VALENTINA BRYAN IN HER CAPACITY AS NATURAL TUTRIX OF DALILA CAROL AYMOND v. CHANTEL AYMOND IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE DALILA CAROL AYMOND TRUST ET AL (2025)

This matter is a companion case to Succession of Aymond, 24-335 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/30/25), ___ So.3d ___. Some of the facts and procedural matters of that case are pertinent here as well.

Carol J. Aymond, Jr., was a successful attorney in Avoyelles Parish.1 He created the Dalila Carol Aymond Trust for his younger daughter in 2013 when she was two years old. He named Dalila as the Trust Beneficiary and his older daughter, Chantel Aymond, as the Trustee.

Id. at 1. The Trust Agreement stated, “The Trustee shall not sell, exchange, mortgage[,] or otherwise transfer the immovable property contributed to the [T]rust ․”

Carol wrote a will on February 16, 2018, that left to the Trust:

[the] naked ownership of any and all assets and properties which I die possessed of (movable and immovable) subject to a lifetime usufruct in favor of Chantel ․ over an undivided 1/212 interest in all property subject to this bequest. It is the testator's intent that pursuant to this usufruct, during her lifetime, Chantel ․ shall earn 1/212 of all funds derived from this property, whith [sic] the remaining funds to be retained by the ․ Trust.

Id. The will named Chantel, a certified financial planner, as the Executrix.² Carol died on February 26, 2021.

Chantel's filings as Executrix led the trial court to issue letters of provisional administration, probate Carol's will, appoint Chantel as the Independent Executrix, and issue Letters of Independent Executorship confirming Chantel's appointment. The Letters “qualified, authorized[,] and empowered” Chantel to “[a]cquire and transfer property to or for the Decedent's succession, by sale, purchase[,] or exchange ․ for whatever price that the Independent Executrix deems prudent in the exercise of her fiduciary duty[.]”

Chantel, as Independent Executrix, then sold 81.7% of the 2,371.02 acres of Carol's land (approximately 1,937 acres) for millions of dollars without placing the property in the Trust. The approximate value of Carol's estate was $10 million with around $1.2 million in cash on the date of his death.

Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).

Valentina Bryan, Dalila's mother/Carol's second former wife, sought to terminate Chantel's usufruct based in part on Chantel's sales of the property.³ The trial court dismissed her petition and “found Chantel had full authority to sell the property in her role as Executrix, the sales she made were prudent, and she had no conflict acting as both Executrix and Trustee.” Id. at 3. Additionally, the court “found Chantel acted as Executrix and not as ‘a potential usufructuary ․ or as Trustee’ regarding the sale of the property. Thus, the Trust and Chantel ․ can equally use the net proceeds of the land sales.” Id. On appeal, however, we reversed the trial court, granted Valentina's petition to terminate Chantel's usufruct, and held that “Chantel's usufruct ended in part by her unauthorized acts.” Id. at 8.

Valentina, as Dalila's tutrix, also filed a petition to remove and replace Chantel as Trustee based in part on Chantel's failure to prevent the sale of Carol's property and preserve it for the Trust. Her petition alleged self-dealing, breach of the duty of loyalty to the Trust beneficiary, and failure to administer the trust in the sole interest of the Trust beneficiary. The petition was also based on Chantel's actions as Executrix in Carol's succession.

The trial court denied Valentina's petition and found Chantel breached none of her duties. Indeed, the trial court held none of Chantel's actions were taken in her role as Trustee. We now address the trial court's denial of Valentina's petition to remove Chantel as Trustee and appoint someone else in her place.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Valentina alleges the trial court erred when it failed to remove Chantel as Trustee. “[T]he removal of a trustee is subject to a manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review.” Cox v. Dupuis, 24-455, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/25), 406 So.3d 481, 484. For the reasons discussed below, we need not address Valentina's other assignment of error alleging the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of an expert witness.

DISCUSSION

The trial court believed Chantel acted solely as Executrix during her administration of Carol's estate. It commented, “No action was required and none was done by her as ․ Trustee[.]” Because the succession was still under administration and the Trust had not yet been placed in possession of the property, the trial court found the Trust had not yet acquired it. The trial court further reasoned that Carol could have created a testamentary trust in his will “had [he] desired that all real estate that he owned at the moment of his death be placed under the provisions of a trust[.]”

To the contrary, “[a]n addition of property to an existing trust by donation mortis causa is effective at the moment of the donor's death.” La.R.S. 9:1936. Thus, Chantel's fiduciary duty to administer the Trust according to the Trust Agreement arose immediately when Carol died. Nothing in our law suggests that her duty to the Trust was subordinate to her administration of Carol's estate as she claims.

And why would Carol need to create a testamentary trust dealing with his immovable property? He created an intact, irrevocable trust more than four years before he wrote his will and more than seven years before he died. Then he wrote a will that moved his property into the Trust at his death!

The trial court relied on Curtis v. Breaux, 458 So.2d 582 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1984) in finding Chantel acted as a prudent administrator. In Curtis, the testamentary trust beneficiaries alleged that the trustee's sales of rental property and subsequent investment of the proceeds resulted in lost income. This court held, “The test is not that the trustee always have his judgment vindicated by the market, but that he exercise the skill and care of a prudent administrator.” Id. at 586. But after quoting Curtis, the trial court then justified Chantel's sales of the property and found her to be a prudent administrator because the sales resulted in “a higher rate of return than was earned historically through farming operations.” In other words, the trial court erroneously applied the test of market vindication instead of the prudent administrator standard.

Our law states a testator's intent “controls the interpretation of his testament.” La.Civ.Code art. 1611. “A disposition should be interpreted in a sense in which it can have effect, rather than in one in which it can have none.” La.Civ.Code art. 1612. The only interpretation that gives effect to the disposition of Carol's immovable property is that it must go to the Trust.

Louisiana also has “a strong public policy in effectuating and protecting the settlor's intent as set forth in the trust document.” Albritton v. Albritton, 600 So.2d 1328, 1331 (La.1992). “The settlor's intent controls, unless opposed to law or public policy.” Miller v. Miller, 35,934, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/8/02), 817 So.2d 1166, 1169, writ denied, 02-1890 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So. 2d 1154 (emphasis in original). Not even Carol himself could modify the Trust Agreement without expressly reserving his right to do so. La.R.S. 9:2021.

The Trust Agreement stated, “The Trustee shall not sell, exchange, mortgage[,] or otherwise transfer the immovable property contributed to the [T]rust ․” This clear language shows Carol's intent to keep the property in Trust ownership. Chantel not only violated the terms of Carol's will, she also violated and modified the Trust Agreement.

Chantel's duty – and the only thing she had authority to do in any role – was to transfer Carol's property to the Trust.

Succ. of Aymond, 24-335, at 5.

Once Chantel breached her fiduciary duty to follow her father's wishes in his will, a hopeless conflict arose in her overlapping roles as Executrix, usufructuary, and Trustee. She could not divorce her duty as Trustee to preserve the property (or at least to offer the right of first refusal to Carol's descendants as set out in the will) from her duties as Executrix and usufructuary ․ Carol's vision assumed Chantel would honor his wishes in all the roles he assigned to her. Nothing suggests he favored or valued her role as usufructuary over her obligations as Executrix and Trustee.

Id. at 5–6.

So, like the trial court, we rely on Curtis, 458 So.2d 582, but with a different application. Because Chantel ignored the explicit directive set out in the Trust Agreement and sold the Trust's property, we find she failed to fulfill her fiduciary duty to exercise the skill and care required of a prudent administrator of the Trust as required by the Curtis court. That the market may have vindicated the sales of the property from a financial standpoint is a non-issue. Rather, the issue is that Chantel failed to read and follow the directions of the will and the Trust Agreement.

“A trustee shall be removed ․ by the proper court for sufficient cause.” La.R.S. 9:1789(A). Chantel could not avoid her mandate to deliver Carol's property to the Trust by claiming to act solely as Executrix and pretending her role as Trustee did not exist. Her only proper act was to deliver the property to the Trust; instead, she wrongfully converted it into cash, resulting in millions of dollars to her benefit. We find Chantel's disregard for the plain language of Carol's will bequeathing his immovable property to the Trust and her disregard for the Trust Agreement's strict and plain prohibition of the sale of that property to be sufficient cause for removing her as Trustee.

CONCLUSION

Chantel wrongfully converted Trust assets into cash in violation of Carol's will and the Trust Agreement. Her tripartite role did not allow her to put on the hat of Executrix, remove it, and put on the other hat(s) of Trustee and/or usufructuary and act independently as she saw fit. She had a duty as both Executrix and Trustee; she failed in both roles individually and collectively. She failed to enforce Carol's will, and she failed to preserve property of which the Trust was seized at the moment of Carol's death.

DECREE

We reverse the ruling of the trial court and hold Chantel sold Carol's immovable property without authorization in violation of the Trust Agreement and thereby failed to act as a prudent administrator. We also grant Valentina's petition to remove Chantel as Trustee of the Dalila Carol Aymond Trust.

We remand this matter to the trial court to appoint a new Trustee for the Trust. The trial court shall also decide the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by the Trust as a result of Chantel's unauthorized actions and shall assess those fees and costs to Chantel.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

As I did in the companion case, Succession of Aymond, 24-335 (La.App. 3 Cir. __/__/25), ___ So.3d ___, I also respectfully disagree with the majority opinion in this case and would affirm the ruling of the trial court which denied the petition to remove and replace Chantel as trustee.

Whether a trustee has breached a duty is a question of fact reviewed under the manifest error standard of review. In order to remove Chantel, the trial court had to find that there was sufficient cause to remove Chantel as trustee. The majority notes that under the express terms of the Trust agreement, the trustee was not to sell any immovable property contributed to the Trust. Accordingly, they find that Chantel violated the Trust agreement when she sold the property and thus failed to fulfill her fiduciary duty to exercise the skill and care required of a prudent administrator of the Trust.

Although the majority is correct that under La.R.S. 9:1936. “[a]n addition of property to an existing trust by donation mortis causa is effective at the moment of the donor's death[,]” they do not adequately consider the effect that the administration of the succession has on the legatees’ rights.

The right of the legal heir to seizen of an interest in the property belonging to the succession, however, is subject to the debts and charges with which that interest is burdened, and it also is subject to the superior right of the administrator or executor to administer, and to maintain possession of, the property belonging to the succession until the administration has been closed.

Rice's Est. v. Deville, 240 So. 2d 379, 383 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1970). Moreover, in Succession of Stauffer, 119 La. 66, 69, 43 So. 928, 929 (1907), our supreme court stated:

By the fiction of the law, ‘le mort saisit le vif,’ the heir is seised of right, but not in fact, until he accepts the succession and is sent into or takes possession according to law. As long as the property is under administration it remains in the custody of the law, and the rights of heirs and legatees are in abeyance until the administration is closed.

The trial court correctly noted that the succession is still under administration and found “that the actions taken by Chantel Aymond regarding the sale of succession real estate was as independent executrix during the administration of this estate. No action was required and none was done by her as․ Trustee of the Dalila Carol Aymond Trust.”

Thus, while the property may have belonged to the Trust as of the moment of the testator's death, the Trust was not in possession of the property. Accordingly, it was impossible for Chantel to sell Trust property when the property was not yet under the control of the Trust. As I stated in my dissent to the companion case, Chantel had authority to sell succession property in her capacity as the independent executrix of the estate. The fact that she is also trustee, a role without the authority to sell Trust property, does not limit her authority as independent executrix to sell succession property while under administration.

Valentina also argued that Chantel breached her duty as trustee by failing to object to the sales. The trial court determined that “the failure of Chantel Aymond to take any action as Trustee with reference to the sale of real estate did not constitute any breach whatsoever of her duty owed to the Dalila Aymond Trust.” The trial court found that Chantel had authority to sell the property as the independent executrix and that those sales were prudent. Specifically, the trial court noted,

This court has carefully scrutinized the various sales and recognizes that the record of this case supports a finding that a substantial profit was garnered by the sales. Clearly, the property was sold in excess of its appraised value. According to Mr. Carty's deposition testimony, a 45% gain above appraisal value was secured. Mr. Carty testified regarding the sale of the real estate at Page 41 of his deposition as follows:

“Well, in my opinion, if I can make that kind of money with a sale that is something that puts a lot of money in my hands, gives me the opportunity to diversify which would reduce my risk, and perhaps increase my liquidity, more than likely it would.”

The trial court further reasoned that “[w]ith the opportunity for substantial profit for the succession by virtue of the sale of the real estate, that same profit unquestionably inures to the benefit of the Trust and to Dalila Carol Aymond as its beneficiary.”

In considering whether Chantel breached her duty to the Trust by failing to act, the trial court reasoned:

The record of this case reflects that Ms. Aymond deposited the proceeds received from the sales in certificates of deposit earning a 4.00% return. According to the uncontradicted trial testimonies of Chantel Aymond and Mr. Carty, this is a higher rate of return than was earned historically through farming operations. As supported by her trial testimony, Ms. Aymond is a certified financial planner who weighed the cost and the expenses attendant to the farming operation, the contractual obligations required in the farming operation and the overall risks related to the operation of the farm. The record of the case further supports a finding that Ms. Aymond considered the age of her sister and recognized that Dalila would not receive her share of her father's estate free from the trust for some twenty-three years. The expert testimony of Mr. Carty further supports the decisions made by Ms. Aymond in the sale of the real estate. Mr. Carty's trial testimony reflects his consideration of the risks involved in farming. He also readily acknowledged the benefit of having liquid assets for investment purposes which allow for diversification with a contemporaneous spreading of the risk associated with business.

As trustee, Chantel had a duty to act prudently and for the benefit of the Trust and Dalila. Based on the evidence in the record, the sale of the succession property under the administration of the succession greatly benefited the Trust. By not objecting to the sales, Chantel allowed the Trust and Dalila to obtain greater benefit. Therefore, it would not have been prudent for Chantel to object to the sales of the succession property. The trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that Chantel did not breach her duty to the Trust, and as such, there was insufficient cause to remove her as trustee.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because several of the characters in this case share the name Aymond we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.

2.   The pleadings use the terms “Executrix” and “Administratrix” interchangeably. We refer to Chantel as the “Executrix.”

3.   For consistency we refer to Ms. Bryan as “Valentina.”

CLAYTON DAVIS JUDGE

Wilson, J., dissents and assigns reasons. Ortego, J., dissents for reasons assigned by Judge Wilson.