TURNER v. MOREAU (2025)

This appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing Plaintiff's suit as abandoned. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Reverend George Turner, filed the instant defamation suit against Defendant, Joseph “Jody” Moreau, on September 7, 2018, asserting a claim for damages resulting from alleged defamatory statements made by Defendant on Facebook regarding Plaintiff's efforts to develop an affordable housing subdivision in East Feliciana Parish. Defendant filed an answer, asserted affirmative defenses, and raised a reconventional demand on October 11, 2018. Plaintiff answered Defendant's reconventional demand on October 26, 2018, and raised an affirmative defense to the reconventional demand. Also on October 26, 2018, Plaintiff served Defendant with his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Defendant responded to Plaintiff's discovery request, serving Plaintiff with his responses by email transmitted on April 24, 2019, and by certified mail delivery received by Plaintiff's counsel at her office address of record.¹

On August 13, 2020, Plaintiff re-served Defendant by email with a duplicate copy of his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents that he originally served on Defendant on October 26, 2018.² Plaintiff fax-filed his duplicate discovery request with the Clerk of Court for the Twentieth Judicial District (“Clerk of Court”), with the original received on August 18, 2020. Plaintiff also fax-filed a request for notice, with the original received on August 18, 2020.

No further action was taken in the instant suit until August 11, 2023, when Plaintiff fax-filed a motion for status conference to obtain a scheduling order. The trial court scheduled an in-person status conference for September 25, 2023, which was continued to October 23, 2023.

On October 2, 2023, prior to the status conference, Defendant filed an ex parte motion to dismiss the instant suit as abandoned pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 561 based on the fact that the parties took no steps in the prosecution or defense of the case for over three years, between April 24, 2019 and April 25, 2022. The trial court set Defendant's motion to dismiss for hearing on January 22, 2024, which was continued to February 26, 2024.

Plaintiff opposed Defendant's motion to dismiss, arguing that on August 13, 2020, he “re-served by US mail and [email his first set of] [i]nterrogatories and [r]equest[s] for [p]roduction of documents on [Defendant].” Plaintiff also contended that he filed his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents into the suit record. While Plaintiff acknowledged that his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents had been originally served on Defendant “back in [2018]”³ , Plaintiff claimed he “had not received the responses to those documents.” Thus, Plaintiff essentially contended that his act of re-serving his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents on Defendant constituted a step in the prosecution of the suit; therefore, the action was not abandoned.⁴

In response, Defendant contended that Plaintiff's “re-serving” and act of filing his duplicate discovery request into the suit record was not sufficient to interrupt abandonment because Plaintiff's discovery request had been previously served on Defendant on October 26, 2018, and Defendant served his responses by email on April 24, 2019, and by certified mail on April 29, 2019.

Following the February 26, 2024 hearing on Defendant's ex parte motion to dismiss the instant suit as abandoned, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed Plaintiff's suit on grounds of abandonment. The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with its ruling on March 13, 2024. Plaintiff now appeals.⁵

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The controlling statute in this case is La. C.C.P. art. 561,⁶ which provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1) An action․is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or defense in the trial court for a period of three years․ .

**  *

B. Any formal discovery as authorized by this Code and served on all parties whether or not filed of record, including the taking of a deposition with or without formal notice, shall be deemed to be a step in the prosecution or defense of an action.

Article 561 imposes three requirements to avoid abandonment: (1) a party must take some “step” in the prosecution or defense of the action; (2) the step must be taken in the proceeding and, with the exception of formal discovery, must appear in the record of the suit; and (3) the step must be taken within three years of the last step taken by either party. Sufficient action by either the plaintiff or the defendant will be deemed a step. Louisiana Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, L.L.C., 2011-0912 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So.3d 978, 981. Article 561 is operative without formal order, but, on ex parte motion of any party or other interested person by affidavit which provides that no step has been timely taken in the prosecution or defense of the action, the trial court shall enter a formal order of dismissal as of the date of its abandonment. La. C.C.P. art. 561(A)(3); Hancock Bank of Louisiana v. Robinson, 2020-0791 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/11/21), 322 So.3d 307,311.

A “step” is a formal action before the court by either the plaintiff or defendant that is intended to hasten the suit toward judgment or the taking of formal discovery. A step by one party prevents abandonment as to all of the parties, even though they are not solidarily liable. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 79 So.3d at 981. Our jurisprudence has uniformly held Article 561 is to be liberally construed in favor of maintaining a plaintiff's suit. Because dismissal is the harshest of remedies, any reasonable doubt about abandonment should be resolved in favor of allowing the prosecution of the claim and against dismissal for abandonment. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 79 So.3d at 981-82. The purpose of Article 561 is to dismiss actions which have been abandoned, and the article provides for dismissal of those cases in which a plaintiff's inaction during a legislatively ordained period has clearly demonstrated his abandonment of the case. The article was not intended, however, to dismiss those cases in which a plaintiff has clearly demonstrated before the court during the prescribed period that he does not intend to abandon the action. Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2000-3010 (La. 5/15/01), 785 So.2d 779, 786 (quoting Kanuk v. Pohlmann, 338 So.2d 757, 758 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1976), writ denied, 341 So.2d 420 (La. 1977)).

Given that dismissal is the harshest of remedies, the general rule is that any reasonable doubt about abandonment should be resolved in favor of allowing the prosecution of the claim and against dismissal for abandonment. Quality Environmental Processes, Inc. v. Energy Development Corp., 2016-0171 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 1045, 1057. Whether a step in the prosecution or defense of a case has been taken in the trial court for a period of three years is a question of fact subject to manifest error analysis on appeal; by contrast, whether a particular act, if proven, interrupts abandonment is a question of law that is examined on appeal by ascertaining whether the trial court's conclusion is legally correct. Williams v. Montgomery, 2020-01120 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 1036, 1042 (citing Martin v. National City Mortgage Co., 52,371 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 261 So.3d 144, 147, writ denied, 2018-2046 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So.3d 435).

Article 561(B) states “[a]ny formal discovery as authorized by this Code and served on all parties” will constitute a step in the prosecution or defense of an action. Pertinently to the instant matter, La. C.C.P. art. 1421 provides that discovery may be obtained through “written interrogatories [and] production of documents or things”, amongst other methods.

Interrogatories are governed by La. C.C.P. art. 1457(A), which sets forth that “[a]ny party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served[.]” Article 1457(B) further provides:

During an entire proceeding, written interrogatories served in accordance with Paragraph A shall not exceed thirty-five in number, including subparts, without leave of court. Additional interrogatories, not to exceed thirty-five in number including subparts, shall be allowed upon [ex parte] motion of any party. Thereafter, any party desiring to serve additional interrogatories shall file a written motion setting forth the proposed additional interrogatories and the reasons establishing good cause why they should be allowed to be filed. The court after contradictory hearing and for good cause shown may allow the requesting party to serve such additional interrogatories as the court deems appropriate. Local rules of court may provide a greater restriction on the number of written interrogatories.

Requests for production of documents are governed by La. C.C.P. art. 1461, which pertinently provides:

Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and pennit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect, copy, test, and sample any designated documents or electronically stored information, including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations in any medium from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection and other devices into reasonably usable form, or except as provided in Article 1462(E), to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Articles 1422 through 1425 and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom the request is served[.]

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1474(A) sets forth that interrogatories, answers to interrogatories, and requests for production of documents and responses thereto may be served as provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 1313, which allows for service by mail or emailing the party or his counsel of record at a designated email address. La. C.C.P. art. 1313(A). Relevant herein, Article 1313(A)(1) provides for service by mailing a copy to the counsel of record. Article 1313(A)(4) provides for service by emailing a copy to counsel of record. Article 1313(B) further requires that “[w]hen service is made by mail․or electronic means, the party or counsel making the service shall file in the record a certificate of the manner in which service was made.” But Article 1313(A)(1) establishes that service is “complete upon mailing,” and Article 1313(A)(4) provides that service is “complete upon transmission but is not effective and shall not be certified if the serving party learns the transmission did not reach the party to be served.” Service is not, however, contingent upon the filing of the certificate. Slaughter v. Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc., 2002-0583 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 425, 428.

Finally, “[t]he serving of any discovery materials pursuant to the provisions of [La. C.C.P. art. 1474] shall be considered a step in the prosecution or defense of an action for purposes of Article 561, notwithstanding that such discovery materials are not filed in the record of the proceedings.” La. C.C.P. art. 1474(C)(4).

Assignments of Error Nos. 1-3

To facilitate our discussion of the errors assigned by Plaintiff on appeal, we consider the first three errors simultaneously, as his arguments are interrelated. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred: (1) in finding that the last step in the prosecution or defense of this action occurred on April 29, 2019, the date when Defendant responded to Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents; (2) in finding that the suit had abandoned by operation of law in 2022, even though Plaintiff filed and re-served his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents on Defendant on August 13, 2020; and (3) in omitting the fact that Plaintiff filed a motion for status conference on August 11, 2023, which fell within three years of August 13, 2020, the date of service of his duplicate discovery request.

Stated plainly, the issue before this court is whether duplicate interrogatories and requests for production of documents—i.e., a subsequent, identical discovery request—may be considered a “step” in the prosecution or defense of an action preventing abandonment.

The record shows that during the February 26, 2024 hearing on Defendant's ex parte motion to dismiss the instant suit as abandoned, the parties offered, filed, and introduced the following exhibits into evidence:

• Exhibit D1: affidavit of Defense counsel, with attached Exhibits A - F.

• Exhibit D2 (A): Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents, served by mail on Defense counsel on October 26, 2018. This discovery request included the following certificate of service: “I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Answer and Affirmative Defense was this date forwarded to [Defense counsel] by depositing a copy of same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,․and/or faxed/emailed to [Defense counsel] on this, the 26th day of October, 2018[.]”

• Exhibit D3 (B): Defendant's responses to Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents, dated April 24, 2019, including a transmittal letter dated April 24, 2019, indicating the methods of service.

• Exhibit D4 (C): Plaintiff's duplicate first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents, fax-filed to the Clerk of Court (original received on August 18, 2020) and served by email on Defense counsel on August 13, 2020. Notably, Plaintiff's duplicate discovery request included the original certificate of service dated October 26, 2018 and a second certificate of service dated August 13, 2020.

• Exhibit D5 (D): Defense counsel's email dated October 28, 2019, sent to Plaintiff's counsel in response to an October 18, 2019 email inquiry from Plaintiff's counsel regarding deposition dates. In the October 28th email, Defense counsel pertinently stated, “On April 24, 2019[,] we forwarded responses to the discovery served on [Defendant.]”

• Exhibit D6 (E): Defense counsel's assistant's email dated April 24, 2019, transmitting Defendant's responses to Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents, including a transmittal letter dated April 24, 2019, indicating the methods of service.

• Exhibit D7 (F): certified mail “green card” return receipt, showing Defendant's responses to Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents was served by mail on Plaintiff's counsel and received at her office address of record on April 25 or 29, 2019.

• Exhibit Pl: Plaintiff's objections to Defendant's ex parte motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, fax-filed to the Clerk of Court on October 6, 2023, including copies of Plaintiff's original discovery request and duplicate discovery request.

• Exhibit P2: Plaintiff's counsel's email dated August 13, 2020, sent to Defense counsel transmitting Plaintiff's duplicate first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents.

• Exhibit P3: Plaintiff's duplicate first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents, mailed to the Clerk of Court on August 13, 2020, including a transmittal letter dated August 13, 2020, indicating the methods of service.

• Exhibit P4: Notice of Assignment from the Clerk of Court that the matter was set for a status conference on September 25, 2023, via Plaintiff's motion for status conference fax-filed on August 11, 2023 (original received on August 15, 2023).

• Exhibit P5: Fax-filing receipt showing the Clerk of Court received Plaintiff's motion for status conference fax-filed on August 11, 2023.

• Plaintiff's Proffered Exhibit Pl: Email from Defense counsel's assistant dated October 23, 2020, sent to Plaintiff's counsel that states: “Attached are [Defendant's] First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admissions to [Plaintiff] dated 10/16/2018.”

The trial court found that Defendant's responses to Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents served by email and by mail on April 24, 2019 constituted a step in the prosecution or defense of the case. We agree. Defendant's discovery responses were formal discovery pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1474 and constitute a step in the defense of the action. See La. C.C.P. art. 561(B); Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 79 So.3d at 981.

Next, the trial court noted that Plaintiff fax-filed a request for notice to the Clerk of Court, who received the original on August 18, 2020. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff's request for notice was not a step in furtherance of the prosecution or defense of the case. We agree. A request for notice is not a step intended to hasten the matter to judgment; rather, it is a request for notification in the event that steps are taken. Hercules Offshore, Inc. v. Lafayette Parish School Board, Sales & Use Tax Dep't, 2014-701 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/11/15), 157 So.3d 1177, 1180.

The trial court then found that Plaintiff fax-filed a document, Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents, to the Clerk of Court on August 13, 2020, who received the original on August 18, 2020. The record shows that the document was also served by email on Defense counsel on August 13, 2020. The trial court noted that Plaintiff's duplicate discovery request included the original certificate of service dated October 26, 2018 and a second certificate of service dated August 13, 2020. The trial court held, “[t]his indicates to this [c]ourt that that document was not a step in the prosecution or defense of this matter as the [i]nterrogatories that were fax-filed with the Clerk had, in fact, been answered and emailed[.]”

We agree. After Plaintiff propounded his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to Defendant on October 26, 2018, Plaintiff's counsel “re-served” Defendant with a duplicate copy of Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents on August 13, 2020, identical to the October 26, 2018 initial discovery request. While Plaintiff argued the duplicate discovery request was filed because he was not aware of the receipt of Defendant's discovery responses, no evidence was presented to show that Plaintiff was prevented from taking, or relieved Plaintiff of the duty to take, some formal action in or before the trial court to hasten the matter to judgment. See Compensation Specialties, L.L.C. v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2008-1549 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/13/09), 6 So.3d 275, 281, writ denied, 2009-0575 (La. 4/24/09), 7 So.3d 1200; Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 79 So.3d at 984 (scheduling a discovery conference pursuant to Rule 10.1 of the Rules for Louisiana District Courts serves as a step in the prosecution or defense of an action, as it is a prerequisite to filing a motion to compel discovery).

According to the record and briefs on appeal, Plaintiff's counsel did not attempt to schedule a Rule 10.1 discovery conference nor file a motion to compel Defendant's discovery responses. Plaintiff propounded his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to Defendant on October 26, 2018, and then took no further action to obtain compliance with that discovery request. Based on Plaintiff's failure to obtain Defendant's discovery responses, we agree with the trial court that Plaintiff's re-service on Defendant and filing into the record a duplicate and identical copy of Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents on August 13, 2020 was not a step in the prosecution or defense of the action interrupting abandonment. A duplicate and identical discovery request is not a step in furtherance of bringing a suit to judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 561. See Gueldner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2009-720 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/10/10), 30 So.3d 1143, 1146. See also Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 79 So.3d at 984; Clark v. Mangham, 55,073 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/24/23), 362 So.3d 1053, 1058, writ denied, 2023-01028 (La. 11/8/23), 373 So.3d 61, reconsideration not considered sub nom., Clark v. Mangham, Hardy, Rolfs & Abadie, 2023-01028 (La. 1/24/24), 377 So.3d 687 (Duplicate copy of a prior discovery request that pro se legal malpractice plaintiff filed when he was prevented from filing a motion to compel did not constitute a step in the prosecution of the action, where plaintiff did not have the certification stating a discovery conference had been held with defendants and never tried to schedule a discovery conference as required by local court rule before a motion to compel could be filed, and he did not serve defendants with such a motion); Occidental Properties, Ltd. v. Zufle, 2011-77 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/11), 79 So.3d 1135 (Plaintiff propounded interrogatories and took no steps after that to obtain any compliance with discovery, arguing that outstanding discovery prevented abandonment; however, the trial court held that Plaintiff's remedy was to file a motion to compel in the trial court seeking answers to interrogatories and/or sanctions).

The trial court held that the last step taken in the prosecution or defense of the action occurred on April 29, 2019. The trial court then ruled that no further action was taken in the instant suit until August 11, 2023, when Plaintiff fax-filed a motion for status conference with the Clerk of Court, who received the original on August 15, 2023. The trial court held that because no step was taken in the prosecution or defense of this action for a period of three years (between April 29, 2019 and August 11, 2023), the action was abandoned.

We agree. More than three years elapsed between April 24, 2019—the date Defendant's responses to Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents were mailed to Plaintiff's counsel ⁷ —and August 11, 2023—the date Plaintiff filed his motion for status conference. Therefore, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 561, the action is abandoned. We find the trial court articulated a reasonable factual basis to support its determination that Plaintiff's action is abandoned. We find no error in the trial court's legal conclusion that Plaintiff's filing of a duplicate and identical discovery request was not a step in furtherance of bringing his suit to judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 561.

Assignment of Error No. 4

In his fourth and final assignment of error, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in failing to admit into evidence Plaintiff's Proffered Exhibit Pl, which is an email from Defense counsel's assistant dated October 23, 2020, transmitted to Plaintiff's counsel, which states: “Attached are [Defendant's] First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admissions to [Plaintiff] dated 10/16/2018.” Plaintiff argues that the October 23, 2020 email serving Plaintiff with Defendant's discovery request constituted formal discovery and interrupted abandonment.

During the February 26, 2024 hearing on Defendant's ex parte motion to dismiss the instant suit as abandoned, Plaintiff attempted to offer, file, and introduce Proffered Exhibit Pl. Defense counsel objected to its admission, arguing that the email was “not attached to any of Counsel's pleadings. I first saw it as an exhibit, a proposed exhibit, moments ago. ․ I'm surprised at this exhibit. It was not attached to her [o]bjection. There was no reference to it.” The trial court ruled, “I'm not admitting this.” Plaintiff then proffered this exhibit into evidence.

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. La. C.E. art. 402. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. La. C.E. art. 401. The trial court has great discretion in its consideration of evidentiary matters. Thus, on review, an appellate court must determine whether the trial court abused its great discretion in ruling on evidentiary matters. See White v. Herbert, 2022-1333 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So.3d 898, 904-05. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1636(A), when a trial court rules against the admissibility of any evidence, the court shall either permit the party offering such evidence to make a complete record thereof or permit the party to make a statement setting forth the nature of the evidence. Article 1636 is mandatory, not discretionary. Williams v. Williams, 2006-2491 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/14/07), 970 So.2d 633, 640. The purpose of requiring a proffer is to preserve excluded evidence so that the testimony or evidence is available for appellate review of a trial court's erroneous ruling. When legal error has been found and a complete record has been made through a proffer, the appellate court is able to conduct a de novo review of the record, including the proffered evidence, to render a decision on appeal. Williams, 970 So.2d at 640.

After reviewing the record, including the transcript of the February 26, 2024 hearing on Defendant's ex parte motion to dismiss the instant suit as abandoned, we find that the trial court did not abuse its great discretion in ruling on evidentiary matters when the trial court refused to admit the October 23, 2020 email into evidence.⁸

DECREE

We affirm the trial court's March 13, 2024 judgment that granted Defendant's, Joseph “Jody” Moreau's, ex parte motion to dismiss the instant suit as abandoned. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiff, Reverend George Turner.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   It is unclear from the handwritten date on the certified mail return receipt “green card” whether the certified mail delivery was received by Plaintiff's counsel on April 25 or April 29, 2019. However, service is complete upon mailing. La. C.C.P. art. 1313. Defendant mailed his discovery responses to Plaintiff's counsel at her office of record via certified mail on April 24, 2019.

2.   Plaintiff's counsel's August 13, 2020 email erroneously noted that Plaintiff originally served Defendant with the first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents in 2017; however, Plaintiff's first discovery request was originally served on Defendant on October 26, 2018, as noted above.

3.   See Footnote 2, supra.

4.   Additionally, Plaintiff argued that on September 10, 2021, August 8, 2022, and September 22, 2022, he requested via email that Defendant provide him with available dates for depositions. We note, however, that the only email attached to Plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss is dated August 13, 2020. Defendant averred that Plaintiff's email requests for deposition dates did not constitute steps in the prosecution or defense of the matter to avoid abandonment. We agree with Defendant. Simply attempting to schedule a deposition through informal correspondence, discussions, or negotiations before a formal notice of deposition is filed or mailed or the deposition actually takes place, is not enough to constitute a step in the prosecution of a case for purposes of interrupting or waiving abandonment. Jackson v. Moock, 2008-1 111 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/08), 4 So.3d 840, 845. Extrajudicial efforts, such as informal discussions and correspondence between the parties, have uniformly been considered insufficient to constitute a step for purposes of interrupting or waiving abandonment. Compensation Specialties, L.L.C. v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2008-1549 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/13/09), 6 So.3d 275, 281, writ denied, 2009-0575 (La. 4/24/09), 7 So.3d 1200.

5.   Plaintiff filed a motion for appeal on April 19, 2024. The trial court signed an order of appeal on April 23, 2024, notice of which was transmitted by the Clerk of Court to the parties on May 6, 2024.

6.   The legislature amended and reenacted La. C.C.P. art. 561 in 2023. See 2023 La. Acts No. 5, § 1 (Reg. Sess.) (eff. Aug. 1, 2023). The prior version of La. C.C.P. art. 561 is applicable to the instant matter. Segura v. Frank, 630 So.2d 714, 725 (La. 1994).

7.   The certified mail “green card” return receipt shows that Defendant's responses to Plaintiff's discovery request were mailed on April 24, 2019. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1313, service by mail is “complete upon mailing.” Therefore, the trial court should have used the April 24, 2019 mailing date, not the April 25 or 29, 2019 receipt of mail date, as the service date of Defendant's discovery responses.

8.   We note that even if the October 23, 2020 email had been allowed into evidence by the trial court, the email is not evidence of formal discovery sufficient to interrupt abandonment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 561. The October 23, 2020 email was sent from Defense counsel's assistant to the email address “legaldove2@yahoo.com.” During the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel stated “[t]hat's my email address. My email address has been that for 30 years.” The email stated:Dear Cici,Attached are our [Defendant's] First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admissions to [Plaintiff] dated 10/16/2018.Thank you,[Neuner Pate]Denise OrtegoAssistant to [Defense counsel]The bottom of the email indicated that it included an attachment titled, “[Defendant's] 1st IRP and RFA to [Plaintiff].docx.” It is clear from the October 23, 2020 email that Defense counsel had previously served Plaintiff with a formal discovery request—Defendant's first set of interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admissions—on October 16, 2018. This October 23, 2020 email, transmitted two years later, is a subsequent emailing (or duplicate transmission) from Defense counsel's assistant to a person named “Cici”, who is either Plaintiff's counsel or a member of Plaintiff's counsel's staff, of Defendant's discovery request dated two years earlier. Correspondence between parties providing a courtesy copy of a discovery request is not a formal “step” interrupting abandonment. See Compensation Specialties, L.L.C., 6 So.3d at 281 (“[E]xtrajudicial efforts, such as informal discussions and correspondence between the parties, have uniformly been considered insufficient to constitute a step for purposes of interrupting or waiving abandonment.”).

EDWARDS, J.