LOUISIANA WETLANDS LLC AND NEW 90 LLC v. ENERGEN RESOURCES CORPORATION CHEVRON USA INC SOUTHERN NATURAL GAS COMPANY LLC EP ENERGY COMPANY LP AND BRAMMER ENGINEERING INC (2025)

In this legacy litigation,¹ James J. Bailey, III, individually and as the representative of the Successions of Willie Palfrey Foster and Fairfax Foster Bailey, appeals a judgment dismissing his claims against Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter involves environmental damage to a tract of land known as Shady Retreat Plantation (“the property”), which is located in St. Mary Parish, Louisiana.² Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (“Chevron”) and Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C. (“SNG”) conducted oil and gas operations on the property pursuant to a mineral lease granted in 1948 (“ 1948 Lease”), which was originally granted to Pan-American Production Company. Chevron and SNG obtained an interest in the 1948 Lease through various assignments and agreements.

On December 27, 2016, the original plaintiffs in this matter, Louisiana Wetlands, LLC and New 90, LLC, filed suit against several defendants, including Chevron and SNG, alleging defendants’ oil and gas operations caused the environmental damage to the property. The petition alleged various claims against the defendants, including the following: (1) negligence; (2) strict liability under La. Civ. Code arts. 667, 2317, and 2322; (3) continuing nuisance; (4) breach of their obligation to exercise their mineral rights with reasonable regard for the property owner, as required by La. R.S. 31:11; (5) breach of the oil, gas, and mineral leases; (6) breach of their obligation to restore the property to its original condition; (7) breach of their obligation as owner of a mineral servitude to restore the property to its original condition, as required by La. R.S. 31:22; (8) breach of their obligation to act as a reasonably prudent operator, as required by La. R.S. 31:122; (9) unjust enrichment; and (10) entitlement to civil fruits based on trespass, pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 486. The petition sought damages to conduct a comprehensive environmental assessment of the property for contamination and to restore the property to its original condition, as well as punitive damages, damages for the defendants’ trespass and unjust enrichment, and an award for stigma damages based on diminution in property value before, during and after restoration. Pursuant to an amending petition filed on July 18, 2019, Louisiana Wetlands, LLC was removed as party plaintiff and James J. Bailey, III, individually and as the representative of the Successions of Willie Palfrey Foster and Fairfax Foster Bailey (“Mr. Bailey”) was added.³ On November 2, 2020, New 90, LLC was dismissed via summary judgment, leaving Mr. Bailey as the only remaining plaintiff. See Louisiana Wetlands I, 330 So.3d at 678.

In August and September of 2020, SNG and Chevron, respectively, filed limited admissions with the district court pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1563(A)(1), wherein each admitted to being a responsible party for the environmental damage occurring on the property. See Louisiana Wetlands II, 380 So.3d at 41. In accordance with La. R.S. 30:29, also known as “Act 312”,⁴ the district court referred the matter to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, office of conservation (“LDNR”),⁵ to formulate a most feasible plan (“MFP”) for the evaluation and remediation of the property to applicable regulatory standards. See Louisiana Wetlands II, 380 So.3d at 41-42. Thereafter, LDNR submitted its MFP to the district court, which adopted the MFP on July 15, 2022. Id. at 40. This court affirmed the district court's judgment adopting the MFP. Id.

On August 23, 2021, the district court granted, in part, a motion for summary judgment filed by Chevron and SNG and dismissed several of Mr. Bailey's claims, including his claims for civil fruits, unjust enrichment, breach of mineral servitude under La. R.S. 31:22, damages based on stigma or diminution of property value, and strict liability under La. Civ. Code art. 2322. The district court also dismissed Mr. Bailey's claims for punitive damages and “for additional remediation required by an express contractual provision” pursuant to La. R.S. 30:29(M)(1)(b).

On April 27, 2022, Chevron and SNG filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Mr. Bailey's remaining claims against them as prescribed. Chevron and SNG argued the 2019 amending petition adding Mr. Bailey as a plaintiff did not relate back to the filing of the original petition and noted the 2019 amending petition was filed more than a year after discovery of the contamination to the property. Chevron and SNG argued that Mr. Bailey's remaining claims, claims for breach of implied statutory obligations, are tort claims subject to a one-year prescriptive period. Therefore, Chevron and SNG argued those claims were prescribed. The district court denied Chevron and SNG's motion for summary judgment on June 16, 2022.

Chevron and SNG sought supervisory review of the district court's judgment denying their motion for summary judgment based on prescription. On September 1, 2022, this court issued an unpublished writ action granting in part, and denying in part, Chevron and SNG's writ application. This court determined that Mr. Bailey's 2019 amending petition did not relate back to the filing of the original petition, and therefore, Mr. Bailey's tort claims had prescribed. Accordingly, this court granted Chevron and SNG's motion for summary judgment in part and dismissed Mr. Bailey's tort claims against Chevron and SNG. This court “denied the writ in all other respects with regard to any contract claims of James Bailey.” Louisiana Wetlands, LLC v. Energen Resources Corp., 2022-0739 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/1/22), 2022 WL 4087994, *1 (unpublished), writ denied, 2022-01495 (La. 12/20/22), 352 So.3d 88.

On September 7, 2022, Chevron and SNG filed a pleading captioned “Motion to Enter Judgment of Dismissal of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C.” Chevron and SNG argued Mr. Bailey's remaining claims against them were for breach of implied obligation to act as a reasonably prudent operator (also referred to as “claims for unreasonable or excessive operations”). Chevron and SNG argued these claims were tort claims that had prescribed. In support of their motion, Chevron and SNG attached this court's September 1, 2022 writ action, citing to the language that Mr. Bailey's “tort claims are prescribed.” Louisiana Wetlands, 2022 WL 4087994 at *1. Chevron and SNG also attached to their motion for dismissal the district court's August 29, 2022 summary judgment that dismissed Mr. Bailey's claim for unreasonable and excessive operations against BP America Production Company (“BP America”), another defendant in this legacy litigation. Chevron and SNG further attached the district court's written reasons for granting BP America's motion for summary judgment, wherein the district court explained that Mr. Bailey's claim against BP America for unreasonable or excessive operations “would be a tort claim.” Chevron and SNG argued that since Mr. Bailey's tort claims are prescribed, and the district court has already concluded that claims for unreasonable or excessive operations are tort claims, dismissal of Mr. Bailey's claims against Chevron and SNG for unreasonable or excessive operations “[was] compelled.”

Mr. Bailey opposed Chevron and SNG's motion for dismissal, arguing the motion was procedurally improper as it was not provided for by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and requested immediate dismissal of Mr. Bailey's remaining claims without a contradictory hearing. Mr. Bailey also asserted that the motion for dismissal was without merit because he had remaining breach of contract claims and breach of implied obligation claims. In particular, Mr. Bailey argued he had remaining claims against Chevron and SNG for breach of the 1948 Lease based on language in the 1948 Lease providing “[a]ll terms and express or implied covenants of this lease shall be subject to all Federal and State Laws, Executive Orders, Rules or Regulations[.]” Thus, Mr. Bailey argued the 1948 Lease includes the obligations set forth in the Louisiana Mineral Code and Louisiana Civil Code, and his claims for breach of those obligations are subject to a ten-year prescriptive period.

On September 8, 2022, the district court held a hearing on Chevron and SNG's motion for dismissal.⁶ Following argument, the district court granted the motion for dismissal, finding Mr. Bailey's remaining claims against Chevron and SNG to be tort claims that had prescribed. Also on September 8, 2022, the district court signed a written judgment granting Chevron and SNG's motion for dismissal and dismissing “[a]ll remaining claims” of Mr. Bailey against Chevron and SNG with prejudice.⁷ From this judgment, Mr. Bailey appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Initially, we note that the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for a motion for dismissal on the basis of prescription. However, courts are obligated to look through the caption of pleadings in order to ascertain their substance. Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So.2d 398, 402 n.2 (La. 1980); Southeastern Louisiana University v. Cook, 2012-0021 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/12), 104 So.3d 124, 127-128. Every pleading is to be so construed as to do substantial justice, and regardless of the parties’ interpretation of the caption of plaintiffs’ pleading, courts will look to the import of a pleading and will not be bound by its title. La. Code Civ. P. art. 865; Armstrong v. ARCCO Company Services, Inc., 2021-0131 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/18/21), 331 So.3d 939, 945. Chevron and SNG's motion for dismissal fails to meet the procedural requirements to be considered a motion for summary judgment. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966. However, the motion for dismissal, a written formal pleading that asserted Mr. Bailey's remaining claims were prescribed, is sufficient to be considered a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription. See Talley v. Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans, 2002-2488 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2/12/03), 840 So.2d 628, 629.⁸

A judgment granting a peremptory exception is generally reviewed de novo, because the exception raises a legal question. Quatrevingt v. State through Landry, 2017-0884 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/8/18), 242 So.3d 625, 631, writ denied, 2018-0391 (La. 4/27/18), 239 So.3d 837. However, when an exception raising the objection of prescription is tried with evidence introduced at a hearing, the district court's findings of fact on the issue are subject to the manifest error standard of review. See Id. Nevertheless, in a case involving no dispute regarding material facts, only the determination of a legal issue, a reviewing court must apply the de novo standard of review, under which the district court's legal conclusions are not entitled to deference. Jenkins v. Kauffman, 2021-1596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/13/22), 344 So.3d 689, 692, writ denied, 2022-01242 (La. 11/8/22), 349 So.3d 576.

PRESCRIPTION

On appeal, Mr. Bailey argues the district court erred by finding his claims for breach of implied obligations under a mineral lease are tort claims.⁹ Mr. Bailey argues those claims are contract claims with a 10-year prescriptive period. See La. Civ. Code art. 3499.

As a general rule, prescription statutes are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished. Taranto v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp., 2010-0105 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 721, 726. Ordinarily, the party urging prescription bears the burden of proof at trial of the exception; however, if the petition is prescribed on its face, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the action is not prescribed. Id. at 726. As discussed, Mr. Bailey's tort claims are prescribed. Louisiana Wetlands, 2022 WL 4087994 at * 1. Thus, in order to prove prescription as to Mr. Bailey's remaining claims for breach of implied obligations, the burden was on Chevron and SNG to show those claims are tort claims.

The proper prescriptive period to be applied in any action depends upon the nature of the cause of action. DePhillips v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish, 2019-01496 (La. 7/9/20), 340 So.3d 817, 820. It is the nature of the duty breached that should determine whether the action is in tort or in contract. Smith v. Citadel Insurance Co., 2019-00052 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So.3d 1062, 1067. The classical distinction between “damages ex contractu” and “damages ex delicto” is that the former flow from the breach of a special obligation contractually assumed by the obligor, whereas the latter flow from the violation of a general duty owed to all persons. Id.

As discussed, Chevron and SNG conducted oil and gas operations on the property pursuant to the 1948 Lease. A mineral lease is a contract, which has the effect of law for the parties. La. Civ. Code art. 1983. A lessee's obligations under a mineral lease are governed by the Mineral Code and the Louisiana Civil Code. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2009-2368 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So.3d 234, 255 (citing La. R.S. 31:2). When the parties made no provision for a particular situation, it must be assumed that they intended to bind themselves not only to the express provisions of the contract, but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in a contract of that kind or necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose. La. Civ. Code art. 2054.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 31:122 provides:

A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.

In the absence of an express lease provision, La. R.S. 31:122 does not impose an implied duty on a lessee to restore the surface to its original condition absent proof that the lessee has exercised his rights under the lease unreasonably or excessively. Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc., 2004-0968 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 789, 801.¹⁰

The Louisiana Civil Code also contains provisions requiring a mineral lessee to perform certain restoration obligations. Louisiana Civil Code article 2683(3) obligates a lessee “[t]o return the thing at the end of the lease in a condition that is the same as it was when the thing was delivered to him, except for normal wear and tear or as otherwise provided hereafter.” Louisiana Civil Code article 2686 provides “[i]f the lessee uses the thing for a purpose other than that for which it was leased or in a manner that may cause damage to the thing, the lessor may obtain injunctive relief, dissolution of the lease, and any damages he may have sustained.” Louisiana Civil Code article 2687 states that “[t]he lessee is liable for damage to the thing caused by his fault or that of a person who, with his consent, is on the premises or uses the thing.”

In Marin, the plaintiffs in an oilfield contamination case filed suit against an oilfield operator, Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”), alleging claims similar to those alleged by Mr. Bailey, including negligence; strict liability under La. Civ. Code arts. 667, 2317, and 2322; breach of oil, gas and mineral leases; breach of the Mineral Code; and breach of Exxon's obligation to restore the property pursuant to La. Civ. Code arts. 2683, 2686, 2687, and 2692.¹¹ Marin, 48 So.3d at 241. Following a trial on the merits, the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages. This court affirmed the judgment on appeal. Id. at 243. Exxon sought writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court arguing, among other things, that the lower courts erred by holding that the plaintiffs’ tort claims survived prescription pursuant to the jurisprudential doctrine of contra non valentum. Id. at 244. The supreme court agreed, finding the doctrine of contra non valentum did not apply. Id. at 244-53. Additionally, the supreme court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Exxon's pollution of their land constituted a continuing tort. Id. at 253-55. Accordingly, the supreme court determined the plaintiffs’ tort claims had prescribed. Id. at 255. The supreme court then considered the plaintiffs’ contract claims and agreed with the plaintiffs that Exxon had “continuing obligations under both the mineral and surface lease that [could] not prescribe as a matter of law.” Id. The supreme court noted that Exxon had implied obligations under La. R.S. 31:122 and La. Civ. Code arts. 2683, 2686, 2687, and 2692. Marin, 48 So.3d at 255-56. The supreme court explained that the damage to the plaintiffs’ property was caused by Exxon's oil and gas operations on the leased property and therefore, as to the plaintiffs’ claims under one of the lease agreements that was still in effect at the time of trial, the “plaintiffs’ claims for damage to their property have not prescribed.” Id. at 256. See also Naquin v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 2011-1217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/7/12), 102 So.3d 875, 878, writs denied, 2012-2676, 2012-2754 (La. 2/8/13), 108 So.3d 87, 93.

Chevron and SNG cite Lexington Land Development, L.L.C. v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 2020-0622 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/25/21), 327 So.3d 8, writ denied, 2021-01194 (La. 11/17/21), 327 So.3d 996, in support of their position that Mr. Bailey's implied obligation claims are tort claims. However, Chevron and SNG's reliance on Lexington Land Development is misplaced. In Lexington Land Development, the district court granted an exception of prescription filed by the defendant, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (“Chevron U.S.A.”), and dismissed the plaintiff's implied obligation claims on the basis that those claims were subject to a one-year prescriptive period. Id. at 21. However, on appeal, this court did not affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ implied obligation claims as prescribed. Instead, this court agreed with Chevron U.S.A.’s argument that “because [the plaintiff] could not have been assigned any rights under the expired 1959 mineral lease, this court should affirm the dismissal of [the plaintiff's] assigned claims regardless of whether the assigned contract claims would be subject to a one-year or ten-year prescriptive period.” Id. at 27-28. This court “[p]retermitt[ed] the soundness of the trial court's stated reasons and basis for its ruling,” and held that the plaintiff had no right to sue Chevron U.S.A. “based on assignments obtained from mineral servitude owners after the mineral and surface leases expired.” Id. at 28.

Chevron and SNG acknowledge that they operated oil and gas operations on the property pursuant to the 1948 Lease and do not deny that they are subject to the statutory implied obligations provided by the Mineral Code and Civil Code. We find Mr. Bailey's implied obligation claims against Chevron and SNG flow from the breach of special obligations contractually assumed by Chevron and SNG. Thus, Mr. Bailey's implied obligation claims are personal and contractual in nature and are subject to the ten-year prescriptive period set forth in La. Civ. Code art. 3499. Accordingly, Chevron and SNG failed to meet their burden of proving Mr. Bailey's implied obligation claims prescribed.

EXCESS DAMAGES

In their appellee brief, Chevron and SNG assert a separate basis for this court to affirm the district court's dismissal of Mr. Bailey's implied obligation claims.¹² Chevron and SNG argue that Act 312 does not allow recovery of remediation damages in excess of an MFP that has been adopted by a district court in the absence of an express contractual provision for such damages. Chevron and SNG point out that the district court dismissed Mr. Bailey's claims for additional remediation required by an express contractual provision because the 1948 Lease does not contain an express remediation provision.

Act 312 sets out a protocol for the development and adoption of an MFP for evaluation and remediation of environmental damage. See La. R.S. 30:29(C). Act 312 was passed by the Louisiana Legislature in 2006 to protect the public interest in litigation by requiring court-supervised, defendant-funded cleanup for all environmental damage claims resulting from oilfield operations. See 2006 La. Acts No. 312. In 2014, Act 312 was amended and La. R.S. 30:29, as amended,¹³ provides, in pertinent part:

H. (1) This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suffered as a result of environmental damage, except as otherwise provided in this Section. Any award granted in connection with the judgment for additional remediation in excess of the requirements of the feasible plan adopted by the court is not required to be paid into the registry of the court.

(2) Damages that may be awarded in an action under this Section shall be governed by the provisions of Subsection M of this Section. This Section shall not be interpreted to create any cause of action or to impose additional implied obligations under the mineral code or arising out of a mineral lease.

* * *

M. (1) In an action governed by the provisions of this Section, damages may be awarded only for the following:

(a) The cost of funding the feasible plan adopted by the court.

(b) The cost of additional remediation only if required by an express contractual provision providing for remediation to original condition or to some other specific remediation standard.

(c) The cost of evaluating, correcting or repairing environmental damage upon a showing that such damage was caused by unreasonable or excessive operations based on rules, regulations, lease terms and implied lease obligations arising by operation of law, or standards applicable at the time of the activity complained of, provided that such damage is not duplicative of damages awarded under Subparagraph (a) or (b) of this Paragraph.

(d) The cost of nonremediation damages.

In support of their position that Act 312 does not permit remediation damages in excess of the MFP absent an express contractual provision, Chevron and SNG cite State v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 2020-00685 (La. 6/1/22), 339 So.3d 1163 (“LL&E III”).¹⁴ LL&E III was the third in a series of cases where the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted the 2006 version of Act 312. In State v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 2012-0884 (La. 1/30/13), 110 So.3d 1038 (“LL&E I”), which involved prescription issues and awards of damages for the remediation of contaminated property, the supreme court considered Act 312 before its amendment in 2014 and held that the landowner could recover damages in excess of those needed to remediate the property to state regulatory standards, even in the absence of a contractual provision; moreover, it held that the damages did not need to be deposited into the court registry. LL&E I, 110 So.3d at 1054.¹⁵ However, in State v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 2020-00685 (La. 6/30/21), 347 So.3d 684 (“LL&E II”), the supreme court overturned its ruling in LL&E I, stating that it “incorrectly held that excess remediation damages were allowed under Act 312” and concluded that a landowner's recovery is limited to a regulatory cleanup of contaminated property, unless the parties had expressly contracted for remediation in excess of Act 312's requirements. LL&E II, 347 So.3d at 691.

The supreme court granted rehearing to reconsider its opinion in LL&E II and affirmed that ruling in LL&E III. In LL&E III, the supreme court first considered the language of La. R.S. 30:29(D)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, that “except as provided in Subsection H of this Section, all damages or payments in any civil action, including interest thereon, awarded for the evaluation or remediation of environmental damage shall be paid exclusively into the registry of the court[.]” LL&E III, 339 So.3d at 1166 (quoting La. R.S. 30:29(D)(1)). The supreme court then looked to the language of the 2006 version of La. R.S. 30:29(H), which provided that a landowner was not precluded from obtaining a judicial remedy or award for “private claims” suffered as a result of environmental damage, or from obtaining “a judgment ordering damages for or implementation of additional remediation in excess of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court pursuant to this Section as may be required in accordance with the terms of an express contractual provision.” LL&E III, 3 3 9 So.3d at 1166-67 (quoting the 2006 version of La. R.S. 30:29(H)). The supreme court determined that the term “private claims,” which was not defined in Act 312, did not encompass claims for evaluation or remediation of environmental damage, and therefore, the only exception to La. R.S. 30:29(D)(1)’s mandate that damages for evaluation or remediation of environmental damage be paid into the registry of the court (to fund the MFP) was an award for evaluation or remediation that was required pursuant to an express contractual provision. LL&E III, 339 So.3d at 1167-68.

However, as discussed, Act 312 was amended in 2014, which is the version of Act 312 at issue in this case. La. R.S. 30:29(H)(1) now provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny award granted in connection with the judgment for additional remediation in excess of the requirements of the feasible plan adopted by the court is not required to be paid into the registry of the court.” Notably, the 2014 version of La. R.S. 30:29(H), unlike the 2006 version at issue in LL&E III, does not limit damages for remediation in excess of the MFP to those awarded pursuant to an express contractual provision. Additionally, La. R.S. 30:29(M) now explicitly sets forth the damages that may be awarded under Act 312, which includes “[t]he cost of evaluating, correcting or repairing environmental damage.. .caused by unreasonable or excessive operations.. .provided that such damage is not duplicative of damages” for the cost of funding the MFP or for the cost of additional remediation required by express contractual provision.

Chevron and SNG argue the 2014 version of Act 312 cannot be construed to allow for excess remediation damages absent an express contractual provision because doing so would unconstitutionally create a new right that did not exist when the 1948 Lease was executed or when Chevron and SNG operated on the property. However, as explained by the supreme court in LL&E III, “Act 312 is a procedural statute. It neither creates nor divests causes of action. La. R.S. 30:29(A). A claim for full remediation of environmental damage existed before and exists after Act 312.” LL&E III, at 1168 (emphasis in original). The 2014 version of Act 312 does not expand the rights of the landowner, but merely changes the procedure for enforcement of those rights. Additionally, as noted, La. R.S. 30:29(M)(c) restricts damages for unreasonable or excessive operations to the extent such damage is duplicative of damage awarded for the cost of funding the MFP. Thus, we find enforcement of Act 312 is not unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reject Chevron and SNG's argument that Mr. Bailey is precluded from seeking an award for excess remediation damages under Act 312.

CONCLUSION

For the assigned reasons, we reverse the district court's September 8, 2022 judgment granting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C.’s motion for dismissal and dismissing with prejudice all remaining claims of James J. Bailey, III, individually and as the representative of the Successions of Willie Palfrey Foster and Fairfax Foster Bailey, against Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C. We remand this matter for further proceedings. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   These types of oilfield contamination actions are referred to as “legacy litigation” because they often arise from operations conducted many decades ago, leaving an unwanted “legacy” in the form of actual or alleged contamination. See Louisiana Wetlands, LLC v. Energen Resources Corporation, 2021-0290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/4/21), 330 So.3d 674, 676 n.1, writ denied, 2021-01610 (La. 1/12/22), 330 So.3d 614 (“Louisiana Wetlands I”).

2.   In prior appeals, we set forth a more detailed factual and procedural history. See Louisiana Wetlands I, 330 So.3d at 676-78; Louisiana Wetlands, LLC v. Energen Resources Corp., 2022-1169 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/30/23), 380 So.3d 38, 41-42, writ denied, 2024-00004 (La. 2/27/24), 3 79 So.3d 1265 (“Louisiana Wetlands II”). We recite only those facts pertinent to the issues in this appeal.

3.   Mr. Bailey's 2019 amending petition incorporated in extenso the original petition.

4.   Act 312 has a stated legislative purpose of ensuring that damage to the environment is remediated to a standard that protects the public interest. La. R.S. 30:29(A). Because this case involves environmental damage arising from oil and gas activities, Act 312 applies.

5.   By 2023 La. Acts No. 150, § 5, effective January 10, 2024, La. R.S. 30:29 was amended and reenacted to rename LDNR the “Department of Energy and Natural Resources, office of conservation.”

6.   At the hearing, the district court admitted Chevron and SNG's motion for dismissal and Mr. Bailey's opposition into evidence.

7.   The district court designated the September 8, 2022 judgment as a partial final judgment pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B) and stated that the district court retained jurisdiction under La. R.S. 30:29(D)(4) to ensure compliance with the MFP and to determine whether any costs are recoverable under La. R.S. 30:29(E)(1). In applying the factors set forth in R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2004-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122, we conclude that the district court properly designated the judgment as a final judgment for purposes of appeal.

8.   We note that on appeal, Mr. Bailey does not object to SNG and Chevron's use of a motion for dismissal to raise the issue of prescription.

9.   We note that on appeal, Mr. Bailey does not assert that he had separate claims for breach of the 1948 Lease beyond the alleged breach of implied obligation claims.

10.   Mr. Bailey also alleged Chevron and SNG breached the implied obligation provided by La. R.S. 31:11(A), which states, in pertinent part, that “the owner of a mineral right must exercise their respective rights with reasonable regard for those of the [landowner].”

11.   Formerly codified in La. Civ. Code arts. 2710, 2719 and 2720.

12.   A party who is satisfied with a judgment and who does not file an appeal, like Chevron and SNG, is entitled to make any argument supported by the record in support of the judgment in its favor. See City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge v. Myers, 2013-2011 (La. 5/7/14), 145 So.3d 320, 330 n. 5. Accordingly, we will consider Chevron and SNG's alternative argument to support the district court's dismissal of Mr. Bailey's implied obligation claims.

13.   As originally enacted, La. R.S. 30:29 did not include section (M) on damages. In 2014, La. R.S. 30:29 was amended by Acts 2014, No. 400 to amend section (H) and add section (M). Section (H) was amended to add the language that damages awarded in an action under Act 312 are governed by the provisions of Section (M) and to delete the language concerning additional remediation, which is now covered in La. R.S. 30:29(M)(1)(b). The legislature noted the 2014 amendment to La. R.S. 30:29 would not apply to cases that were set for trial before May 15, 2014. See 2014 La. Acts 400, § 3.

14.   Chevron and SNG also cite this court's opinion in Louisiana Wetlands, LLC v. Energen Resources Corp., 2023-0564 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/19/24), 390 So.3d 378, in support of their argument that remediation damages in excess of the MFP absent an express contractual provision are not permitted under Act 312. However, on June 21, 2024, this court granted an application for rehearing filed by Mr. Bailey and on December 11, 2024, this court issued an opinion reversing summary judgment in favor of BP America Production Company on the basis that Mr. Bailey is not precluded under Article 312 from seeking excess remediation damages in excess of the MFP absent an express contractual provision. Louisiana Wetlands, LLC v. Energen Resources Corp., 2023-0564 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/11/24), 404 So.3d 835, 843-44, writ denied, 2025-00043 (La. 4/15/25), 406 So.3d 428.

15.   In LL&E I, 110 So.3d at 1054, the supreme court also noted that La. R.S. 30:29 “does nothing to the substantive rights of the landowner, whether arising out of (1) the implied obligations of the mineral lease under the Civil Code or (2) the implied obligation arising out of La. R.S. 31:122 if the landowner can show a mineral lessee has acted unreasonably or excessively under the lease.”

STROMBERG, J.