SUCCESSION OF AYMOND v. << (2025)

Carol J. Aymond, Jr., was a successful attorney in Avoyelles Parish.¹ He created the irrevocable Dalila Carol Aymond Trust for his younger daughter in 2013 when she was two years old. He named Dalila as the Trust Beneficiary and his older daughter, Chantel Aymond, as the Trustee. Carol wrote a will in 2018 that left the naked ownership over the bulk of his estate to the Trust. The will left usufructs over that property to the Trust and Chantel to share one-half each. The will named Chantel, a certified financial planner, as the Executrix.

Carol died on February 26, 2021. Valentina Bryan, Dalila's mother/Carol's second former wife, seeks to reverse the trial court's judgment holding that Chantel's usufruct did not end when she sold Carol's immovable property without placing it into the Trust and that Chantel's usufruct attached to the proceeds of the sales of the property.  ² We address Valentina's motion to remove Chantel as Trustee in Bryan v. Aymond, 24-334 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/30/25), ––– So.3d ––––.

Facts and Procedural History

Carol and his first wife had two children, Carol James “Jamie” Aymond, III, and Chantel. They divorced, and Carol married Valentina in 2006. Dalila was born in 2011. Carol and Valentina divorced in 2013.

The plain language of Carol's will states:

I will and bequeath to the ․ Trust naked ownership of any and all assets and properties which I die possessed of (movable and immovable) subject to a lifetime usufruct in favor of Chantel ․ over an undivided 1/212 interest in all property subject to this bequest. It is the testator's intent that pursuant to this usufruct, during her lifetime, Chantel ․ shall earn 1/212 of all funds derived from this property, whith [sic] the remaining funds to be retained by the ․ Trust. This usufruct interest shall terminate at her death resulting in full ownership of all property by the ․ Trust.

Carol died possessed of 2,371.02 acres of land to be delivered to the Trust. The Trust Agreement prohibited the Trustee from selling, exchanging, mortgaging, or otherwise transferring immovable property contributed to the Trust. Thus, the will contemplated Chantel would have the use of a one-half interest in the Trust property. She would also enjoy half the fruits produced by the Trust property.

Chantel's filings as Executrix led the trial court to issue letters of provisional administration, probate Carol's will, appoint Chantel as the Independent Executrix, and issue Letters of Independent Executorship confirming Chantel's appointment.³ The Letters “qualified, authorized[,] and empowered” Chantel to “[a]cquire and transfer property to or for the Decedent's succession, by sale, purchase[,] or exchange ․ for whatever price that the Independent Executrix deems prudent in the exercise of her fiduciary duty[.]”

Chantel, as Independent Executrix, then sold 81.7% of the 2,371.02 acres of Carol's land (approximately 1,937 acres) for millions of dollars without placing the property in the Trust. The approximate value of Carol's estate was $10 million with around $1.2 million in cash on the date of his death. While Chantel would have enjoyed half the earnings generated by the immovable property had she placed it in the Trust as required by Carol's will, she now claims her usufruct extends to half the cash generated by the sale. She believes her rights as usufructuary are subordinate to her administration of Carol's estate.

Valentina filed a petition to remove Chantel as the Independent Executrix in part because Chantel had sold the property. Chantel maintained she sold the property because she could obtain a better yield on cash investments than on land rents, and the Trust would have more value than if she kept the property.

Chantel responded to Valentina's petition with a Motion for Declaratory Judgment. The trial court's September 29, 2023 judgment on that motion declared the Trust to be the naked owner of 100% of the estate and the co-usufructuary of an undivided one-half interest. It recognized Chantel as the co-usufructuary of the other undivided one-half interest in the estate. The trial court found Chantel had full authority to sell the property in her role as Executrix, the sales she made were prudent, and she had no conflict acting as both Executrix and Trustee. Indeed, the trial court described Chantel's actions as “a win/win situation for all concerned.” The trial court did not determine the duration of Chantel's usufruct.

In a second judgment of April 2, 2024, the trial court addressed Valentina's petition and found Chantel acted as Executrix and not as “a potential usufructuary ․ or as Trustee” regarding the sale of the property. Thus, the Trust and Chantel, according to the trial court, can equally use the net proceeds of the land sales. The trial court dismissed all of Valentina's demands. Valentina now seeks reversal of the trial court's judgment approving Chantel's sales of the property and recognizing her usufruct over half the proceeds of the sales. She also seeks review of the trial court's denial of her objections to the testimony and qualifications of an expert witness at trial.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Valentina alleges the trial court's legal and manifest errors for finding Chantel's usufruct did not terminate when she sold the property of the estate and by allowing the usufruct to attach to the proceeds of the sales. Additionally, Valentina says the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of an expert witness into evidence.

DISCUSSION

Our de novo review addresses legal issues involving the succession and Chantel's usufruct. See Westlawn Cemeteries, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Cemetery Bd., 21-1414 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So.3d 548.

One issue drives all others in this case: did Chantel have authority and discretion to sell Carol's property, or was she obligated to transfer it directly to the Trust? The answer decides whether Chantel's usufruct ended when she sold Carol's property or whether her usufruct attaches to the proceeds of the sale. We consider first whether Chantel had the authority to sell Carol's property. We then decide how to deal with her usufruct.

Sale of the property

The clear and plain language of the will answers the question. It left “all assets and properties which [Carol] die[d] possessed of (movable and immovable)” to Dalila's Trust subject to Chantel's usufruct. The charge to the Executrix was to transfer all of Carol's property to the Trust upon his death. Once the naked ownership of the property was in the Trust, Chantel would get half the earnings and the Trust would get the other half.

“The intent of the testator controls the interpretation of his testament. If the language of the testament is clear, its letter is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” La.Civ.Code art. 1611(A). Such is the “cardinal rule of the interpretation of wills[.]” Succession of Liner, 19-2011, p. 4 (La. 6/30/21), 320 So.3d 1133, 1137.

The Trust is a “particular successor” that succeeded to the property Carol intended to bequeath – the naked ownership and a one-half usufruct of his property. La.Civ.Code art. 935. The naked ownership and the usufruct of half of Carol's estate became vested in the Trust at the moment of his death. Id. Chantel's usufruct over half that property, movable and immovable, came into being at the same time. Id. The Trust Agreement prohibited Chantel (or any Trustee) from “sell[ing], exchang[ing], mortgag[ing,] or otherwise transfer[ring] immovable property contributed to the [T]rust.” Chantel's duty – and the only thing she had authority to do in any role – was to transfer Carol's property to the Trust.

Further, La.Civ.Code art. 568 prohibits Chantel, a usufructuary, from disposing “of nonconsumable things” without the express right to do so. Land is a “nonconsumable thing.” La.Civ.Code art. 537. Chantel argues La.Civ.Code art. 568.1 gives her the usufruct over the proceeds of the sale of Carol's land. She ignores the detail that La.Civ.Code art. 539 gives her only the right to possess the land “and to derive the utility, profits, and advantages that [it] may produce, under the obligation of preserving [its] substance.”

Sadly, Chantel's unauthorized sales cannot be undone to restore the property to the Trust and to allow Chantel and the Trust to enjoy their rightful use and fruits of it. Chantel lost the use and the fruits of the 1,937 acres she failed to preserve in the Trust. We note that Carol's will requires Chantel to transfer full ownership of the remaining land (the acreage she did not sell) to the Trust.

Chantel argues her role as Executrix, under the guise of which she sold the property, is separate from her roles as usufructuary and Trustee. She claims the Trust's rights as naked owner/co-usufructuary and her rights as co-usufructuary are subordinate to the administration of the estate under La.Civ.Code art. 938(B). This is plainly not the case. Once Chantel breached her fiduciary duty to follow her father's wishes in his will, a hopeless conflict arose in her overlapping roles as Executrix, usufructuary, and Trustee. She could not divorce her duty as Trustee to preserve the property (or at least to offer the right of first refusal to Carol's descendants as set out in the will) from her duties as Executrix and usufructuary. Her roles meshed only if she followed her father's wishes and delivered all assets and property to the Trust. As Trustee, she could then preserve the property and, as usufructuary, enjoy half the earnings produced by the property. Carol's vision assumed Chantel would honor his wishes in all the roles he assigned to her. Nothing suggests he favored or valued her role as usufructuary over her obligations as Executrix and Trustee.

Chantel engaged in self-dealing. By not immediately delivering the property to the Trust as she was supposed to do, she could avoid the restriction she faced as Trustee from selling the property. By selling it, she converted immovables into cash and now claims half the proceeds of the sales – millions of dollars to her benefit. The simple and direct plan laid out in Carol's will prohibits what Chantel did.

Chantel defends her actions by contending Carol's estate and, by extension the Trust, financially benefited from the sale of the land and created a greater return than it would have otherwise produced. That argument is irrelevant; Chantel's job was to deliver all of Carol's property to the Trust, not to try to grow its value as she saw fit. She failed in her charge and violated her fiduciary duty by not following the will's directive. To find otherwise would allow Chantel to rewrite Carol's will, an act our law prohibits. La.Civ. Code art. 1611(A).

Chantel's usufruct

The trial court believed Chantel's good faith performance of her duties could not “be used to either take away her inheritance or reduce her usufruct to an amount less than the legacy amount of 50% provided in her father's will.” Had Chantel delivered Carol's property to the Trust as required by his will, we would agree. But Chantel violated the terms of the will and the Trust Agreement when she sold the property.

How does this affect Chantel's usufruct over Carol's estate? “The usufruct may be terminated by the naked owner if the usufructuary ․ alienates things without authority ․ or abuses his enjoyment in any other manner.” La.Civ. Code art. 623. Comment (d) explains that “[u]nauthorized alienation by the usufructuary of property is an abuse of the enjoyment.” When “the usufructuary abuses his enjoyment, the usufruct may terminate in part or in whole.” La.Civ.Code art. 623, comment (b).

When a usufruct is terminated:

the court may decree termination of the usufruct or decree that the property be delivered to the naked owner on the condition that he shall pay to the usufructuary a reasonable annuity until the end of the usufruct. The amount of the annuity shall be based on the value of the usufruct.

La.Civ.Code art. 624.

Chantel lost her right to use the land and enjoy the fruits of it when she sold it without authority contrary to the directive of Carol's will. No provision in the will, the Trust Agreement, or the law allows for the creation of a new usufruct over the cash proceeds from the sale. The usufruct property is gone. Thus, Chantel's usufruct extends to the remaining immovable property and the movable property Chantel is obligated to place in the Trust, but not to the cash from the unauthorized property sales.

Because we find that Chantel's usufruct ended in part when she sold the land without authorization and did not attach to the proceeds of the sales of Carol's land, we do not need to consider the evidentiary issue of whether the trial court erred in allowing the expert testimony into evidence.

CONCLUSION

Chantel ignored and violated the clear directives of Carol's will when she sold the bulk of his immovable property and turned it into cash over which she now claims a usufruct. Chantel does not have a usufruct over the cash; her usufruct over the property ended when she sold it, and it does not extend to the cash from the sales. Her usufruct extends only to what was left after she removed the land from the snapshot of the estate at the moment of Carol's death.

DECREE

We reverse the ruling of the trial court and hold Chantel sold Carol's immovable property without authorization. We further hold Chantel's usufruct ended in part by her unauthorized acts. The Trust's full ownership – naked ownership and usufruct – extends to all the proceeds of the sales of the land and to half the Trust's movable and remaining immovable property. Chantel's usufruct extends to the other half of the Trust's movable and remaining immovable property.

We remand this matter to the trial court to decide the amount of an annuity to be paid by the Trust for Chantel's benefit. The amount of the annuity shall reflect the value of Chantel's usufruct according to La.Civ.Code art. 624. The trial court shall also decide the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by the Trust as a result of Chantel's unauthorized actions and shall assess those fees and costs to Chantel.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion in this case and would affirm the judgment of the trial court, which denied the objections to the testimony and qualifications of Mr. Steven Carty as an expert, denied demands for the removal of Chantel G. Aymond as independent executrix of the succession of Carol Aymond, Jr., and denied demands for the termination/reduction of the usufructuary rights of Chantel.

The majority opinion correctly notes that the driving issue in this case is whether Chantel had the authority to sell Carol's immovable property. However, the majority fails to first discuss the appropriate standard of review in this case. On appeal, Valentina asserts that the trial court committed legal error and manifest error when it concluded that Chantel's usufruct did not terminate, and when it authorized the usufruct to attach to the proceeds received in the sales of immovable property. While questions of law are reviewed de novo, a trial court's finding of fact may not be set aside unless it is clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). The trial court's ruling in this case included several facts, and we may not set aside these findings in the absence of manifest error.

The majority holds that “the only thing [Chantel] had authority to do in any role – was to transfer Carol's property to the Trust.” While the majority thoroughly explored the limitations placed on Chantel as a usufructuary and trustee, this conclusion ignores the authority granted to independent executors.

The testator, a skilled attorney, chose to make Chantel an independent executrix of his succession and chose not to put any limitations on her authority to act in that role. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3396.15 provides that “an independent administrator shall have all the rights, powers, authorities, privileges, and duties of a succession representative provided in Chapters 4 through 12 of this Title, but without the necessity of delay for objection, or application to, or any action in or by, the court.” According to La.Civ.Code art. 3261 (emphasis added), “[a] succession representative may sell succession property in order to pay debts and legacies, or for any other purpose, when authorized by the court as provided in this Chapter.” The law is clear that independent executors are authorized to sell property.

In order for the sale of succession property to be proper, “[t]here must be good reasons for the sale[,] and it must be in the best interest of the succession.” Succession of Shepherd, 454 So.2d 1265, 1267 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1984). The propriety of the sale of succession property is a question of fact. Chantel stated that her reasons for selling the properties were two-fold: (1) there was concern that the estate could be worth in excess of twenty-five million dollars, and there could be a substantial estate tax owed in excess of the 1.2 million dollars in cash owned by the estate; and (2) given the risks involved with farming operations, a higher rate of return could be earned on the market.

“The approval of an application to sell succession property at private sale rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. Because Chantel was an independent executrix, it was not necessary for her to receive court approval before completing the sales; however, after reviewing the record the trial court accepted the reasons for sale provided by Chantel and found that the sales were in the best interest of the Succession. Although no estate tax was ultimately owed by the estate, that fact had not been established at the time Chantel began making the sales, and she testified that she was concerned that sales had to be completed promptly to ensure adequate funds were available before the tax deadline in the event an estate tax was owed. Both parties initially believed that the estate could be worth over twenty-five million dollars, well over the exclusion amount. Moreover, after considering the historical return on investment received through farming operations and the risks involved in such compared to historical returns in the market coupled with the advantage of having liquid assets in terms of diversification and spreading of risk, it appears that the succession would benefit greatly from the sales. The trial court found this to be a good reason. I do not find that the trial court abused its discretion or manifestly erred in finding the sales of succession property were prudent.

Holding that Chantel had authority as independent executrix to sell the property, we must consider whether her exercise of this authority requires the termination or reduction of her usufructuary rights. The majority asserts that under La.Civ.Code art. 935, ownership of Chantel's usufruct vested at the time of the testator's death. While ownership may have vested, the trial court found that “this succession is still in administration[,]” and that “Chantel Aymond has not yet been placed in possession of her one half (1/2) usufructuary interest.” It further reasoned that “the actions taken by Chantel Aymond with reference to the sales of real estate were solely in her capacity as Independent Executrix and no action whatsoever has been taken by her in this succession proceeding as potential usufructuary under the terms of the decedent's will.” I agree with the trial court's finding.

The majority reasons that under La.Civ.Code art. 623, the usufruct may be terminated when the usufructuary alienates the property subject to the usufruct; however, it does not provide for termination of the usufruct if the property is alienated by the independent executrix of the succession. If Chantel was not acting in her capacity as usufructuary, this article does not apply. No law has been cited which provides for the termination of a usufruct when the subject property is sold by an independent executor during the administration of a succession. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the usufruct of Chantel was not terminated.

The trial court also did not err in ruling that Chantel is the “usufructuary of the remaining one-half (1/2) of the net proceeds from the sale of the land.” As previously stated, the estate is currently under administration. Louisiana Civil Code Article 938(B) provides that “[i]f a successor exercises his rights of ownership after the qualification of a succession representative, the effect of that exercise is subordinate to the administration of the estate.” Comment (b) to this article clarifies that “in a testate succession, if the testament leaves Blackacre to A, and the succession representative sells Blackacre, A's rights attach to the proceeds, and no other successor would be able to dispose of Blackacre either prior to qualification of a succession representative or during administration.” In this case, the rights of Chantel as usufructuary are subordinate to the administration of the estate. Succession property subject to the usufruct was sold by the independent executrix during the administration, as such, the usufructuary rights that were attached to the property now attach to the proceeds of the sales. The trial court did not err in declaring Chantel the usufructuary of one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of the land.

Because the majority finds that Chantel lacked authority to sell succession property, her usufruct ended when she sold the land without authorization, and her usufruct did not attach to the proceeds of the sales, they do not consider the evidentiary issue of whether the trial court erred in allowing Mr. Carty's testimony into evidence. Because I respectfully disagree with the majority's holding and find that the sales were authorized, I will now consider the evidentiary issue.

Valentina asserts that the trial court committed an error of law in its evidentiary rulings by allowing the irrelevant, immaterial, and non-pertinent speculation of Mr. Carty into evidence. The trial court found that the testimony of Mr. Carty was competent expert testimony and relevant for the purpose of determining whether Chantel's sale of the land was prudent.

When determining the issue of admissibility of expert testimony, La.Code Evid. art. 702 is applicable and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:

(1) The expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(2) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(4) The expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

In considering Valentina's objections to the testimony of Mr. Carty, the trial court carefully examined each requirement of the article and the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), noting the following:

In this regard, the first requirement for relevant expert testimony under La. Code of Evidence, Art. 702 requires that expert's scientific, technical, or otherwise special knowledge would help the trier of fact to determine a fact in issue. After reviewing Mr. Carty's deposition, this Court concludes that his findings are based on historically accurate data which is sourced from publicly available data bases published on a daily basis, namely Bloomberg and other. The data used by Mr. Carty satisfies requirement two (2) of Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 702 in that his testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data. Moreover, the record of this case is void of any information to challenge the accuracy of this data relied on by Mr. Carty in support of his expert opinion. Additionally, Mr. Carty's methodology required him to multiply the net proceeds received from the sales of the succession properties concerned by the 30-year average return from various investment classes to show the estimated return on each separate investment class. Mr. Carty used publicly sourced data that is subject of review to determine an average 30-year annual rate of return; he then applied those average rates of return to the net proceeds generated from the sales of the real estate in the Aymond succession. His testimony provides a historical perspective of investing done in readily available index funds at different levels of risk; his testimony does not offer a future prediction (page 51, Deposition of Mr. Carty).

This court further finds that Mr. Carty's testimony and analysis fully comply with provision three (3) of the Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 702; his testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods. The record of this case is void of evidence that asserts with specificity how Mr. Carty's methodology was flawed or how he made a mistake in his calculations. Moreover, this Court recognizes that the purchase prices of the various real estate sales in the succession proceedings total $6,784,723.57. After deducting the broker's fees and the capital gains taxes, the results show that an investment of $6,529,496.00 in the S&P 500 index would yield a return of $736,096.00 on an annual basis; this is based on a 30-year historical review of the S&P 500 index. Assuming the aforesaid funds were invested in fixed corporate bonds, they would yield a return of $334,882.00 on an annual basis based on a 30-year review of the Bloomberg U.S. Corporate Bond Index Return. If these same funds were invested in treasury bonds, said bonds would yield a return of $291,172.00 on an annual basis, again, based on a 30-year historical review of the Bloomberg U.S. Treasury Index Return. If the same funds were invested in treasury bills, said funds would yield $161,256.00 on an annual basis, based upon the same 30-year historical review of the Bloomberg U.S. Treasury Index. Finally, if the same funds were invested in a blended portfolio, said funds would yield an earning of $550,877.00 on an annual basis, based on the same 30-year historical review of the foregoing indices comprised of 60% equity, 20% corporate bonds, 10% treasury bonds and 10% treasury bills. A review of Mr. Carty's deposition reflects that his analysis reliably applied the principles and methods of his field to the net purchase price of the property sold by Ms. Aymond. In this regard, requirement four (4) of the Louisiana Code of Evidence 702 is met; the expert has readily applied the principles and methods to the facts of this case. (Mr. Carty Deposition, Pages 25 & 26 and Affidavit – Exhibit A-1).

The record reflects Mr. Carty's list of qualifications attached to his Affidavit (see Exhibit A-1 of record). He was tendered at page 40 of his deposition as an expert based upon his more than fifty years of experience in dealing with investment portfolios and as a certified financial planner. He has been qualified in multiple states including Louisiana and holds eight certifications in his field. This Court considers Mr. Carty an expert in his field as a Certified Financial Planner. By virtue of his many years of experience and training and his various certifications in his profession, this Court recognizes him as an expert and his opinion is recognized as valid and entitled to much weight as his findings are substantiated by the record of this case. Under Daubert, supra, Mr. Carty's expert testimony is admissible as he is qualified to provide competent testimony regarding the matters that he has testified to in this case; his methodology by which he has reached his conclusions are reliable as required by Daubert, supra, and his testimony assists this Court through the application of his technical and his specialized expertise in resolving issues of fact presented in this litigation.

“[A] district court is afforded broad discretion in determining whether expert testimony is admissible, and its decision with respect thereto shall not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.” Blair v. Coney, 19-795, p. 8 (La. 4/3/20), 340 So.3d 775, 781. In this case, the trial court reviewed the testimony of Mr. Carty and applied the applicable law. The trial court determined that:

His testimony meets all requirements of Louisiana Code of Evidence Article [402], Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 702 and all factors of Daubert, supra, regarding expert testimony. This Court finds that his testimony is relevant for the purposes of determining whether or not Ms. Aymond's sale of the land was prudent as Independent Executrix of the Succession of Carol James Aymond, Jr. and beneficial to the [Dalila] Carol Aymond Trust. The objections filed by Mrs. Bryan in her capacity as Natural Tutrix of Dalila Carol Aymond to his testimony and his qualifications as an expert are without merit and the motions to exclude and/or strike his testimony are hereby denied.

In this case, Valentina made assertions that Chantel breached her duty both as a succession representative and as trustee when she sold succession real estate. In evaluating those claims, it was necessary for the trial court to determine the prudence of the sales. Mr. Carty's testimony was highly relevant in that regard. After reviewing the record in this case, it is evident that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Mr. Carty.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because several of the characters in this case share the name “Aymond,” we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.

2.   For consistency we refer to Ms. Bryan as “Valentina.”

3.   The pleadings use the terms “Executrix” and “Administratrix” interchangeably. We refer to Chantel as the “Executrix.”

DAVIS, Judge.

Wilson, J., dissents and assigns reasons. Ortego, J., dissents for reasons assigned by Judge Wilson.