JOHN TYLER GREGOIRE v. STEPHANIE LYNN MARIE WRIBORG (2025)

John Tyler Gregoire appeals a trial court judgment that modified the previously entered custody judgment, held him in contempt, and denied his motions to continue and to disqualify counsel. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

John Tyler Gregoire and Stephanie Lynn-Marie Wriborg were never married. In August of 2019, Mr. Gregoire filed a petition seeking to establish shared custody of their minor child P.G., who was 10 months old at that time. By agreement of the parties, the trial court signed a consent judgment on October 16, 2019, granting Mr. Gregoire and Ms. Wriborg the shared custody of P.G., with the parents sharing the physical custody of the child on a 2 day/2 day/3 day rotating basis. The parties also entered into a shared custody implementation plan, which provided for physical custody during holidays and included other general provisions, such as the sharing of information about the child.

Thereafter, Mr. Gregoire and Ms. Wriborg resumed an intimate relationship, and a second child, J.G., was born on March 16, 2021. On September 19, 2022, Mr. Gregoire filed a petition to establish paternity and legal and physical custody, seeking shared physical custody of the minor children on a 7 day/7 day rotating basis. Ms. Wriborg also filed a petition to establish paternity and custody on September 19, 2022, requesting joint custody of the minor children, with Ms. Wriborg being named domiciliary parent.¹

On April 26, 2023, the parties entered into another consent judgment, approved by the trial court, recognizing Mr. Gregoire as the biological father of the minor children, awarding the parties the joint care, custody and control of the minor children, with Ms. Wriborg named domiciliary parent, and the parties sharing physical custody on a 7/7 schedule with all other visitation in accordance with a shared custody implementation plan signed by the parties. Each party was granted “the right of first refusal” if the other parent was in need of child care overnight during the school year and for an overnight in excess of 24 hours during non-school periods. In addition to providing for holiday visitation, the shared custody implementation plan provided that neither parent would post on any social media negative or condescending remarks about the other parent, nor comment or discuss the legal proceedings or custody issues with regard to the minor children.

On April 25, 2024, Ms. Wriborg filed a rule to change custody and for contempt. Therein, she claimed that there had been a material change in circumstances since the April 26, 2023 consent judgment to justify a custody modification. Ms. Wriborg requested that the children reside with her at all times other than every other weekend, as Mr. Gregoire refused to co-parent, making shared physical custody impossible. Ms. Wriborg set forth several assertions in support of her claim that a material change in circumstances had occurred. She alleged that since the rendition of the consent judgment, Mr. Gregoire had attempted to abdicate his parental duties by requesting that Ms. Wriborg “deal with” his girlfriend, rather than him. She further alleged that Mr. Gregoire refused to respond to messages regarding the children, including a request from Ms. Wriborg that he agree to utilize a parenting coordinator in an attempt to help with co-parenting. Ms. Wriborg also alleged that Mr. Gregoire failed to ensure that the children's homework was turned in on time and failed to ensure that the younger child attends his speech appointments. She requested an order requiring the parents to utilize a parenting coordinator to help with co-parenting and Our Family Wizard to communicate. Ms. Wriborg also contended that Mr. Gregoire had violated the provisions of the consent judgment by failing to give her the right of first refusal and by posting derogatory information about the case on social media. A hearing was set for June 25, 2024.

On June 20, 2024, Mr. Gregoire filed a motion to disqualify Ms. Wriborg's attorney, Danna Schwab. The basis of his motion was that his current attorney, Cheleste Gottschalk, had represented Mr. Gregoire in connection with the child support matter. According to the motion, at the time of representation in the child support matter, Rebecca Huskey was employed with Ms. Gottschalk's firm, listed on all pleadings as counsel for Mr. Gregoire, and Ms. Gottschalk discussed issues of custody with Ms. Huskey. The motion further indicated that Ms. Huskey was now employed at Ms. Schwab's firm.

Also on June 20, 2024, Mr. Gregoire filed a motion to continue the June 25, 2024 custody hearing. This motion was based on Mr. Gregoire's contention that opposing counsel had a conflict of interest; his counsel, who was also a public defender, had multiple clients on the priority list for felony trials for the week of June 24-28, 2024; and his counsel intended to call multiple witnesses, which would exceed the court's allotted 45 minutes, therefore requiring a special setting for this matter.

Ms. Wriborg's rule to change custody and for contempt came for hearing as scheduled on June 25, 2024. Prior to addressing the merits of the rule, the trial court took up the motion to disqualify Ms. Schwab and the motion to continue, noting they were intertwined. Ms. Schwab indicated she was waiving service of the motion to disqualify, and was ready to proceed. Counsel for Mr. Gregoire objected to proceeding with the motion to disqualify, arguing that she had not been served with Ms. Schwab's opposition. The trial court heard argument on the motion to disqualify, and denied the motion. With regard to the motion to continue, the trial court confirmed that Mr. Gregoire's counsel did not have a conflicting felony trial that week, and denied the motion to continue.

In connection with the rule to change custody and for contempt, both parties testified and introduced evidence in connection with their testimony. P.G.’s teacher testified, as did Mr. Gregoire's fiancée, Kasie Hebert, and his mother. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court invited the parties to submit post-trial memoranda, and took the matter under advisement. On July 29, 2024, the trial court rendered judgment without giving reasons for judgment. The judgment denied Mr. Gregoire's motions to continue and to disqualify counsel. The trial court found there had been a material change in circumstances since the rendition of the April 26, 2023 judgment, and awarded the joint care, control, and custody of the minor children to the parties, with Ms. Wriborg being named the domiciliary parent, subject to visitation by Mr. Gregoire every other weekend from Friday until Sunday. The judgment ordered that the parties communicate only through Our Family Wizard, except in the case of an emergency, and ordered the parties to utilize the services of a parenting coordinator for any conflict dealing with co-parenting. The trial court further found Mr. Gregoire in contempt of court and ordered him to pay the sum of $1,500.00 to Ms. Wriborg. Mr. Gregoire appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mr. Gregoire assigns as error the following:

1. The trial court abused its discretion in changing custody of the minor children; the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in changing custody and did not take all evidence into consideration;

2. The trial court abused its discretion in finding Mr. Gregoire in contempt of court and ordering him to pay $1,500.00 in attorney's fees to Ms. Wriborg;

3. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to continue the custody trial held on June 25, 2024, when the court had not set several pending motions for a contradictory hearing;

4. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Gregoire's motion to disqualify opposing counsel without setting the motion for a contradictory hearing; and

5. The trial court erred in not disqualifying opposing counsel based on Rule 1.10 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, “Imputation of Conflicts of Interest.”

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Change of Custody (Assignment of Error Number 1)

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Gregoire contends the trial court abused its discretion in changing custody of the minor children because Ms. Wriborg failed to prove a material change in circumstances. He further argues the trial court did not correctly weigh the evidence presented at the custody hearing, and therefore abused its discretion in changing the physical custody schedule.

Where, as here, the underlying custody decree is a stipulated judgment, a party seeking to modify the custody plan is required to prove (1) a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the children, and (2) the proposed modification is in the best interest of the children. See Burns v. Burns, 2017-0343 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/17), 236 So. 3d 571, 573.

Every child custody case must be viewed in light of its own particular set of facts and circumstances. Underwood v. Underwood, 2021-0277 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/21/21), 332 So. 3d 128, 139. The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the best interest of the child given each unique set of circumstances. Accordingly, a trial court's determination of custody is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. Yepez v. Yepez, 2021-0477 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So. 3d 36, 41. Additionally, in most child custody cases, the trial court's determination is based heavily on factual findings. Id. It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside the trial court's findings in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. See Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). If the findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse those findings even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id.

Mr. Gregoire testified at the hearing regarding his communication with Ms. Wriborg since the April 26, 2023 consent judgment. In connection with his testimony, strings of text messages were introduced into evidence. In August of 2023, Ms. Wriborg indicated in a text to Mr. Gregoire that her income had changed and if she had to go back to court she would ask for child support. Thereafter, Mr. Gregoire's texts contained derogatory comments directed at Ms. Wriborg. He continued to berate her for seeking child support in text messages in October, November, and December of 2023. Mr. Gregoire acknowledged that when Ms. Wriborg sought child support, he became angry and began giving her a hard time, testifying that, “She had a really good job set up, and she got fired from it.”

Mr. Gregoire admitted that, at times, he did not respond to Ms. Wriborg's texts regarding the children. According to Mr. Gregoire, he only responded to things that were “really necessary,” and he did not respond to things he already knew.

Mr. Gregoire testified that he began dating Kasie Hebert in January of 2023, and she and her two children moved into his house in late May/early June of 2023.² Around January of 2024, Mr. Gregoire decided that Mrs. Wriborg should “deal with” Ms. Hebert and not him regarding the children.

According to Mr. Gregoire, he worked from 7:00 a.m. until 2:30-3:00 p.m. This testimony was contradicted by that of Ms. Hebert and his mother, who both testified that he worked until at least 5:00 p.m. Mr. Gregoire testified that during the weeks he had the children, P.G. spent at least one school night and one weekend night with his mother. According to Mr. Gregoire, Ms. Hebert was primarily responsible for getting P.G. to school and either she or Mr. Gregoire's brother picked her up.

Both parties testified regarding specific incidents involving the children. According to Ms. Wriborg, the first time she exchanged the children with Ms. Hebert, there was no car seat in the car for P.G. When she asked Ms. Hebert about the car seat, Ms. Hebert responded that they did not have one for P.G., and Ms. Wriborg testified that she gave her the car seat out of her vehicle. On another occasion, Mr. Gregoire brought P.G. to a doctor's appointment, and Ms. Wriborg met them at the doctor's office. According to Ms. Wriborg, P.G. got out of the car and there was not a booster seat in the car for her, only the infant car seat for J.G. With regard to this incident, Mr. Gregoire testified that P.G. sat in the baby seat, which he testified was “technically a booster seat.”

Ms. Wriborg testified that when J.G. was 18 months old, J.G.’s doctor noted that his speech was delayed, and recommended speech therapy. On one occasion, during his time with Mr. Gregoire, J.G.’s speech therapy was moved to a different day. Ms. Wriborg asked if Mr. Gregoire could bring him that day or did he want Ms. Wriborg to take him to speech therapy. Mr. Gregoire responded that he did not think thirty minutes a week was going to improve J.G's speech, and he could just skip that week. Ms. Wriborg further testified that when J.G.’s doctor indicated J.G. needed tubes in his ears and a tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy, Mr. Gregoire did not want the surgery performed, indicating that he wanted to keep him on allergy medicine.

On appeal, Mr. Gregoire argues that the parties have continuously had trouble communicating and historically do not get along, and the circumstances at the time of trial were the same as they were at the time of the April 26, 2023 consent judgment, if not slightly better.

The parties’ failure to communicate well has been held to constitute a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child. Poillion v. Thomas, 2015-1564 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/17), 2017 WL 4216546, *6 (unpublished); see also Boesch v. Boesch, 16-526 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/8/17), 210 So. 3d 937, 945. The record in this case reflects that after Ms. Wriborg lost her job and indicated she would seek child support, Mr. Gregoire's texts began to contain derogatory comments directed at Ms. Wriborg, and berated her for seeking child support. In fact, Mr. Gregoire admitted that when Ms. Wriborg sought child support, he became angry and began giving her a hard time. Thus, based upon our review of the record, we find the trial court's factual finding that there had been a material change in circumstances since the last judgment was reasonably supported by the record and is not clearly wrong.

We must next address whether the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the previous custody arrangement by changing Mr. Gregoire's physical custody from 7/7 to every other weekend from Friday until Sunday. The paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. See La. C.C. art. 131; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So. 2d 731, 738. This applies not only in actions setting custody initially, but also in actions to change custody. Mulkey v. Mulkey, 2012-2709 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So. 3d 357, 364. The trial court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 134(A).³ The weight to be given each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court. Morgan v. Morgan, 2023-0945 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/19/24), 390 So. 3d 317, 330, writ denied, 2024-00639 (La. 9/4/24), 391 So. 3d 1056. The trial court is not bound to make a mechanical evaluation of or provide a literal articulation of all of the factors and is not required to specifically explain its weighing and balancing of the factors. Rather, the trial court should decide each case on its own facts and circumstances in light of Article 134 and other relevant factors. Id.

On appeal, Mr. Gregoire contends the trial court did not weigh the evidence that was presented in light of the best interest of the children.

The best interest of the child standard is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires the weighing and balancing of factors concerning the issue of custody on the basis of the evidence presented. Poillion, 2017 WL 4216546 at *7. In this case, the trial court had the benefit of seeing the parties and witnesses and hearing their testimony. After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the trial court concluded the previous custody arrangement should be modified, with Mr. Gregoire's physical custody changed to every other weekend. Based upon our review of the record, we find no manifest error in the trial court's determination that a modification of the previous custody arrangement was warranted. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Contempt (Assignment of Error Number 2)

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Gregoire contends the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt of court and ordering him to pay $1,500.00 to Ms. Wriborg.

A contempt of court is any act or omission tending to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or respect for its authority. La. C.C.P. art. 221. There are two kinds of contempt of court, direct and constructive. Id. Willful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court constitutes a constructive contempt of court. La. C.C.P. art. 224(2). To find a person guilty of constructive contempt, the trial court must find the person violated the court's order intentionally, purposely, and without justifiable excuse. Babin v. McDaniel, 2005-2455 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/06), 934 So. 2d 69, 73. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 225(B) states that if a person is found guilty of contempt, “the court shall render an order reciting the facts constituting the contempt, adjudging the person charged with contempt guilty thereof, and specifying the punishment imposed.” Nevertheless, the jurisprudence has held the trial court's failure to recite the facts constituting the basis for the contempt in the actual order will not invalidate a contempt order if the trial court recites such facts in open court. Babin, 934 So. 2d at 73. The trial court has great discretion in determining whether a party should be held in contempt for disobeying a court order, and an appellate court should reverse the trial court's decision only when it finds an abuse of that discretion. Id.

The judgment in this case states, “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that John Gregoire is hereby held in contempt of court and ordered to pay the sum of $1,500.00 to Stephanie Wriborg within 30 days of the date of this Judgment.” The judgment does not contain any facts upon which the contempt judgment is based. As indicated above, the trial court did not issue reasons for judgment. Moreover, as the matter was taken under advisement, the trial court did not recite the basis for the contempt in open court.

Thus, because the trial court failed to “render an order reciting the facts constituting the contempt,” as required by La. C.C.P. art. 225(B), we reverse the judgment insofar as it held Mr. Gregoire in contempt of court and ordered him to pay the sum of $1,500.00 to Ms. Wriborg. See Babin, 934 So. 2d at 74.

Motion to Continue (Assignment of Error Number 3)

In his third assignment of error, Mr. Gregoire contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to continue the custody hearing. Specifically, he contends the trial court should have granted his requested continuance based upon the pending motion to disqualify opposing counsel.

The trial court may grant a continuance on peremptory or discretionary grounds. La. C.C.P. arts. 1601 and 1602. There are only two peremptory grounds: (1) the party seeking the continuance, despite due diligence, has been unable to obtain material evidence; or (2) a material witness is absent without the contrivance of the party applying for the continuance. La. C.C.P. art. 1602. Mr. Gregoire does not contend, nor does the record reveal, that there were any peremptory grounds for a continuance in this case.

Absent peremptory grounds, a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. City of Bogalusa v. Moses, 2020-0165 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 323 So. 3d 404, 407. Article 1601 provides for a continuance “if there is good ground therefor.” The trial court must consider the particular facts of a case when deciding whether to grant or deny a continuance. The trial court should consider the diligence and good faith of the party seeking the continuance and other reasonable grounds. The trial court may also weigh the condition of the court docket, fairness to the parties and other litigants before the court, and the need for orderly and prompt administration of justice. St. Tammany Parish Hospital v. Burris, 2000-2639 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So. 2d 960, 963. The trial court has great discretion in granting or denying a continuance under Article 1601, and its ruling should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. City of Bogalusa, 323 So. 3d at 407.

Accordingly, we review the trial court's denial of Mr. Gregoire's motion to continue for abuse of discretion. As noted above, Ms. Wriborg filed her rule to change custody on April 25, 2024. On June 7, 2024, Ms. Gottschalk filed a motion to enroll as counsel of record in this matter, which was signed by the trial court on June 12, 2024. On June 20, 2024, Mr. Gregoire filed a motion to continue the June 25, 2024 custody hearing, based on his contention that opposing counsel had a conflict of interest, his counsel had multiple clients on the priority list for felony trials that week, and he intended to call multiple witnesses, requiring a special setting for this matter.⁴

Prior to addressing the merits of the rule to change custody, the trial court took up the motion to disqualify opposing counsel and the motion to continue, noting they were intertwined. Counsel for Mr. Gregoire indicated she was prepared to go forward with the motion to continue but not the motion to disqualify. After hearing the arguments of the parties on both motions, the trial court stated:

[I]t seems to me ․ we have two people that have been waiting to come to court to present their case with reference to custody, right? That's the bottom line. What they've been seeing and the Court has been seeing is a lot of lawyering, which I'm not necessarily saying that's a bad thing, but ․ these two clients need to get this matter resolved.

․ If this matter is continued, this case is going to go on for another half a year to a year. ․ [T]hat's not what your clients want. That's not what the court system is all about. ․

Here we are at the eve of the trial, and all theses things come up. I'm not going to continue it. ․ I'm not going to stay the proceedings. ․ [W]e will try this matter today.

As noted above, there is no peremptory ground requiring a continuance, and there is no statutory basis for a continuance or stay in the proceedings while a motion to disqualify counsel is pending. We note that during the custody hearing, counsel for Mr. Gregoire made no objections based upon attorney-client privilege. Having reviewed the entire record of these proceedings, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Gregoire's motion to continue. The trial court noted the motions to disqualify counsel and to continue were filed “at the eve of trial,” and weighed the fairness to the parties and the need for a prompt resolution of the pending custody issues. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Assignments of Error Numbers 4 and 5)

In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Gregoire contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to disqualify opposing counsel without setting the motion for a contradictory hearing. In his fifth assignment of error, he contends the trial court erred in not disqualifying opposing counsel based on Rule 1.10 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, which sets forth the provisions for the general rule for the imputation of conflicts of interest.

The burden of proving disqualification of an attorney or other officer of the court rests on the party making the challenge. Walker v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 2001-2078 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So. 2d 57, 60. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 963(B) requires a contradictory hearing when the mover is not clearly entitled to the order applied for or when there is a need for supporting proof. The relief requested by Mr. Gregoire was not something to which he was clearly entitled. Moreover, because he bore the burden of proof, there was a need for supporting proof. Thus, the matter was required to be decided contradictorily with the adverse party. See Searles v. Searles, 2008-1098 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/09), 9 So. 3d 997, 998.

As noted above, prior to addressing the merits of the custody rule, the trial court instructed Mr. Gregoire's counsel to argue both the continuance and motion to disqualify, as the two were intertwined. While Mr. Gregoire's counsel indicated she was prepared to go forward with the motion to continue, she stated, “but as far as the motion to disqualify, it hasn't been set or served or anything yet, so that needs to be served.” Counsel for Ms. Wriborg responded, waiving service, and indicating she was ready to proceed. Both sides proceeded to argue the grounds for the motion to disqualify, referencing affidavits that were subsequently introduced into evidence. During the argument, Mr. Gregoire's counsel indicated that an affidavit from her secretary contradicted an affidavit relied upon by Ms. Wriborg, and thus a contradictory hearing needed to be set so that she could call in witnesses to testify. After hearing further argument from the parties, but before the parties introduced the referenced affidavits into evidence, the trial court ruled that it would not disqualify Ms. Wriborg's counsel, and the parties would proceed to try the custody matter.

The record in this matter shows that the trial court ruled on the motion to disqualify without allowing the parties to call witnesses or submit evidence. The trial court relied on arguments made by the parties’ attorneys to make factual determinations necessary to support its ruling on the motion to disqualify. These arguments were not evidence on which the trial court could rely to render judgment on the motion to disqualify. See Searles, 9 So. 3d at 999. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment insofar as it denied Mr. Gregoire's motion to disqualify counsel, and remand this matter to the trial court for a full contradictory hearing. See Id.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's July 29, 2024 judgment is reversed in part, vacated in part, and affirmed in part. It is reversed insofar as it held John Tyler Gregoire in contempt of court and ordered him to pay the sum of $1,500.00 to Stephanie Wriborg. The portion of the judgment denying the motion to disqualify counsel is vacated and remanded. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are equally assessed to the parties.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.

I agree with the majority in reversing the trial court's order finding John Tyler Gregoire in contempt and ordering him to pay $1,500.00 without reciting the facts constituting his contempt. I further agree with the majority to the extent it concludes the trial court erred in not holding a contradictory hearing on appellant's, John Tyler Gregoire, motion to disqualify appellee's, Stephanie Wriborg, counsel and remanding the matter back to the trial court for a full contradictory hearing. I dissent insofar as the majority affirms the ruling on the modification of custody, which hearing occurred following the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to disqualify without a contradictory hearing. I find that until the motion to disqualify is properly heard and determined, Ms. Wriborg should not have the benefit of counsel who may be subject to disqualification due to a conflict of interest, in proceeding on the merits of her case.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The two suits were consolidated in the trial court.

2.   Mr. Gregoire testified he and Ms. Hebert became engaged in December of 2023.

3.   Louisiana Civil Code art. 134(A) provides that the court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child, including:(1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children's Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration.(2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.(4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.(5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.(6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.(7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.(8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any party.(9) The mental and physical health of each party. Evidence that an abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other parent shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody.(10) The home, school, and community history of the child.(11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.(12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party, except when objectively substantial evidence of specific abusive, reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable concerns for the child's safety or well-being while in the care of the other party.(13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.(14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.

4.   On appeal, Mr. Gregoire only assigns as error the trial court's denial of the motion to continue based on the pending motion to disqualify opposing counsel. We note that the trial court confirmed that Mr. Gregoire's counsel did not have a conflicting felony trial and did not limit the time for the hearing or the number of witnesses.

PENZATO, J.

Fields, J. concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons