CALVIN DAVIS v. SECRETARY JAMES LEBLANC LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS WARDEN OF RAYMOND LABORDE CORR CTR AND UN NAME CORRECTIONAL OFFICER (2025)

An inmate appeals a judgment dismissing his petition for judicial review of an Administrative Remedy Procedure he claims he filed but which the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPSC) has no record of receiving. The trial court dismissed the inmate's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction upon finding he failed to prove that he exhausted administrative remedies. After review, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 15, 2024, Calvin Davis, an inmate in DPSC's custody, filed a Petition for Judicial Review of an administrative remedy procedure (ARP) he claimed he filed with the warden of Raymond Laborde Correctional Center (RLCC) in Cottonport, Louisiana.¹ In his petition, Mr. Davis alleged he did not receive a response to his ARP from the RLCC warden. He also alleged he then filed his ARP with the Secretary of DPSC and similarly received no response. Attached to Mr. Davis’ petition were two documents. The first document is titled “This Is A Request for Administrative Remedy” purportedly signed by Mr. Davis on December 1, 2023, wherein he alleges he was injured on November 20, 2023, while being transported on a bus from Hunt Correctional Center to “Cottonport Prison.” The document is not addressed to a specific recipient and bears no markings or other indications of when or to whom it was sent or of when or by whom it was received. The second document is a copy of a January 15, 2024 memorandum addressed from Mr. Davis to the DPSC Secretary, identifying the memorandum as Mr. Davis’ request to move to the second step of the ARP process, because the “Warden over Cottonport” had not timely answered his ARP. Similar to the first attached document, the second attached document bears no markings or other indications of when it was sent or of when or by whom it was received.

On June 6, 2024, DPSC filed an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging DPSC had no record of an ARP filed by Mr. Davis and that his petition should be dismissed for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In support of its exception, DPSC filed the affidavit of Kelly Stone Liebert, a DPSC administrative coordinator, wherein Ms. Liebert attested she had reviewed DPSC records and was unable to locate an ARP filed by Mr. Davis in connection with the captioned matter. Mr. Davis responded to DPSC's exception but alleged no additional facts nor filed evidence corroborating his purported filing of an ARP with DPSC.

On July 23, 2024, a Nineteenth Judicial District Court commissioner signed a screening report, noting that she had reviewed the matter and was recommending that the trial court grant DPSC's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismiss Mr. Davis’ appeal without prejudice for his failure to provide proof that he had exhausted administrative remedies.² Mr. Davis filed a traversal of the screening report, contending the trial court should remand the matter to DPSC for consideration, as he argued had been done in a similar case filed by another inmate. In support of his traversal, Mr. Davis attached a May 9, 2023 “Order Remanding Matter to [DPSC]” in a suit captioned Derrick Allen v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, No. 729,472 (19th Judicial District Court).

On September 24, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment, adopting the commissioner's recommendation and dismissing Mr. Davis’ suit without prejudice. Mr. Davis appeals from the adverse judgment asserting eight assignments of error. Because they are related, we address certain assignments of error together.

DISCUSSION

In related assignments of error numbers one and five, Mr. Davis contends the trial court erred in adopting the commissioner's findings and dismissing his Petition for Judicial Review.

A trial court's determination of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction is subject to de novo review. Morales v. Wilder, 2023-0067 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/23), 375 So.3d 1019, 1023, writ denied, 2023-01383 (La. 12/19/23), 375 So.3d 409. Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue, because a judgment rendered by a court that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is void. La. C.C.P. art. 3; Robinson v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2022-1115 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/18/23), 2023 WL 3555513, *2. Where the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not apparent on the face of the petition, evidence may be offered to support or controvert the exception. See La. C.C.P. art. 930; Guy v. Caivit, 2019-1675 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/5/20), 311 So.3d 362, 368. In this case, Mr. Davis’ Petition for Judicial Review specifically alleged he filed his ARP with the RLCC Warden, and then with the DPSC Secretary, but that he received no response from either. Thus, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction was not apparent on the face of the petition, and DPSC had the burden of providing evidence to support its exception. Accord Morales, 375 So.3d at 1023-24.

Under the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure, La. R.S. 15:1171-1179, and applicable DPSC regulations, LAC 22:I:325, an offender must exhaust a two-step ARP before he can proceed with a suit in state court. La. R.S. 15:1176; LAC 22:I.325(F)(3)(a)(viii); Barnes v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2024-0042 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/20/24), 405 So.3d 628, 630, writ denied, 2024-01339 (La. 1/28/25), 399 So.3d 415; Robinson, 2023 WL 3555513 at *3. Only after the request for administrative remedy is accepted can proper exhaustion occur. LAC 22:I.325(F)(3)(a)(viii). Proper exhaustion only occurs when an offender files a timely and procedurally proper request for remedy, which after it is accepted, and is addressed on the merits at both the first and second step. LAC 22:I:325(E); Allen v. Louisiana Department of Safety and Corrections, 2024-0533 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), 2024 WL 5233039, *2. If an offender fails to exhaust administrative remedies, the trial court and the appellate court lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the claim. Robinson, 2023 WL 3555513 at *3.

In support of its exception, DPSC provided Ms. Liebert's affidavit wherein she attested that DPSC had no record of an ARP filed by Mr. Davis. This evidence supported DPSC's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Mr. Davis’ failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The burden of proof then shifted to Mr. Davis to prove he had exhausted his administrative remedies. See Morales, 375 So.3d at 1024; also see Barnes, 405 So.3d at 631 (noting the burden of proof in any civil administrative appeal lies with the petitioner). Although Mr. Davis provided copies of documents he purportedly sent to RLCC Warden and to the DPSC Secretary, and contends he “filed a proper ARP” with both persons, he has provided no evidence to support his self-serving assertions that the ARP was actually filed or accepted.³ Thus, based on our review of the administrative record, we agree with the trial court and the commissioner that Mr. Davis failed to prove he exhausted his administrative remedies.

In related assignment of error numbers two, three, four, seven, and eight, Mr. Davis contends the trial court and/or commissioner denied him equal protection of the law, retaliated against him, and broke the law by failing to rule similarly to a ruling made in a suit captioned Derrick Alien v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, No. 729,472 (19th Judicial District Court). We know of no authority mandating that the trial court or this Court is bound by action taken by another commissioner in an unrelated case involving unknown facts and filed by another inmate. These assignments of error are meritless.

In assignment of error number five, Mr. Davis contends that commissioners of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court are unconstitutional, because they are not elected officials and impermissibly have “the same identical jobs as a judge.” According to La. R.S. 13:713(A), commissioners of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court shall perform such duties as are assigned to them. However, La. R.S. 13:713(B)(4) specifically states that these commissioners shall not have the power to adjudicate cases, other than in certain cases not pertinent herein. See La. R.S. 13:713(B) and (E). Further, under La. R.S. 13:713(C)(1) and (2), in proceedings arising out of incarceration of prisoners, a commissioner's duties are limited to receiving evidence and preparing a written report that he/she files with the trial court. Under La. R.S. 13:713(C)(5), the trial court may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part a commissioner's findings and recommendations, and may receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the commissioner with instructions. Thus, the above statutory scheme shows that the commissioners of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court have limited duties and are not impermissibly performing “the same identical jobs as a judge.” Mr. Davis’ argument to the contrary is meritless.

After a de novo review, we conclude the trial court properly granted DPSC's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed Mr. Davis’ petition for judicial review without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For reasons stated, we affirm the September 24, 2024 judgment dismissing Calvin Davis's Petition for Judicial Review without prejudice. We assess costs of the appeal to Calvin Davis.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time he filed the petition, Mr. Davis was housed at Rayburn Correctional Center in Angie, Louisiana. Further, in his petition, Mr. Davis named James LeBlanc, then Secretary of DPSC, as a defendant.

2.   The office of the commissioner of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court was created by La. R.S. 13:711 to hear and recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state prisoners. The commissioner submits his/her written findings and recommendations to a district judge, who may accept, modify, or reject them. See La. R.S. 13:713(A) and (C)(5).

3.   Compare Dillon v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2020-0477 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 2020 WL 7771002, *1, wherein this Court remanded a case to the trial court to determine if DPSC had properly acted upon an ARP. In Dillon, however, the administrative record included documentary evidence that the inmate had actually filed an ARP, had received a first-step response form, and had completed his second step response. See Dillon, 2020 WL 7771002 at *1 and *3. In the present case, unlike in Dillon, there is no proof that Mr. Davis ever filed his ARP, so as to prompt responses from the RLLC warden or from DPSC. Also compare Allen v. Louisiana Department of Safety and Corrections, 2023-1238 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/14/24), 2024 WL 2988979, *1-2, wherein the inmate provided proof that his ARP had been accepted and rejected.Additionally, we find no merit to Mr. Davis’ assignment of error number six, wherein he contends the trial court erred in failing to apply the “mailbox rule” in this case. The “mailbox rule” states that a pro se inmate's petition for judicial review is deemed filed at the time it was delivered to the prison authorities for forwarding to the district court. See Bourque v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2016-1342 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 1041, 1043. Mr. Davis provides no controlling authority that the mailbox rule also applies to the initial filing of an ARP.

GREENE, J.