CHESSON PLC v. GANDY (2025)

Plaintiffs/Appellants, Christian D. Chesson, PLC, a domestic professional law corporation, and Christian Chesson, individually and on behalf of his minor child, M.C.,¹ appeal judgments sustaining peremptory exceptions, granting sanctions, and dismissing their claims against Defendants/Appellees, Erin N. Abrams and Jamell Janese. Appellees have answered the appeal, seeking increases in the awards of sanctions for the additional work performed in the appeal of this matter. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, and we increase the sanction awards in the amount of $2,500.00 apiece to Erin N. Abrams and Jamell Janese.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit commenced on September 19, 2022, with the filing of a “Petition for Damages, Defamation and Defamation Per Se, Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process, Fraud, and Attorney[ ] Fees”² by Christian D. Chesson, PLC, a domestic professional law corporation (“the Chesson law corporation”), and Christian Chesson (“Chesson”), individually and on behalf of his minor child, M.C. (sometimes collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”). Named as Defendants were Logan Ryan Gandy (“Gandy”), Jamell Janese ³ (“Janese”), Erin N. Abrams (“Abrams”), and the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”)⁴ (sometimes collectively referred to as “Defendants”).

Plaintiffs’ allegations in this matter evolve from civil proceedings which were instituted by Jessica Henson (“Henson”) against Gandy in order to establish a custody arrangement for their child, T.G., born May 23, 2019. Chesson represented Henson. At that time, Henson and Chesson were in a romantic relationship.⁵

Gandy responded to Henson's petition on September 28, 2021, with the filing of a “Petition for Custody and for Immediate Temporary Ex Parte Custody and Motion to Disqualify Counsel with Request for Expedited Consideration” (“Ex Parte Petition”), seeking sole custody of T.G. Abrams represented Gandy.

Gandy's Ex Parte Petition alleged that T.G. was being exposed to dangerously inappropriate behavior while in Henson's custody. Attached to the Ex Parte Petition were sworn statements, photographs, videos, and a confidential letter from DCFS addressed to Janese, Gandy's mother. The letter stated, in relevant part: “The information you provided meets the legal and agency definition of a report of child abuse and/or neglect. An investigation will be or is being conducted in accordance with the Louisiana Children's Code and the policy of DCFS.”⁶

Abrams ⁷ responded by filing six exceptions and a motion for sanctions. In her exceptions, Abrams asserted: (1) Plaintiffs’ “petition fails to state a cause of action ․ for which the law grants any remedy[;]” (2) the Chesson law corporation “has no cause of action to assert general damages of any kind[;]” (3) Plaintiffs’ “[p]etition states no cause of action which would permit an award of attorney fees[;]” (4) the Chesson law corporation and Chesson on behalf of M.C. “have not asserted a cause of action against Abrams[;]” (5) Plaintiffs’ “petition is impermissibly vague[;]” and (6) Plaintiffs’ “petition is barred/estopped insofar as it asserts causes of action for malicious prosecution because such actions have not been dismissed in favor of Plaintiff, and in fact[,] judgments were rendered against Plaintiff Christian Chesson.” Abrams’ motion for sanctions alleged that Plaintiffs’ petition was filed to harass Abrams and the other defendants. According to Abrams, Chesson, a veteran lawyer, knew that no cause of action existed against anyone arising from the pleadings filed against him or Henson.

In response to Abrams’ exceptions, Plaintiffs maintained that their petition alleged specific facts demonstrating Abrams’ defamatory statements and malicious actions which caused them harm. Plaintiffs contended that under the broad scope of La.Civ.Code art. 2315, Abrams’ intentional acts, including defamation per se, damaged Chesson's reputation, diminished his standing in the community, and deterred others from associating with him, personally and professionally. Thus, Plaintiffs argued the Chesson law corporation has a cause of action and may recover general damages for reputational harm and economic loss caused by Abrams’ actions. Citing La.Civ.Code arts. 1957 and 1958 in support of their claims for attorney fees, Plaintiffs argued attorney fees “are allowed as damages for successful defense of claims of wrongful prosecution.” They asserted entitlement to attorney fees as damages for successfully defending claims against legal proceedings initiated by Abrams, which allegedly included: “false charges leading to [Chesson's] arrest,” a protection from abuse petition filed on behalf of Gandy against Chesson, and the complaint to DCFS by Janese. Plaintiffs next argued that the Chesson law corporation and Chesson, on behalf of M.C., have valid causes of action against Abrams under La.Civ.Code art. 2315. Plaintiffs contended Abrams’ intentional acts impaired Chesson's ability to provide financial support to M.C. through the Chesson law corporation. Thus, Plaintiffs’ argued their petition clearly stated actionable claims.

Janese originally answered Plaintiffs’ petition, denying the allegations and excepting to the petition's failure to state a cause of action or right of action against her. Eventually, Janese formally filed ten exceptions, or alternatively, a motion for summary judgment, with a motion for sanctions. Therein, Janese asserted: (1) Plaintiffs’ “petition fails to state a cause of action ․ for defamation or wrongful prosecution[;]” (2) the Chesson law corporation “does not have a cause of action to assert general damages of any kind[;]” (3) “[n]one of the plaintiffs assert a legal right or legal authority for awarding attorney fees[;]” (4) the Chesson law corporation and Chesson on behalf of M.C. “have not asserted a cause of action ․ against [her], nor can they[;]” (5) the petition sets forth “no allegation of legal right or factual cause of action ․ for the minor child of [Chesson] which entitled him to damages as a result of anything [Janese] may or may not have done[;]” (6) the Chesson law corporation has no cause of action or right of action for personal injuries, such as damages for mental anguish; (7) “there was no cause of action set forth to establish a right to any damages incurred by any of the three plaintiffs[;]” (8) “Plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action against [Janese] for wrongful prosecution[;]” (9) Plaintiffs’ “petition is vague and ambiguous ․ by reason of [Plaintiffs’] failure to set forth that the damages do or do not exceed the jury trial threshold[;]” and (10) “Plaintiffs have failed to assert a legal right to wrongful prosecution by [the Chesson law corporation] or M.C., given there is no allegation of fact that states [Janese] prosecuted any legal proceeding against either of those two plaintiffs.” Janese also moved for sanctions pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 863, asserting that Plaintiffs filed a petition knowing “the allegations were false and lacking in legal basis or factual support[.]”

Plaintiffs’ opposition to Janese's exceptions asserted that La.Civ.Code arts. 2315 and 2324 provide the grounds for their claims of a conspiracy by Defendants to cause them harm. They alleged Janese and Gandy, with the assistance of Abrams, made false complaints about Chesson, which equates to conspiracy to commit the torts of defamation and wrongful prosecution. Plaintiffs argued the Chesson law corporation and, in turn, M.C., were damaged by the wrongful conduct of Janese and her co-conspirators, which gave Chesson the right to assert the cause of action for their damages. Finally, Plaintiffs opposed the motion for sanctions, arguing sanctions are intended to be used only in exceptional circumstances and that where the slightest justification for assertion of a legal right exists, sanctions are not warranted.

After hearing arguments in two separate hearings, the trial court orally sustained the peremptory exceptions and granted the motions for sanctions filed by Abrams and Janese.⁸ On July 1, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment sustaining the exceptions of no cause of action and dismissing, with prejudice, all Plaintiffs’ claims against Abrams.⁹ On July 16, 2024, a written judgment awarding Abrams $10,975.00 for sanctions was signed by the trial court. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by judgment dated August 27, 2024.

A written Ruling on Sanctions and an Amended Ruling on Sanctions were rendered by the trial court on August 29, 2024, followed by a written judgment signed by the trial court on September 6, 2024. Therein, the trial court awarded $2,500.00 for sanctions and sustained Janese's peremptory exceptions. Plaintiffs’ appeal followed.

Abrams and Janese answered Plaintiffs’ appeal. Each seeks an increase in the sanction awards, asserting entitlement to additional attorney fees for the work necessitated by the appeal in this matter.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

A. The trial court erred in granting appellees’ exceptions of no right of action dismissing appellants’ action with prejudice and without opportunity to amend.

B. The trial court erred in granting appellees’ exceptions of no cause of action dismissing appellants’ action with prejudice and without opportunity to amend.

C. The trial court erred in granting appellees’ requests for sanctions and awarding attorney[ ] fees.

In answer to Plaintiffs’ appeal, Abrams and Janese assert the trial court ordered Plaintiffs to pay attorney fees as a sanction. Here, each seeks modification of the trial court's judgment, with each requesting an increase in the award of sanctions in the form of attorney fees for the additional work performed in the appeal of this matter.

APPELLANTS’ ARGUMENTS

Plaintiffs contend their petition alleges specific facts showing intentional torts by appellees involving false evidence and abuse of legal process; thus, they argue it was error for the trial court to sustain the peremptory exceptions and dismiss their suit against Abrams and Janese without being granted the opportunity to amend their petition under La.Code Civ.P. art. 934. Plaintiffs allege that had an amendment been permitted, they would have clarified that damages exceeded the jury trial threshold, provided additional details regarding the defamatory statements, and incorporated newly discovered evidence concerning the protective order proceeding. Thus, Plaintiffs assert that the trial court's judgments dismissing their claims should be reversed, the awards of sanctions should be vacated, and their case should be remanded for further proceedings.

APPELLEES’ POSITIONS

Abrams

Abrams contends the trial court correctly found Plaintiffs’ petition fails to state any cause of action against her. She alleges the actual facts asserted by Plaintiffs expressed negligence, not intentional torts, and she submits that the standard set forth by the supreme court in Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127, supports the trial court's decision to sustain the exceptions and dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. Abrams further argues the trial court was correct in not allowing further opportunity for amendment, as it would have been vain and useless. Finally, Abrams asserts the sanction awards were appropriate, and she argues the award should be increased for the additional work necessitated by this appeal.

Janese

Janese contends the trial court correctly found Plaintiffs have no right of action against her, and Plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action against her. She further alleges there are no allegation of facts supporting any legal right or factual cause of action by the minor child of Chesson or the Chesson law corporation which entitle them to damages as a result of anything she may or may not have done or said. Janese further argues the trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims without granting Plaintiffs’ opportunity to amend. She alleges Plaintiffs requested to amend their petition only after exceptions were raised. Janese argues that Plaintiffs had ample time to file a motion for leave of court to amend; yet, Plaintiffs have persistently defended their petition as being legally sufficient. Finally, Janese contends the trial court rightly awarded attorney fees as sanctions for Plaintiffs’ filing of a petition which contained no justification in existing law. She requests additional sanctions in the form of attorney fees for having to defend against Plaintiffs’ baseless claims once more.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

At the outset, we note that the issues presented herein concern two exceptions which are often confused or improperly combined—no right of action and no cause of action. The peremptory exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action are separate and distinct. La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(A)(5) and (6). The supreme court explained the differences between these exceptions in Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc., 05-612, 02-719, pp. 6–7 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211, 1216–17:

[O]ne of the primary differences between the exception of no right of action and no cause of action lies in the fact that the focus in an exception of no right of action is on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, while the focus in an exception of no cause of action is on whether the law provides a remedy against the particular defendant. [Indus. Cos., Inc. v. Durbin, 02-665 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1207].

The function of an exception of no right of action is a determination of whether plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the petition. La. C.C.P. art. 927; Turner v. Busby, 03-3444, p. 4 (La. 9/9/04), 883 So.2d 412, 415. The exception of no right of action serves to question whether the plaintiff in the particular case is a member of the class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Id.

In contrast, an exception of no cause of action questions whether the law extends a remedy against the defendant to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition. Industrial Cos., [837 So.2d 1207]. The exception is triable on the face of the petition and, to determine the issues raised by the exception, each well-pleaded fact in the petition must be accepted as true. Id. In reviewing a district court's ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of action, appellate courts conduct a de novo review because the exception raises a question of law and the district court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. Id. An exception of no cause of action should be granted only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief. Id. at p. 7, 837 So.2d at 1213; Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So.2d 1007, 1018 (La.1993). If the petition states a cause of action on any ground or portion of the demand, the exception should generally be overruled. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1236 (La.1993). Every reasonable interpretation must be accorded the language used in the petition in favor of maintaining its sufficiency and affording the plaintiff the opportunity of presenting evidence at trial. Industrial Cos., 837 So.2d [1207].

Cause of Action

We will first address Plaintiffs’ second assignment of error, wherein they contend the trial court erred in sustaining the exceptions of no cause of action. Both Abrams and Janese filed exceptions of no cause of action, alleging the factual allegations of Plaintiffs’ petition were insufficient to state a remedy against them.

“The function of the peremptory exception is to have the plaintiff's action declared legally nonexistent, or barred by effect of law, and hence this exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 923. The peremptory exception of no cause of action examines the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy under the facts alleged. Hayes v. Univ. Health Shreveport, 21-1601 (La. 1/7/22), 332 So.3d 1163. “A cause of action, when used in the context of the peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant.” Wederstrandt v. Kol, 22-1570, p. 4 (La. 6/27/23), 366 So.3d 47, 51.

“No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 931.

The purpose of an exception of no cause of action is to determine the sufficiency in law of the petition. The exception is triable on the face of the papers and for the purposes of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well pleaded facts must be accepted as true.

City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-690, p. 2 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 241.¹⁰ “The burden of demonstrating that no cause of action has been stated is upon the mover or exceptor.” Id. at 253.

Consequently, we conduct a de novo review because the peremptory exception of no cause of action “raises a question of law and the lower court's decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the petition.” Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, pp. 7–8 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 119. “The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiff's behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief.” Id.

At issue is whether the law extends a remedy against either Abrams or Janese under the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ petition. In this regard, we first address whether the trial court correctly answered the question: Does Plaintiffs’ petition state a valid cause of action for relief against Abrams?

Erin Abrams

Abrams argues that as an attorney, she had no duty to her client's adversary and, as such, cannot be liable to her client's adversary, even if she was negligent. Abrams points to Montalvo, 637 So.2d 127, as being supportive of her contention that even assuming the factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ petition were true for evaluating her exception of no cause of action, the actual facts alleged do not meet the standard for pursuing a claim against an opposing party's attorney. She further alleges Plaintiffs’ petition contains general conclusions which are unsupported by factual allegations.

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend Abrams incorrectly relies on Montalvo, 637 So.2d 127, to defend her exception of no cause of action. According to Plaintiffs, while Montalvo establishes that attorneys generally owe no duty to adversaries in negligence claims, “the Louisiana Supreme Court in Penalber[ v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577 (La.1989),] clearly established that an attorney can be held personally liable to a non-client for intentional tortious actions.” Plaintiffs further assert their petition alleged that Abrams “exceeded the boundaries of legitimate advocacy” in the following respects (references to the record omitted):

(a) Paragraphs four (4) through seven (7) therein detail Abrams’ intentional torts, including her use of a false DCFS report filed by a third-party witness and mother of her client Logan Ryan Gandy, Jamell[ ] Janese.

(b) The petition further references “Exhibit A,” a confidential acceptance letter to Janese that was later deemed meritless and closed on November 12, 2021[,] as “invalid” and “not justified,” demonstrating that Abrams publicized confidential information that was false.

(c) Paragraphs thirteen (13) through fourteen (14) specifically describe how Abrams orchestrated Janese's filing of a false complaint, displaying at minimum reckless disregard for truth, and how she deliberately withheld from the court that the DCFS complaint was subsequently closed.

(d) At bare minimum, the facts established that Abrams personally engineered the dissemination of confidential information obtained not from her client, but from third-party witness Janese, and crafted a petition incorporating this letter alongside fabricated evidence.

Thus, Plaintiffs argue that sufficient facts relating to Abrams’ deliberate actions, which allegedly defamed Chesson, were pleaded in their petition to maintain a cause of action. We disagree.

The paragraphs of Plaintiffs’ petition relevant to the cause of action against Abrams alleged as follows:

3.

Defendants herein maliciously and intentionally conspired to cause harm unto ․ Plaintiffs by first causing to be filed a false DCFS Complaint against your Plaintiffs; said fraudulent complaint had no basis in fact, but rather was done as a part of a concert ed [sic] effort to undermine the legitimate child custody laws and procedures of Louisiana; and sadly, their actions have worked to a certain extent/ and once the investigation was concluded, there was a finding of “unjustified and invalid.” (Exhibit A).[11]

4.

Defendants maliciously and intentionally acting “In Solido” filed multiple baseless petitions and other false complaints, not limited to Henson v. Henson, bearing docket number 2014-1060 and Henson v. Gandy, bearing docket number 2021-3824, of the 14th Judicial Family Court, ongoing and continuing actions, for the strategic and illicit purpose to gain Coercive Control over [Chesson's] Romantic Partner's minor children, to gain an illegal and unlawful advantage.

5.

On September 28, 2021, Defendants incorporated into their family court filings, a letter from DCFS, confidentially addressed to Gandy's mother, exposing her as the maker of the false DCFS complaint, since closed as “Unjustified” and “Invalid.” (Exhibit C).

6.

In his filings referenced above in paragraph 5, Gandy attached pictures of a faceless, bruised, potentially abused child, without any reference whatsoever reference to the identity of the child in the pictures, when the photos were taken, and the identity of the photographer, and then the Defendants verified in that same filing and his attached affidavit that he had “seen his child who had bruises.” It is easy to see the entire purpose of these misrepresentations to the Court, were to imply beyond words that the attached photos were Plaintiff's Romantic Partner's child, but in truth and fact, they were not. This filing of course was signed by Defendant Abrams, Logan Gandy's Attorney of record.

7.

Despite knowing that reporters of DCFS complaints regarding child abuse are highly confidential, Abram's [sic] nonetheless, in the face of all common sense, attached the confidential DCFS acceptance letter referred to in paragraph 5, as Exhibit “A,” to Gandy's September 28, 2021 filing, which resulted in a brutal change of custody across the board for many innocent people.

․

13.

Abrams, Counsel for Defendant[,] failed to exercise any reasonable due diligence in filing these pleadings and knew or should have known through a minimally reasonable investigation, that Defendants were dishonest, further imposing upon Abrams, the continued duty to bring such fraudulent misrepresentations to the Tribunals [sic] attention, regardless of negative impact and outcome of her client's case.

14.

Abrams[’] misrepresentations and suppression of the truth, made with malice and without probable cause, which acts were immaterial to the litigation, because Abrams did not have a reasonable belief in truth to the representations of fact, nor evidence attached to the pleading, undersigned by Abrams.

Plaintiffs’ claims for defamation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and fraud arise from actions allegedly taken while Abrams was acting on behalf of Gandy. In Penalber, 550 So.2d at 578 (footnote omitted), the supreme court held:

[A]n attorney can be held accountable to a non-client for intentional tortious conduct such as the knowing violation of a prohibitory statute, but no cause of action lies in favor of a non-client under theories of malpractice and negligence because the attorney owes no duty to the adversary of his client.

Recognizing that “identifying an intentional tort in the context of an attorney's actions may be more difficult than identifying a traditional intentional tort[,]” the supreme court in Montalvo, 637 So.2d at 130, explained the petition must allege facts that show “specific malice or an intent to harm on the part of the attorney in persuading his client to initiate and continue the suit.” In this matter, there are no specific factual allegations stating that Abrams persuaded Gandy to take action, i.e., file the Ex Parte Petition, or that she persuaded Janese to report abuse allegations to DCFS.

When a non-client sues his adversary's attorney, this court “has required more definite allegations to satisfy the ‘specific malice’ requirement of Montalvo, 637 So.2d at 130.” Mahfouz v. Davenport, 14-358, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/14), 149 So.3d 845, 852. For example, in Mahfouz, this court addressed a similar issue where the plaintiff sued the attorney who represented his son's mother in a domestic suit concerning child custody and support. He alleged malicious prosecution, abuse of process, wrongful collection/seizure, defamation, false light/invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The trial court sustained the attorney's exceptions of no cause of action. On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's decision with regard to the plaintiffs’ claims which concerned the attorney's alleged actions as counsel during the underlying domestic suit.¹² We reasoned:

Mr. Mahfouz's allegations are insufficient to constitute facts showing specific malice or an intent to harm Mr. Mahfouz. As in Montalvo, 637 So.2d 127, Mr. Mahfouz's petition simply alleges that Mr. Davenport made assertions to the trial court which, had Mr. Davenport apprised himself of the record and/or applicable law, he would have realized were incorrect. In addition, many of Mr. Mahfouz's allegations are conclusory and are therefore insufficient to support a cause of action.

Id. at 853.

Here, Plaintiffs contend that Abrams’ actions in representing Gandy constitute an intentional tort. Their allegations primarily focus on her filing the Ex Parte Petition on behalf of Gandy, which included a confidential letter from DCFS to Janese. According to Plaintiffs, Abrams “failed to exercise any reasonable due diligence” to determine the truth of the allegations contained in the Ex Parte Petition.

Having thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff's petition, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to constitute facts showing specific malice or an intent to harm. Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action in intentional tort against Abrams. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment which sustained the peremptory exceptions of no cause of action in favor of Abrams.

Plaintiffs also argue the trial court erred in denying leave to amend their petition. Under La.Code Civ.P. art. 934:

When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. If the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, or if the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed.

“The right to amend is not absolute[;]” the trial court has discretion as to whether to permit amendment of the petition after sustaining an exception of no cause of action. Deal v. Haney, 14-1232, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/25/14), 158 So.3d 35, 39 (quoting Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Jeffers, 573 So.2d 1262, 1265 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1991). “[L]eave to amend is not required when it would constitute ‘a vain and useless act.’ ” Id. at 39 (quoting Broussard v. F.A. Richard & Assocs., Inc., 99-010, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/99), 740 So.2d 156, 160).

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion. While the question before us is whether the petition states a cause of action against Abrams, we are justified in searching the record to determine if the trial judge might have abused his discretion in finding that the cause-of-action objection was not curable. See Broussard, 740 So.2d 156. There is nothing in the record to suggest specific malice or an intent to harm sufficient to state a cause of action against Abrams. Under the circumstances, the amendment would be vain and useless.

Jamell Janese

Next, we examine Plaintiffs’ allegations against Janese. In doing so, we address whether the trial court correctly answered the question: Does Plaintiffs’ petition state a valid cause of action for relief against Janese?

Aside from being listed as a defendant herein, only paragraph five of Plaintiffs’ petition specifically references Janese, stating: “On September 28, 2021, Defendants incorporated into their family court filings, a letter from DCFS, confidentially addressed to Gandy's mother, exposing her as the maker of the false DCFS complaint, since closed as ‘Unjustified’ and ‘Invalid.’ (Exhibit C).” Other than identifying Janese as the individual who communicated abuse allegations to DCFS, Plaintiffs’ petition simply alleges Janese was part of a conspiracy, with Gandy and Abrams, to defame Chesson.

As explained by this court in Kahn v. Jones, 95-259, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95), 664 So.2d 700, 704–05:

To withstand an exception of no cause of action, the petition must set forth the ultimate material facts on which the cause of action is based. It is insufficient for a petition to simply state factual conclusions without setting forth the facts which support the conclusions. Consequently, any allegations which are no more than factual conclusions shall be disregarded. Saxena v. Saxena, 518 So.2d 1098 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1987); Delta Bank & Trust Co. v. Lassiter, 383 So.2d 330 (La.1980).

With respect to Plaintiffs’ allegations against Janese, we agree with the trial court that the allegations fail to set forth a cause of action under the facts presented in the petition. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's judgment sustaining the exception of no cause of action in favor of Janese.

Right of Action

In their first assignment of error, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in sustaining the exceptions of no right of action. However, as the exception of no right of action was filed by Janese, the judgment was rendered in her favor alone.

Janese argues Plaintiffs’ petition presented conclusory claims of defamation with no specific facts alleged, wrongful prosecution with no favorable judicial proceeding ruling, and conspiracy and fraud, without any allegation that Janese used any judicial process against any of the three plaintiffs.

The peremptory exception of no right of action tests whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the suit. La.Code Civ.P. art. 927; Badeaux, 927 So.2d 1211. Appellate review of a trial court's decision on an exception of no right of action is typically de novo because the peremptory exception of no right of action raises a question of law. Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. Turner Indus. Grp., LLC, 19-403 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/18/20), 297 So.3d 797, writ denied, 20-774 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 319. However, when evidence is introduced to support or oppose the exception of no right of action, we review a trial court's findings of fact under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. Id.

Here, the issue is whether the trial court correctly answered the question: Do Plaintiffs have a right to bring their suit against Janese? Plaintiffs allege defamation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and fraud. Their allegations stem from Janese's complaint to DCFS, accusing Henson of exposing T.G. to dangerous behavior, which resulted in Abrams filing the Ex Parte Petition on behalf of Gandy. Henson's relationship with Chesson was part of the complaint Janese communicated to DCFS. Plaintiffs’ allege Janese's complaint to DCFS was proved false, but not before Gandy's Ex Parte Petition was filed against Henson nor before Gandy filed petitions for protection from abuse against Chesson.

Janese argues Plaintiffs have not alleged that any judicial proceeding took place with regard to the DCFS investigation; there was no allegation that Janese made any accusations about Chesson in her request for an investigation by DCFS. Janese further contends Plaintiffs’ lawsuit arises out of prior litigation involving Gandy and Henson. None of the three Plaintiffs were a party to the child custody matter, and neither was Janese—she is Gandy's mother and T.G.’s grandmother. Chesson was merely the boyfriend of Henson. The Ex Parte Petition, filed in the child custody proceeding, was between Henson and Gandy. Furthermore, Janese, the Chesson law corporation, and M.C. were not parties to Gandy's petition for protection from abuse against Chesson. Thus, Janese asserts no right of action exists for Plaintiffs’ action for defamation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and fraud. We agree.

Though a petition for protection from abuse evolved from the child custody proceeding, Janese did not institute any proceeding. She was a witness in the underlying litigation between Gandy and Henson and, presumably, between Gandy and Chesson. The letter from DCFS to Henson acknowledges her report was received, and an investigation was opened. Accusations made by Janese concerned Henson's behavior and its effect on T.G. Plaintiffs do not belong to the class of persons that have a right of action in the subject matter—defamation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and fraud—of the litigation at issue.

In light of these facts and as the objection of no right of action cannot be removed by amendment of the petition, we find no error in the trial court's judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ action without providing an opportunity to amend.

Sanctions

In their third and final assignment of error, Plaintiffs argue that sanctions were erroneously imposed by the trial court. Plaintiffs contend their petition is factual, supported by law, and was not filed for any improper purpose. Pointing to Dauzat v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. of Kansas, 95-1235, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/96), 670 So.2d 785, 791 (quoting Murphy v. Boeing Petroleum Services, Inc., 600 So.2d 823, 827 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1992), Plaintiffs emphasize: “The slightest justification for the exercise of legal right precludes sanctions.”

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 863(B)(1) authorizes the imposition of sanctions if a finding is made that the pleading is “being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” To avoid sanctions under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(B)(2), the pleading must be “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivilous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” See also La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(D).

A trial court's judgment awarding sanctions under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 is reviewed on appeal for manifest error; the determination of the type and amount of sanctions is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Acosta v. B&B Oilfield Servs., Inc., 12-122 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 91 So.3d 1263.

In Lavespere v. Brasher, 96-190, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/96), 688 So.2d 1166, 1170, this court explained:

[Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure] Article 863 applies to the certification of pleadings, motions and other papers. It imposes a personal, nondelegable duty upon the signing attorney to make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law; thereby, satisfying himself, upon application of his own judgment, that the pleading is factually and legally responsible. Subjective good faith will not satisfy the duty of reasonable inquiry.

In reaching its conclusion to award sanctions, the trial court wrote:

The allegations set forth in the petition lack evidentiary support, nor are they warranted by existing law. Specifically, there is no evidentiary basis or reasonable basis of fact or law as to the alleged defamatory statements made by the defendant or as to the claim for wrongful prosecution.

[Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article] 863 mandates a sanction for violations upon the person who made the certification or the represented party, or both. Mr. Chesson, himself an attorney, verified the petition, filed pleadings in this case and appeared as counsel at this most recent hearing and in a prior hearing.

In the end, our review of the record supports the trial court's finding that Plaintiffs’ petition lacked evidentiary support and was not well grounded in law. We find no clear error in the trial court's determination that Plaintiffs’ petition was presented for an improper purpose. Thus, the sanction awards are affirmed.

ANSWERS TO APPEAL

Abrams and Janese answered the appeal and requested an additional award of sanctions for having to respond to Plaintiffs’ appeal. Under La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164, “The court may award damages, including attorney fees, for frivolous appeal or application for writs, and may tax the costs of the lower court or appellate court, or any part thereof, against any party to the suit, as in its judgment may be considered equitable.”

In Lavespere, 688 So.2d at 1170, this court held that an increase in attorney fees is warranted “when: 1) the appellant appeals but obtains no relief; 2) the appeal requires more work from the appellee; and 3) the appellee requests such an increase in accordance with proper appellate procedure.” See also George v. M&G Testing & Servs., Inc., 95-31 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/19/95), 663 So.2d 79, writ denied, 96-39 (La. 3/8/96), 669 So.2d 403.

Plaintiffs have unquestionably obtained no appellate relief; moreover, the increase requests by Abrams and Janese are procedurally appropriate. Accordingly, our review of the additional work necessitated by this appeal reveals that an additional $2,500.00 attorney fee award to each is warranted.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, the judgments dismissing Plaintiffs’ actions against Erin N. Abrams and Jamell Janese are affirmed. Plaintiffs/Appellants, Christian D. Chesson, PLC, a domestic professional law corporation, and Christian Chesson, individually and on behalf of his minor child, M.C., are ordered to pay an additional $2,500.00 apiece to Erin Abrams and Jamell Janese, as well as all costs of this appeal.

AFFIRMED AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Initials are used to protect the identity of minors.

2.   This suit was originally filed in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. In December 2023, it was transferred to the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, pursuant to a motion to transfer for forum non conveniens filed by Defendant, Erin Abrams. See Chesson v. Gandy, 23-818 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/31/23) (unpublished writ opinion) (2023 WL 7167769).

3.   Misspelled “Jamelle Janise” in Plaintiffs’ petition.

4.   DCFS was dismissed from these proceedings after successfully urging a declinatory exception of insufficiency of service of process.

5.   Henson is identified as Chesson's “Romantic Partner” in Plaintiffs’ petition.

6.   In addition, the letter referred to “child[ren] with the initials T.G., H.H. and T.H.”

7.   In this lawsuit, all responsive pleadings attributed to Abrams were filed through her counsel and were not filed by Abrams as counsel for Gandy. In fact, no responsive pleading from Gandy appears in this record.

8.   A hearing on Abrams’ exceptions and motion was held on June 4, 2024. Due to improper notice, the hearing on Janese's exceptions and motion was reset and held on August 27, 2024.

9.   Though it orally granted the motions for sanctions, the trial court allowed post-trial briefing before establishing the awards.

10.   Evidence admitted without objection in the trial court may be viewed as an enlargement of the pleadings and considered as such. Sterling v. Jones, 255 La. 842, 233 So.2d 537 (1970); Touro Infirmary v. Am. Mar. Officer, 09-0697 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/9/09), 24 So.3d 948; Teague v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 06-1266 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/7/09), 10 So.3d 806, writ denied, 09-1030 (La. 6/17/09), 10 So.3d 722.

11.   Though Plaintiffs’ petition references two exhibits, none appear with the petition in this record. These exhibits do, however, appear in the record as attachments to the memorandum in support of the exception and motion for sanctions filed by Abrams, which were admitted without objection in the trial court at the June 4, 2024 hearing.

12.   This court reversed the trial court's decision to sustain the exception of no cause of action as to the plaintiff's defamation claim that allegedly arose from conduct unrelated to the defendant attorney's legal representation.

PERRY, Judge.