GULF STATES CONTRACTORS v. DAVIE SHORING INC (2025)

Defendants, Davie Shoring, Inc. and Warren Davie, appeal an amended final judgment finding them liable for damages plus interest, costs, and attorney fees, to plaintiff, Gulf States Contractors, L.L.C., based on breach of contract and negligence claims. Plaintiff answered the appeal, seeking an increase in the award of attorney fees and costs, as well as an award of additional attorney fees for defending the appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We further grant the answer to the appeal in part and deny in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Gulf States Contractors, L.L.C. (“Gulf States”) is a general residential construction contractor licensed in Louisiana. In 2013, the owner of Gulf States, Christopher Jean, entered into contracts with numerous homeowners through a federal program known as the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (“the program”) for the purpose of elevating homes located in areas designated for flood protection assistance.¹ Under the program, homeowners could enter into written contracts with qualified contractors in order to elevate their homes using federal funds administered through the program. With the help of James Davidson, an independent project manager with program experience, Gulf States entered into nine written subcontracts with an experienced home elevation contractor, Davie Shoring, Inc. (“Davie Shoring”), owned by Warren Davie. In lieu of a bond, which was required by all program contracts, Mr. Davie signed a personal guarantee for each subcontract. Mr. Davidson managed a total of sixty-nine program homes for Gulf States, but only nine of those homes were subcontracted with Davie Shoring. The subcontracts between Gulf States and Davie Shoring were referenced by street names: Olive, Avery, Deanne, Chamale, Catawba, Cypress, Jolivette, Kenneth, and Killington.

Prior to the start of any subcontract work, a meeting between Mr. Jean, Mr. Davidson, and Mr. Davie took place at Mr. Jean's office. All three men verbally agreed that the subcontracts were to be completed on a “turnkey” basis, which was not actually defined in the written subcontracts. Mr. Davidson oversaw all phases of managing the subcontracts from finding eligible houses, negotiating reasonable costs and profit margins for Gulf States, to communicating and coordinating progress and payments between Gulf States and Davie Shoring. Initially, Gulf States would receive an agreed upon price for each of the qualified homes in the program. Gulf States had a written contract with each homeowner. Gulf States retained the funds for payment as work progressed and it kept a portion as profit. The program outlined a payment schedule for the price set in each of the nine subcontracts: (1) 60% upfront paid by Gulf States to Davie Shoring to start the work; (2) 30% paid by Gulf States to Davie Shoring at a specified milestone in the elevation process known as “completion of block;” and (3) 10% paid by Gulf States to Davie Shoring at final completion of each home as accepted by the program within a set timeframe.

As the 60% upfront payments for each house were distributed to Davie Shoring and the elevation work began, the relationship between Gulf States and Davie Shoring began to rapidly deteriorate. Mr. Jean and Mr. Davie had differing views as to the scope of work required by a “turnkey” subcontract. Mr. Jean thought that Davie Shoring would work on the nine elevation projects from “start to finish” without any responsibility on the part of Gulf States. Mr. Davidson believed that the nine subcontracts were meant to be turnkey, with “nothing left out,” at a set price no matter what obstacles came up. Mr. Davie thought that the scope of work did not include any interior work or repairs made necessary by the elevations, but instead focused on proper permitting, foundation preparation, house elevation, and certification of completion from the program.

By December 2013, Davie Shoring considered all work to be complete on eight of the nine subcontracts. The Olive Street house was not complete at that time, because Mr. Davie claimed he was waiting on revised engineering plans, even though Mr. Davidson had already given the plans to Mr. Davie, and Mr. Davie was unwilling to take on the extra work outside the original plans due to an increase in time, effort, and cost on his part. Mr. Jean disagreed with Mr. Davie's position, and maintained that once the upfront payment was made, Davie Shoring was required to do the extra repair work required at each house for the original subcontract price despite any increase in cost.

When Mr. Jean learned that the subcontract work on the Olive Street house was not in compliance with the program requirements, he discovered an overall pattern of what he considered incomplete work on all of the program houses. Mr. Jean discovered that Mr. Davidson and Mr. Davie were apparently working against him. Mr. Davidson and Mr. Davie actually quit working on the nine houses subcontracted by Gulf States. Mr. Davie was paying cash to Mr. Davidson for him to back-charge Gulf States for materials and expenses that were Davie Shoring's responsibility. Mr. Davie also requested that Mr. Davidson get final payments approved on houses that were not actually completed per program guidelines. Because of the dispute between Davie Shoring and Gulf States on all nine subcontracts, Mr. Jean felt compelled to hire other subcontractors to finish the homeowners’ punch lists and repair items damaged during the elevation of each house.

In January 2014, Gulf States filed a petition for damages, including attorney fees, against Davie Shoring, alleging that Davie Shoring had breached the Olive Street subcontract by failing to timely commence, perform, and fulfill its subcontractor obligations. In August 2014, Gulf States amended its petition to add Mr. Davie and Mr. Davidson as defendants and to include breach of contract claims, negligent performance claims, and collusion claims on all nine of the subcontracts.² Gulf States asserted that Mr. Davidson had breached his fiduciary duties to Gulf States by mismanaging the subcontracts with Davie Shoring, which caused Gulf States damages. Gulf States further set forth allegations which essentially contend that Mr. Davidson had intentionally colluded with Mr. Davie to obtain progression payments from Gulf States when work was not completed by Davie Shoring or had been negligently performed by Davie Shoring. In the prayer of the first amended and supplemental petition, Gulf States sought damages against Davie Shoring, Mr. Davie, and Mr. Davidson, “jointly, severally and/or in solido[.]”

Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie filed an answer generally denying all allegations. Mr. Davidson, however, did not answer or otherwise oppose the petition. As a result, Gulf States obtained a default judgment in the amount of $943,214.17 solely against Mr. Davidson on June 21, 2018. That judgment was neither contested nor appealed, and is now a final judgment. Gulf States’ remaining claims against Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie for breach of contract, negligent performance, reimbursement of construction costs, penalties, and attorney fees progressed to a bench trial in October 2023.

At the end of a three-day trial, where Mr. Davie, Mr. Jean, and Mr. Davidson testified, the trial court ruled in favor of Gulf States and against Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie, finding the testimony of Mr. Jean and Mr. Davidson to be more credible than Mr. Davie's testimony. Mr. Davidson admitted that he acted contrary to Gulf States’ best interests, that he and Davie Shoring intentionally stopped working on the subcontracts, that he accepted cash payments from Mr. Davie, and that Mr. Davie believed Davie Shoring was due more money for the increased scope of work required to finish the jobs. The trial court's December 6, 2023 judgment awarded damages to Gulf States totaling $144,975.42, plus judicial interest and costs on all nine subcontracts, but denied the request for attorney fees. Gulf States filed a limited motion for new trial on the issue of attorney fees. The trial court granted the new trial and, after a hearing, rendered an amended final judgment on July 9, 2024, against Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie, awarding Gulf States the same amount of total damages, plus $3,000.00 in costs, and $23,869.27 for attorney fees.

Pursuant to an Interim Order issued by this court on July 7, 2025, the trial court rendered a second amended final judgment on July 24, 2025, to further clarify that the entire judgment was rendered in favor of Gulf States and against both Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie. That judgment was filed into the appellate record on July 29, 2025. After review, we find that the second amended final judgment is sufficiently definite as to the parties and it constitutes a final appealable judgment. See Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Company, Inc., 2017-1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/10/18), 268 So.3d 1044, 1046 (en banc).

Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie suspensively appealed. They raise three assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in holding them liable for reimbursement of expenses that were previously determined to be owed solely by co-defendant, Mr. Davidson; (2) the trial court erred in holding them liable for expenses for which they were not responsible under the subcontracts; and (3) the trial court erred in awarding Gulf States attorney fees and costs. Gulf States filed an answer to the appeal, seeking an increase in the attorney fees and costs awards and additional attorney fees for work on this appeal.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The trial court awarded a total of $144,975.42 to Gulf States for damages arising out of Davie Shoring's breach of the nine subcontracts. The judgment outlined the specific amounts owed for expenses paid by Gulf States to completely finish each of the nine home elevation projects in accordance with program requirements. Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie question the scope of the work required by the subcontracts that resulted in the damage award. They maintain that they are not responsible for the damages because Mr. Davidson was already cast in judgment for the same damages and the subcontracts did not specify their responsibility for those damages or for costs and attorney fees.

When the words of contracts are clear and unambiguous, issues pertaining to the proper interpretation of contracts involve questions of law. Strachan v. Eichin, 2015-1431 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/15/16), 195 So.3d 61, 64. An appellate court reviews questions of law utilizing a de novo standard of review, and renders judgment on the record, without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court. Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 2011-0084 (La. 10/25/11), 74 So.3d 1159, 1168. However, where factual findings are pertinent to the interpretation of a contract, an appellate court applies a manifest error standard of review. Lonesome Development, LLC v. Town of Abita Springs, 2021-1463 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/29/22), 343 So.3d 831, 839, writ denied, 2022-01158 (La. 11/1/22), 349 So.3d 3.

Assignment of Error #1 -

Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie argue that the trial court erred in holding them liable for the same expenses on the nine subcontracts that were previously awarded solely against Mr. Davidson in the 2018 default judgment. The default judgment was rendered against Mr. Davidson and in favor of Gulf States for a total damage award of $943,214.17, without reference to any other defendant or specific amounts attached to particular projects. Further, the default judgment did not dismiss any party nor award any attorney fees. A judgment of default against one defendant, not appealed from, is a final judgment. See Ross and Wallace Paper Products, Inc. v. Team Logistics, Inc., 2019-0196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/8/20), 308 So.3d 346, 350 n.2, writ denied, 2020-00989 (La. 11/4/20), 303 So.3d 641; Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Edwards, 2017-214 (La. App. 5th Cir. 11/15/17), 232 So.3d 688, 696. Once final and definitive, a default judgment precludes the named defendant from contesting liability and damages based upon the prima facie evidence presented for confirmation. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. C.E. Albert Const. Co., Inc., 98-1831 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/31/99), 731 So.2d 968, 972. Thus, while Mr. Davidson can no longer contest liability and damages, his failure to appear and answer does not necessarily constitute a legal finding of fault and causation that is binding on the other defendants, Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie.

At trial, Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie had the opportunity to fully litigate the issues of their liability and damages. The trial court found that Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie were liable to Gulf States for $144,975.42 for damages arising out of their breach of the nine subcontracts. That judgment makes no mention of Mr. Davidson or his liability, which is legally correct since the default judgment against Mr. Davidson is final and no court has the authority to modify, revise, or reverse it at this point. See Tolis v. Board of Sup'rs of Louisiana State University, 95-1529 (La. 10/16/95), 660 So.2d 1206, 1206-1207 (per curiam). All of the defendants remained in the lawsuit at the time of trial.

Gulf States was not precluded from pursuing a separate judgment for damages against Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie on the nine subcontracts, despite the previously rendered default judgment against Mr. Davidson for some of the same damages. See Frank's Door & Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Double H. Const. Co., Inc., 459 So.2d 1273, 1277 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). There was no evidence that Mr. Davidson had paid any of the damages after the default judgment was rendered against him. Proof of extinguishment of the obligation on the nine subcontracts was the burden of Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie, because, as explained below, all of the defendants are solidary obligors. See La. Civ. Code art. 1794 (a performance rendered by one of the solidary obligors relieves the others of liability toward the obligee), and La. Civ. Code art. 1795 (unless the obligation is extinguished, an obligee may institute action against any of his solidary obligors even after institution of action against another solidary obligor). See also Amsouth Bank v. Sessions, 2009-504 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2/9/10), 34 So.3d 342, 344, writ denied, 2010-0531 (La. 5/7/10), 34 So.3d 862. This allows for the possibility of separate judgments. Id.

Each of the defendants had separate obligations to perform separate acts. Davie Shoring was contractually bound to Gulf States to completely perform the home elevations in a workmanlike manner as provided in each written subcontract. Mr. Davie was contractually bound to Gulf States as a personal guarantor on the nine subcontracts. Mr. Davidson was contractually bound to Gulf States by a verbal agreement to act as a project manager on each of the nine subcontracts with Davie Shoring as well as the other subcontracts he managed for Gulf States. Each party promised or was obligated separately to perform distinct acts. The obligations were several in that regard. See La. Civ. Code art. 1787; Standard Roofing Co. of New Orleans v. Elliot Const. Co., Inc., 535 So.2d 870, 881-882 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writs denied, 537 So.2d 1166, 1167 (La. 1989). There was no solidary obligation for the performance of the separate obligations. Id. at 882.

However, the obligation to pay damages to Gulf States for the breach of their respective contracts and duties is what is at issue here. All three defendants’ actions combined and contributed to cause the same items of damages on the nine subcontracts between Gulf States and Davie Shoring. Thus, all of the defendants are solidarily liable for the damages on the nine subcontracts. It does not matter that the respective obligations to pay the damages arise from an offense or quasi-offense or from a contract, or both. All of the elements of an obligation in solido are met. See Id. See also Town of Winnsboro v. Barnard & Burk, Inc., 294 So.2d 867, 885 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writs denied, 295 So.2d 445 (La. 1974). It is the co-extensiveness of the obligations for the same debt, and not the source of liability, that determines the solidarity of the obligation. Bellard v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 2007-1335 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So.2d 654, 665.

Gulf States’ first supplemental and amending petition for damages specifically prayed for judgment against Davie Shoring, Mr. Davie, and Mr. Davidson, jointly, severally, and/or in solido. The trial court orally ruled that the obligations were definitely solidary, but the judgment is silent as to solidarity. The need for an express statement of solidarity was unnecessary, however, because it is provided by operation of law. The defendants’ respective breaches of their contractual obligations combined and contributed to cause the same damages sustained by Gulf States. The defendants are all obliged to pay the same compensatory damages, and each may be compelled for the whole of the damages on the nine subcontracts. Payment by one would exonerate the other toward Gulf States. The jurisprudence recognizes that solidary obligations may result even though the parties are bound under separate contracts and even though one party may be bound under contract and the other through some other basis of law. Town of Winnsboro, 294 So.2d at 886.

In determining that the defendants were solidarily liable, the trial court specifically determined that the testimony of Mr. Jean and Mr. Davidson was more credible than the testimony of Mr. Davie. Where factual findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the trial court's findings demand great deference and are virtually never manifestly erroneous nor clearly wrong. Boudreaux v. Jeff, 2003-1932 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/17/04), 884 So.2d 665, 671. In our view, this case hinges on credibility, and the lack of it. From the oral reasons of the trial court, it is clear that the trial court listened carefully to the testimony of all of the witnesses, examined the voluminous documentary evidence, compared the testimony to the documents, noted inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony and documents, and evaluated the believability of the circumstances described by the parties. When an action is performed intentionally with the assistance of a co-conspirator, as was done by Mr. Davidson, Davie Shoring, and Mr. Davie, all are solidarily liable for the damage caused by their actions. See La. Civ. Code art. 2324(A) (he who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage cause by such act). See also Boudreaux, 884 So.2d at 673-674. Moreover, payment by one obligor for the damages owed on the nine subcontracts will remit the debt of the other obligors; thus, there is no possibility of double recovery for Gulf States on those nine subcontracts. See Boudreaux, 884 So.2d at 674.

For all of these reasons, we find no merit to Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie's first assignment of error.

Assignment of Error #2 -

Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie argue that the subcontracts did not provide that they would be responsible for the extra expenses claimed by Gulf States for finishing each project and, therefore, the trial court erred in ordering them to pay those expenses. The measure of damages for a breach of contract is the sum that will place the plaintiff in the same position as if the obligation had been fulfilled. Kelly McHugh and Associates, Inc. v. RPDE Development, LLC, 2019-0709 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/5/20), 300 So.3d 417, 425. See also La. Civ. Code art. 1995 (providing that the measurement of damages for a breach of contract includes the loss sustained by the obligee and the profit of which he has been deprived).

Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and must be performed in good faith. La. Civ. Code art. 1983. Courts are obligated to give legal effect to contracts according to the common intent of the parties. La. Civ. Code art. 2045. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La. Civ. Code art. 2046. Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. Civ. Code art. 2050. Parol or extrinsic evidence is generally inadmissible to vary the terms of a written contract unless the written expression of the common intention of the parties is ambiguous. Country Club of Louisiana Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Baton Rouge Water Works Company, 2019-1373 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/17/20), 311 So.3d 395, 399. The determination of whether a contract is clear or ambiguous is a question of law. Id. A contract is considered ambiguous on the issue of intent when either it lacks a provision bearing on that issue, its terms are susceptible to more than one interpretation, there is uncertainty or ambiguity as to its provisions, or the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the language employed. Id.

A contract may be modified by mutual consent. While modification can be presumed by silence, inaction, or implication, one party may not change the terms unilaterally. Cajun Constructors, Inc. v. Fleming Const. Co., Inc., 2005-2003 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/15/06), 951 So.2d 208, 214, writ denied, 2007-0420 (La. 4/5/07), 954 So.2d 146. Written contracts for construction may be modified by oral contracts and by the conduct of the parties, even when the written contract contains a provision that a party is liable only if the change orders are in writing. Id. Further, the party asserting modification of a contract must prove by a preponderance of the evidence facts or acts giving rise to the modification. Id.

With these rules of contract interpretation in mind, we review the pertinent provisions of the subcontracts between Gulf States and Davie Shoring. The primary dispute between the parties is over the scope of the work required by Davie Shoring. Three of the nine subcontracts actually contain, but do not define, the term “turn key” as follows: “Davie [Shoring] agrees to do this job turnkey.” Seven of the nine subcontracts contain the phrase that Davie Shoring will “complete the project in full” with exceptions for “minor punch out items not related to your scope” or for “all associated lists ․ attached to contract.” Two of the nine subcontracts contain very specific items for Davie Shoring to complete such as “excavation around home,” “disconnect and [reconnect] of utilities,” “replace flat work and steps and decks,” “provide trash and bathroom facilities for work crew,” “clean-up and leave area level.” Because the scope of work in the subcontracts is subject to more than one interpretation and the intent of the parties cannot be determined from the language, the scope of work is ambiguous. Therefore, it is necessary to use parol evidence to determine the parties’ common intent.

The trial testimony of Mr. Jean, Mr. Davie, and Mr. Davidson clearly established that the parties discussed that all of the subcontracts would be “turnkey” projects, but there obviously was not a mutual understanding as to what the term “turnkey” meant. Mr. Jean testified that Mr. Davidson informed him that Mr. Davie would do the subcontracts on a turnkey basis, meaning Davie Shoring was required to do whatever the program required from “start to finish” and Gulf States was not responsible for any construction related expenses, including common repair work necessitated by the elevations of the houses, and providing ten-year warranties and permits as required by the program. Mr. Davidson, as an independent project manager, testified that the subcontracts were “absolutely supposed to be turnkey,” which meant “start to finish” with “[n]othing left out.” He further stated that everyone agreed verbally that the projects were turnkey and they all understood what it meant to finish a turnkey project no matter what obstacles occurred, including permits, plans, repairs after the house lift, cleaning, and ten-year warranties. Mr. Davie agreed that turnkey meant that he was to have the house ready for certificate of completion or occupancy, but he expected Gulf States to be responsible for surveys, bonding, certificates, engineering, warranties, and interior work for minor cosmetic repairs after the house lifts, such as new sheetrock, painting, and caulking.

The trial court made credibility determinations after listening to the testimony and found Mr. Jean and Mr. Davidson to be more credible than Mr. Davie, because Mr. Davie's testimony had too many contradictions. As such, the common intent of the parties according to Mr. Jean and Mr. Davidson was that Davie Shoring was obligated by a verbal agreement to complete each turnkey subcontract project in full and according to the program requirements. As an appellate court, we will not disturb the trial court's reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact where there is conflict in the testimony. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989).

After finding that Davie Shoring had breached the subcontracts by not completing the projects in full, the trial court relied on Paragraph 10 in each of the nine subcontracts to support the damage award. Paragraph 10 provides, in pertinent part:

Should [Davie Shoring] at any time ․ cause interference or delay to the project, or abandon the work or fail in any respect to prosecute the work ․ or fail in the performance of any of the covenants and agreements herein contained, ․ [Gulf States] may attempt to remedy the default by whatever means [Gulf States] deems necessary, including the supplementing of [Davie Shoring's] labor force, as well as the correction and/or completion of the work by itself or through others ․ and deducting the costs thereof ․ from any money then due ․ to [Davie Shoring.]

We have reviewed the entire record alongside the detailed list of expenses outlined by the trial court as incurred by Gulf States at each of the nine homes covered by the turnkey subcontracts. We find no manifest error in the total damage award of $144,975.42 against Davie Shoring and also against Mr. Davie, as personal guarantor. There is a reasonable factual basis for the damages awarded for each of the subcontracts.

Consequently, we find no merit to Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie's second assignment of error.

Assignment of Error #3 -

Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie argue that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs to Gulf States. Attorney fees are not allowed in an action for breach of contract unless there is a specific provision in the contract. Maloney v. Oak Builders, Inc., 235 So.2d 386, 390 (La. 1970). Paragraph 23 in each of the subcontracts, except for the Cypress Street subcontract, provides for reasonable attorney fees and costs to be paid by Davie Shoring and by Mr. Davie (as guarantor), in solido, to Gulf States in the event that Gulf States employed an attorney to enforce any provisions of the subcontracts and prevailed on any of the matters in dispute. In their brief, Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie simply argue that the attorney fees award should be overturned in the event that the damage award was reversed by this court. Since we have determined that the damage award should be upheld, there is no reason to overturn the attorney fee award, which is clearly permissible under each of the subcontracts, with the exception of the Cypress Street subcontract. Additionally, we note that the trial court properly granted Gulf States’ limited motion for new trial to consider Gulf States’ request for attorney fees and costs at a contradictory hearing. Thus, the substantive amendment of the judgment to award attorney fees and costs in addition to damages was within the trial court's discretion and in accordance with proper procedure. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1971.

We find no merit to Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie's third assignment of error.

ANSWER TO APPEAL

In the July 9, 2024 amended final judgment, the trial court ordered Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie to pay Gulf States $23,869.27 for attorney fees. Gulf States filed an answer to Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie's appeal, seeking an increase in the amount awarded to $44,305.19 as evidenced by a ledger of invoiced amounts attached to Gulf States’ limited motion for new trial.³ The evidence of the amount of attorney fees was not, however, introduced at the contradictory hearing on March 20, 2024. Nevertheless, the trial court has the discretion to determine the value of legal services without evidence of such. See Gulf Wide Towing, Inc. v. F.E. Wright (U.K.) Ltd., 554 So.2d 1347, 1354-1355 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Ashley v. Weicker, 522 So.2d 172, 174 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988). There is no requirement that the trial court hear evidence concerning time spent or the hourly rates charged since the record will reflect much of the services rendered. Naquin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 2005-2104 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/17/06), 951 So.2d 228, 232, writ denied, 2006-2979 (La. 3/9/07), 949 So.2d 441. The trial court is also allowed to call upon its own experience and expertise in the valuation of legal services rendered. Id.

At the hearing, the trial court looked at the ledgers and determined that a reasonable award for attorney fees was $23,869.27. A trial court has much discretion in fixing attorney fees, and its award will not be modified on appeal, absent an abuse of discretion. J. Ray McDermott, Inc. v. Morrison, 96-2685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/7/97), 702 So.2d 364, 367, writs denied, 97-3061, 97-3063 (La. 2/13/98), 709 So.2d 754. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the $23,869.27 award for attorney fees is a reasonable amount given the complexity of the case, the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, the amount of the damage award, and the ultimate result obtained for Gulf States. We cannot say that the trial court's failure to award more than this amount was an abuse of discretion. The trial court was in the best position to observe and evaluate the attorneys’ work. See Naquin, 951 So.2d at 232. Thus, we decline to increase the amounts of attorney fees and costs awarded by the trial court.

Gulf States also requests an additional award of $22,680.00 for attorney fees associated with defending this appeal. When the trial court awards attorney fees to a party, and the party is then forced to and successfully defends an appeal, it is appropriate for the appellate court to reasonably increase the amount of the awarded attorney fees to keep the appellate judgment consistent with the underlying judgment. Millican v. Wade, 2023-1050 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/23/24), 384 So.3d 1011,1017. An appellate court has discretion to award or increase attorney fees for defending an appeal based on factors such as the attorney's skill and the amount of time and work reflected in the appeal. Id. Based on these factors and our review of the appeal, we conclude Gulf States is entitled to an additional award of attorney fees for successfully defending this appeal and find that $5,000.00 is a reasonable amount.

CONCLUSION

For the outlined reasons, the second amended final judgment, dated July 24, 2025, is affirmed. Gulf States Contractors, L.L.C.’s answer to appeal is denied in part and granted in part, and Davie Shoring, Inc. and Warren Davie are ordered to pay $5,000.00 in additional attorney fees to Gulf States Contractors, L.L.C. for work performed in connection with this appeal. We assess all costs of this appeal to defendants, Davie Shoring, Inc. and Warren Davie.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART.

I respectfully disagree in part with the majority opinion, because I think it inadequately addresses the issues raised by Davie Shoring, Inc. and Warren Davie in their assignment of error number two.

To clarify, I think the majority correctly holds that the trial court did not manifestly err in finding Mr. Jean and Mr. Davidson more credible than Mr. Davie and that the common intent of the parties was that David Shoring “was obligated by a verbal agreement to complete each turnkey subcontract project in full and according to program requirements.” However, the majority opinion does not specify what the “program requirements” are and does not discuss how GSC carried its burden of proving that all of the work it hired others to perform after Davie Shoring withdrew was within the scope of the turnkey subcontracts.

At a minimum, I think the opinion inadequately addresses Davie Shoring and Mr. Davie's challenge to the trial court's award of damages for:

(1) work GSC had done at 9236 Olive Street after Davie Shoring withdrew from the project;

(2) work GSC had done by unlicensed contractors, K&H Construction, LLC and American Builders, LLC;

(3) ten-year warranties when Davie Shoring's subcontracts with GSC only required one-year warranties;

(4) work expressly excluded from GSC's contracts with homeowners;

(5) itemized expenses listed on page 26-27 of Appellants’ brief; and

(6) work GSC had done at 7128 Deanne Street, when GSC's claim for this property was alleged based on negligence and when Davie Shoring allegedly complied with the plans GSC provided.

Without this discussion, and/or reference to specific “program requirements” showing the challenged items are reasonably included in the turnkey subcontracts, I am unable to determine whether GSC met its burden of proving its damages and whether the trial court had a reasonable factual basis upon which to award the amounts it did.

Additionally, I disagree with awarding GSC additional attorney fees for defending this appeal.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The program is sometimes mistakenly referred to as the “Housing Mitigation Grant Program” in the record.

2.   Gulf States also named United Specialty Insurance Company, the general liability insurer for Davie, as a defendant; however, the insurer was later dismissed from the litigation.

3.   This amount included $14,155.50 for attorney fees paid to prior counsel for Gulf States and $30,149.69 for attorney fees to Gulf States’ current counsel. In its answer to appeal, Gulf States also requests an increase in the amount of court costs awarded from $3,000.00 to $4,929.99, without any mention or explanation setting forth the basis for this request in its brief. Therefore, we will not address that issue as it is considered abandoned. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4).

WOLFE, J.

Greene, J. agrees in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.