MUNICIPAL POLICE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM v. HOLLINS (2025)

Appellant, Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System (“MPERS”), appeals the trial court's judgment granting the peremptory exception of no cause of action in favor of appellees, Loria Hollins, in her official capacity as Mayor of the Town of Jonesville (“Mayor”), and Catina Branch, Sholonda Branch, Angela Carter, June Gayden, and Dexter Jefferson, in their official capacities as Alderpersons for the Town of Jonesville, (collectively “Jonesville”) and dismissing MPERS’ claims against Jonesville with prejudice. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

MPERS is responsible for administering the retirement system for municipal police employees and ensuring its actuarial soundness. See La. Const. Art. 10 § 29(E). See also La. R.S. 11:2225(A)(1). Under La. R.S. 11:2213(11), MPERS-eligible employees include full-time police officers with arrest authority, decommissioned officers due to illness or injury who remain employed in law enforcement, and full-time police department employees under the direction of a chief of police and paid from the department's budget. From September 9, 1977, to June 30, 2021, employees under age fifty at the time of hire were considered MPERS-eligible. La. R.S. 11:2214(A)(1) and (2)(a)(i). Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:2214(A)(2)(a) mandates MPERS enrollment for all qualifying employees regardless of age.¹

Jonesville has an appointed chief of police and a police department under La. R.S. 33:381(B). As an employer, Jonesville is required to enroll its MPERS-eligible employees and remit mandatory employee and employer contributions. See La. R.S. 11:2213(12). Jonesville's Mayor, as the chief executive officer, is obligated under La. R.S. 33:362(B) and La. R.S. 33:404(A)(1) to supervise and ensure compliance with state laws, while the Aldermen are responsible for taking necessary actions to comply with mandatory statutory requirements.

On May 28, 2021, MPERS sent a formal notice reminding municipalities, including Jonesville, of their obligations. On June 4, 2024, MPERS sent the Mayor a letter requesting human resource and payroll records beginning June 1, 2021 and ending May 31, 2024, for all former and current MPERS-eligible employees to calculate “how much the Town of Jonesville owes ․” The Mayor did not respond to the records request.

On September 9, 2024, MPERS filed a petition for writ of mandamus alleging at least three Jonesville Police Department employees are full-time, which necessitates their enrollment in MPERS.² MPERS further alleged that Jonesville's failure to perform its ministerial duties, including to enroll MPERS-eligible employees and timely remit contributions as mandated by law, “has and continues to negatively impact the actuarial soundness of MPERS, causing damage to the municipalities participating in MPERS by increasing the employer contribution rate and to retirees by delaying eligibility for cost-of-living increases to benefits.” Specifically, MPERS sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing Jonesville to take the following actions: (1) enroll in MPERS every former and current employee as defined by La. R.S. 11:2213(11) as required by La. R.S. 11:2214(A)(2)(a); (2) remit to MPERS all delinquent contributions and other amounts required by La. R.S. 11:62(6), La. R.S. 11:103, and La. R.S. 11:2227(B)(1), (D)(1)(a) and (J) for all former MPERS-eligible employees as defined by La. R.S. 11:2213(11) not timely enrolled by Jonesville; and (3) remit to MPERS all delinquent contributions and other amounts required by La. R.S. 11:62(6), La. R.S. 11:103 and La. R.S. 11:2227(B)(1), D(1)(a) and (J) for each current MPERS-eligible employee not timely enrolled. MPERS attached to its petition for mandamus the May 28, 2021 and June 4, 2024 letters sent to Jonesville and the Mayor, respectively.

On September 23, 2024, Jonesville filed multiple exceptions, including a peremptory exception of no cause of action, relevant to the instant appeal. Jonesville argued that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is only applied where ordinary means cannot be used to obtain relief, and that MPERS’ petition does not allege that it cannot obtain relief by ordinary means. Jonesville specifically argued MPERS may obtain delinquent payments pursuant to La. R.S. 11:2227(D)(2)(a) or (b). Jonesville pointed out that prior to filing suit, MPERS sought recovery of delinquent funds pursuant to La. R.S. 11:2227(D)(2)(a), by sending the state treasurer certification that Jonesville was delinquent in the amount of at least $817,493.75 for employer and employee contributions, and requesting the state treasurer to deduct the amount of delinquent contributions from any monies available for distribution to Jonesville and to send those monies to MPERS. Jonesville attached a copy of MPERS’ certification letter to the state treasurer to its memorandum in support of its exceptions.

On October 3, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on Jonesville's objection of no cause of action. Following argument, the trial court granted the exception, finding “no [in]justice has been pled in the petition” to support a writ of mandamus. The trial court also noted that it would adopt the reasons and argument “made in support of the exception.” The trial court signed a written judgment on October 3, 2024, denying MPERS the opportunity to amend its petition for writ of mandamus, granting Jonesville's exception of no cause of action, and dismissing MPERS claims against Jonesville with prejudice. Notably, the written judgment signed by the trial court was prepared by counsel for MPERS and stated, in pertinent part, that the exception was granted by the trial court “[a]fter reviewing the Exception and Memorandum In Support and Exhibits thereto, entertaining argument of both counsel, and adjourning and conducting its own independent research[.]”³

MPERS now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting Jonesville's exception of no cause of action. MPERS also argues the trial court erred by considering evidence attached to Jonesville's memorandum in support of its exception as stated in the trial court judgment. MPERS further assigns as error the dismissal of its petition in its entirety, leaving MPERS without any judicial remedy to fulfill its obligations. Lastly, MPERS argues that the trial court erred by denying it the opportunity to amend its petition as required by La. C.C.P. art. 934.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Peremptory Exception

A peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action is subject to de novo review by an appellate court, employing the same principles applicable to the trial court's determination of the exception. A no cause of action exception questions whether the law affords the plaintiff any remedy under the allegations of the petition. Rhodus v. Lewis, 2015-1454 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/15/16), 193 So. 3d 215,218. If a remedy is provided, the exception must be overruled. Id at 219. The exception is triable solely on the face of the petition and any attached documents. White v. State, Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections Office of Motor Vehicles, 569 So. 2d 1001, 1002 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1990). The court must presume all-well pleaded facts are true, must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and must resolve any doubts in favor of the petition's sufficiency. Rhodus, 193 So. 3d at 219. The exceptor bears the burden of showing that no cause of action has been stated. City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Com'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-0690 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So. 2d 237, 253 (per curiam).

Louisiana Code Civil Procedure article 931 provides, in pertinent part: “No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” Here, as noted, the trial court erred by considering evidence outside the petition in its judgment, specifically “exhibits thereto.” Since the trial court erred in its ruling, we now consider, on appeal, whether the writ of mandamus petition was proper and if so, whether it stated a valid cause of action.

Writ of Mandamus

Louisiana Code Civil Procedure Article 3862 states:

A writ of mandamus may be issued in all cases where the law provides no relief by ordinary means or where the delay involved in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice; provided, however, that no court shall issue or cause to be issued a writ of mandamus to compel the expenditure of state funds by any state department, board or agency, or any officer, administrator or head thereof, or any officer of the state of Louisiana, in any suit or action involving the expenditure of public funds under any statute or law of this state, when the director of such department, board or agency, or the governor shall certify that the expenditure of such funds would have the effect of creating a deficit in the funds of said agency or be in violation of the requirements placed upon the expenditure of such funds by the legislature.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which should be applied only where ordinary means fail to afford adequate relief. Aberta, Inc. v. Atkins, 2012-0061 (La. 5/25/12), 89 So. 3d 1161, 1163. A writ of mandamus may be directed to a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law. La. C.C.P. art. 3863. A ministerial duty is one in which no element of discretion is left to the public officer, in other words, a simple definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law. Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 2020-01231 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So. 3d 369, 371. The writ of mandamus should be issued only in cases where the law provides no relief by ordinary means or where the delay involved in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice. La. C.C.P. art. 3862; Bd. of Trustees of Sheriff's Pension and Relief Fund v. City of New Orleans, 2002-0640 (La. 5/24/02), 819 So. 2d 290, 292.

On this appeal, in our limited role, we determine only whether the petition survives the exception of no cause of action. MPERS’ original Petition for Writ of Mandamus specifically alleged:

The Mayor and the Alderman failed to perform the following ministerial duties[4]:

B. Enroll in MPERS every former and current employee as defined by La. R.S. 11:2213(11), as required by La. R.S. 11:2214(A)(2)(a);

C. Remit to MPERS all delinquent contributions and other amounts required by La. R.S. 11:62(6), La. R.S. 11:103, and La. R.S. 11:2227(B)(1), (D)(1)(a) and (J) for each former MPERS-Eligible Employee not timely enrolled while employed by Jonesville; and

D. Remit to MPERS all delinquent employer and employee contributions and other amounts required by La. R.S. 11:62(6), La. R.S. 11:103 and La. R.S. 11:2227(B)(1), D(l)(a) and (J) for each current MPERS-Eligible Employee not timely enrolled. [5]

In New Orleans Fire Fighters Pension & Relief Fund v. City of New Orleans, 2013-0873 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/18/13), 131 So. 3d 412, 414, writ denied, 2014-0142 (La. 3/21/14), 135 So. 3d 623, the court was called to answer “whether mandamus is the proper procedure for the enforcement of a statutory provision․” The Fourth Circuit, in affirming the trial court, explained:

[W]e find that mandamus was a proper procedural vehicle to direct the payment by the City of its mandatory contribution to the Fund. We agree with the trial court's finding that the City's funding obligations are ministerial in nature and that any delay in that funding process “may” cause an injustice, thereby warranting the issuance of the writ of mandamus. We therefore affirm the trial court's issuance of a mandamus directing the City to make the actuarially required contribution to the Fund.

Id. We find this analogous to the case at bar, and find that the writ of mandamus was the appropriate procedural vehicle to bring the instant matter to the trial court. See Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 320 So. 3d 369, 374 (wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate court that sustained the City's exception of no cause of action, and held that mandamus was an appropriate vehicle because the city's ministerial duty to pay was based on specific statutes); See also Nicolay v. City of New Orleans, 546 So. 2d 508, 512 (La. App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 1324 (La. 1989) (holding that the proper procedure for enforcement of the obligations set forth in a pension statute is mandamus․). The cases cited by Jonesville are not convincing. In Louisiana Assessors’ Ret. Fund v. City of New Orleans, 2001-0735 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So. 2d 955 (per curiam)⁶ and Bd. of Trustees of Sheriffs Pension and Relief Fund v. City of New Orleans, 819 So. 2d 290 at 292 ⁷ , the writs were recalled because plaintiffs failed to prove an injustice sufficient to justify the issuance of a mandamus.

In the instant matter, on the contrary, MPERS has clearly stated that a “delay involved in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice” and upend its goal for actuarial soundness, increased employer contribution rates for other participating municipalities, and delayed cost-of-living adjustments for retirees. Further, we note that MPERS is not vested with any element of discretion. See Watson Mem'l Spiritual Temple of Christ v. Korban, 2024-00055 (La. 6/28/24), 387 So. 3d 499, 512, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 145 S. Ct. 1169, 221 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2025).

Herein, the petition alleges that Jonesville had a funding obligation, which is ministerial in nature, there is no discretion, and delay in that funding process causes an injustice, thereby warranting the issuance of the writ of mandamus. We find that the petition states a valid cause of action.⁸ Further, we find that failure to allow the petition to stand leaves MPERS without any recourse to enforce Louisiana laws.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $1173.50 are assessed to appellees, Loria Hollins, in her official capacity as Mayor of Jonesville, and Catina Branch, Sholonda Branch, Angela Carter, June Gayden, and Dexter Jefferson, in their official capacities as Alderpersons for the Town of Jonesville.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

I agree with the majority that the Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System (MPERS) has stated a cause of action in its petition for a writ of mandamus regarding enrollment of eligible employees in MPERS. Having so found, I find it unnecessary to address MPERS’ argument that mandamus is, in fact, the appropriate vehicle to seek remittance of delinquent funds. This court recognizes that the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action should be overruled when the petition states a cause of action as to any demand or theory of recovery. See Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1239 (La. 1993); Expert Riser Solutions, LLC v. Techcrane International, LLC, 2018-0612 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/18), 270 So.3d 655, 663; State, by and through Caldwell v. Astra Zeneca AB, 2016-1073 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/11/18), 249 So.3d 38, 42 (en banc), writs denied, 2018-00766, 2018-0758 (La. 9/21/18), 252 So.3d 899, 904. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the result reached by the majority.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While La. R.S. 11:157 allows certain municipal employees, who participated in Social Security before July 1, 1973, to opt out by filing a § 157 Affidavit, MPERS asserts that no such affidavits have been filed by Jonesville employees.

2.   As of the date of filing, Jonesville's MPERS-eligible employees remained unenrolled, and none had executed the required § 157 affidavits to opt out.

3.   Jonesville argues that since no exhibits were filed, the statement “after reviewing the Exception and Memorandum In Support and Exhibits thereto” in the trial court's written judgment was in error.

4.   According to the record, in Part A, the MPERS petition initially requested that Jonesville be directed to provide all payroll records, by month, for the period beginning June 1, 2021 through the most recent payroll period for current and former employees of the Jonesville Police Department to MPERS. However, that request was voluntarily stricken by MPERS.

5.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:2213(11) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:(11) “Employee” shall mean any of the following classifications:(a)(i) Any full-time police officer, empowered to make arrests.(ii) Any full-time police officer, decommissioned due to illness or injury, employed by a municipality of the state of Louisiana, and engaged in law enforcement.(iii) Any person who is employed on a full-time basis by a police department of any municipality of this state, who is under the direction of a chief of police, and who does not meet any other definition of employee.(iv) Any person listed in this Subparagraph shall only be defined as an employee if he is earning at least three hundred seventy-five dollars per month excluding state supplemental pay.(b) Any elected chief of police whose salary is at least one thousand dollars per month.(c) Any academy recruit, who shall be defined as a full-time municipal employee, who is participating in, or who is awaiting participation in, a formal training program as required by Peace Officer Standards and Training Certification, previous to commission as a municipal police officer, with complete law enforcement officer authority.Louisiana Revised Statutes ll:2214(A)(2)(a):(2)(a)(i) Except as provided further in this Paragraph, any person who becomes an employee as defined in R.S. 11:2213 on and after September 9, 1977, shall become a member as a condition of his employment. However, a person who becomes an employee before July 1, 2021, shall become a member only if the person is under fifty years of age at the date of employment.(ii) An employer shall submit to the retirement system for each member that it employs a fully completed membership enrollment form, a copy of the birth certificate and Social Security card for each member and his beneficiaries, and a fully completed physical examination form pursuant to Subparagraph (d) of this Paragraph by the later of ninety days after the member became eligible for membership or October 1, 2024.(iii) If a member submits an affidavit pursuant to R.S. 11:157 opting out of membership, such affidavit shall not be effective until the date that all documents specified in Item (ii) of this Subparagraph and pertaining to the member are provided to the retirement system.Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:62(6):Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System:(a) For members hired prior to January 1, 2013, and for members of the Hazardous Duty Subplan:(i) Any member whose earnable compensation is less than or equal to the most recently issued poverty guidelines issued by the United States Department of Health and Human Services according to the size of the member's family unit - 7.5%.(ii) For employee contributions due and payable July 1, 2011, or thereafter, any member whose earnable compensation is more than the most recently issued poverty guidelines issued by the United States Department of Health and Human Services according to the size of the member's family unit:(b) For members of the Non-Hazardous Duty Subplan - 8%, or equal to the rate established in Item (a)(ii) of this Paragraph if less than 8%.Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:103(A) provides:A. The provisions of this Section are applicable with respect to the statewide public retirement systems, whose benefits are not guaranteed by Article X, Section 29(A) and (B) of the Louisiana Constitution.Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:2227, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:B. Annuity savings fund:The annuity savings fund shall be the fund in which shall be accumulated contributions from the compensation of members to provide for their annuities. Contributions to the annuity savings fund shall be made as follows:(1)(a) Each municipality shall make deductions from any salary or wages excluding overtime paid by them to any member of this system in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 11:62(6) on the earnable compensation paid him in each and every payroll.D. Pension accumulation fund:The pension accumulation fund shall be the fund in which shall be accumulated all reserves for the payment of all pension and benefits payable from contributions made by employers. Contributions to and payments from the pension accumulation fund shall be made as follows: (1)(a) In addition to the assessment collected above, each municipality which has employees on its police force who become members in this retirement system shall contribute the employer contribution rate as determined in R.S. 11:103, and shall remit this amount monthly to the system. J.(1) If any employer fails to transmit either employer's contributions or member's contributions within five days after their due date, the payment shall be delinquent. As used in this Subsection, “due date” means the close of the tenth day after the end of the month for which payment of employer's and member's contributions is applicable or deducted. In addition to the employer and member contributions owed, the employer shall submit an amount determined in accordance with Paragraph (2) of this Subsection.

6.   Louisiana Assessors’ Retirement Fund and Louisiana Clerks’ of Court Retirement and Relief Fund brought a mandamus action, granted by the trial court, against city to enforce collection of taxes and their remittance to funds. The plaintiffs alleged that the delay in obtaining ordinary relief would cause injustice sufficient to warrant the extraordinary relief provided by a writ of mandamus. The supreme court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of showing that a delay in obtaining ordinary relief would cause injustice sufficient to warrant the issuance and recalled the writ. Louisiana Assessors’ Ret. Fund v. City of New Orleans, 809 So. 2d at 956.

7.   Board of Trustees of the Sheriff's Pension and Relief Fund alleged that the City failed to deduct and remit the sums due pursuant to La. R.S. § 11:2174, but according to the supreme court they did not state, after more than 38 years, any further delay would cause injustice sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The supreme court recalled the writ. Bd. of Trustees of Sheriffs Pension and Relief Fund v. City of New Orleans, 819 So. 2d 290 at 292.

8.   In light of our findings, we pretermit discussion on the trial court's failure to allow MPERS to amend its petition as required by La. C.C.P. art. 934.

BALFOUR, J.

Concurs for reasons Assigns by Judge McClendon McClendon, C.J. concurs and assigns reasons.