STATE v. PAIGE (2025)

The State of Louisiana charged the defendant, Montrey Trevell Paige, by bill of information with illegal carrying of weapons while in possession of or during the sale or distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E) (count two); distribution or possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance (heroin), a violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) and (B)(3)(a) (count three); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count four).¹ The defendant initially entered a plea of not guilty on each count. However, pursuant to a final plea agreement, the defendant subsequently pled guilty to each offense in the instant matter, as well as pled guilty to two additional offenses in companion cases bearing docket numbers 1900133 and 1900176, which are the subject of two related appeals previously decided by this court. See Louisiana v. Paige, 2024-0141 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/10/24), 2024 WL 5050215, *1 (unpublished); State v. Paige, 2024-0142 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/21/24), 2024 WL 4850505, *1 (unpublished).²

The defendant failed to appear for sentencing and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas for all five offenses. The trial court denied that motion. At his next court appearance, the defendant re-urged his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court again denied. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to ten years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count two; forty years imprisonment at hard labor on count three;³ and twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count four, with each sentence to be served concurrently.⁴ The defendant now appeals, designating three assignments of error. For the following reasons, we set aside the defendant's convictions and sentences and remand for further proceedings, allowing the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas.

BREACH OF PLEA AGREEMENT

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to order specific performance of the plea agreement or, alternatively, in failing to set aside his guilty pleas. The defendant contends the State breached the plea agreement by imposing an additional condition after he entered his pleas, rendering his pleas constitutionally infirm.

In determining the validity of plea bargain agreements, Louisiana courts generally refer to rules of contract law, while recognizing a criminal defendant's constitutional right to fairness may be broader than his or her rights under contract law. State v. Givens, 99-3518 (La. 1/17/01), 776 So.2d 443, 455. The four elements of a valid contract are: (1) the parties’ capacity to contract; (2) the parties’ freely given mutual consent; (3) the existence of a certain, lawful object for the contract; and (4) the existence of a lawful purpose, or cause, of the contract. State v. Rider, 2023-0164 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/9/23), 379 So.3d 49, 52, writ denied, 2023-01711 (La. 6/5/24), 3 85 So.3d 1160. See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1918, 1927, 1966, and 1971. Under substantive criminal law, there are two alternative remedies available for a breach of a plea bargain: (1) specific performance of the agreement; or (2) nullification or withdrawal of the plea. The party demanding performance of a plea bargain agreement has the burden of proving its existence and the terms thereof. Rider, 379 So.3d at 52-53.

A valid guilty plea must be a voluntary choice by the defendant and not the result of force or threats. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 556.1. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must personally inform the defendant of the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, and the maximum possible penalty. Id. The trial court must also determine whether the defendant has voluntarily and knowingly waived his right against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, and his right to confrontation. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969);⁵ State v. Young, 2020-0049 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/6/20), 315 So.3d 904, 907, writ denied, 2020-01402 (La. 2/9/21), 310 So.3d 177.

The withdrawal of a guilty plea is predicated on a legal cause, that is, on a showing made by a defendant that his plea bargain was constitutionally infirm, creating a legal defect that nullifies the agreement between the parties. Young, 315 So.3d at 907-08. A guilty plea is constitutionally infirm when it is not entered freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin colloquy was inadequate, or when a defendant is induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain or what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain and that bargain is not kept. A constitutionally infirm guilty plea may be set aside either by means of an appeal or post-conviction relief. Id. at 907.

On November 16, 2021, the State and the defendant agreed the defendant would enter guilty pleas in exchange for a combined sentence of eighteen years.⁶ The State further agreed not to file a habitual offender bill of information against the defendant. The trial court then conducted a colloquy with the defendant on the record to determine whether his pleas were entered with the defendant's full knowledge of its consequences. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712-13. The trial court advised the defendant of the nature of the charges, the mandatory minimum sentences, and the possible maximum sentences. The defendant stated that he understood same. The trial court then advised the defendant of his rights under Boykin, which the defendant waived. The defendant subsequently entered his guilty pleas.

The trial court then asked the defendant whether he was threatened or coerced to enter a plea, and the defendant responded, “Basically.” Defense counsel spoke with the defendant for a few minutes regarding his answer. When the trial court again asked the defendant whether he was threatened or coerced to enter a plea, the defendant asked what the trial court meant by coercion. The trial court stated to the defendant, “You just had several minutes to discuss with your attorney what that means” to which the defendant responded, “No sir, I haven't. No sir.” The following colloquy then occurred:

[THE STATE]: Judge, right. I don't think – I think what – he's confused by the fact that I'd be habitual offendering him. And he'd have been looking at a lot more time. And he's thinking that might be coercion. But coercion is: I have threatened you with bodily harm, or life, or taken something away from you․.

[THE DEFENDANT]: Eighty years is life.

[THE STATE]: Okay. I understand. But that's not a coercion. That's just a fact of law that your Judge – that your attorney and I've explained to you. I mean that's – that's what he would get on a habitual offender.

THE COURT: The calculation of time is not considered coercion. We have to inform you of what you're looking at because if not, then you wouldn't be fully informed. And that's why we have to inform you of what your exposure could be.

When the trial court asked the defendant a third time whether he felt threatened or coerced to enter the plea, the defendant responded negatively. The defendant then stated he was not promised anything more lenient than the plea deal offered that day. The trial court asked whether the offer was the best offer given since the defendant received new charges (the three charges in the instant case), at which point the following discussion took place:

[THE STATE]: That's correct, Judge. But after consulting with the court and with my office, Your Honor, it has to be sentencing on [November 19, 2021].

THE COURT: Right.

[THE STATE]: That he understands if he gets in any other criminal conduct, he gets arrested even for a traffic ticket, he – he does not show up, the State of Louisiana is not going to withdraw, but we have the right to ask for the maximum amount sentence, which is going to be the forty. And the [S]tate will be filing a habitual offender if he doesn't show up [on November 19, 2021] for sentencing[.]

THE COURT: All right.

[THE STATE]: But right now, the offer is eighteen total.

THE COURT: All right.

The trial court asked defense counsel whether he had advised the defendant of the nature of the charges and his legal and constitutional rights and whether he believed the defendant understood his advice. Counsel responded affirmatively to each question and stated he did not have any further advice for the defendant. The trial court then asked the defendant whether he had any questions, to which he responded he did not. The defendant further stated he was satisfied with his attorney's representation.

The trial court accepted the defendant's guilty pleas, finding them to be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The trial court noted the defendant wished to exercise the sentencing delay “based upon the agreed stipulations that we've previously put on the record.” The trial court advised the defendant that sentencing was set for November 19, 2021, “with the stipulations that the ankle monitor is to remain, that there's no new criminal activity, and you remain at your home[.]” When the trial court asked whether anything else needed to be put on the record, the State responded: “No. He – he understands that he has to be here, no criminal conduct, ankle bracelet on, or Em able to ask for the forty years and file a habitual offender. So, he just needs to show up, be ready for remand.”

Three days later, on November 19, 2021, the defendant failed to appear for sentencing. That same day, his attorney filed a motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty pleas, arguing the plea colloquy demonstrated his pleas were accepted unintelligently and unknowingly. Specifically, the defendant noted he twice stated he felt threatened or coerced to enter a plea, and he had to consider pleading guilty to the charges he received in the instant case just three months prior in August. Thus, the defendant contended that “because of the immense pressure to reconsider his plea options, [he] did not recall being advised of all of his rights enunciated in Boykin[,]” nor did he “recall being apprised by the [c]ourt of the possible sentences for the offenses for which he plead [sic] guilty to.” (Emphasis added).

When neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared for the hearing on March 15, 2022, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty pleas. The defendant re-urged the motion on February 27, 2023, asserting the same grounds alleged in the written motion; namely, his plea was not voluntary and knowing because he twice stated during the plea colloquy that he felt coerced to plead guilty and was very reluctant to take the plea deal. The trial court again denied the motion and stated the defendant was not coerced; rather, he did not understand the definition of coercion. The trial court found the defendant knowingly and intelligently accepted the plea agreement “and then didn't want to face the time that he was facing then.” The defendant noted his objection without reasons. The trial court then imposed the maximum sentences on each of the instant offenses.⁷

On appeal, the defendant does not repeat the arguments made in his written motion to withdraw his guilty pleas or at the motion hearing. Instead, he argues his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Specifically, he claims that after he entered his guilty pleas, the State set an additional condition regarding the consequences of his failure to appear at sentencing; namely, that the State would seek the maximum sentence and file a habitual offender bill of information against him. The defendant further claims the trial court failed to inquire whether he understood or accepted such term. Thus, he contends the State breached the plea agreement, and this court should vacate his sentences and remand the matter to the trial court for specific performance of the plea agreement or to allow him the opportunity to withdraw his pleas.

At the outset, we note a defendant ordinarily may not raise an argument for the first time on appeal. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 841(A). However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently permitted a constitutionally infirm guilty plea to be withdrawn after sentencing by way of appeal or post-conviction relief. State v. Dixon, 449 So.2d 463, 464 (La. 1984). Further, courts have reviewed claims of constitutionally infirm pleas on appeal even in the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See State v. Gamboa, 2022-806 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/13/23), 3 70 So.3d 1260, 1266, writ denied, 2023-013 76 (La. 4/9/24), 3 82 So.3d 842; State v. Hebert, 2002-884 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/02), 838 So.2d 30, 31-32; State v. West, 97-1638 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98), 713 So.2d 693, 695. As the defendant in this case did file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we will address his claim that his plea was constitutionally infirm based on the additional term set by the State.⁸ See State v. Casson, 2007-1081 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/4/09), 2 So.3d 1246, 1247-48, writ denied, 2009-0501 (La. 11/20/09), 25 So.3d 785 (court vacated original judgment finding defendant precluded from asserting new ground for withdrawal of guilty plea, noting the issues raised on appeal are “ ‘core constitutional rights of the defendant-they are not “trial errors” that are normally waived by failing to file a contemporaneous objection.’ ”).

On appeal, the defendant relies on the three Rider cases—State v. Rider, 2023-0162 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/9/23), 379 So.3d 40, writ denied, 2023-01713 (La. 6/5/24), 385 So.3d 1154; State v. Rider, 2023-0163 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/9/23), 379 So.3d 45, writ denied, 2023-01706 (La. 6/5/24), 385 So.3d 1158; and State v. Rider, 2023-0164 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/9/23), 379 So.3d 49, writ denied, 2023-01711 (La. 6/5/24), 385 So.3d 1160—in arguing that his convictions and sentences should be set aside and the case remanded so he has the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas. In the Rider matter, the defendant initially pled not guilty to three nonviolent felony offenses, but later pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Rider, 379 So.3d at 42; Rider, 379 So.3d at 46; Rider, 379 So.3d at 51. During the Boykin examination, defense counsel stated the defendant would enter guilty pleas “as per our pretrial discussions.” Id. at 43; Id. at 48; Id. at 52. After the plea colloquy concluded, the State advised the defendant it would file a habitual offender bill of information against him if he failed to appear for sentencing. Defense counsel stated he understood. When the defendant failed to appear for sentencing, the State filed a habitual offender bill against him. Id.; Id.; Id. The defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court denied. Id. at 42; Id. at 47; Id. at 51. The trial court adjudicated the defendant a fourth-felony offender and sentenced him to twenty years in prison without benefits on each offense. On review, this court set aside the Rider defendant's convictions, habitual offender adjudication, and sentences and remanded to the trial court to allow the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas. Id.; Id.; Id. This court found the plea colloquy did not establish the defendant consented to or understood the consequences of the additional condition the State attempted to impose after the defendant pled guilty. Id. at 44; Id. at 48-49; Id. at 53-54. Further, the defendant signed a written plea agreement, which specifically provided for no additional conditions other than those contained in the plea colloquy. Thus, this court found the State unilaterally changed the terms of the agreement after the defendant entered his guilty pleas, thereby rendering the pleas invalid. Id.; Id. at 49; Id. at 53.

We recognize that in the Rider matter, the defendant therein was not informed on the record prior to entering his plea that his failure to appear at sentencing would result in the filing of a habitual offender bill. Rather, the State added the condition at the end of the plea colloquy after the trial court accepted the plea. The defendant also signed a written plea agreement providing that no additional conditions, other than those in the plea colloquy, were to be imposed. Id.; Id. at 48-49; Id. at 53-54.

In opposition, the State argues that because the defendant was aware of what would occur should he fail to appear for sentencing, he should not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The State contends this case is distinguishable from the Rider matter because in the Rider cases, the defendant signed a written plea form which provided that no additional understandings, promises, or conditions were entered into other than those contained in the plea colloquy. The State further argues that in the Rider matter, unlike in the present case, the failure to appear edict was added after the defendant entered his guilty pleas. The State argues that the present case is similar to State v. Stewart, 2003-976 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/03), 862 So.2d 1271, 1276-77, wherein the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal upheld an increased sentence after the defendant failed to appear at his previously set sentencing date. In Stewart, 862 So.2d at 1276, the trial court specifically asked the defendant if he understood that if he did not show up for sentencing, his sentence would be different and he could receive the maximum sentence, to which the defendant replied that he did. The Fifth Circuit found the transcript of the plea colloquy clearly showed the defendant was informed of his rights and the consequences of his plea, and that the plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Stewart, 862 So.2d at 1276-77.

The record in the present case indicates that after the defendant entered his guilty plea, but before the trial court accepted the plea, the State put on the record that if the defendant did not appear for his sentencing, the State would have the right to ask for the maximum forty-year sentence and would file a habitual offender bill. The trial court asked the defendant if he had any questions, to which the defendant answered, “No. sir.” The trial court accepted the defendant's plea and indicated its understanding that the defendant wished to exercise the sentencing delay “based upon the agreed stipulations that we've previously put on the record.” We note the transcript does not reflect that the defendant agreed to the condition set forth by the State—that if the defendant did not appear for sentencing, the State would seek the maximum sentence and file a habitual offender bill. The only response to that statement was from the trial court, which responded, “All right.” The trial court then advised the defendant his sentencing was set for November 19, 2021, “with the stipulations that the ankle monitor is to remain, that there's no new criminal activity, and you remain at your home[.]” After the trial court asked, “All right?”, and the defendant replied, “Yes, sir.”

Thus, while the transcript of the plea colloquy shows the defendant acknowledged the stipulation that the ankle monitor was to remain, there would be no new criminal activity, and he was to remain at home, there is no acknowledgment by the defendant that he consented to or understood that if he did not appear for his sentencing, the State would have the right to ask for the maximum forty-year sentence and would file a habitual offender bill. Unlike in Stewart, 862 So.2d at 1276-77, the trial court in this case did not ask the defendant if he understood that his sentence would be different if he did not show up for sentencing. There is no evidence the defendant agreed to the maximum sentence or the filing of a habitual offender bill if he failed to appear for sentencing. The defendant's failure to ask questions or any other tacit acquiescence in the decision to plead guilty cannot render the plea valid. See Rider, 379 So.3d at 44; Rider, 379 So.3d at 48; Rider, 379 So.3d at 53.

Because there was no existing plea agreement providing for the maximum sentence or the filing of a habitual offender bill, there was no plea agreement for which to demand specific performance. Accordingly, we find merit in the defendant's first assignment of error. We set aside the defendant's convictions and sentences and remand the case for further proceedings, allowing the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas.⁹

DECREE

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES SET ASIDE; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS.

I concur with the result. I am bound to follow two companion cases, Louisiana v. Paige, 2024-0141 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/10/24), 2024 WL 5050215 (unpublished), and State v. Paige, 2024-0142 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/21/24), 2024 WL 4850505 (unpublished). In both cases, this Court set aside the defendant's conviction and sentence and remanded the matter for further proceedings to allow the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. I am compelled to do the same.

Although I concur due to the unique posture of this case, I would join Judge Hester in dissenting if a defendant in a subsequent case sought to withdraw a guilty plea based on similar facts.

Respectfully, I dissent from the majority opinion. I find the defendant was informed of his rights and the consequences of his plea, and the plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State entered a nolle prosequi on count one (possession with intent to distribute a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance).

2.   This matter bears docket number 2101766 and is the subject of the instant appeal (2023 KA 1341). Under docket number 1900133 (2024 KA 0141), the defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin. See Louisiana v. Paige, 2024 WL 5050215 at *1. Under docket number 1900176 (2024 KA 0142), the defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana with an aggregate weight of less than two and one-half pounds. See State v. Paige, 2024 WL 4850505 at *1.

3.   In the defendant's third assignment of error, he contends there is a discrepancy in the record regarding the sentence imposed on count three. The State concedes this assignment of error has merit. On count three, the sentencing transcript reflects the trial court imposed a sentence of forty years imprisonment at hard labor without restricting benefits. However, the minute entry and commitment order state the trial court imposed the sentence without benefits. The penalty provision of the possession with intent to distribute heroin statute does not authorize such a restriction. See La. R.S. 40:966(B)(3)(a). Where there is a discrepancy between the transcript and a minute entry and/or commitment order, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). See also State v. Johnson, 2020-0679 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/28/21), 2021 WL 1662420, *6 n.4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2021-00802 (La. 10/5/21), 325 So.3d 381. Normally, we would remand for correction of the minutes and the commitment order and for transmission of a corrected commitment order to the Department of Corrections. See State v. McMooain, 2014-1067 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/6/15), 2015 WL 997164, *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2015-0655 (La. 2/26/16), 187 So.3d 467. However, because we are setting aside the defendant's convictions and sentences and remanding for further proceedings to allow the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas, we pretermit consideration of the defendant's third assignment of error as moot.

4.   The trial court ordered the sentences in the instant matter to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed in the two companion cases. Under docket number 1900133 (2024 KA 0141), the trial court sentenced the defendant to forty years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the sentences herein and consecutively to the sentence imposed under docket number 1900176 (2024 KA 0142). See Louisiana v. Paige, 2024 WL 5050215 at *1 n.3. Under docket number 1900176 (2024 KA 0142), the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the sentences herein and consecutively to the sentence imposed under docket number 1900133 (2024 KA 0141). See State v. Paige, 2024 WL 4850505 at *1 n.2. In total, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ninety years imprisonment at hard labor on all five offenses.

5.   In Boykin v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court emphasized three federal constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712-13. Because a plea of guilty waives these three fundamental rights of an accused, due process requires that the plea be a voluntary and intelligent waiver of these rights in order to be valid. See State v. Galliano, 396 So.2d 1288, 1290 (La. 1981).

6.   The State offered a separate, concurrent sentence for each offense in the instant case, as well as the companion cases. In this case, the State offered ten years on count two and eighteen years on each of counts three and four, with each sentence to be served concurrently with each other and the sentences imposed in the companion cases. In the companion cases, the State offered a concurrent ten-year sentence, respectively, for each offense therein. See Louisiana v. Paige, 2024 WL 5050215 at *2 n.4 (2024 KA 0141); State v. Paige, 2024 WL 4850505 at *2 n.3 (2024 KA 0142). Thus, the eighteen-year sentence represented the longest sentence the defendant would receive under the agreement.

7.   The State did not file a habitual offender bill of information against the defendant in the instant case; however, the State filed a habitual offender bill under docket number 1900133 (2024 KA 0141). As a result, the trial court adjudicated the defendant a fourth-felony offender in that case only. See Louisiana v. Paige, 2024 WL 5050215 at *1. The sentences herein are not enhanced pursuant to his habitual offender status.

8.   In State v. West, 2018-0868 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/19), 277 So.3d 1213, 1217, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea but asserted different grounds on appeal. Thus, this court found the defendant's claim was not properly before the court but ultimately analyzed the merits, finding the defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea. Id. However, we find the cases relied on in West to support the procedural bar to the defendant's claim do not apply to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

9.   In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends the sentences imposed in this case are unconstitutionally excessive and that the trial court erred in failing to articulate reasons for imposing the sentences. However, based upon our disposition of the defendant's first assignment of error, we pretermit consideration of the defendant's remaining assignment of error challenging his sentences as excessive. We also need not conduct a patent error review at this stage in the proceedings. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2); State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242.

EDWARDS, J.

Hester, J., dissents and assigns reasons. Theriot, J., concurs with reasons.