STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RONALD DEAN RIPPENKROEGER (2025)

The State charged the defendant, Ronald Dean Rippenkroeger, by bill of information with one count of oral sexual battery upon D.R.² (Count One), and one count of oral sexual battery upon T.F. (Count Two), violations of La. R.S. 14:43.3; one count of sexual battery upon D.R. (Count Three), a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1; and two counts of indecent behavior with juveniles (Counts Four and Five), violations of La. R.S. 14.81. He pled not guilty to all charges. After a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged on all counts. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, a motion in arrest of judgment, and a motion for new trial, all of which the trial court denied. The trial court thereafter sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years on each of Counts One and Two, twenty-five years on Count Three, and ten years on each of Counts Four and Five, all to be served at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant now appeals, raising six assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions, vacate the sentences, and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.

FACTS

On July 29, 2018, eight-year-old T.F. and her six-year-old sister D.R. returned home from spending the weekend with their babysitter, a long-time family friend. They disclosed to their mother and grandmother that the defendant, who lived with the children's babysitter, had touched their genitals with his tongue, exposed his penis, and forced D.R. to touch his exposed penis. The children's mother contacted the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office and reported the sexual assault. T.F. and D.R. were interviewed at the Children's Advocacy Center (CAC). During their CAC interviews, T.F. and D.R. each provided a detailed account of the sexual assault committed on them by the defendant. At trial, the CAC interviews were published for the jury.

The defendant testified at trial and denied ever sexually assaulting T.F. and D.R.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1 - 3

In these three related assignments of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial which was based, in part, on the fact that the State introduced the CAC interviews without calling T.F. and D.R. as witnesses.³

The defense did not object to the admission of T.F.’s and D.R.’s CAC interviews, nor did the defense object when the State failed to call T.F. and D.R. during its case-in-chief. A defendant must make a contemporaneous objection “to a claimed confrontation violation” in order to preserve it for appellate review. State v. Vallo, 2013-1369 (La. 1/10/14), 131 So.3d 835, 837 (per curiam). The contemporaneous objection rule, La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A), provides that “[a]n irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.”

The purpose behind the contemporaneous objection rule is to put the trial court on notice of an alleged irregularity so that it may cure the problem. It is also intended to prevent the defendant from gambling for a favorable verdict and then resorting to appeal on errors that might easily have been corrected by an objection. State v. Johnson, 2015-0513 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/23/15), 185 So.3d 822, 829, writ denied, 2016-0174 (La. 2/3/17), 215 So.3d 688.

To the extent that the defendant argues that raising the confrontation clause claim in a motion for new trial cured his failure to contemporaneously object to the State's failure to call T.F. and D.R. as witnesses in its case-in-chief, we reject this argument. Raising an issue for the first time in a motion for new trial does not serve to revive the issue when the defendant failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection, nor does it preserve the issue for appellate review. See State v. Moody, 2000-0886 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/00), 779 So.2d 4, 7-8, writ denied, 803 So.2d 40 (La. 12/7/01).

Based on the defense's failure to object to the admission of T.F.’s and D.R.’s CAC interviews when the State did not call the children as witnesses in its case-in-chief, we find the defendant waived appellate review of assignments of error one, two, and three.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 4

In the defendant's fourth assignment of error, he contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of T.F.’s and D.R.’s CAC interviews without requiring that the State call the children as witnesses in its casein-chief.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is generally relegated to post-conviction proceedings in the trial court where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted, unless the record permits definitive resolution on appeal.⁴ State v. Vickers, 2024-0297 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/6/25), __ So.3d __, __, 2025 WL 1305275, *3. A defense counsel's decision of whether to object to the introduction of evidence may be strategic. Id.

The investigation of strategy decisions requires an evidentiary hearing, and therefore, cannot possibly be reviewed on appeal. Further, under our adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel, the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial rest with an accused and his attorney. The fact that a particular strategy is unsuccessful does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Anderson, 2022-05 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/22), 357 So.3d 845, 855, writ denied, 2023-00352 (La. 9/6/23), 369 So.3d 1267.

Thus, the defendant's fourth assignment of error regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is not subject to appellate review.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 5

In the defendant's fifth assignment of error, he contends the trial court erred, with respect to each of the five sentences, by sentencing him under the penalty provisions applicable to offenses committed on a victim under the age of thirteen years. He argues the State did not charge that grade of offenses, the trial court did not instruct the jury regarding that element of the offenses, and the jury did not reach such a finding with respect to any of the offenses.

A defendant has a constitutional right to be advised, in a criminal prosecution, of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. La. Const. art. I, § 13. The indictment or bill of information shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 464. The bill of information must contain all the elements of the crime intended to be charged in sufficient particularity to allow the defendant to prepare for trial, to enable the court to determine the propriety of the evidence that is submitted upon the trial, to impose the appropriate penalty on a guilty verdict, and to protect the defendant from double jeopardy. State v. Templet, 2005-2623 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/16/06), 943 So.2d 412, 420, writ denied, 2006-2203 (La. 4/20/07), 954 So.2d 158.

Furthermore, any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2355, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); State v. Marks, 2022-0575 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/17/23), 2023 WL 3493887, *18 (unpublished). Additional elements of an offense must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Marks, 2023 WL 3493 887 at *18. The statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Id., citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).

The bill of information in the present case reflects that the defendant was charged in Counts One and Two with oral sexual battery, violations of La. R.S. 14:43.3. The sentencing provisions are contained in La. R.S. 14:43.3(C), which provides, in relevant part:

C. (1) Whoever commits the crime of oral sexual battery shall be punished by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, for not more than ten years.

(2) Whoever commits the crime of oral sexual battery on a victim under the age of thirteen years when the offender is seventeen years of age or older shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than twenty-five years nor more than ninety-nine years. At least twenty-five years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

The bill of information further reflects that the defendant was charged in Count Three with sexual battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1. The sentencing provisions of this offense are contained in La. R.S. 14:43.1(C), which provides, in relevant part:

C. (1) Whoever commits the crime of sexual battery shall be punished by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, for not more than ten years.

(2) Whoever commits the crime of sexual battery on a victim under the age of thirteen years when the offender is seventeen years of age or older shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than twenty-five years nor more than ninety-nine years. At least twenty-five years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Finally, the bill of information reflects that the defendant was charged in Counts Four and Five with indecent behavior with juveniles, violations of La. R.S. 14:81. The sentencing provisions are contained in La. R.S. 14:81(H), which provides, in relevant part:

H. (1) Whoever commits the crime of indecent behavior with juveniles shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than seven years, or both, provided that the defendant shall not be eligible to have his conviction set aside or his prosecution dismissed in accordance with the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 893.

(2) Whoever commits the crime of indecent behavior with juveniles on a victim under the age of thirteen when the offender is seventeen years of age or older, shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two nor more than twenty-five years. At least two years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that the relevant sentencing provision with regard to oral sexual battery was paragraph (C)(2), and sentenced the defendant in accordance therewith. Similarly, the trial court sentenced the defendant in accordance with La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2) and La. R.S. 14:81(H)(2).

The bill of information in this case did not include T.F.’s and D.R.’s dates of birth, nor did it reference which of the penalty provisions applied. Thus, we find the trial court committed an Apprendi violation by sentencing the defendant under La. R.S. 14:43.3(C)(2), La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2), and La. R.S. 14:81(H)(2). See State v. Chester, 2024-00207 (La. 6/27/25), __ So.3d __, __, 2025 WL 1788150, *1. Accordingly, we vacate the sentences imposed herein, and remand for resentencing under La. R.S. 14:43.3(C)(1), La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(1), and La. R.S. 14:81(H)(1). See Chester, __ So.3d at __, 2025 WL 1788150 at *2.⁵

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Initials are used to protect the identity of victims of sex offenses. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

3.   In his first assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the CAC interviews of T.F. and D.R. without requiring that the State call the children as witnesses in its case-in-chief. In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his constitutional right to confront his accusers. In his third assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial, which was based, in part, on the confrontation error.

4.   The defendant would have to satisfy the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 924, et seq., in order to receive such a hearing.

5.   Based upon our ruling, we pretermit discussion of the defendant's sixth assignment of error contending the trial court imposed sentences immediately after denying the defendant's post-trial motions. We note that La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 requires that if a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled, unless the defendant expressly waives the delay. We further note that the trial court failed to advise the defendant of his post-conviction relief deadlines.

PENZATO, J.