B.A.M. that found him delinquent, amend the disposition, in part, and remand with further instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 12, 2024, Brittany Johnson (“Ms. Johnson”), the bookkeeper at DeRidder Junior High School (“DJHS”), was waiting to begin lunch duty when a group of three students passed her; as they passed, she heard one of the students use the words “shoot up the school.” Alarmed, Ms. Johnson immediately reported the matter to the principal.

The principal, Ashley McBride (“Ms. McBride”), testified that after Ms. Johnson alerted her to a troubling statement made by a student, she initiated an in-school investigation. She affirmed that she had watched a school video of the lunchroom with Ms. Johnson. After viewing the video, it was determined that J.J., T.P., and M.G. were the three students who passed Ms. Johnson in the lunchroom and that J.J. was the student in the group that Ms. Johnson overheard.

Ms. McBride talked to J.J., who told her that B.A.M., who was not one of the students who passed Ms. Johnson in the lunchroom, “stated that, ‘what would happen if someone shot up the school tomorrow, Friday at 1:10.’ ” She testified that B.A.M.’s statement made her fearful for the safety of herself and the students considering recent events, such as a school shooting in Georgia the previous week.² Also, she was disturbed that B.A.M. mentioned a specific day and time.

At trial, J.J. testified that in September 2024, he and B.A.M. were students at DJHS. J.J. further stated that one day B.A.M. said, “either he or somebody else was going to shoot up the school the next day at 1:10.” J.J. testified that it scared him, particularly because B.A.M. added the remark “no questions asked.” J.J. noted that two other students, T.P. and M.G., were present while B.A.M. was talking. On cross-examination, he explained the four boys were sitting in the bleachers in the school gym when B.A.M. made the statement at issue. Questioned about whether he was actually scared or made any attempt to report B.A.M.’s statement, J.J. answered that he did ask to speak to Ms. McBride but waited until his next class was over. He explained that he did not want to cause a disruption. However, a direct question from the trial court clarified that he was summoned to the principal's office to talk to Ms. McBride.

Another student, T.P., testified that in September 2024, he was in the school's gym when he heard B.A.M. say that he wanted “to shoot up the school tomorrow.” T.P. stated that initially he was not concerned because B.A.M. said it in a joking manner. However, in his written statement to Ms. McBride, he said, “I was in PE watching basketball and talking to [J.B., another student] and I heard [B.A.M.] say he wants to shoot the school up.”

Ms. McBride talked to B.A.M. After an initial denial, he admitted making the statement. Although B.A.M. had no explanation for making the statement, when she and a school counselor reviewed a threat-assessment form with him, he indicated that he was seeking attention. B.A.M. also admitted having access to weapons.

The trial court also heard testimony from Deputy Greg Hill (“Deputy Hill”). At the time of the offense, he was assigned to DJHS as a resource officer. Ms. McBride contacted him and claimed that B.A.M. had made a threat against the school. The principal informed him of the information she had obtained from B.A.M. and the other students she questioned. Afterwards, Deputy Hill took B.A.M. into custody, transported the youth to the DeRidder Police Department, and contacted the boy's father, who is a police officer.

Deputy Hill allowed B.A.M. and his father to have a talk, and they agreed that B.A.M. would give a statement without a lawyer present. In his video-recorded statement, B.A.M. acknowledged that he said, “What happens if a school shooting happened at 1:15 tomorrow?”

As a precaution, the start of school the next day was delayed for thirty minutes as authorities searched students’ bookbags and had the students walk through a metal detector. Police also provided security for the teachers and the principal.

The day after B.A.M. was taken into custody, Ms. McBride questioned M.G. He testified that he told Ms. McBride that he never heard B.A.M. making any statements about a shooting. M.G. further said that Ms. McBride asked him “would your parents be okay with you lying to me about it.” In M.G.’s words, he stated, “When I told her she could call them, she basically just kind of gave up and let me go.” Under cross-examination at trial, M.G. was surprised to learn that B.A.M. admitted that he said something about a shooting.

M.G. further testified at trial that after Ms. McBride spoke with him, he asked J.J. if he had heard anything about B.A.M. saying he was going to shoot up the school. According to M.G., although J.J. acknowledged having heard B.A.M.’s statement, he later told M.G. that Ms. McBride had threatened him with expulsion if he did not cooperate.

Finally, B.A.M. testified in his own defense. He said that during a discussion with his friends regarding recent school shootings, he asked them what they would do if a school shooting happened the next day at 1:15 p.m. He stated that none of his friends appeared to be frightened. According to B.A.M., he was later called to the principal's office. He walked there unescorted. However, when Ms. McBride questioned him, he acknowledged saying, “what if a school shooting happened tomorrow at 1:15?” B.A.M. then stated that he was asking a question; he was not joking. He recalled that when he was in elementary school, he participated in active-shooter drills conducted there.

During cross-examination, B.A.M. acknowledged that what he said was problematic in statement form, but he reiterated that he was asking a question. In response to a question from the trial court, he acknowledged that such communication from another person would make him fearful. However, he said that he and his friends were talking about a school shooting that happened the week before, and he was concerned that such a shooting could happen at his school.

On September 16, 2024, the State filed a petition alleging that B.A.M. was delinquent or, alternatively, that his family was in need of services, as he had committed the offense of menacing, a violation of La.R.S. 14:40.1(B). Even though the petition also mentioned terrorizing, on February 12, 2025, the State filed an amended petition that omitted the reference to terrorizing.

The trial court conducted an adjudication hearing on February 19, 2025; after receiving evidence, including witness testimony and viewing B.A.M.’s video statement, the court adjudicated B.A.M. delinquent. On February 25, the court conducted a disposition hearing and ordered B.A.M. to serve two years in juvenile detention but suspended the term and ordered eighteen months’ probation with eleven special conditions. The disposition will be discussed in greater detail in the “Errors Patent” section of this opinion.

B.A.M. now appeals.

APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The evidence is insufficient to support the delinquency adjudication, depriving [B.A.M.] of Due Process[.]

2. Is criminally punishing [B.A.M.] for asking a question a direct violation of his First Amendment right to free speech?

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS

B.A.M. contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support adjudicating him delinquent for menacing as described in La.R.S. 14:40.1(B). He argues that he did not intentionally communicate that a crime of violence was imminent, in progress or that a circumstance dangerous to human life existed or was about to exist. His argument is threefold: (a) the evidence failed to show that the members of the general public were in sustained fear for their safety; (b) the evidence is void of a proof that any building, structure of facility of transportation was evacuated or that there was any serious disruption to the general public; and (c) the evidence failed to prove that a reasonable person would have known that such actions could cause such sustained fear. In support of those arguments, B.A.M. relies heavily on State ex rel. R.T., 33,246 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/23/99), 748 So.2d 1256, and the affirmation of that decision, State ex rel. RT, 00-205 (La. 2/21/01), 781 So.2d 1239, a case that involved the terrorizing provisions of La.R.S. 14:40.1(A).

Additionally, B.A.M. raises a constitutional argument, contending that punishing him for asking a question is a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. After recognizing that a serious expression conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence may evade the protection of the First Amendment, B.A.M. asserts that his question did not support that it was a serious expression that he intended to commit an act of unlawful violence.

APPELLEE'S POSITIONS

The State argues that the record shows that it proved that B.A.M. committed the crime of menacing as described in La.R.S. 14:40.1(B) and fully supports the trial court's delinquency adjudication. It showed that B.A.M. intentionally communicated information that a crime of violence was imminent and that the statement caused members of the general public to be in sustained fear. Additionally, it proved that a reasonable person would have known that his statement could cause members of the general public to suffer such fear. In support of its argument, the State points out that much of B.A.M.’s argument is based on questions of witness credibility. As stated in State v. Kennerson, 96-1518 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, it is well-established jurisprudentially that questions of the credibility of witnesses and the sufficiency of evidence should not be second-guessed by an appellate court.

The State next argues that there is no merit to B.A.M.’s contention that his conviction violates his First Amendment rights. The menacing statute, La.R.S. 14:40.1(B), prohibits the utterance of words that a crime of violence is imminent, and which causes members of the general public to sustain fear as result of the utterance. Under settled jurisprudence, the First Amendment does not protect such speech.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The constitutional argument

Because B.A.M. has raised a constitutional argument, we will first address that contention as a favorable resolution may make his sufficiency of the evidence assignment of error moot.

B.A.M. argues for the first time in brief that punishing him for asking a question is a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. It is well accepted that an appellate court will not consider constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Par. of Calcasieu, 03-732 (La. 1/19/05), 903 So.2d 392. As recognized in State v. Celestine, 19-42, pp. 7–8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/19), 280 So.3d 1179, 1184, writ granted, cause remanded, 19-1688 (La. 6/3/20), 296 So.3d 1029,³ only four narrow exceptions to that rule exist, namely:

(1) when a statute attempts to limit the constitutional power of the courts to review cases; (2) when the statute has been declared unconstitutional in another case; (3) when the statute applicable to the specific case becomes effective after the appeal is lodged in the higher court; or (4) when an act which is the basis of a criminal charge is patently unconstitutional on its face and the issue is made to appear as an error patent on the face of the record.

Finding that none of these exceptions are applicable in the present case, that B.A.M. did not raise this argument in the trial court, and the interest of justice does not require otherwise, this constitutional issue is not properly before this court for review. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 1–3. See Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., Inc., 94-1238 (La. 11/39/94), 646 So.2d 859. Thus, this issue has not been preserved for appellate review.

Sufficiency of Evidence

In addressing sufficiency of the evidence within a juvenile adjudication proceeding, the supreme court explained in State in Interest of E.S., 18-1763, pp. 10–11 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So.3d 1046, 1054–55:

It is axiomatic that in a juvenile adjudication proceeding, as in any criminal trial, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense alleged in the petition. Ch. C. art. 883 (“In order for the court to adjudicate a child delinquent, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed a delinquent act alleged in the petition.”); In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (“The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child.”); State in the Interest of D.P.B., 02-1742, p. 4-5 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 753, 756–57. The constitutional standard of review for juveniles is likewise identical to that of adults, i.e., the appellate court must determine whether, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find that the State proved all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Ch. C. art. 883; State ex rel. R.T., 00-0205, p. 2 (La. 2/21/01), 781 So.2d 1239, 1241 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

In cases subsequent to Jackson, the United States Supreme Court has explained that the “any rational trier of fact” standard is not particularly demanding. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (“The Jackson standard, which focuses on whether any rational juror could have convicted, looks to whether there is sufficient evidence which, if credited, could support the conviction.”); Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012) (“[T]he only question under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality.”); Musacchio v. U.S., 577 U.S. 237, 136 S.Ct. 709, 715, 193 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016) (“Sufficiency review essentially addresses whether the government's case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In the present case, the court adjudicated B.A.M. delinquent for menacing, a violation of La.R.S. 14:40.1(B)(1), which states in pertinent part:

Menacing is the intentional communication of information that the commission of a crime of violence, as defined in R.S. 14:2(B), is imminent or in progress or that a circumstance dangerous to human life exists or is about to exist, when committed under any of the following circumstances:

(a) The actions of the offender cause members of the general public to be in sustained fear for their safety, and a reasonable person would have known that such actions could cause such sustained fear.

In argument to this court, B.A.M. contends that he did not intentionally communicate that a dangerous circumstance would occur or that members of the general public were put in fear. Referencing the “reasonable person” standard, he notes that he is an eighth grader. Also, he argues that the students who heard him did not make independent efforts to report the matter to any authorities.

Supporting his argument, B.A.M. relies on State ex rel. RT, 781 So.2d 1239, a case that involved terrorizing, a crime delineated in La.R.S. 14:40.1(A), that was found to be insufficiently proven under the Jackson standard.⁴ In reaching that conclusion, the supreme court stated:

The state presented the testimony of only one witness to substantiate this charge. CM, a fellow biology student, testified that she had an “off-hand” conversation with RT during biology class. In that conversation he told her “how it would be really easy to have a shooting” in the biology class. He then described a scenario of how he could carry out a shooting with the help of others by blockading doors and windows and then shooting those he did not like, while skipping over his friends. He also remarked at another point in the conversation that it would be easy to carry out such a shooting when students were together for graduation, ring ceremonies, or group days. When the prosecutor asked if the statement caused her to be afraid, the witness answered that “․ I just didn't really know what to think. I just kind of didn't think much about it.” Under cross-examination the witness clarified that RT never said he actually planned to carry out this scenario. He just explained what could be done. The conversation ended when the teacher spotted them talking during class.

The state produced no evidence that the witness seemed alarmed or that she reported the conversation in question to anyone. She remained in class, seated next to RT, and attended school the next day. She missed a few days of school after the conversation, but explained that her mother pulled her out of school in fear for her safety in the aftermath of the Columbine tragedy. The state presented no evidence that the witness ever repeated this conversation to her mother or anyone else prior to RT's arrest or that her absence from school was a result of anything that RT had done or said.

We agree with the court of appeal that the state did not present sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of delinquency for violation of La. R.S. 14:40.1(A). There was no evacuation of any building, public structure, or facility of transportation. There is no evidence that the conversation was repeated by this witness or overheard by anyone else. Therefore, there is no evidence that any statements made to this witness by RT could have caused any public disruption or could have caused fear in any person other than CM.

The only portion of the statute that RT could possibly have violated is the section that prohibits the intentional communication of false information that a crime of violence is imminent or in progress, or that a circumstance dangerous to human life exists or is about to exist, thereby causing any person to be in sustained fear for his or another person's safety. However, the state presented no evidence that information was conveyed to the effect that a crime of violence was in progress or imminent, or that a circumstance dangerous to human life existed or was about to exist. The description of the conversation, taken as a whole, is more suggestive of a discussion of hypothetical conduct. Moreover, causation of “sustained fear” is clearly an essential element of this part of the statute. Both the direct testimony and conduct of CM refute any contention that the conversation caused her any “sustained fear.” Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and without taking RT's exculpatory testimony into consideration, the state did not prove each essential element of the crime so as to justify a rationale trier of fact in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that RT was guilty of the offense of terrorizing.

State ex rel. RT, 781 So.2d at 1241–42.

Having reviewed the description of facts in RT, we find the adjudication of B.A.M. in the present case significantly differs in the following particulars: B.A.M. named a specific time the next afternoon when a dangerous circumstance, i.e., a shooting, could occur; the State presented testimony of Ms. Johnson and J.J. that B.A.M.’s words scared them; and the principal, Ms. McBride, testified that she feared not only for herself and but also for the students under her care.

Additionally, B.A.M. argues the State's evidence did not demonstrate that he referenced an “imminent” crime of violence or dangerous circumstance as required by La.R.S. 14:40.1(B). Unlike the facts in RT, which lacked any suggestion that the crime was imminent, the evidence recounted in the present case shows that B.A.M. intentionally communicated information that a circumstance dangerous to human life would arise the next afternoon. The time he mentioned, whether it was 1:10 or 1:15, in a way that a reasonable person would have known would raise alarm. B.A.M.’s words raised sufficient alarm with the school's principal and with law enforcement to cause a thirty-minute delay of school the next morning as students were searched and required to walk through metal detectors.

Next, B.A.M. argues that J.J. was not a credible witness because his testimony conflicted with his statement to Ms. McBride, the principal. Ms. McBride testified that J.J. told her that B.A.M. had said, “what would happen if someone shot up the school tomorrow, Friday at 1:10.” In a short, barely legible written statement he gave to Ms. McBride, J.J. noted that B.A.M. referred to the school being “shot up” the next day. He also indicated that the remark was part of a conversation in which some boys were discussing earlier school shootings. At the adjudication hearing, J.J. testified that B.A.M. “said either he was or somebody else was gonna [sic] shoot up the school at 1:10.” Further, he testified that B.A.M. added, “no questions asked.” J.J. also testified he did not remember what the boys were talking about before B.A.M. mentioned the possibility of a shooting the next day. However, on re-direct, he acknowledged that there had been some conversation about other school shootings across the country.

On cross-examination of J.J., B.A.M. also tried to show inconsistencies between J.J.’s trial testimony and his videotaped statement given to police. Although counsel for B.A.M. played some of J.J.’s video statement at the hearing, the record shows that the State and the trial court disputed counsel's characterization of it. Although B.A.M. introduced J.J.’s written statement as an exhibit, he did not introduce the video statement to police.

At one point in his testimony, J.J. appeared to say during cross-examination that he asked to see the principal to report the matter. However, he clarified to the court that he went to talk to Ms. McBride because he was summoned.

Lastly, B.A.M. highlights the testimony of M.G., who testified that two or three weeks after the offense at issue, J.J. told him that Ms. McBride threatened to expel J.J. if he did not identify the person who made the offending remark. M.G. also indicated that he thought Ms. McBride tried to pressure him to make a statement against B.A.M. Further, M.G. did not think the boys who heard what B.A.M. said were frightened by it.

“This court has further explained that the trial court's findings of fact in a juvenile criminal matter are subject to the manifest error standard of review and the appellate court should not therefore disturb reasonable evaluations of credibility and inferences of fact absent manifest error.” State in Interest of X.J.M., 23-625, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/24), 379 So.3d 1285, 1289; see also State in re J.A., 15-641 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/2/15), 179 So.3d 959, writ denied, 15-2317 (La. 3/4/16), 188 So.3d 1058. More specifically, “[w]hen the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, ․ the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review.” Kennerson, 698 So.2d at 1371. Our review shows that the trial court's appreciation of the testimony is fully supported by the record, and we will not second guess its findings of fact and credibility determinations.

After carefully considering the record in light of the Jackson standard of review and B.A.M.’s arguments to this court, we find no merit to his contention that the evidence was insufficient to adjudicate him delinquent for menacing under the provisions of La.R.S. 14:40.1(B).

ERROR PATENT REVIEW

Although the Louisiana Children's Code is silent as to whether a juvenile criminal proceeding is entitled to an errors patent review, this court has found that such a review is mandated by La.Ch.Code art. 104 and La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. State in Interest of T.T., 96-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96), 677 So.2d 466. See also State in Interest of J.C.G., 97-1044 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/98), 706 So.2d 1081. After carefully reviewing the record, there are several errors patent that we will address.

In the present case, the record shows the trial court failed to conduct the adjudication hearing within ninety days of the initial appearance to answer the petition as required by La.Ch.Code art. 877. However, in State in Interest of M.P., 20-567, p. 1 (La. 11/4/20), 303 So.3d 622, 622–23, the supreme court held:

Writ granted. Children's Code art. 877(A) sets forth the time limits for delinquency adjudication hearings such as the present one and provides: “If the child is not continued in custody, the adjudication hearing shall commence within ninety days of the appearance to answer the petition[.]” Additionally, Children's Code art. 877(D) provides: “For good cause, the court may extend such period.” Here, after the case was allotted to a different section because the original juvenile court judge granted juvenile's motion to recuse, the adjudication was continued several times until it finally occurred nearly seven months after the juvenile answered the petition. Though the juvenile objected to the continuances and findings of good cause, the juvenile never sought supervisory review of those adverse rulings, nor did the juvenile file a motion to dismiss, as required by Children's Code art. 877(C) (“If the hearing has not been commenced timely, upon motion of the child, the court shall release a child continued in custody and shall dismiss the petition”) (emphasis added). As such, the court of appeal erred in reversing the juvenile court and in dismissing the adjudication as untimely commenced. See In the interest of R.D.C., 93-1865 (La. 2/28/94), 632 So.2d 745, 748–49. Therefore, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal. We reinstate the juvenile court's adjudication and disposition.

Because the record in the present case shows there was good cause for the delay brought by joint motions/agreements to continue, there is no error patent to be recognized. Additionally, the record shows the State filed an amended petition on February 12, 2025, and the adjudication hearing was held the following day.

Next, B.A.M.’s place of birth was not listed in the petition as required by La.Ch.Code art. 845. However, this is a defect as to form only, and B.A.M. has alleged no prejudice as a result; thus, the error is harmless. La.Ch.Code art. 845(B); State in Interest of D.D., 11-1384 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/12), 86 So.3d 171.

Also, B.A.M. was not apprised of his rights as required by La.Ch.Code art. 855 when he appeared to answer the petition. However, because B.A.M. was represented by counsel at that time and denied the allegations, the error was harmless. See State in Interest of X.J.M., 379 So.3d 1285.

Additionally, La.Ch.Code art. 898(A) provides that “[t]he court shall give a child credit for time spent in secure detention prior to the imposition of disposition.” Our review of the record in the present case shows the court failed to give B.A.M. credit for time served in secure detention prior to disposition, if any. Accordingly, even though the record does not indicate whether B.A.M. spent time in a secure detention facility prior to the imposition of disposition, we amend B.A.M.’s disposition to reflect that he is given credit, if any is available to him, for time spent in secure detention prior to disposition as required by La.Ch.Code art. 898(A). We remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to note the amendment in the custody order and in the minute entry. State in re J.A., 179 So.3d 959.

Furthermore, our review of the record shows that the trial court failed to advise B.A.M. of the time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief as required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8. Although the Children's Code does not contain a provision like La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, this court has found that the notice should be given. See, e.g., State in re J.A., 179 So.3d 959.

Historically, when this court has been faced with the trial court's failure to advise a juvenile of the time limitations for filing an application for post-conviction relief, we have remanded the matter to the trial court to provide the proper instruction. However, recently, a majority of this court's judges have chosen to allow the opinion to serve as notice of the time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 24-308 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/25), 406 So.3d 579; State v. Mason, 24-407 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/25), 407 So.3d 822, writ denied, 25-270 (La. 4/29/25), 407 So.3d 620. In Mason, 407 So.3d at 826, this court stated:

The first, second, and fifth circuits have allowed their opinions to serve as notice to Defendant of the correct time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief:

Finally, after the trial court imposed the sentences herein, it failed to advise the defendant of the applicable time period to file an application for post-conviction relief․ At the time of sentencing, the trial court shall inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for applying for post-conviction relief. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Its failure to do so, however, has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Further, the Article does not provide a remedy for an individual defendant who is not told of the limitations period. Id. at 1142-43.

Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. Id. at 1143.

State v. Folse, 23-1299, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/20/24), 405 So.3d 645, 654. See also State v. Sajna, 23-893 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/20/24), 405 So.3d 667; State v. Green, 54,955 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23), 361 So.3d 546; State v. Franklin, 23-524 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/28/24), 398 So.3d 193, clarified on reh'g, 23-524 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/19/24) (unpublished opinion) (2024 WL 4247537).

We agree. We advise Defendant that pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, no application for post-conviction relief, including applications seeking an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under La.Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922.

Accordingly, following the analysis outlined in Mason, we advise B.A.M. that pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, no application for post-conviction relief, including applications seeking an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of adjudication and disposition has become final under La.Code Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922.

Finally, our review of the Uniform Commitment Order shows that it requires correction. B.A.M. was adjudicated delinquent based on a charge of menacing, a violation of La.R.S. 14:40.1(B); however, the commitment order indicates that he was adjudicated delinquent for terrorizing, a violation of La.R.S. 14:40.1(A). We direct the trial court to correct the Uniform Commitment Order to reflect the correct offense for which B.A.M. was adjudicated delinquent.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's determination which adjudicated B.A.M. delinquent for menacing, a violation of La.R.S. 14:40.1(B). We amend B.A.M.’s disposition to reflect that he is entitled to credit for time spent in secure detention prior to disposition, if any, and affirm as amended. We remand this matter with instructions for the trial court to note the amendment in the custody order and in the minute entry. Further, we order the trial court to correct the Uniform Commitment Order to reflect the correct offense for which B.A.M. was adjudicated delinquent.

ADJUDICATION AFFIRMED. DISPOSITION AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED. REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5–2, we will use the initials of B.A.M. and the various minor witnesses.

2.   On September 4, 2024, two students and two teachers died in a school shooting at Apalachee High School in Barrow County, Georgia. “GBI Investigates School Shooting in Barrow County,” (Sept. 6, 2024), https://gbi.georgia.gov/press-releases/2024-09-06/gbi-investigatesschool-shooting-barrow-county (accessed June 27, 2025).

3.   The case was remanded due to the decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020), which introduced the nationwide requirement for unanimous jury verdicts to uphold serious criminal convictions.

4.   The case also involved La.R.S. 14:54.1(A) that prohibits the “communicating of false information of planned arson.” The trial court adjudicated RT delinquent in this respect, and the supreme court found the state proved that adjudication with sufficient evidence.

JONATHAN W. PERRY JUDGE