RENTALS LLC v. HENRY REYES (2025)

In this case involving a petition for eviction, the lessee appeals a trial court judgment in favor of the lessor. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 2, 2020, T&S Rentals, L.L.C. (“T&S”) and Henry Reyes (“Reyes”) executed a Lease Contract with the Option to Purchase (“the Lease”) for property located at 108 Ziegler Avenue in Houma (“the leased premises”). The Lease provides for a term of 154 months, commencing in February 2020 and terminating in December 2032. Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, Reyes agreed to pay rent to T&S in the amount of $1,200.00 per month.¹ In addition to payment of rent, the Lease obligates Reyes to pay for all maintenance, upkeep, and repairs, both major and minor; all city, parish, and state ad valorem taxes and special assessments; and all utilities. The Lease further provides that as long as Reyes is not in default under the terms and provisions of the Lease, he will have the exclusive right, privilege, and option to purchase the leased premises for the sum of $95,000.00, which amount would be fully satisfied by payment of all rent owed during the full term of the Lease.

In August of 2021, Hurricane Ida caused damage to the leased premises. T&S filed a claim with its insurance company for the damage to the property and ultimately filed suit against its insurer for payment of the claim. While this process was ongoing, T&S alleges that Reyes failed to maintain and secure the premises, leading to further damage. T&S further alleges that Reyes began subletting the leased premises to another individual, from whom he collected rent and other expenses.

At the request of T&S, a Notice to Quit dated April 11, 2023 was issued by the City Court of Houma, instructing Reyes and all occupants to vacate the leased premises and surrender possession thereof on or before April 18, 2023. According to the Marshal's return of service, service of the notice was made on April 12, 2023 “by tacking same to the front door of said premises, said premises being closed and the whereabouts of the defendant being unknown at the time of service.” Two violations of the Lease by Reyes were cited in the April 11, 2023 Notice to Quit: (1) the prohibition against subleasing the leased premises without T&S's prior written consent, found in section 6 of the Lease; and (2) Reyes's obligation to undertake all repairs and maintenance of and to the leased premises and to maintain the leased premises in good, clean, and neat condition at his sole cost and expense, found in section 9 of the Lease. When Reyes failed to comply with the Notice to Quit, a Rule to Show Cause was issued on April 26, 2023, citing the same two violations (sections 6 and 9 of the Lease), and ordering Reyes and all occupants of the leased premises to appear in the City Court of Houma on May 1, 2023 to show cause why possession of the leased premises should not be delivered to T&S. Service of the Rule to Show Cause was made on April 26, 2023 “by tacking same to the front door of said premises, said premises being closed and the whereabouts of the defendant being unknown at the time of service.” The record before us on appeal does not contain any further record of the City Court proceedings; however, it appears to be undisputed that Reyes appeared in City Court on May 1, 2023 with his attorney, who objected to the matter being heard in City Court, and thereafter, T&S initiated eviction proceedings in the 32nd Judicial District Court.

On May 11, 2023, T&S filed a Petition for Eviction in the 32nd Judicial District Court, requesting that Reyes be evicted from the leased premises based on his subletting of the leased premises and “fail[ure] to keep the house insurable.” T&S attached the April 11, 2023 Notice to Quit, the April 26, 2023 Rule to Show Cause, and a copy of the March 2, 2020 Lease to the petition. The matter was set for hearing on June 30, 2023; however, on that date, counsel for Reyes advised the trial court that there was another pending suit that should be consolidated with this matter, and the matter was continued without date.²

On September 28, 2023, T&S filed an Amended Petition for Eviction and Possession of Leased Premises. In addition to alleging that Reyes sublet the leased premises without T&S's consent and failed to maintain and repair the leased premises (violations of sections 6 and 9), T&S also alleged that Reyes violated the provisions of the Lease that require him to comply with all laws, ordinances, and regulations of the lawful authority having jurisdiction over the leased premises (section 7), to maintain the leased premises in a neat and clean condition (section 7), and to be responsible for and pay for all maintenance, upkeep, and repairs, both major and minor (section 14). T&S's Amended Petition for Eviction and Possession of Leased Premises was originally set for hearing on November 14, 2023; however, neither Reyes nor his attorney appeared in court on that date. Counsel for T&S advised the trial court that he was unable to obtain service on either Reyes or his counsel of record, and as a result, the matter was continued without date. The matter was reset for hearing on January 22, 2024, but was again continued at the request of Reyes's attorney, and was ultimately heard on April 23, 2024, more than a year after the initial eviction proceedings were initiated in the City Court of Houma and Reyes was notified of the alleged Lease violations.³

T&S's property manager, Eugenia Hernandez, testified at the trial of the eviction proceeding. Hernandez testified that in addition to her duties as property manager, she translates for Spanish-speaking tenants, such as Reyes. Approximately two years before the trial, Hernandez became aware that Reyes was not residing in the leased premises and that someone named Julie Contreras was living there. According to Hernandez, Reyes initially claimed that Contreras was a family member and was not paying him rent, but Contreras later informed Hernandez that she was not a family member and that Reyes was collecting rent from her. Hernandez testified that Reyes was never given permission to sublet the leased premises, nor did he ask for such permission. Rather, she testified that she personally told Reyes that he could not sublet the property. She also recalled an occasion where her boss had a conversation with Reyes about his subletting of the property, which “did not go well,” so she started the eviction process in Houma City Court.

Hernandez also testified concerning her observations of the condition of the property. Hernandez testified that after Hurricane Ida damaged the roof of the home, Reyes was told that T&S was pursuing an insurance claim and that he needed to keep the roof tarped to prevent further damage to the property. According to Hernandez, this was not done, and “the property start[ed] having more damage, like water leaking inside, walls creating mold, humidity inside of the house that was not fixed, so it kept going and going until the condition of the house deteriorated more.”

Hernandez acknowledged that no formal letter was sent to Reyes about his violations of the Lease; however, she explained that she typically communicated with Reyes either on the phone or by text and, further, that the Notice to Quit issued by the City Court in the first eviction proceeding on April 11, 2023 outlined the Lease violations forming the basis for the eviction.

Randy Tisdale, Jr., the owner of T&S, testified at the trial of the eviction proceeding regarding Reyes's violations of the Lease. According to Tisdale, Reyes breached a number of provisions of the Lease. Specifically, Reyes failed to keep the leased premises in a neat and clean condition, failed to perform maintenance and repairs at his expense, and sublet the leased premises without permission. Tisdale testified that Reyes allowed the plastic tarp placed on the roof after Hurricane Ida to disintegrate and never put another tarp back on, despite the fact that he was instructed to have the roof tarped. As a result, the leased premises sustained water damage and mold grew. Tisdale testified that when the roof was initially inspected after the hurricane, it only needed “shingle work;” however, after being left uncovered for so long, the roof ultimately required more extensive repairs, including the replacement of shingles, plywood, and rafters. Tisdale testified that in addition to allowing the property to sustain additional damage, Reyes's failure to repair and maintain the premises made the property uninsurable, which was a problem for T&S because the mortgage company holding the mortgage on the property required that the property be insured. Tisdale also testified that he observed the yard being unkept at the leased premises. Finally, Tisdale testified that Reyes was subleasing the leased premises to Contreras without permission. Tisdale explained that although he does sometimes give permission for a lessee to sublease one of his properties, Reyes never requested permission to sublease the leased premises. Tisdale testified that Reyes was given written notice of his violations of the Lease when he was served with the notice outlining the violations in the initial eviction proceedings.

Reyes testified through an interpreter at the trial of this matter. Reyes claimed that he was not given a chance to read the Lease before signing it, and he had only read it recently. As a result, Reyes denied knowledge of the provision in the Lease requiring him to perform all repairs and maintenance on the leased premises. In addition, Reyes explained that he believed that he was entitled to use the insurance proceeds from T&S's policy to repair the leased premises because he was told that insurance premiums were included in his monthly rental payment. Nevertheless, Reyes testified that he had the roof tarped on three occasions at his own expense after Hurricane Ida while he waited for the insurance proceeds to repair the house. Reyes claimed that he could not afford to repair the damage without the insurance proceeds, and while he waited on insurance, the damage worsened. However, in contradiction to his claim that he could not afford to make the repairs, Reyes testified that he purchased another house for approximately $3 80,000.00 ⁴ for his family to live in temporarily due to the damage to the leased premises. Further, Reyes told Hernandez in a December 14, 2022 text message:

[T]ell your boss to take out a loan to put on the roof for as long as [sic] and when the check comes, deduct the roof because I have the money, I'm not going to invest in the house, that's why it was paid for sure.

Reyes denied that he ever received written notice from T&S prior to the eviction proceedings that he needed to fix certain things; however, he admitted that he was given verbal notice that he needed “to put something to fix ․ on the outside.” Despite admitting that Hernandez told him he needed to take some actions to fix the leased premises, Reyes also claimed that Hernandez told him that he had to stop working on the leased premises or the insurance company would not pay for the damages. In any event, Reyes testified that he made some repairs himself at his own expense because the damage was worsening.

Regarding the allegations that he subleased the leased premises to Contreras, Reyes denied that he charged Contreras rent to live in the leased premises with her children. He testified that Contreras needed a place to stay and offered to give him money for the bills if he allowed her to live there. According to Reyes, Contreras paid him for half of the electricity, water, and lawn care bills, which sometimes totaled $1,800.00 to $1,900.00 per month “if the light was very high that month,” but he never charged her rent. Reyes was asked about a text message purportedly sent by him to Contreras in which he stated:

Look, I'm going to – let's do something. I don't want to give the house to anybody else, only to you and no other people, and 800, I will pay the other 100 from my own pocket to my wife only for you and your children. What do you think?

Reyes did not remember ever sending or receiving that text message, but he maintained that any payments he received from Contreras were payments for her half of the bills or repayments of loans, and not rental payments.

Nathan Rodas, Reyes's cousin and Contreras's former boyfriend, testified that he lived in the leased premises along with Contreras at one point. According to Rodas, the only thing Reyes ever asked of him was that he take care of the house and keep it secure. Rodas never observed Contreras paying Reyes rent or Reyes asking Contreras to pay rent.

Candy Zamora, Reyes's wife, testified that she does not believe that Contreras ever paid rent to Reyes in exchange for living in the house. Zamora testified that she recorded a video in which Contreras explained that she does not pay rent, she only pays the bills, and that she was not coerced into saying those things on video.

The parties also filed a number of exhibits into evidence, including among other things the Lease, text messages in Spanish and English, and pictures of the leased premises.

Following the trial, the trial court signed a judgment dated June 25, 2024 granting the petition for eviction; ordering Reyes to vacate the premises on or before July 19, 2024; decreeing that T&S is not responsible for any payment or reimbursement for any expenses, repairs, upgrades, or maintenance incurred by Reyes; decreeing that T&S is not responsible for any payment or reimbursement for improvements to the leased premises; and assessing all costs to Reyes.

The trial court issued written reasons for judgment, in which it made various findings and concluded that T&S has the right to terminate the Lease with Reyes because Reyes failed to maintain and repair the leased premises, sublet the leased premises without T&S's consent, and failed to keep the leased premises clean.

The trial court noted that although T&S admitted that it failed to send notice of the lease violations to Reyes by certified mail, there was testimony that verbal warnings were given to Reyes by Tisdale and Hernandez. In addition, although it did not seem achievable to give notice to Reyes through certified mail because his address was indeterminable at the time, T&S did cause a Notice to Quit to issue on April 11, 2023, which was tacked to the door at the leased premises according to the City Marshal, as well as an April 26, 2023 Rule to Show Cause, served in the same manner since Reyes's whereabouts were indeterminable. Reyes clearly received both notices, since he appeared in court on May 1, 2023, although the method by which he received those notices is unknown. Finally, Reyes received actual notice of the trial court eviction proceedings, as evidenced by his presence in court at the trial of the matter and his failure to raise lack of notice as an issue prior to trial.

The trial court also noted that Reyes performed repairs and made improvements on the leased premises from March of 2020 until August of 2021, when Hurricane Ida damaged the property. Reyes testified that he lacked the money to complete certain repairs after the storm, and instead purchased a $370,000.00 home for his family in Jefferson Parish while waiting for the money from the insurance claim filed by T&S to fund the repairs. The insurance claim was tied up in litigation for some time, and the insurance proceeds were eventually paid to T&S's mortgage company. During this time, the property further deteriorated and sustained additional damages costing more than the insurance proceeds. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Reyes failed to fulfill his obligation to make repairs and secure the property following Hurricane Ida.

In addition, the trial court found that Reyes sublet the leased premises to Julie Contreras without T&S's consent, in direct violation of the Lease. Although Reyes denied subleasing the leased premises while living in his newly-purchased Jefferson Parish home, the trial court did not find his testimony to be credible and noted that regardless of how Reyes attempted to characterize the payments he received from Contreras while she was living in the leased premises, they were clearly rental payments for the leased premises.

Finally, the trial court found that Reyes failed to keep the premises in a clean condition. Specifically, the trial court noted there was evidence that Reyes had informed Contreras that the yard looked like a “jungle” and that there were copious amounts of “trash” for the lawn company to pick up. The trial court rejected as not credible Reyes's attempted explanation that the words “jungle” and “trash” have different meanings in Honduras and that these statements did not indicate that the leased premises were not kept in a clean condition.

Reyes appealed the June 25, 2024 judgment, assigning the following trial court errors:

1. The trial court erred in applying the default provision of the Lease and ignoring the requirements for written notice and an opportunity to cure the default;

2. The trial court erred in finding that T&S proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Reyes violated the terms of the Lease; and

3. The trial court erred by not weighing the evidence presented by Reyes in his defense of the eviction against the lack of evidence presented by T&S.

DISCUSSION

In an eviction proceeding, the appellate court reviews the trial court's factual findings for manifest error. Under this standard of review, an appellate court must find from the record that there is a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's findings of fact, and the record must establish that the trial court's findings are not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Factual findings should not be reversed on appeal absent manifest error. JoAnn Place v. Ricard, 2022-0456, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/27/22), 356 So.3d 518, 526.

Eviction is a proper remedy for an owner of immovable property who wishes to evict a lessee after his right of occupancy has ceased. La. C.C.P. art. 4701. Under Louisiana law, the cancellation of leases is not favored. The lessor's right to dissolution must be clear. Terrebonne Parish Port Commission v. Eagle Dry Dock & Marine Repairs, L.L.C., 2014-0010 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/7/15), 2015WL4094331, *9 (unpublished). When a lessor seeks eviction based on lease violations, the lessor has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the violation of the lease provides sufficient grounds for an eviction. JoAnn Place, 2022-0456 at p. 16, 356 So.3d at 529.

In interpreting the lease, we begin from the well-settled premise that contracts have the effect of law for the parties and the interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. Lobell v. Rosenberg, 2015-0247, p. 8 (La. 10/14/15), 186 So.3d 83, 88-89; La. C.C. arts. 1983 and 2045. The reasonable intention of the parties to a contract is to be sought by examining the words of the contract itself, and not assumed. Lobell, 2015-0247 at p. 8, 186 So.3d at 89. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La. C.C. art. 2046. Common intent is determined, therefore, in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain, and popular meaning of the words used in the contract. When a clause in a contract is clear and unambiguous, the letter of that clause should not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit, as it is not the duty of the courts to bend the meaning of the words of a contract into harmony with a supposed reasonable intention of the parties. Lobell, 2015-0247 at p. 8, 186 So.3d at 89. However, even when the language of the contract is clear, courts should refrain from construing the contract in such a manner as to lead to absurd consequences. Id.; La. C.C. art. 2046. The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning. La. C.C. art. 2047. Moreover, a contract provision that is susceptible to different meanings must be interpreted with a meaning that renders the provision effective, and not with one that renders it ineffective. La. C.C. art. 2049. Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. C.C. art. 2050; Lobell, 2015-0247 at pp. 8-9, 186 So.3d at 89.

The Lease agreement between T&S and Reyes provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

6.

․ The leased premises may not be sublet or assigned in whole or in part by the Lessee unless Lessor's prior written consent is obtained.

7.

The Lessee shall at all times fully and promptly comply with all laws, ordinances, orders[,] and regulations of any lawful authority having jurisdiction of the leased premise, including but not limited to such as shall relate to the cleanliness, safety, occupation[,] and use [of] the leased premise[s] and the nature, character[,] and manner of the business conducted in or at said premises. Lessee further agrees to keep the leased premises in a clean and neat condition.

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9.

Any and all repairs and maintenance of and to the leased premises shall be assumed and properly undertaken by the Lessee at his/her sole cost and expense. Lessor does not grant any warranties on the leased premises and any such warranties are waived by Lessee. Lessee shall maintain the leased premises in a good, clean[,] and neat condition at his own cost and expenses and deliver the same to Lessor at the termination of this lease in the same condition, normal wear and tear alone accepted [sic].

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12.

The happening of any one or more of the following listed events (hereinafter referred to singularly as “event of default” and plurally as “events of default”) shall constitute a breach of this lease agreement on the part of the Lessee, namely:

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c. The failure of Lessee to fully and promptly perform any act required of him/her in the performance of this lease or to otherwise comply with any term or provision hereof and the continuance of each default twenty (20) days after written notice, without proper steps having been taken to remedy the same.

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Upon happening of any event of default, Lessor shall have the right and option to exercise any one of the following remedies in addition to appropriate remedies which may otherwise be provided by law, as follows:

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B. Lessor shall have the right, at its election, to annul this lease and immediately re-enter upon and take possession of said premises․

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14.

Lessee shall be responsible for and shall pay all maintenance, upkeep[,] and repairs, both major and minor.

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16.

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C. Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be in writing and may be served personally or [by] certified mail, prepaid and addressed to Lessor or Lessee at addresses stated above.

In his first assignment of error, Reyes argues that the trial court erred in allowing T&S to terminate the Lease under the default provision, in spite of the fact that he was not given written notice and an opportunity to cure the violation.

Under the terms of the Lease, T&S has the right to annul the Lease and immediately re-enter upon and take possession of the leased premises when an event of default occurs. An event of default occurs when the lessee fails to fully and promptly perform any act required of him in the performance of the Lease or to otherwise comply with any term or provision thereof and the continuance of each default twenty days after written notice, without proper steps having been taken to remedy same. In this case, T&S alleges that Reyes failed to comply with certain terms or provisions of the Lease; i.e., the requirement to maintain and repair the property and the prohibition against subleasing the leased premises without prior permission. Applying the Lease's default provision, if the failure to comply with certain terms or provisions of the lease continues for twenty days after written notice without proper steps having been taken to remedy same, then T&S shall be entitled to annul the lease and immediately re-enter and take possession of the leased premises. As noted by the trial court, evidence was presented showing that Reyes was given notice, either verbally or by text message, of his violations of the Lease. Further, the April 11, 2023 Notice to Quit and April 26, 2023 Rule to Show Cause issued in connection with the initial eviction proceedings filed in City Court, both of which described the alleged Lease violations, were served by the City Marshal by tacking them to the door of the leased premises since Reyes's whereabouts were unknown. As noted by the trial court, Reyes obviously received actual notice of these allegations, since he appeared in City Court on May 1, 2023. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that Reyes received written notice of the lease violations. Further, although Reyes was arguably not afforded twenty days after receipt of the written notice to cure the violations before T&S instituted eviction proceedings in City Court, more than twenty days passed between service of the Notice to Quit and the filing of T&S's Petition for Eviction and Amended Petition for Eviction and Possession of Leased Premises in the trial court. This assignment of error lacks merit.

In his next two assignments of error, Reyes argues that the trial court erred in finding that T&S proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the terms of the Lease. Specifically, Reyes argues that T&S did not present sufficient evidence to prove that he kept the leased premises in disrepair or in such a condition that constitutes a breach of the Lease or that he subleased the property without T&S's consent. He also argues that the trial court improperly failed to consider the evidence he presented that contradicted T&S's evidence of the violations.

As noted by the trial court, evidence was presented at trial that Reyes allowed Contreras to live in the house in exchange for a sum of money. Although Reyes attempted to characterize the payments he received from Contreras as something other than rental payments, such as payment for bills or repayment of loans, the trial court clearly did not find his testimony about the purpose of the payments to be credible. In matters of credibility, an appellate court must give great deference to the findings of the trier of fact, as the trial court is in the best position to view the demeanor and mannerisms of the witnesses. When conflicting testimony exists, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact made by the trial court are not to be disturbed. Ragland v. Ragland, 2022-0770, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/22), 2022WL17847347 *3. Based on our review of the record before us in its entirety, we cannot say that the trial court's factual finding that Reyes subleased the leased premises to Contreras was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

The trial court also found that Reyes failed to repair and maintain the house in a neat and clean condition. According to Tisdale's testimony, Reyes did not keep the roof covered after Hurricane Ida as he was told to do, and this failure led to more extensive damage. There was evidence presented by both sides concerning the water damage and mold in the house that resulted from repairs not being made. Despite Reyes's testimony that he was waiting on T&S's insurance company to pay the claim before he made any repairs and that Hernandez instructed him not to do any work on the house, Reyes was obligated under the terms of the Lease, which he admitted he did not read until after the eviction proceedings were initiated, to repair and maintain the property in a neat and clean condition. There was also evidence that the yard was unkept, with tall grass and garbage in the yard. Although Reyes denied the allegations that the grass was tall and that there was garbage in the yard and testified that the leased premises were maintained in a neat and clean condition, the trial court clearly did not find this testimony to be credible. Based on our review of the evidence before us, we cannot say that the trial court's finding that Reyes failed to repair and maintain the property was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Assignments of error number 2 and 3 lack merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the June 25, 2024 judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to defendant-appellant, Henry Reyes.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Lease provides that of this monthly rental payment, $600.00 per month will be applied and credited against the purchase price of $95,000.00 in the event that Reyes elects the option to purchase the property under the Lease.

2.   Also on June 30, 2023, Reyes filed his answer and affirmative defenses to T&S's petition for eviction.

3.   Also on April 23, 2024, Reyes filed his answer and affirmative defenses to T&S's amended petition. T&S objected to the extent that new affirmative defenses were raised on the morning of trial, and the trial court ordered any new affirmative defenses stricken from Reyes's answer.

4.   According to the November 15, 2021 Cash Sale in the record, the purchase price for the house Reyes purchased in Jefferson Parish was $3 70,000.00.

THERIOT, J.