STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CURTIS LEE STEWART JR (2025)

The defendant, Curtis Lee Stewart, Jr., was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. He waived a formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

The defendant now appeals, alleging in his sole assignment of error that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of second degree murder. For the following reasons, we reverse.

FACTS

On April 25, 2021, at 7:40 p.m., officers with the Baton Rouge Police Department were dispatched to 4700 Prescott Road in reference to a shooting. When the officers arrived on the scene, they found the victim, Devonta Ennis, lying on the ground beside a black Mercedes near a Dollar General. During the investigation, surveillance video was recovered from the Dollar General. The State argues that in the surveillance video, a white Chevrolet Traverse and a silver Nissan Armada appear to box in the black Mercedes; a person exits the Traverse and appears to open fire towards the Mercedes; the individual then returns to the Traverse and flees while the Mercedes rolls forward; and the Armada follows in the same direction as the Traverse. However, some of the facts alleged by the State cannot be confirmed when viewing the surveillance video alone.

Detective Heather Anderson with the Baton Rouge Police Department's Homicide Unit testified that after the shooting, she learned about two vehicles that were burned at a park near the location of the murder. The vehicles were identified as a white Chevrolet Traverse, which was reported stolen by Shalana Sims, and a silver Nissan Armada, which was reported stolen by Tierra Hayes.¹ When questioned, Sims and Hayes indicated that the defendant had used their vehicles in the past and had access to their vehicles. In June of 2021, the defendant was arrested for the murder of Ennis.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second degree murder. He further argues the State's use of circumstantial evidence did not prove he was the person who drove the vehicle and shot the victim. Thus, the case before us turns on the identity of the perpetrator.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So. 2d 654, 660. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Welch, 2019-0826 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/21/20), 297 So. 3d 23, 27, writ denied, 2020-00554 (La. 9/29/20), 301 So. 3d 1193.

When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder, in order to convict, must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is not a separate test that applies instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction. State v. White, 2023-0878 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/4/24), 391 So. 3d 722, 728. Rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dorsey, 2010-0216 (La. 9/7/11), 74 So. 3d 603, 633.

Second degree murder is defined in pertinent part as “the killing of a human being: (1)[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. State v. Hollins, 2023-0785 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/19/24), 387 So. 3d 641, 646, writ denied, 2024-00487 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So. 3d 865. The State bears the burden to prove those elements, along with the burden to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. “When the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification.” State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So. 3d 17, 22-23, writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So. 3d 802.

Here, the defendant asserts that he is not any of the three individuals seen in the video and that the State has failed to prove his identity as one of the perpetrators beyond a reasonable doubt.² He specifically asserts that there were no eyewitnesses and the police failed to have the rifle ³ or the spent shell casings tested, which he believes could have been used to identify the actual perpetrator in this shooting. He believes the trial court's guilty verdict should be reversed because it was against the weight of the evidence.

Detective Anderson testified regarding her findings in this investigation. She arrived at the scene of the shooting after 8:00 p.m. She saw the victim on the ground and noted the bullet holes in the nearby Mercedes. She helped collect evidence, which included a rifle that she later determined was not the murder weapon,⁴ cartridge casings,⁵ and a temporary license tag. Detective Anderson testified that she also obtained and reviewed the surveillance video from the Dollar General. At trial, Detective Anderson narrated her perception of what the video depicted, as it was played at trial:

I know it's really grainy, but in the video, you are ultimately able to see a white Traverse. The white Traverse, the Mercedes and the silver Armada box[ed] in the Mercedes. The suspect exits out the white Traverse, opens fire onto the Mercedes. The parties get back into the vehicles and flees. The Mercedes then rolls into the roadway. ․ It's ․ real quick.

Detective Anderson stated that she was later informed that two vehicles were found burned in a BREC park near the location of the shooting on the same evening. Detective Anderson testified that she contacted the Fire Marshal's office who informed her that the vehicles were a white Traverse and a silver Armada. According to her testimony, Detective Anderson discovered there were stolen vehicle reports for both vehicles. Detective Anderson testified that the blood on the rifle was not tested and the shell casings found at the scene were not a match to the rifle found at the scene. The defendant also claimed he did not know the victim, but at one point during the police interview, according to Detective Anderson, the defendant referred to the victim using his nickname, “Vonta.”

Additionally, Detective Anderson testified that police received an anonymous tip from Crime Stoppers naming the defendant as being connected to the shooting. When asked about the anonymous tip, Detective Anderson testified, “We don't know anything about the identity of [the tipster]. All of that information is taken by somebody other than me. I don't take Crime Stoppers tips.” She further stated, “They didn't give a firsthand account in the short synopsis that was gathered by the agent taking the tipster's information.” Additionally, Detective Anderson indicated the tip contained details that corroborated what they already knew from their investigation. Defense counsel did not object to Detective Anderson's testimony regarding the anonymous tip, and we are unable to determine what value, if any, the trial court attached to this evidence.

On cross examination, Detective Anderson admitted that an Armada cannot be identified by watching the Dollar General surveillance video but that a four-door silver sedan can be seen leaving the scene. She further testified that the surveillance video did not show the white vehicle was a Traverse, but the temporary tag for the Traverse was found at the scene. The police discovered the temporary license tag was connected to a white Traverse that was registered to Sims. Sims's fingerprints were also found on the temporary license tag. Sims gave a statement to the police stating the defendant would often use her vehicle without her knowledge. The investigation also revealed that the silver Armada had been leased by Hayes, who was also in a relationship with the defendant.⁶ Both women stated that they had reported their vehicles stolen. Sims testified that she made the report “the night” of April 25th and Hayes testified she reported that her vehicle was stolen shortly before midnight on April 25th.

Levert Kemp, an employee from the Baton Rouge Fire Department, also testified at trial. He confirmed he discovered the vehicles that were burned at a BREC park around 1:00 a.m. on April 26, 2021. Kemp determined “[i]t was two intentionally set fires[.]” He took photos of both vehicles with extensive damage: a white Chevrolet Traverse and a silver Nissan Armada.⁷

Sims, who shares a child with the defendant, testified at trial. Sims could not recall the statement she had given to police despite the prosecutor playing the police interview to refresh her memory. Based on Sims's refusal or inability to testify consistently with her previous statements, the trial court declared her to be an unavailable witness and allowed the State to play the police interview. Defense counsel objected, arguing that if the video was being played for the purpose of impeachment, then the State should only play the part of the video that pertained to the question that was elicited. The trial court did not explicitly rule on the objection, but it instructed the State to “go to [the part of the video] so as to refresh the [witness's] memory only.” We cannot determine from the transcript which portions of the video were played at trial, although it appears that the entire video was introduced into evidence.⁸ We note this objection was not raised as an assignment of error on appeal. Thus, we learn from the video that when the detectives initially interviewed Sims, she stated that on the night of the homicide, she discovered her vehicle was missing around 12:30 a.m. She then called the defendant and asked him if he had her vehicle. He told her to “leave it alone, don't ask questions about it, just let it be.” Sims also stated that the defendant had borrowed her car before. Detective Anderson located the police report, previously filed by Sims, where she accused the defendant of taking her vehicle on another occasion without her consent, which corroborated her initial interview.

Hayes testified that on the night of the homicide, she had left her 2021 Nissan Armada rental vehicle in her driveway, unlocked with the keys inside. She testified that she reported her car stolen when she arrived home later that night. At trial, she stated she couldn't “remember the exact time,” but believed it was between 11:00 p.m. and midnight. When asked if the defendant used her vehicle before, Hayes responded, “No, he didn't use that one.” Hayes reviewed the photograph of a burned car taken by Kemp and identified it as her rental vehicle.

Detectives obtained a search warrant for the defendant's cell phone records. With the use of geolocation, detectives were able to place the defendant in the area of the homicide around the time it occurred. At trial, Michael Fegely was accepted as a geolocation analyst expert. He testified that the District Attorney's Office provided him with locations and addresses of interest and that he mapped the phone records in relation to those addresses provided. However, he stated that his location analysis was only an estimate and that he could not determine the exact location of the device within the area covered by the cell site. Fegely further testified that between 6:36 p.m. and 7:45 p.m., the defendant's cell phone was located within the area of 72nd Street, where Sims lived, and 4700 Prescott Road, where the homicide took place. According to the demonstrative video evidence, the defendant's cell phone transferred back and forth between four different towers during that time. Fegely also stated the defendant's phone received a call at 6:43 p.m. and that phone call was answered and remained active for approximately seventy minutes.⁹ Fegely testified, “because of the distance that would have to be moved within a minute or two[,] you would have to be in a motor vehicle ․ [.]” Further, in response to questioning by defense counsel, Fegely agreed the technology he used showed the defendant's location within a “four-mile radius,” but it could not pinpoint the defendant's exact location.¹⁰

At trial, Dr. William Beau Clark, the East Baton Rouge Parish Coroner, confirmed the victim's cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. The autopsy revealed that the victim sustained eight bullet wound injuries. There is no dispute that the shooting was the cause of the victim's death.

Finally, the State put on Grant Auzenne, a trooper with the Louisiana State Police, who testified about other crimes evidence.¹¹ The State argued this other evidence established preparation, identity, plan, and opportunity.¹² Trooper Auzenne testified that he received a call about a shooting where a house (wherein several persons were present inside and outside) was struck several times by gunfire. His investigation led to the arrest of the same defendant in November 2020.

While an arrest may reflect an officer's opinion that probable cause exists, ultimately, no evidence linking the defendant to this shooting was introduced at the trial apart from the conclusion offered by the testifying witness. At trial, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the other acts. State v. Dawson, 2019-1612 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/17/20), 316 So. 3d 77, 88, writ denied, 2021-00217 (La. 5/4/21), 315 So. 3d 222. However, no facts were proven, nor did the witness identify any evidence for the court to evaluate, which might link the defendant to this separate shooting. Sufficient competent evidence was not introduced, comporting with the rules of evidence, to provide the fact finder with an adequate basis to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant actually committed the other crimes identified by the State. See State v. Jones, 2017-00658 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So. 3d 1074, 1082. Even if we were to conclude that sufficient evidence was introduced for the court to determine that the defendant was involved in the other shooting, no evidence was offered to show how the 2020 shooting served as preparation for the later shooting; established a plan for the later shooting; or created an opportunity for the later shooting. While we must consider the entirety of the evidence presented when addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, see State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 (La. 1992), insufficient evidence was introduced to establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator in either of the shootings.

In State v. Briggs, 2024-490 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 4/2/25), 409 So. 3d 399, another case revolving around the identity of the defendants, the State attempted to show the defendants were either the shooter or a principal. In Briggs, two brothers, Donald and Stefan, were charged with second degree murder.¹³ The State contended that as the driver, Donald gave his brother, Stefan, as the shooter, the opportunity to kill the victim; thus, Donald aided and abetted Stefan in the commission of the victim's murder. Id. at 403. The defendants were convicted, but the appellate court reversed their convictions and found that the evidence was insufficient to convict Donald and Stefan of second degree murder. Id. at 417, 432. In doing so, as to the reversal of Donald's conviction, the court noted:

Even if the jury reasonably inferred from the video evidence that the brothers were in the vicinity of the shooting at the time of the shooting ․ the jury was required to speculate as to whether the shots were fired from the brothers’ car. ․ [T]he jury's determination that the shots were fired from the brothers’ vehicle was based on speculation rather than reasonable inferences. Furthermore, the evidence was not sufficient to prove Donald possessed the specific intent to kill.

Briggs, 409 So. 3d at 416.

In reversing Stefan's conviction, the court held: “There was only circumstantial evidence ․ as to ․ whether they shot the victim. ․ The video footage placing Donald and Stefan Briggs at the scene of the crime was not very clear.” Briggs, 409 So. 3d at 429. The court thus concluded:

Given the lack of physical evidence connecting the brothers to the shooting, the absence of any weapon, the absence of any evidence connecting the brothers to the victim, ․ the jury's determination that the shots were fired from the brothers’ vehicle was based on speculation rather than reasonable inferences. The State failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

Briggs, 409 So. 3d at 432.

Here, the State only sought to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the shooter. Unlike in Briggs, the State did not attempt to prove the defendant was a principal to the shooting, in the sense that he aided and abetted. In its closing statement, the State unequivocally rejected the hypothesis that the defendant was a principal in the broader sense of the word. The State argued, “[the defendant] ․ shot up [the victim][;]” the defendant “didn't miss his mark[;]” and the defendant was “guilty of killing, ambushing, executing” the victim. Further, as to whether or not charging the defendant as a principal was appropriate, the State argued in its rebuttal closing argument, “No. The State chose the right crime of second degree murder because the defendant in this matter murdered [the victim].” Finally, the State concluded that “there's only one person that took [the victim's] life, and [that] man is standing in court today.”

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we are convinced the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements necessary to support the defendant's conviction for the second degree murder of Devonta Ennis. Most glaringly, no rational trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was the shooter. Even if the trial court reasonably inferred from the evidence that the defendant had access to the Traverse and the Armada and that he was in the vicinity at the time of the shooting, the trial court was required to speculate as to whether the defendant was in one of the two vehicles and, if so, whether the shots were fired by the defendant.

Although surveillance video obtained from Dollar General was introduced, we are unable to ascertain from the surveillance video who was present during the shooting. We are only able to view one person getting into the driver's seat of the Traverse, and we saw nothing to suggest gunfire. Obviously, each vehicle had a driver and may or may not have had passengers. The victim appeared to have been alone in his vehicle. Moreover, it is unclear from the phrasing of Detective Anderson's depiction of the video that “[t]he parties get back into the vehicles and flees” whether the detective is trying to convey that multiple people were getting back into the Traverse and the Armada or that one person was getting back into the Traverse. Viewing the video, it is difficult to confirm any of the details set forth by Detective Anderson in her testimony. For example, the surveillance video does not show that the Mercedes vehicle was “box[ed] in.” Further, we note that when the surveillance video was played for the trial court, the court stated, “I'm sorry. I don't see it on the screen.” We have carefully and repeatedly reviewed the video, and we too are unable to see some much of the action the State alleges is depicted in the surveillance video.

Given the lack of physical evidence connecting the defendant to the shooting and the lack of any witness identification, the trial court's determination that the shots were fired by the defendant was based on speculation rather than reasonable inferences. Very simply put, if two vehicles were involved, and we have no evidence putting the defendant in either vehicle at the time of the shooting, and we cannot say that the defendant was the shooter, the State failed to negate a reasonable probability of misidentification. Therefore, we find that no rational trier of fact could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of second degree murder and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant's conviction and sentence is reversed.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE REVERSED.

I agree that the defendant's conviction must be reversed in this case, because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant murdered Davonta Ennis. However, I respectfully concur with the majority opinion, because I disagree with its discussion regarding the other crimes evidence admitted at trial.

When addressing sufficiency of the evidence, consideration must be given to the entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence that was erroneously admitted, to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992) (Emphasis added.) Thus, even if the trial court erroneously admitted Officer Auzenne's testimony regarding another crime for which the defendant was previously arrested, this Court is required to consider that testimony in a sufficiency analysis – and, we may not reweigh that evidence. State v. Howard, 2023-1060 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/24), 392 So.3d 365, 370, 2024-00812 (La. 2/19/25), 400 So.3d 923. In my view, the majority's assessment of the evidentiary weight of Officer Auzenne's testimony as part of the sufficiency analysis is unnecessary.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Sims testified that she called the Baton Rouge Police Department on the evening of April 25, 2021, after she realized her vehicle was stolen. However, Detective Anderson testified that Sims reported that she woke up between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m. on April 26, 2021, when she realized her vehicle was stolen. Hayes testified that she rented the Armada and that she contacted the rental car company, Enterprise, on April 25, 2021, to report that the vehicle was stolen.

2.   On appeal, the defendant concedes that three people “had to be” involved in this shooting, but he argues that he was not one of them.

3.   Detective Anderson testified that the gun found at the scene was a 300 Blackout Rifle.

4.   She indicated the rifle found at the scene did not match the cartridge casings found at the scene.

5.   Although the prosecutor stated in her opening statement that there were approximately twenty-two bullet hole in the Mercedes, only three shell casings were found at the scene.

6.   Hayes and the defendant were neighbors. Hayes testified that she and the defendant also had an “off and on” dating relationship in 2021.

7.   Kemp testified that there were no charges filed by his agency with respect to the arson.

8.   During Sims's testimony, the transcript states in multiple places, “(AT THIS TIME, THE VIDEO WAS PLAYED IN OPEN COURT.).” The start time is indicated before the video is played on two occasions, but there is no end time indicated, and there is no time indicated for the other instances of the video being played.

9.   This means that at the time of the shooting, there was an active phone call on the defendant's phone. No evidence was introduced to identify who was on the other end of the call.

10.   Defense counsel asked Fegely if the distance between Sims's house and the 4700 block of Prescott Road was approximately four miles, and Fegely stated, “that seems correct from what I was looking at on the maps.”

11.   Officer Auzenne was employed by the East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office in the Homicide Division before becoming a state trooper.

12.   The State filed a motion to use other crimes evidence against the defendant under La. C.E. art. 404(B). The trial court granted the motion. The defendant was charged with four counts of attempted second degree murder; assault by drive-by shooting; illegal use of a weapon; and aggravated criminal damage to property five months earlier.

13.   All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals. La. R.S. 14:24.

MILLER, J.

Wolfe, J. dissents. Greene, J. concurs with reasons.