CITY OF BATON ROUGE AND PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE v. LOUISIANA EAST FIRST JURISDICTION COGIC (2025)

The City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge appeal the trial court's June 20, 2024 judgment granting Louisiana East First Jurisdiction COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus. For the following reasons, we reverse the June 20, 2024 judgment and recall the writ of mandamus.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 15, 2020, the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge on behalf of the Greater Baton Rouge Airport District (collectively, “the City/Parish”) filed a petition to expropriate property owned by Louisiana East First Jurisdiction COGIC ¹ (“COGIC”) in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. The City/Parish sought to expropriate approximately four acres (“the four-acre parcel”) of a larger, 30-acre tract of land (“the 30-acre tract”) owned by COGIC as part of a project to make certain improvements to the Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport (“the airport project”).² The airport project also involved closing, rerouting, and relocating Plank Road, which is located directly in front of COGIC's property.

In its petition to expropriate the four-acre parcel, the City/Parish asserted that just compensation was approximately $175,587.00. This amount was supported by certificates of just compensation executed by two separate disinterested real estate appraisers.

On October 16, 2020, the trial court granted the City/Parish's request to expropriate the four-acre parcel, ordered the City/Parish to deposit $175,587.00 into the trial court's registry, and authorized the City/Parish to enter into and take possession of the four-acre parcel upon making the deposit. The City/Parish deposited $175,587.00 into the trial court's registry shortly thereafter, thus becoming the owner of the four-acre parcel. Although the City/Parish expropriated the four-acre parcel, it did not take or seek to expropriate the remainder of the 30-acre tract (“the remaining Property”).

On December 8, 2020, COGIC filed an ex parte motion to withdraw the expropriation funds for the four-acre parcel from the trial court's registry wherein it reserved its right to seek recovery to the full extent of any loss, as well as any other relief allowed by law. The trial court granted COGIC's request to withdraw the funds and recognized COGIC's reservation of rights in an order signed December 10, 2020.

On February 3, 2021, pursuant to its reservation of rights, COGIC filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and reconventional demand in response to the City/Parish's October 15, 2020 petition. In the reconventional demand, COGIC asserted that the property at issue is the corporate headquarters and home campus of COGIC's fifty-four churches and more than five thousand parishioners, and contains two churches and serves as a faith-based sanctuary for its parishioners and a nexus of all vital operations.³ COGIC alleged that the City/Parish's expropriation of the four-acre parcel, in conjunction with the City/Parish's plan to close, reroute, and relocate Plank Road, severed the remaining Property such that the redesign and reconstruction of the remaining Property was required. COGIC asserted that the compensation offered by the City/Parish was “woefully inadequate” due to the City/Parish's failure to include the costs of redesigning and relocating the property, acquiring land, erecting a new building, purchasing furniture/fixtures/equipment, and relocating a congregation that requires a different and separate worship location and facility. COGIC further alleged it would incur damages totaling “millions of dollars” as a result of the initial expropriation.

The City/Parish answered COGIC's reconventional demand on March 9, 2021. On October 20, 2021, COGIC filed an ex parte motion to set trial date and fix pre-trial deadlines. From March 9, 2022, to May 15, 2024, the City/Parish and COGIC filed a total of eight joint motions to extend pre-trial deadlines and postpone trial while the parties worked on a potential settlement. As a result, a trial date has yet to be set.⁴

While the matter was ongoing, several reports pertinent to this appeal were issued. The first is a Supplemental Environment Assessment (“Supplemental EA”) issued by the Federal Aviation Association (“FAA”) on February 23, 2023. In the Supplemental EA, the FAA found that “one church” (presumably COGIC) would be displaced due to the airport project drastically limiting access to the church's property. The FAA acknowledged that only a portion of the church's property was needed for the airport project, but further found that the full property acquisition “may be justified and warranted” at the church's discretion due to the change in access. Relevantly, the FAA stated that the church (and other affected businesses) would have a one-year deadline beyond the project's completion to choose full acquisition.

The second pertinent report is an appraisal of the remaining Property performed by The Lakvold Group, LLC on September 8, 2023 (“the Lakvold Appraisal”), which was conducted for the purposes of determining the remaining Property's market value as a basis for compensation. The Lakvold Appraisal identified COGIC as now owning two tracts of land as a result of the City/Parish's expropriation of the four-acre parcel. The first tract consists of approximately fourteen acres of land fronting the existing Plank Road. The second tract consists of approximately eleven acres of land on the east side of the new section of Plank Road under construction. The Lakvold Group, LLC estimated that just compensation to COGIC for the expropriation of these two tracts of land totaled $23,616,672.00.⁵

The third relevant document is a review of the Lakvold Appraisal performed by Robinson Appraisal Services, LLC (“the Robinson Review”). The Robinson Review, dated October 30, 2023, found that the Lakvold Appraisal was adequately performed, documented, and supported. After receiving the Lakvold Appraisal and the Robinson Review, the City/Parish forwarded those documents to COGIC. Specifically, the City/Parish sent the Lakvold Appraisal to COGIC via email on October 31, 2023, and emailed the Robinson Review to COGIC the following day.

On November 22, 2023, COGIC sent correspondence to the City/Parish containing its formal demand that the City/Parish “comply with the relevant federal statutes and regulations” and make a written offer for the full acquisition of the remaining Property by November 29, 2023. COGIC alleged that federal funds were being used for the airport project such that federal law applies, and that federal law mandates that the City/Parish make a formal offer to purchase the remaining Property. COGIC further asserted that it was exercising its right to choose full acquisition of the property as provided in the Supplemental EA.

On December 4, 2023, the City/Parish responded to COGIC's November 22, 2023 letter, claiming that it was “not in a position to make an offer within the timeline (as extended) in your correspondence.” The City/Parish alleged that it was “working diligently toward reaching the goal of the ability to make a good faith offer” but that the offer “must be made when it is fiscally responsible to do so and can reasonably expected to be honored.”

On February 6, 2024, COGIC filed the petition for writ of mandamus at issue in this appeal. In its petition, COGIC alleged that federal law requires property be appraised before the initiation of negotiations, after which the agency acquiring the property must establish an amount which it believes is just compensation for the real property. COGIC asserted that the City/Parish was required by federal law to make a written offer for the full amount believed to be just compensation for the property, but failed to do so. Accordingly, COGIC asked the trial court to direct the City/Parish to offer COGIC “an amount it deems appropriate to provide just compensation in exchange for title to” the remaining Property.⁶ COGIC attached a portion of the FAA's Supplemental EA and the November 22, 2023 letter to its petition.

The City/Parish filed a memorandum in opposition to COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus on March 28, 2024, arguing that it had been unable to make an offer of “just compensation” because of a lack of funding, feasibility issues concerning the project, and the Department of Transportation and Development's (“DOTD”) questioning of the justification of the expropriation. The City/Parish argued that forcing it to make any offer of just compensation would oblige the entity to do something that it cannot honor in good faith or expend public dollars that may not be justified under law. The City/Parish alleged that COGIC sought to compel it to enter into settlement negotiations that would resolve the principal litigation despite the matter requiring ordinary proceedings. The City/Parish further pointed to permissive language used in the Supplemental EA, which stated that the acquisition “may be justified and warranted.” (Emphasis added.) The City/Parish asserted that, while some discretion lies with COGIC, any acquisition of the remaining Property is not mandatory and must still comply with the law.

On April 4, 2024, COGIC filed a reply memorandum in support of its petition for writ of mandamus. COGIC attached the Lakvold Appraisal and the Robinson Review to its reply memorandum. A hearing on the matter was held on April 8, 2024, during which the City/Parish objected to the trial court's consideration of the Lakvold Appraisal and the Robinson Review. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and informed the parties that its judgment would include rulings on the admissibility of the Lakvold Appraisal and the Robinson Review.

On June 20, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment granting COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus, overruling the City/Parish's objections to the admission of the Lakvold Appraisal and the Robinson Review, and ordering the City/Parish to make a written offer to COGIC to acquire the remaining Property at issue for the full amount determined to be just compensation, which shall not be less than $23,616,672.00 as provided in the Lakvold Appraisal. This appeal by the City/Parish followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The City/Parish assigns the following as error:

(1) The Trial Court erred in granting the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and ordering the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge to make a written offer to Louisiana East First Jurisdiction COGIC in the amount of $23,616,672.00, without any contingencies, for acquisition of property.

(2) The Trial Court erred by overruling [the] City-Parish's objections and admitting Exhibit A to COGIC's Reply Memorandum [the Lakvold Appraisal] and Exhibit B to COGIC's Reply Memorandum [the Robinson Review].

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, an appellate court reviews a trial court's judgment on a writ of mandamus under an abuse of discretion standard. Odoms v. Common, 2021-0828 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/22), 2022 WL 620773 at *3 (unreported), writ denied, 2022-00560 (La. 5/24/22), 338 So.3d 1186. A trial court's findings of fact in a mandamus proceeding are subject to a manifest error standard of review. However, questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed by appellate courts under the de novo standard of review, and the appellate court is not required to give deference to the lower court in interpreting a statute. Odoms, 2022 WL 620773 at *3; see also Town of Sterlington v. Greater Ouachita Water Company, 52,482 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So.3d 1257, 1265, writs denied, 2019-00913, 2019-00717 (La. 9/24/19), 279 So.3d 3 86, 931.

DISCUSSION

The City/Parish argues that the trial court erred in granting COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus and in ordering the City/Parish to make a written offer to COGIC in the amount of $23,616,672.00, without any contingencies, for acquisition of property.⁷ Mandamus is a writ directing a public officer to perform a ministerial duty required by law. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3861 and 3863; Turner v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 2017-1769 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/4/18), 252 So.3d 990, 992, writ denied, 2018-1127 (La. 10/15/18), 253 So.3d 1299. In general terms, a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and may be issued in all cases where the law provides no relief by ordinary means or where delay in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3862; Crooks v. State Through Department of Natural Resources, 2022-00625 (La. 1/27/23), 3 59 So.3d 448, 450.⁸ A “ministerial duty” is one in which no element of discretion is left to the public officer; in other words, it is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law. If a public officer is vested with any element of discretion, mandamus will not lie. Crooks, 359 So.3d at 450.

COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus relates to expropriation proceedings; namely, the October 2020 expropriation of the four-acre parcel and whether the City/Parish is obligated to acquire the remaining Property.⁹ Pursuant to La. Const. Art. 1, § 4(B)(1), property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit. See St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal District v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., LLC, 2017-0434 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 243, 250. Louisiana Constitution article 1, § 4(B)(5) provides that a landowner whose property is expropriated “shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss,” which includes but is not limited to “the appraised value of the property and all costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages actually incurred by the owner because of the expropriation.” The intent of the provision to compensate the owner “to the full extent of his loss” is to permit the owner to remain in equivalent financial circumstances after the taking and be put in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have been had his property not been taken. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government v. Richard, 2015-0728 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/16), 196 So.3d 684, 688, writ denied, 2016-1237 (La. 10/17/16), 207 So.3d 1065.

COGIC asserts that the City/Parish's initial expropriation of COGIC's four-acre parcel, as well as the City/Parish's plan to close, reroute, and relocate Plank Road, severed COGIC's property such that the remaining Property is useless. COGIC attached an excerpt of the FAA's Supplemental EA in support of its petition for writ of mandamus. In the Supplemental EA, the FAA stated the following in relevant part:

There are (4) additional businesses and (1) one church that [will be] displaced by the [airport project], due to access to the businesses being drastically limited by the program. [․] Though only portions of each of these properties are required for the project's construction, the full property acquisition may be justified and warranted at the business's discretion due to the changes in access. The owners of․ the church organization will be eligible for business relocation and reestablishment assistance[.] ․

The entirety of․ the church [property] may not be needed to meet the project's roadway right of way requirements, however, due to DOTD's control of access standards which will no longer allow left turns into traffic, access is significantly reduced to these parcels beyond what was planned in the original [Environmental Assessment] with at-grade signalization. These standards also eliminate left turns across traffic into parking lots. Though only portions of each of these properties are required for the project's construction, the full property acquisition may be justified and warranted at the ․ church's discretion due to the changes in access.

There will be a one-year deadline beyond the project competition to be put in place for the ․ church to choose full acquisition. If they choose not to participate by that one-year deadline, the foil property will not be acquired. (Emphasis added.)

COGIC argues that the City/Parish has a ministerial duty to offer just compensation to COGIC for the purchase of the remaining Property. It asserts that federal law governs this matter due to the involvement of federal funding. COGIC further argues that federal law mandates that just compensation be in an amount not less than the approved appraisal value of the property. See 49 C.F.R. § 24.102(d).¹⁰ COGIC asserts that it elected for the full acquisition of the remaining Property as authorized in the Supplemental EA, and further asserts that the City/Parish is required to acquire the remaining Property for the appraised value as a result.

According to federal jurisprudence, the purpose of an environmental assessment has typically been to provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether the preparation of a more costly and time-consuming environmental impact statement is necessary. Louisiana Crawfish Producers Association-West v. Rowan, 463 F.3d 352, 356 (5th Cir. 2006), citing Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Department of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 677 (5th Cir. 1992). In other words, the Supplemental EA does not appear to be a binding mandate or even the final step in making environmental decisions.¹¹

The burden of proof on the property owner in an expropriation case is to establish his claims by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence; speculation, conjecture, mere possibility and even unsupported probability are not sufficient to support a judgment. City of Baton Rouge v. Mucciacciaro, 2021-0656 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/25/22), 342 So.3d 955, 963, writ denied, 2022-01172 (La. 11/1/22), 349 So.3d 2. Where the landowner challenges the amount deposited as just compensation for an expropriation, a greater value must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Mucciacciaro, 342 So.3d at 963. The question of what damages will appropriately compensate the landowner is one of fact. Such a determination is necessarily dependent on evidence presented by expert witnesses; however, the factfinder is not obligated to accept an expert's opinion in expropriation cases, since those opinions are not binding, but are advisory in nature. Id.

This matter involves legal issues that have not yet been ruled upon by the trial court, including whether the City/Parish must acquire the remaining Property despite its allegation that it does not need the property, whether federal or state law applies, and what amount constitutes just compensation and/or the full extent of COGIC's loss. COGIC's utilization of the writ of mandamus procedure further negates the City/Parish's ability to question the respective authors of the Lakvold Appraisal and the Robinson Review or call additional witnesses. Like the issues above, the factual question of the appropriate amount of damages is more properly presented at trial rather than determined by a writ of mandamus hearing.

Further, Louisiana law plainly anticipates the occurrence of a trial in the context of expropriation proceedings. For instance, Louisiana Constitution Article 1, § 4(B)(5) provides that in every expropriation, a party has the right to trial by jury to determine whether the compensation is just, and the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss, which includes the appraised value of the property and all costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages actually incurred by the owner because of the expropriation. See also La. R.S. 19:4 (“Expropriation cases shall be tried before the court without a jury, except that a party shall have the right to trial by jury to determine compensation.”); La. R.S. 19:5 (providing the deadline for fixing the time of trial of an expropriation suit and further providing the notice requirements relating to that trial); La. R.S. 19:8(A)(1) (“Expropriation suits shall be tried by preference and shall be conducted with the greatest possible dispatch. All issues shall be decided by the trial judge, except compensation when either party has demanded a trial by jury to determine compensation.”); La. R.S. 19:8(C) (“After the trial to determine compensation the court shall render judgment against the plaintiff in the amount of the compensation determined to be due the owner.”); La. R.S. 19:8(D) (“The expropriating authority shall present its evidence of value first.”); and La. R.S. 19:131.7 (providing that where property is expropriated by the City/Parish, any defendant may apply for a trial to determine the measure of compensation to which he is entitled if certain requirements are met).

In the instant case, the parties filed at least eight joint motions to extend pretrial deadlines, but the matter never went to trial. We find that the issues presented and decided at the writ of mandamus hearing – i.e., whether the City/Parish is required to expropriate the remaining Property despite its assertions that full acquisition is not necessary, and if so, whether the City/Parish must pay the amount contained within the Lakvold Appraisal and supported by the Robinson Review - are more properly presented at trial.

As stated above, a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and may be issued in cases where the law provides no relief by ordinary means or where delay in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3862; Crooks, 359 So.3d at 450. In the case before us, there are ordinary means of obtaining relief. Although the mandamus procedure may have been appropriate in this matter had a trial occurred and a final judgment been rendered, this matter has simply not reached that stage of the proceedings.

The jurisprudence cited by COGIC supports our conclusion that mandamus may be appropriate after a final judgment of expropriation is rendered, not before. COGIC cites Watson Memorial Spiritual Temple of Christ v. Korban, 2024-00055 (La. 6/28/24), 387 So.3d 499, cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 1169, 221 L.Ed.2d 251 (2025), wherein the Supreme Court of Louisiana considered whether the mandamus procedure may be used to compel satisfaction of a judgment for inverse condemnation ¹² against the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans. In so doing, the Supreme Court of Louisiana noted the similarities between inverse condemnation actions and cases involving expropriation, both of which arise from a “taking” implicating constitutional concerns of deprivation of property and are afforded the protections provided under La. Const. Art. 1, § 4(B)(1). Watson, 387 So.3d at 512-13. The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that the payment of a money judgment based on inverse condemnation under the Louisiana Constitution is a ministerial duty; thus, it may be enforced via mandamus. Id. at 513. Likewise, Louisiana courts have held that the payment of final judgments of damages in expropriation cases is a ministerial duty and not a discretionary one. See Jazz Casino Company, L.L.C. v. Bridges, 2016-1663 (La. 5/3/17), 223 So.3d 488, 496 n.19, citing Parish of St. Charles v. R.H. Creager, Inc., 10-180 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/10), 55 So.3d 884, 892, writ denied, 2011-0118 (La. 4/1/11), 60 So.3d 1250.

However, we have been unable to find any jurisprudence wherein aspects of expropriation proceedings have been decided pursuant to a writ of mandamus prior to the matter being tried and a judgment being rendered. Rather, the courts considering the appropriateness of mandamus in similar proceedings have done so after a final judgment was rendered in those proceedings. See Watson, 387 So.3d at 512 (finding “that the payment of just compensation for a judgment arising from inverse condemnation is a ministerial, non-discretionary duty; therefore, mandamus may issue to enforce a final judgment for just compensation.”); see also Jazz Casino Company, L.L.C., 223 So.3d at 498 (finding that the trial court acted within its constitutional and statutory authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the Louisiana Department of Revenue to compel the department's compliance with a taxpayer's refund judgment); Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 2020-01231 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 369, 374 (finding a valid cause of action when a group of firefighters’ amended petition for a writ of mandamus requested the town of Bastrop appropriate funds necessary to satisfy a judgment awarding back wages to the group of firefighters).

Considering the foregoing, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus. See Odoms, 2022 WL 620773 at *3. The issues presented in COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus relate to matters that must be argued and decided upon in the context of a trial. A writ of mandamus would only be proper in this matter if these issues had been properly heard, a judgment had been rendered, and the City/Parish subsequently failed to satisfy that judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's June 20, 2024 judgment granting COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus.

In so doing, we do not reach the City/Parish's second assignment of error, wherein it argues that the trial court erred in overruling the City-Parish's objections and admitting the Lakvold Appraisal and the Robinson Review.

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, the 19th Judicial District Court's June 20, 2024 judgment granting Louisiana East First Jurisdiction COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus is reversed and the writ of mandamus is recalled. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the appellee, Louisiana East First Jurisdiction COGIC.

REVERSED; WRIT OF MANDAMUS RECALLED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   COGIC stands for “Church of God in Christ Incorporated.”

2.   COGIC acquired the 30-acre tract from the First Apostolic Church of East Baton Rouge (“First Apostolic Church”) via credit sale on July 1, 2004. First Apostolic Church filed a motion for leave to intervene in this matter on August 10, 2023, alleging that it was a necessary party due to a vendor's lien on the 30-acre tract as a result of the credit sale. First Apostolic Church further alleged that COGIC still owed a balance of $3,113,502.52 for the property. It is unclear from the record on appeal whether First Apostolic Church's motion for leave to intervene was granted.

3.   These vital operations include ministry leadership training, large jurisdictional meetings, convocations, conventions, summer camps, funerals, commencements, sports training, intramural sports tournaments, banquets, concerts, and disaster relief housing.

4.   According to the appellate record, the only hearings in this matter occurred on April 8, 2024, when the trial court considered whether to grant the petition for writ of mandamus at issue in this appeal, and on June 19, 2024, when the parties confidentially exchanged settlement offers through the trial court.

5.   The Lakvold Group, LLC opined that total compensation for the fourteen-acre tract would be $22,566,740.00, and that total compensation for the eleven-acre tract would be $1,049,932.00.

6.   The petition for writ of mandamus did not list the amount for which the remaining Property was appraised, nor did COGIC specify in the petition what it sought as “just compensation.”

7.   The City/Parish also argues that COGIC's petition for writ of mandamus is moot because of an offer made by the City/Parish on or about April 3, 2024, a few days prior to the hearing on the writ of mandamus. Although the parties’ attorneys referenced this offer at the hearing on the petition for writ of mandamus and during appellate arguments, there is no witness testimony regarding whether an offer was made. A Court of Appeal is a court of record, which must limit its review to evidence in the record before it and render its judgment upon the record on appeal. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2164; Thibodeaux v. Rental Insurance Services, Inc., 2013-1947 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/24/15), 2015 WL 1882456 at *5 (unreported), writ denied, 2015-1213 (La. 9/25/15), 178 So.3d 567. Argument by counsel does not constitute evidence. Davis v. Naquin, 2023-0057 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/23), 375 So.3d 968, 971 n.3. Because there is no evidence of an offer being made aside from the arguments of counsel, we are unable to determine whether the writ of mandamus is moot on this basis.

8.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3862 further provides:[N]o court shall issue or cause to be issued a writ of mandamus to compel the expenditure of state funds by any state department, board or agency, or any officer, administrator or head thereof, or any officer of the state of Louisiana, in any suit or action involving the expenditure of public funds under any statute or law of this state, when the director of such department, board or agency, or the governor shall certify that the expenditure of such funds would have the effect of creating a deficit in the funds of said agency or be in violation of the requirements placed upon the expenditure of such funds by the legislature.

9.   As stated previously, the City/Parish is not seeking to expropriate the remaining Property.

10.   Title 49, § 24.102(d) of the Code of Federal Regulations provides the following relating to the establishment and offer of just compensation:Before the initiation of negotiations, the agency shall establish an amount which it believes is just compensation for the real property. The amount shall not be less than the approved appraisal or waiver valuation of the fair market value of the property, taking into account the value of allowable damages or benefits to any remaining property. An agency official must establish the amount believed to be just compensation. Promptly thereafter, the agency shall make a written offer to the owner or the designated owner's representative to acquire the property for the full amount believed to be just compensation. (Internal citation omitted.)

11.   Although there is no dispute as to the admissibility of the Supplemental EA, we reiterate that the document fails to specify the name of the church being affected by the airport project. Further, as argued by the City/Parish, the relevant recommendations in the Supplemental EA are largely framed as permissive rather than mandatory.

12.   The action for inverse condemnation provides a procedural remedy to a property owner seeking compensation for land already taken or damaged against a governmental or private entity having the powers of eminent domain where no expropriation has commenced. State Through Department of Transportation and Development v. Chambers Investment Company, 595 So.2d 598, 602 (La. 1992).

THERIOT, J.