IN RE: MARRIAGE OF CAROL P. TREADWAY AND HAROLD JOSEPH TREADWAY (2025)

This is an appeal from a judgment that denied exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, lis pendens, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Harold Joseph Treadway (Harold) and Carol Ostrand Treadway (Carol) were purportedly married at a ceremony at Hosanna Lutheran Church in Covington, Louisiana on October 14, 2006. The underlying issue in the case is whether a valid marriage existed.

Harold was previously married and his spouse passed away in 2004. Carol was previously married twice; she was divorced from her first husband and her second husband died in 2000. Harold and Carol began a romantic relationship after their spouses died and participated in the October 14, 2006 ceremony subsequent to the start of their relationship. The couple lived together until Carol suffered a stroke and moved in with her son in May of 2023. Soon thereafter, one of Harold's children filed suit to interdict him and on June 27,2023, a judgment of permanent interdiction was signed and Harold's daughter, Karen Treadway Champagne (Ms. Champagne), was appointed as his curatrix.

On July 28, 2023, Ms. Champagne, as curatrix, filed a petition for damages, for revocation of an inter vivos donation of Harold's house to Carol, for a temporary restraining order, and a motion for a preliminary injunction in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. In that suit, Ms. Champagne maintained that Harold was diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease on December 10, 2019, and that in January of 2021, Carol, acting with full knowledge of Harold's declining condition, began removing all of the funds from accounts belonging to Harold and depositing those funds into her own accounts. Ms. Champagne also alleged that on August 25, 2022, Carol had Harold execute a durable power of attorney giving Carol full power and authority over Harold's affairs, and directed that Harold's Social Security payments and savings be moved into an account owned by Carol and her son, William P. Verret.² Ms. Champagne maintained that Carol also had Harold modify his last will and testament to provide that the assets in Harold's bank accounts go to Carol upon his death, despite Harold's condition. Ms. Champagne sought damages in the form of all assets taken from Harold's accounts, sought revocation of the inter vivos donation of Harold's house to Carol, and sought injunctive relief to prevent Carol from fraudulently acting on behalf of Harold. Ms. Champagne also sought an emergency order enjoining Carol from evicting Harold from the property or selling or disposing of the property pending the outcome of this litigation.

On January 26, 2024, Carol filed this suit in the Family Court in the Parish of East Baton Rouge. Carol asked for a separate property regime and a partition of community assets, asserting that she and Harold were married and had a community property regime, and that she suffered immediate, irreparable injury or loss of her interest in the community and had no access to community funds because of Ms. Champagne's actions as curatrix. Carol sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting Ms. Champagne from disposing of, alienating, or encumbering any assets belonging to the community until at least a show cause hearing could be held. Carol also asked the Family Court to order Ms. Champagne to give a detailed accounting of the funds in her possession as of the date she was appointed curatrix, and to post a reasonable security until the partition. Carol asked for an interim advance from her portion of the community for living expenses, for use of one or both of the community cars, and for joint possession of the community home with Harold. The Family Court granted a temporary restraining order on January 29, 2024, in accordance with that request.

Ms. Champagne, as curatrix, filed exceptions of no right of action, no cause of action, lis pendens, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction and asked that Carol's petition be dismissed with prejudice. Ms. Champagne maintained that the parties did not intend to be legally married, thus Carol had no right of action and no cause of action. Ms. Champagne also maintained that there was already a pending interdiction proceeding and a civil proceeding regarding these matters, and that Carol was attempting to have the Family Court usurp the authority of the courts in the existing suits, and thus her exception of lis pendens should be granted. Ms. Champagne asked that Carol's petition be dismissed with prejudice. Ms. Champagne also filed a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum from Carol in the Family Court proceeding asking for financial documents belonging to Harold or Harold and Carol and for documents reflecting any change in beneficiaries of any accounts belonging to Harold such as retirement or life insurance. Ms. Champagne maintained that because this matter should be dismissed via her exceptions, and because Harold and Carol were not legally married, Carol had no right to Harold's personal banking and financial information. Carol opposed the exceptions.

The exceptions were heard on March 13, 2024 and April 22, 2024. Thereafter, the Family Court signed a judgment on May 8, 2024, denying the peremptory exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, denying the declinatory exception of lis pendens, and denying the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum.³ Ms. Champagne appealed that judgment.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

After the record was lodged, this Court issued a rule to show cause on December 9, 2024, stating that it appeared that the May 8, 2024 judgment at issue in the instant appeal is a non-appealable ruling. The parties were ordered to show cause by briefs as to whether this appeal should or should not be dismissed for that reason.

Carol asks that the appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Gary Treadway maintains that the ruling was properly designated as final, and alternatively, asks that this Court convert the appeal to a writ and consider the merits of the case. The May 8, 2024 judgment was certified as final by the Family Court pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) for purposes of an immediate appeal. However, a judgment denying exceptions is not susceptible of certification pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). Young v. City of Plaquemine, 2004-2305 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/05), 927 So.2d 408, 411 (La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) does not authorize a trial court to designate a judgment denying an exception as final); see also Bannister v. SFB Companies, Inc., 2019-0079 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/15/19), 290 So.3d 1134, 1138, writ denied, 2020-00263 (La. 5/1/20), 295 So.3d 943.

We recognize that this Court has discretionary authority to convert an appeal from an interlocutory judgment to an application for supervisory writs. See Stelluto v. Stelluto, 2005-0074 (La. 6/29/05), 914 So.2d 34, 39.⁴ After review, we decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

We dismiss the appeal and decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction to convert the appeal to a writ. The costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellant, Gary Treadway.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   William P. Verret is Carol's son by her first marriage.

3.   We note that the Family Court signed the judgment at issue before Harold's death. After Harold's death, Carol's partition action was no longer an action to partition the community property or property acquired pursuant to a matrimonial regime between a spouse and an interdicted spouse; instead, it became an action to partition such property between Carol and the succession legatees. See McCann v. McCann, 2011-2434 (La. 5/8/12), 93 So.3d 544, 550.

4.   The motion for appeal was filed within the thirty-day time period for filing an application for supervisory writs. See Uniform Rules - Courts of Appeal, Rule 4-3.

GREENE, J.

Miller, J. concurs.