VINTON HARBOR TERMINAL DISTRICT v. REUNION ENERGY COMPANY (2025)

In this legacy oilfield litigation initiated by Plaintiff-Respondent, Vinton Harbor and Terminal District (Vinton Harbor), Defendant-Relator, Honeywell International, Inc. (Honeywell), seeks review of the trial court judgment denying its peremptory exception of no right of action. In a companion writ application, Docket Number 25-64, Defendant-Relator, Texas Pacific Oil Company, Inc. (Texas Pacific), also seeks review of the trial court's denial of its peremptory exception of no right of action. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court denying Honeywell's exception of no right of action is reversed, and judgment is rendered granting the exception and dismissing Vinton Harbor's claims against it with prejudice. As noted in our opinion under Docket Number 25-64, the judgment of the trial court denying Texas Pacific's exception of no right of action is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and rendered.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Vinton Harbor, a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana, is the owner of eight tracts of land located in Calcasieu Parish on which historical oil and gas exploration and production activities have been conducted since the 1930s. At issue in these two writ applications are four tracts of land (tracts 3-6) acquired by Vinton Harbor from Cleon Land Development, Inc. (Cleon Land), comprising the West half of Section 35, Township 10 South, Range 12 West. In chronological order, Vinton Harbor acquired tract 4 on July 23, 1968; tract 5 on July 24, 1976; tract 6 on July 19, 1977; and tract 3 on July 30, 1987.¹ In each act of sale, the property was sold by Cleon Land subject to a reservation of mineral rights.

Prior to these transfers,² Cleon Land had entered into a mineral lease with Union Sulphur Company, Inc. (Union Sulphur) on November 1, 1943, which affected “[t]he West Half (W1/212) of Section Thirty-five (35), Township Ten (10) South, Range Twelve (12) [W]est (Lease 303644).” Pursuant to Lease 303644, Union Sulphur was granted:

[T]he exclusive right to enter upon and use the land hereinafter described for the exploration for, and production of, oil, gas, sulphur and all minerals, together with the use of the surface of the land for all purposes incident to the exploration for and production, ownership, possession and transportation of said mineral, and the right of ingress and egress to and from said lands at all times for such purposes, including the right to construct, maintain and use roads and/or canals thereon, and including the right to remove from the land any property placed by Lessee thereon and to draw and remove casing from wells drilled by Lessee on said land[.]

Additionally, the lease provided that Union Sulphur, as lessee, would “be responsible for all damages to timber and growing crops of Lessor caused by Lessee's operations.” It also provided that “[a]ll provisions hereof shall extend to and bind the successors and assigns (in whole or in part) of the parties hereto; but no change in ownership of the land or any interest thereon, whether by sale, inheritance or otherwise or any change in the capacity of the Lessor shall impose any additional burden on Lessee[.]”

On October 25, 1957, Union Sulphur's successor-in-interest, Union Oil and Gas Corporation of Louisiana (Union Oil), executed a partial release in favor of Cleon Land, by which it released its rights in Lease 303644 with the exception of 100 acres located in the northwest quarter of Section 36. This 100-acre tract included portions of all four tracts of property that Vinton Harbor later acquired from Cleon Land. Subsequently, on November 1, 1960, Union Texas Natural Gas Corporation ³ assigned its rights in Lease 303644 to Anderson-Pritchard Oil Corporation (Anderson Pritchard), which that same day, assigned its rights in the lease to Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. (Seagram), the predecessor-in-interest of Texas Pacific.⁴ On October 18, 1968, Seagram assigned its rights in Lease 303644 to American Well Service and Salvage, Inc. (American Well). According to the lease history, various interests in Lease 303644 were assigned an additional fifty-seven times through July 1, 2019. Pursuant to the affidavit of Vinton Harbor's expert in petroleum engineering and oil and gas operations, Lease 303644 terminated by its own terms ninety days after October 2020, due to a cessation of operations.

Vinton Harbor filed suit on December 5, 2023, alleging causes of action in tort and breach of contract based on damage caused to its property by oil and gas activities beginning in the 1930s. Named as defendants were thirteen entities who either conducted or were the successors-in-interest of entities who conducted oil and gas exploration and production on its property, including the two defendants at issue in these writ applications: Honeywell, as the successor-in-interest of Union Sulphur, Union Sulphur & Oil Company, and Allied Chemical Corporation; and Texas Pacific, as the successor-in-interest of Frankfort Oil Company.⁵

In response to Vinton Harbor's original and first supplemental and amending petitions, Honeywell and Texas Pacific (referred to collectively as “Defendants”), both filed multiple exceptions, including exceptions of no right of action, which Vinton Harbor opposed. Following a November 12, 2024 hearing, the trial court orally denied Defendants’ exceptions of no right of action. On November 27, 2024, a written judgment denying the exceptions was rendered by the trial court. It is from this judgment that Defendants seek supervisory review.

On review, Defendants specify the same assignments of error:

1. The Trial Court erred in failing to sustain Texas Pacific and Honeywell's Exception of No Right of Action, despite proof that Plaintiff was not a third-party beneficiary to the mineral lease under which Texas Pacific and Honeywell formerly operated.

2. The Trial Court erred in finding that a landowner's right to sue a mineral lessee for damage to property is a real right that transfers with the property.

OPINION

The standard of review pertaining to an exception of no right of action was laid out by the supreme court in State ex rel. Caldwell v. Molina Healthcare, Inc., 18-1768, pp. 5-7 (La. 5/8/19), 283 So.3d 472, 477 (alterations in original), as follows:

Generally, a legal action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest in doing so. See La. C.C.P. art. 681. “When the facts alleged in the petition provide a remedy under the law to someone, but the plaintiff who seeks the relief is not the person in whose favor the law extends the remedy, the proper objection is no right of action, or want of interest in the plaintiff to institute the suit.” Howard v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 07-2224, p. 16 (La. 7/1/08), 986 So.2d 47, 59 (citing 1 FRANK L. MARAIST & HARRY T. LEMMON, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.7, 121 (1999)). Such an objection is presented as a peremptory exception of no right of action raised by the defendant or noticed by the court on its own motion, in either the trial or appellate court. See La. C.C.P. arts. 927 and 2163. “The function of the peremptory exception is to have the plaintiff's action declared legally nonexistent, or barred by effect of law, and hence this exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action.” La. C.C.P. art. 923.

“The burden of showing that the plaintiff has stated no cause of action is upon the exceptor.” City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Directors of Louisiana State Museum, 98-1170, p. 9 (La. 3/2/99), 739 So.2d 748, 755. “On the trial of the peremptory exception [of no right of action] pleaded at or prior to the trial of the case, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition.” La. C.C.P. art. 931. In instances when “evidence [has been] introduced at the hearing” on a peremptory exception, “the trial court's findings of fact ․ are subject to the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review.” London Towne Condominium Homeowner's Ass'n v. London Towne Co., 06-401, p. 4 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1227, 1231.

In other respects, “[t]he determination of whether a plaintiff has a legal right to bring an action raises a question of law, which requires de novo review.” Rebel Distributors Corp., Inc. v. LUBA Workers’ Comp., 13-0749, p. 10 (La. 10/15/13), 144 So.3d 825, 833 (citing, inter alia, Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 06-0582, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037, 1045. “An appellate court considering an exception of no right of action should focus on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit and is a member of the class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation, assuming the petition states a valid cause of action for some person.” Rebel Distributors, 13-0749 at 10, 144 So.3d at 833. If doubt exists about the appropriateness of an objection of no right of action, it is to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Rebel Distributors, 13-0749 at 10, 144 So.3d at 833.

At issue is whether Vinton Harbor has a right of action against Defendants for pre-acquisition damage to its property allegedly resulting from oilfield operations by their predecessors-in-interest. Defendants argue that Vinton Harbor's claims are barred by the subsequent purchaser rule as Vinton Harbor was not a third-party beneficiary of the 1943 lease and because a surface owner's right to sue a mineral lessee for damage is not a real right that automatically attaches to the property.

In opposition, Vinton Harbor argues that it is a third-party beneficiary to the 1943 lease because it owned the property during the term of the lease. It also argues that because the mineral lease was in existence during its ownership of the property, it has a right of action for damages at the conclusion of the lease against the party who caused property damage during the lease. It further argues that it has a real right under Louisiana property law to assert claims against Defendants. Finally, Vinton Harbor argues that this court's opinion in Castex Development, L.L.C. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 23-394 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/15/23), 374 So.3d 384, has “extremely limited” the application of the subsequent purchaser rule.

Subsequent Purchaser Rule

As Vinton Harbor acquired the four tracts of property at issue subject to an existing mineral servitude and mineral lease, our consideration of the subsequent purchaser rule is paramount to resolving this writ application. As set out by the supreme court in Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 10-2267, p. 8 (La. 10/25/11), 79 So.3d 246, 256–57:

The subsequent purchaser rule is a jurisprudential rule which holds that an owner of property has no right or actual interest in recovering from a third party for damage which was inflected on the property before his purchase, in the absence of an assignment or subrogation of the rights belonging to the owner of the property when the damage was inflicted.

After carefully reviewing the applicable principles of property and obligations law and the jurisprudential development of the substantive purchaser rule, the supreme court concluded:

Although the plaintiff asserts the subsequent purchaser rule applies only when there is apparent damage to property, we think the rationale also extends to the situation where the damage to property is not apparent. Whether this should be called an extension of the subsequent purchaser rule, or simply the way in which the fundamental principles of property law operate, the result is the same. Damage to property may disturb not only the owner's rights of use of, and enjoyment in, the property (the usus and fructus rights in ownership), but may also disturb his right to alienate the property, or to dispose of the property, completely and without disturbance (the abusus right in ownership).

The property owner at the time the damages were inflicted has a personal right of action against the tortfeasor for the disturbance of his real right in the property. When the damage is apparent, the property owner obtains the personal right of action to sue for damages to compensate for a loss of value in the property or an interference with the property's use. This personal right exists during his use and enjoyment while he owns the property. This personal right exists even during and after his disposal of the property, as it is assumed the apparent damage would result in a loss of value to the property which would be reflected in the sale price. Where damage to the property is not apparent, and the property has been sold, the law provides the purchaser with the right to seek rescission of the sale or a reduction in the purchase price. In that instance, the former owner's right to dispose of the property without disturbance has been affected, as the owner must now defend against an action in redhibition or take some other action to repair, remedy or correct the defect.

Id. at 275.

Although the facts in Eagle Pipe dealt with a surface lease, the supreme court clearly indicated in Global Marketing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., 10-1912, 10-1914, 10-1922, 10-1924, 10-1931 (La. 3/2/12), 84 So.3d 538, 539, 540, that the subsequent purchaser rule also applies to mineral leases. In that case, the mineral lessees sought review of the trial court's judgment denying their exceptions of no right of action and motions for summary judgment, which found that ‘ “the right to recover damages is a property right arising out of the original lease and attaches to the property itself.’ ” Global Mktg. Sols., L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., 13-2132, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/19/14), 153 So.3d 1209, 1212. In granting writs in favor of the mineral lessees, the supreme court stated, “The case is remanded to the district court for reconsideration of its rulings in light of Eagle Pipe[.]” Global Mktg., 84 So.3d at 538.

On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the mineral lessees based on the subsequent purchaser rule articulated in Eagle Pipe. The plaintiff appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of Eagle Pipe to claims arising from mineral leases. Global Mktg., 153 So.3d 1209. After reviewing Eagle Pipe, the first circuit stated:

We find no ambiguity in the supreme court's language, which states that an owner's right to sue for damage to his property is a personal right and is held by the person who was the owner at the time the damage was caused. This personal right is not transferred to a subsequent owner without a clear stipulation that the right has been transferred. We find the district court reached the same conclusion as we have in its interpretation of Eagle Pipe, and we find no error in its application.

Id. at 1215.

The plaintiff then applied for supervisory writs to the supreme court, which were denied. Global Mktg. Sols., L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., 14-2572 (La. 4/23/15), 173 So.3d 1164. In concurring in the writ denial, Justice Crichton stated:

I concur in the denial of this writ application. Under the “subsequent purchaser ” rule articulated in [Eagle Pipe], “an owner of property has no right or actual interest in recovering from a third party for damage which was inflicted on the property before his purchase, in the absence of an assignment or subrogation of the rights belonging to the owner of the property when the damage was inflicted.” Eagle Pipe, 2010-2267, p. 8, 79 So. 3d 256-57. Because there is no such assignment or subrogation here, I agree with the decision of the court of appeal.

Global Mktg. Sols., L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., 14-2572, p. 1 (La. 4/23/15) (unpublished concurrence) (footnote omitted).

In a footnote, Justice Crichton further stated:

The analysis is similar in the Mineral Code context. See La. R.S. 31:16 cmt. (“Not all obligations created by the lease are binding on a subsequent owner of the land.”). Because a mineral right is a limited personal servitude, it does not pass with the property, and the subsequent landowner must have “privity of contract, assignment of rights, or be a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui” to sue. Frank C. Minvielle LLC v. IMC Global Operations Inc., 380 F.Supp. 2d 755, 776 (W.D. La. 2004). The applicant does not have privity with the mineral lessees or an assignment of the right to sue, [sic] and is not a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui. As such, its argument seeking review on this ground is without merit.

Id.

Subsequent to Eagle Pipe, this court, in applying the subsequent purchaser rule to mineral leases, has consistently held that the damage caused to property during a mineral lease creates a personal right in favor of the owner of the property at the time the damage occurred rather than a real right which attaches to the property. Boone v. Conoco Phillips Co., 13-1196 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/14), 139 So.3d 1047; Bundrick v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 14-993 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/4/15), 159 So.3d 113 7, writ denied, 15-557 (La. 11/16/15), 184 So.3d 24; Grace Ranch, LLC v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 17-1144 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/18/18), 252 So.3d 546, writ denied, 18-1655 (La. 2/18/19), 264 So.3d 450.

In Boone, 139 So.3d at 1052-53 (footnote omitted) (alterations in original), this court stated:

In articulating the application and source of the subsequent purchaser doctrine, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. provided a thorough analysis of the pertinent principles of Louisiana property law and Louisiana's law of obligations in the Louisiana Civil Code. Relevant to our inquiries here, a real right is not defined by the Civil Code but has long been held to be a proprietary interest and a species of ownership, which “defines the relation of man to things and may, therefore, be declared against the world.” Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc., 79 So.3d at 259 (quoting Harwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 652, 124 So.2d 764, 767 (1960)). A real right and a real obligation both attach to a thing. Id. at 261; La.Civ.Code art. 1764, Revision Comments–1984, (b).

The legal right that a person has against another person to demand the performance of an obligation is called a personal right. Distinct from a real right, which can be asserted against the world, a personal right is effective only between the parties. La. C.C. art. 1758. This court has declared that “a personal right ․ defines man's relationship to man and refers merely to an obligation one owes to another which may be declared only against the obligor.” Harwood Oil & Mining Co., 240 La. at 651, 124 So.2d at 767 citing Reagan [v. Murphy], 235 La. [529], 541, 105 So.2d [210], 214 [(1958)].

․

This court has held “[u]nder the civil law concept, a lease [a contract about property] does not convey any real right or title to the property leased, but only a personal right.” Richard v. Hall, 2003-1488, p. 17-18 (La.4/23/04), 874 So.2d 131, 145. “That a lease is not a real right under the civil law is well settled.” Reagan, [105 So.2d at] 214.

․

Real rights, and real obligations pass to a subsequent acquirer of the thing to which it is attached without the need of a stipulation to that effect. La. C[iv.Code] art. 1764, Revision Comments–1984, (c). A personal right, by contrast, cannot be asserted by another in the absence of an assignment or subrogation. La. C.C. art. 1764, Revision Comments-1984, (d) and (f).

Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc., 79 So.3d at 261–62 (footnotes omitted).

Based upon the foregoing, real rights and obligations attach to the thing, while personal rights and obligations attach to the person. Further, and more specifically, the real rights and obligations of ownership attach to a piece of property when it is sold without the need of a stipulation, but the personal rights and obligations arising from a lease between the former owner and the lessee for events occurring before the sale do not pass to the new owner unless they are specifically assigned.

This court, in Bundrick and Grace Ranch, recognized that although a mineral lease creates a real right in favor of the lessee, it creates no such right in favor of the lessor. In Bundrick, 159 So.3d at 1143–42 (footnotes omitted), this court stated:

In its remaining assignments of error, Bundrick basically argues that it has a cause of action for the remediation of its contaminated property pursuant to Article 11 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, because mineral rights are real rights and, as such, pass with the property to a subsequent purchaser without the need for specific assignment or subrogation. We find no merit in this argument.

As previously held, despite the language of La.R.S. 31:16 stating that mineral rights are real rights, that status is reserved to the mineral lessee and not the mineral lessor.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 31:11(A) provides that:

The owner of land burdened by a mineral right or rights and the owner of a mineral right must exercise their respective rights with reasonable regard for those of the other. Similarly the owners of separate mineral rights in the same land must exercise their respective rights with reasonable regard for the rights of other owners.

Those rights consist of both parties acting in good faith; the mineral lessor delivering the property and doing nothing to disrupt the mineral lessees’ actions pursuant to the mineral lease; and the mineral lessee acting as a reasonably prudent operator in furthering his plans under the lease. Although the Mineral Code focuses on transactions involving the lessee's interest, it is generally silent with regard to transactions involving the lessor's interest. However, it does state, “To the extent of the interest acquired, an assignee or sublessee acquires the rights and powers of the lessee and becomes responsible directly to the original lessor for performance of the lessee's obligations.” La.R.S. 31:128. There is no corresponding statute pertaining to a subsequent owner's obligations towards the lessee, original or otherwise.

In Global Marketing, 153 So.3d at 1216, the first circuit, in addressing a similar argument, stated:

Despite Global's interpretation of La. C.C. art. 667 and La. Mineral Code arts. 11 and 134, which contains no statutory or jurisprudential support, Eagle Pipe clearly states that leases convey personal rights only, and we can find nothing in the Mineral Code or the Civil Code which make mineral leases an exception to that rule. Global, therefore, has no real right to sue the defendants for the damage to the land. No such right transferred to Global upon its purchase of the property, and no such right was assigned to Global by any party at any time.

In specifically addressing La.R.S. 31:11 and La.R.S. 31:134, the first circuit stated, “these articles contemplate the real rights and obligations that exist between parties who occupy the land contemporaneously with a mineral lease.” Id.

In Grace Ranch, 252 So.3d at 553 (alteration in original), a different panel of this court stated:

The classification of mineral rights as real rights with respect to a lessee was succinctly explained by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana in Minvielle v. IMC Global Operations, Inc., 380 F.Supp.2d 755, 775 (W.D. La. 2004), as follows:

In the case of a mineral lease, the Mineral Code designates the right as a real one in order to protect the mineral lessee from losing his rights if the land is sold during the existence of the lease. This conclusion is apparent in the reasoning behind La.R.S. 31:16, which [is] illustrated in the Comments stating:

All things considered, the lease has the major characteristics of a real right: the mineral lessee may follow the land, regardless of transfers of ownership; the mineral lessee may assert his rights against the world just as the proprietor of any other real right; he may enjoy directly and draw from the land a part of its economic advantages by appropriating a wasting asset; he has certain rights of preference; and he holds a right that is in reality susceptible of a type of possession through exercise.

The fact that the real right created is the right held by the lessee, is specifically noted in the Comments to La.R.S. 31:154, “The mineral lease, though it creates a real right in the hands of the lessee is still an elaborate contractual relationship.” Accordingly, the mineral lease gives real rights to the lessee, but the Mineral Code is void of any indication that it creates real rights in favor of the lessor. This is accounted for in the Comments to La.R.S. 31:16, which note:

It is true that there are certain distinctions from the normal real right which give the mineral lease markings of kinship to personal rights. Not all obligations created by the lease are binding on a subsequent owner of the land.

After reviewing Bundrick, 159 So.3d 1137, and the federal court's explanation in Minvielle, 380 F.Supp.2d 755, we find that Louisiana statutory law holds that a mineral lease creates a real right in favor of the mineral lessee rather than the lessor. Thus, Grace Ranch's argument that a mineral lease creates a real right which runs with the land and enables a landowner to sue for property damage, is without merit.

This court, in Boone, 139 So.3d at 1053–55 (third alteration in original), further recognized that the subsequent purchaser rule bars a subsequent property owner from raising tort and breach of contract claims against a mineral lessee for pre-acquisition damage to property under an existing lease:

The subsequent purchaser doctrine is not limited to tort claims, as shown in Clark [v. J.L. Warner Co.], 6 La.Ann. 408 [(1851)], and it is not limited to cases involving expired leases, as suggested by the Boones. In its comprehensive analysis of the doctrine, the court in Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc., 79 So.3d at 266 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), discussed further jurisprudence that included the relevant issues, as follows:

In Matthews v. Alsworth, 45 La.Ann. 465, 12 So. 518 (1893), property was sold subject to an existing lease. The new owner filed suit against the lessee for a dissolution of the lease based on the lessee's violation of his obligations, for compensation for the diminution in the value of the property for the lessee's damage to the property, and for the rent for the year which accrued in the year before the sale. This court found the new owner had no right of action to sue for damages from the lessee for damage to the property before the sale, either under the lease contract or in tort. Instead, the right to sue for damage to the property inflicted before the sale was a personal right of the former owner/lessor which arose from the lessee's breach of the contractual obligations of the lease during the time the lessee owed those obligations to the former owner/lessor.

The former owner had not assigned or subrogated this personal right to the new owner in the act of sale. The deed contained the following language:

Said lease and all the aforesaid conveyors’ rights in, to, or under the same are transferred hereby, and simultaneously herewith, to the conveyee herein. This conveyance is made with complete transfer and subrogation of all rights and all actions of warranty or otherwise against all former claimants, proprietors, tenants, or warrantors of the property herein conveyed.

By this language, the court held the new owner/lessor was subrogated to the lease provisions, but only from the date of his purchase of the property. “The lessee is liable on the covenants of his lease, and to these, unquestionably, plaintiff [the new property owner] is subrogated from the date of his purchase. By the use of the words ‘right in, to, or under the lease,’ the plaintiff did not become an assignee of damages of date prior to the sale.” Matthews, 45 La.Ann. at 469, 12 So. at 519.

The personal right of the owner to sue for damages was not explicitly assigned in the act of sale, and additionally was not an accessory right which passed with the title without description of, or reference to, the claim. In the act of sale, the property was specifically described, and there was no mention of a claim for damages. The court held it could not “presume that there were additional rights in the nature of damages, the deed being silent as to damages.” Matthews, 45 La.Ann. at 469, 12 So. at 519. Matthews reinforces the proposition that personal rights of the former owner do not pass with the property in an act of sale unless specifically assigned or subrogated to the new owner.

Thus, even when property is conveyed during the term of a lease, the purchaser cannot recover from the lessee for damages accruing prior to the sale. See also Prados v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 329 So.2d 744 (La. 1975). In Matthews, 12 So. 518, because the deed of sale also conveyed the lease and the seller's rights in the lease to the new owners, they would have a right of action against the lessee, but only for damages arising after the date of sale.

Applying the subsequent purchaser rule to the facts at issue, we find that Vinton Harbor is barred from raising tort and breach of contract claims against Honeywell for pre-acquisition property damage caused to the four tracts at issue during the mineral lease. After entering into and then partially releasing their rights to Lease 303644, Honeywell's predecessors-in-interest assigned all of their rights in the lease to Anderson-Pritchard on November 1, 1960. This was eight years prior to Vinton Harbor's earliest acquisition of property from Cleon Land. Thus, absent an assignment or subrogation of Cleon Land's personal right to sue for property damage occurring during its ownership of the property, the subsequent purchaser rule bars Vinton Harbor's claims against Honeywell for pre-acquisition damage to its property.

Applying the subsequent purchaser rule to Texas Pacific, we note that on November 1, 1960, the same date that Anderson Pritchard acquired its interest in Lease 303644, it assigned the lease to Texas Pacific's predecessor-in-interest. Thereafter, on October 18, 1968, Texas Pacific's predecessor-in-interest assigned the lease to American Well. However, prior to this assignment, Vinton Harbor acquired tract 4 from Cleon Land on July 23, 1968. Vinton Harbor acquired the three remaining tracts in 1976, 1977, and 1987. Thus, absent an assignment or subrogation of Cleon Land's personal rights, the subsequent purchaser rule bars Vinton Harbor's right of action for pre-acquisition damage to all four tracts. We will discuss Vinton Harbor's personal right to sue for post-acquisition damages under the section titled “Real Rights.”

Third-Party Beneficiary

In their first specified error, Defendants argue that the trial court erred by failing to grant their exceptions of no right of action despite proof that Vinton Harbor was not a third-party beneficiary of Lease 303644. We agree.

A stipulation for a third party, otherwise known as a “stipulation pour autrui,” occurs when a contracting party stipulates a benefit for a third party and the third party indicates their intention of accepting the benefit. La.Civ.Code art. 1978. The supreme court has recognized three criteria for identifying a stipulation pour autrui: “1) the stipulation for a third party is manifestly clear; 2) there is certainty as to the benefit provided the third party; and 3) the benefit is not a mere incident of the contract between the promisor and the promissee.” Canal/Claiborne, Ltd. v. Stonehedge Dev., LLC, 14-664, pp. 6-7 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So.3d 627, 633. “The most basic requirement of a stipulation pour autrui is that the contract in question manifest a clear intention to benefit the third party; absent such a clear manifestation, a party claiming to be a third party beneficiary cannot meet his burden of proof. A stipulation pour autrui is never presumed.” Id. (citation omitted).

The trial court, in orally denying Defendants’ exceptions, stated:

The Court has read the extensive briefing of the parties and looked at the exhibits as it relates to that. The Court has found the - has read the Hazelwood [Farm, Inc. v. Liberty Oil and Gas Corp., 02-266 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/03), 844 So.2d 380] case as briefed by the plaintiffs [sic] in this case and has extensively looked at [La.Civ.Code art.] 667 limitations on use of property as well as the Mineral Code. The Court finds that there was the purchase in the ‘60s by Vinton. There was a lease that all parties were bound under at that time. They were the surface owners of that property subject to the mineral rights not being their's – being retained and assigned. But the Court does find that the plaintiffs [sic] have a right of action in looking at [Article] 667, as well as looking at legal servitudes in this particular case. And so it would be at this time the Court would deny the exception of no right of action subject to the objections, if there are any.

Based on our review of the ruling, it appears that the trial court agreed with Defendants that Vinton Harbor was not a third-party beneficiary of Lease 303644 but denied the exceptions based on its finding that Vinton Harbor has a right of action under the legal servitude found in La.Civ.Code art. 667.

The damage clause in Lease 303644 states, “The Lessee shall be responsible for all damages to timber and growing crops of Lessor caused by Lessee's operations.” It is evident that at the time Lease 303644 originated, this was boilerplate language for mineral leases as this or amended versions of this language has been mentioned and discussed in multiple opinions.

In Broussard v. Northcott Exploration Co., Inc., 481 So.2d 125, 127 (La.1986) (alteration in original), the mineral lease at issue initially contained the above quoted language but was modified by the parties to provide that “ ‘[t]he Lessee shall be responsible for all surface damages of the Lessor (emphasis added) caused by the Lessee's operations.’ ” In finding that the language did not create a stipulation pour autrui in favor of the plaintiff, the supreme court stated:

In negotiating the mineral lease the parties modified the phrase “for all damages to timber and growing crops” to read “for all surface damages.” However, they did not modify the mineral lease to expand Northcott's liability beyond the “damages of the lessor.” For this reason, we can easily distinguish Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347 (1969), and Hargroder v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 So.2d 874 (La. 1974).

In Andrepont, supra, the standard clause set forth above was modified by deleting the phrase “to timber and growing crops of Lessor.” The resulting clause read: “The Lessee shall be responsible for all damages (emphasis added) caused by Lessee's operations.” It did not restrict liability to the damages suffered by “the Lessor.” The crop loss suffered by the farmer in Andrepont, supra, was clearly included within the “all damages” language allowing him to recover under the mineral lease. In Hargroder, supra, it was specified in the agreement that the defendant would pay for damages “which may arise to growing crops.” In both cases the intent to pay for crop damage was beyond question.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court of Appeal was correct when it concluded that the mineral lease did not create a stipulation pour autrui in favor of Minos Broussard.

Id. at 127.

This phrase was also found in the mineral lease at issue in Lejeune Brothers, Inc. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., L.L.C., 06-1557, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/28/07), 981 So.2d 23, 29, writ denied, 08-298 (La. 4/4/08), 978 So.2d 327, but was modified by the parties to provide, ‘ “The Lessee shall be responsible for all damages to Lessor caused by Lessee's operations.’ ” This court, in finding that the only damage allowed under the lease was that suffered by the lessor, affirmed the finding that a stipulation pour autrui did not exist in favor of the plaintiff.

Accordingly, we find that Lease 303644 did not create a stipulation pour autrui as the language is clear that the only damage the parties envisioned the lessee being liable for were those suffered by the lessor, Cleon Land. As there was no clear intent by the lessee to benefit any party other than Cleon Land, Vinton Harbor is not a third-party beneficiary under Lease 303644.

Despite the absence of a stipulation pour autrui, Vinton Harbor argues that it has a right to sue Defendants for property and breach of contract claims arising under Lease 303644 as the lease was still in effect when it acquired the property and operations under the lease continued until October 2023. In brief, it points to this court's opinion in Hazelwood Farms, Inc. v. Liberty Oil and Gas Corp., 02-266 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/03), 844 So.2d 380, writs denied, 03-1585, 03-1624 (La. 10/31/03), 857 So.2d 476, stating:

This Court determined that although there was no specific assignment in Hazelwood's deed, Hazelwood was entitled to claim damages as a surface owner [in] its capacity as a third party beneficiary. It was undisputed that the mineral lease was in effect at the time of acquisition and that the lease continued during Hazelwood's surface ownership. Citing Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co.[, 576 So.2d 475 (La. 1991)], this Court concluded that Hazelwood had a property right arising out of the 1926 lease and that Chevron was responsible for the damages caused by its oil and gas operations.

(First alteration in original) (footnote omitted).

However, this argument ignores the fact that our finding in Hazelwood was based on a previous finding that the mineral lease at issue created a stipulation pour autrui, which gave the plaintiff a right of action against the defendant for damages under the lease. In Hazelwood Farms, Inc. v. Liberty Oil & Gas Corp., 01-345, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/20/01), 790 So.2d 93, 101, writ denied, 01-2115 (La. 7/26/01), 794 So.2d 834, the damage clause in the mineral lease provided that ‘ “Grantee shall be responsible for all damages caused by his operations.’ ” After reviewing the supreme court's opinion in Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co. 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 340 (1969), this court held that the lease provision created a stipulation pour autrui in favor of the surface owner plaintiff:

The fact that Hazelwood was not specifically named as a third party beneficiary in the mineral lease is of no consequence. Our jurisprudence recognizes that stipulations may be made in favor of undetermined persons. Id.; Fairbanks [v. Tulane Univ., 99-1228 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/31/99)], 731 So.2d 983. In addition, the law does not require express acceptance or consent on the part of the beneficiary nor does it require a particular form of acceptance or consent. Andrepont, 231 So.2d 347. Because we find that the Wilson & Cochran Lease created a stipulation pour autrui in favor of Hazelwood, as surface owner, we find that the trial court erred in using a motion to strike to remove Hazelwood's ex contractu claims from the pleadings.

Id.

In referencing this finding in the subsequent appeal, this court stated:

We have already held that the law of this case is that the Wilson & Cochran Lease created a stipulation pour autrui in favor of Hazelwood as surface owner. We recognize that by definition a stipulation pour autrui establishes a benefit in favor of a person and not an estate. La.Civ.Code art. 1978. However, it is in the nature of a stipulation pour autrui that a third person, in this case Hazelwood, derives a benefit from a contract made by others. That benefit in this case is the right to claim against the mineral lessee damages to the property caused by the lessee's operations. The jury found that Hazelwood, as the current owner, has suffered damages. The fact that Hazelwood was not named in the stipulation is of no moment. Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347 (La. 1969). Hazelwood acquired its right to sue for damages not by its 1991 contract of exchange, whereby it acquired title to the property, but by virtue of its status as owner of the land and by virtue of the 1926 oil and gas lease contract. In other words, it acquired its right to sue for damages by virtue of a stipulation pour autrui which made it a third party beneficiary of a contract made by others.

Our disposition of this assignment is further supported by language found in Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So.2d 475 (La. 1991). In that case, the 1985 owner of property filed suit to recover damages for the mineral lessee's continuing breach of its contractual obligations which began twenty-one years earlier when the property was owned by a different person. The Supreme Court said: “Magnolia's right to recover damages is a property right arising out of the original lease and attached to the property.” In support of this observation the Supreme Court cited Andrepont, 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347. In Andrepont, after a farmer was granted a verbal lease to farm soybeans, the owners of the farm executed an oil and gas lease which provided that the oil and gas lessee was responsible for all damages caused by its operations. The Supreme Court held that that was a stipulation pour autrui in favor of the farmer and that the farmer could sue the oil and gas lessee for damage to his crops.

Id. at 387.

Furthermore, while the supreme court in Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So.2d 475, 477, 483 (La. 1991), held that the plaintiff's “right to recover damages is a property right arising out of the original lease and attached to the property[,]” it had previously noted that the lease provided that “ ‘Lessee shall pay for all damages caused by Lessee's operations, including damage to ․ soil and other property[.]’ ” Thus, although the supreme court did not expressly find that the mineral lease created a stipulation pour autrui in favor of the plaintiff, it effectively did so by finding that the lease imposed “an express obligation” on the defendant to repair the surface damage its predecessors caused during the mineral lease. Moreover, the defendant's predecessor had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, prior to its acquisition of the property, whereby the defendant admitted its responsibility for plugging the leaking well and performing surface remediation.

Accordingly, we find no merit in Vinton Harbor's argument that it is a third-party beneficiary under Lease 303644 because the lease was extant when it purchased the property and mineral operations continued during its ownership.

Vinton Harbor further argues that this court's opinion in Castex Development, LLC v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 23-3 94 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/15/23), 374 So.3d 384,⁶ “rightfully reversed years of confusion and corrected certain improprieties associated with the subsequent purchaser doctrine as it relates to legacy claims.” We disagree with this claim as our opinion had no effect on the subsequent purchaser rule as enunciated in Eagle Pipe. Rather, we recognized that a prior statement by this court, that “it was impossible to transfer rights to an assignee under an expired mineral lease[,]” was dicta and not binding on the trial court. Id. at 388 (quoting Lejeune, 981 So.2d at 28). In doing so, we held that our prior statement was “contrary to the express provisions of La.Civ.Code arts. 1984 and 2642[,]” regarding the heritable and assignable nature of contractual rights and obligations and the assignability of rights. Id. at 389.

We further pointed out that “[i]f the landowner and/or lessor still has the legal, contractual right to demand enforcement of La.Civ.Code art. 2683(3) after the lease's expiration, the right can be assigned unless otherwise prohibited.” Id. at 391–92. In denying the defendant's writ application, we concluded:

Having determined that the language relied on from LeJeune and propagated by its progeny was pure obiter dicta, the trial court was not in error in failing to blindly follow what simply is not supported by our civil law tradition. Additionally, this court has specifically found that leases, which had expired in the 1950s, and which had not been assigned to the new landowner but contained a stipulation pour [autrui] for the benefit of the new landowner, permitted that landowner to sue the lessees directly. Duck v. Hunt Oil Co., 13-628 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/14), 134 So.3d 114, writs denied, 14-703, 14-709, 14-715, 14-73 5 (La. 6/13/14), 140 So.3d 1189, 1190. It did not matter that the new landowner bought the land after the leases had expired.

Id. at 392 (emphasis added).

Based on the above highlighted language, Vinton Harbor evidently asserts that as a third-party beneficiary, it has a right of action against Defendants, as Union Sulphur's successors, to enforce the restoration obligations found in the lease provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code. While we agree that Defendants, as assignees of Lease 303644, are bound by the lease's provisions, we have already disproved Vinton Harbor's claim that it is a third-party beneficiary under the lease.

Louisiana law grants a subsequent owner, who has acquired a prior owner's personal rights under a mineral lease via a stipulation pour autrui, a cause of action for pre-acquisition damage to property. As Vinton Harbor was not a third-party beneficiary under Lease 303644, it does not belong to the class of persons to whom the law grants this cause of action. Accordingly, we find that the trial court legally erred by not granting Defendants exception of no right of action on this issue.

Real Rights

In their second specified error, Defendants argue that the trial court's denial of their exception was based on an erroneous conclusion that a surface owner's right to sue a mineral lessee is a real right that attaches to land that is subject to a lease. Vinton Harbor counters by arguing that while the subsequent purchaser rule may bar its tort claims, it nevertheless has a right of action under Louisiana property law based upon its status as surface owner to demand restoration of the surface and remediation of pre-purchase damages from Defendants. Defendants, however, counter that the surface owner's rights against a mineral lessee are personal rights, not real rights, and therefore, cannot be enforced by a subsequent surface owner without an express transfer or assignment of rights.

The trial court, just prior to ruling, questioned Texas Pacific's counsel regarding La.Civ.Code art. 667, stating, “I want to hear from you, do you disagree with the premise – [Article] 667 is briefed heavily by the parties in this case. It talks about the neighbor provisions and that the surface dweller is neighbors with the mineral owner or the person using the minerals.” In denying Defendants’ exceptions on this issue, the trial court stated, “But the Court does find that the plaintiffs have a right of action in looking at [Article] 667, as well as looking at legal servitudes in this particular case.” Despite the brevity of this ruling, we find it was clearly based on a finding that Vinton Harbor has a right of action for property damage that occurred during its ownership of the property.

“The property owner at the time the damages were inflicted has a personal right of action against the tortfeasor for the disturbance of his real right in the property.” Eagle Pipe, 79 So.3d at 275. The supreme court further stated:

Louisiana law provides that when property is damaged through the actions of another, the owner of the property (obligee) obtains a personal right to demand that the tortfeasor (obligor) repair the damage to the property. La. C.C. art. 2315 (“Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”). This personal right of the property owner arises because his real rights in the ownership of the property have been disturbed—his use, enjoyment or disposal of the property.

The analysis in Clark [v. J.L. Warner Co., 6 La.Ann. 408 (1851)], continued beyond the portion above-cited, making clear that each successive owner of the property was recognized as having a right to sue for the damage to the property which occurred during his or her ownership. This right of action arose when the real rights of the owners were disturbed by the operation of the adjoining business:

The damages which occurred while Herriman owned the premises, belong to him; a part belongs to Gregg in like manner; and Mrs. Springer is entitled to what happened while she owned the property. Did she or they transfer their claim to damages to the plaintiff? The claim is an incorporeal right, and strictly personal property.

Id., 6 La.Ann. at 409. Clark makes clear that the former property owners still have a personal right of action against a tortfeasor for the damage he inflicted on the property while they were the owners, despite the fact that they no longer own the property.

Id. at 264.

Accordingly, Vinton Harbor has a right of action against Texas Pacific for any post-acquisition damage to its property that occurred as a result of the actions of Texas Pacific's predecessors-in-interest during the eighty-seven-day period before the lease was assigned to American Well.

“Legal servitudes are limitations on ownership established by law for the benefit of the general public or for the benefit of particular persons.” La.Civ.Code art. 659. The legal servitudes established for the benefit of particular persons include obligations of vicinage. La.Civ.Code arts. 667-669.

These articles principally govern the rights and obligations of neighboring proprietors. Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 93-681 (La.9/6/94), 642 So.2d 1243. Specifically, they place limitations on the rights of owners by setting out principles of responsibility applying the doctrine of sic utere tuum ut alienum non laedas, which requires an owner to use his property in such a manner as not to injure another. 4 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise–Predial Servitudes §§ 25, 33 (1983). The obligations contained in these articles are legal servitudes imposed on the owner of property and “embody a balancing of rights and obligations associated with the ownership of immovables.” Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So.2d 1071, 1077 (La.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046, 106 S.Ct. 1262, 89 L.Ed.2d 572 (1986). The general rule is that a landowner is free to exercise his rights of ownership in any manner that he sees fit. He may even use his property in ways which cause some inconvenience to his neighbor. However, a landowner's rights do not allow him to do real damage to his neighbor. Id.

Gautreau v. Trahan, 07-875, pp. 6–7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/5/07), 971 So.2d 445, 448–49 (footnote omitted).

Prior to April 1, 1996, La.Civ.Code art. 667 provided that “[a]lthough a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he can not [sic] make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him.”⁷

In Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 93-681 (La. 9/6/94), 642 So.2d 1243, the supreme court examined the application of La.Civ.Code arts. 667–669 ⁸ to a claim involving parties with coexisting rights in the same property. There, the defendant, a surface lessee and holder of a right of way, held coexisting rights to a portion of the property leased by the plaintiff, an oyster lessee, who filed suit based on damage caused to its lease by the defendant's dredging operations. Both leases were granted by the State of Louisiana, with the defendant's surface lease predating the oyster lease. Under those facts, the supreme court noted that two relationships were at play because in one instance, the parties held coexisting rights in the same property, whereas in the other instance, the parties were simply neighbors.

In examining the applicability of La.Civ.Code arts. 667-669 to the facts at issue, the supreme court stated:

[Louisiana Civil Code] Articles 667–669 place limitations on the rights of owners by setting out principles of responsibility applying the doctrine of sic utere tuum ut alienum non laedas, which requires an owner to use his property in such a manner as not to injure another. 4 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise—Predial Servitudes §§ 25, 33 (1983). Article 667 prohibits uses which cause damage to neighbors or deprive them of the enjoyment of their property, while Article 668 permits uses which merely cause neighbors some inconvenience. Id. at § 34. Article 669 allows suppression of certain inconveniences, if excessive under local ordinances and customs, and requires tolerance of lesser inconveniences․

․

Articles 667–669, while setting standards of responsibility for a landowner to his neighbors, do not purport to impose delictual liability for violation of the standards and do not specify whether responsibility is founded on negligence, intentional misconduct, or abuse of right. However, judicial decisions have clarified that conduct by a proprietor violative of Articles 667–669 may give rise to delictual liability, without negligence, as a species of fault within the meaning of La.Civ.Code art. 2315. See, e.g., Chaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 259 La. 1, 249 So.2d 181 (1971) (holding that a landowner was liable for damage to a neighbor caused by use of heavy equipment in canal improvements, although the work was done prudently by usual standards).

The concept has emerged that Article 2315 establishes delictual responsibility for injury to others through “fault,” a term encompassing more than negligence or other blameworthy conduct and including violations of standards of conduct set out in the Civil Code and the statutes to govern the responsibility of persons in certain relationships and arising from certain activities. See, e.g., Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971) (imposing delictual liability under Article 2315 for fault as analogized from the conduct required by Article 669, when gas escaped from a ruptured pipe which, without regard to negligence, caused damages). The courts have referred to Articles 667–669 to determine the conduct which constitutes “fault” under Article 2315 in the context of neighboring proprietors. See State of La., Through Dept. of Transp. and Dev. v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So.2d 598 (La. 1992) (holding that a property owner could not recover from an expropriating authority the damages related to the delayed development of the property because there was no evidence of physical damage or injury to the property and no evidence of ultrahazardous activity or excessive or abusive conduct which exceeded the level of inconvenience which a neighbor must tolerate under Article 668).

The term “proprietor” in Article 667 also has been expansively interpreted by the courts to apply not only to a landowner, but also to a person whose rights derive from the owner. See, e.g., Lombard v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So.2d 905 (La.1973); see generally Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Obligations of Neighborhood, 40 Tul.L.Rev. 701, 711 (1966). Therefore, delictual actions under Article 2315, based on conduct which violates the obligations of Articles 667–669 not to use one's property so as to cause damage to neighbors or to deprive neighbors of the enjoyment of their property, may be brought by persons holding rights derived from the landowner or against such persons.

In summary, this court has used Articles 667–669 by analogy to determine the type of conduct which gives rise to liability without proof of negligence when activity by one party holding a right to immovable property has caused damages to a party holding a right to neighboring property. Liability generally has been imposed for fault under Article 2315 by analogy to the conduct required by Articles 667–669, despite the absence of negligence in the proprietor's conduct. Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93 (La. 1975); Lombard v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So.2d 905 (La.1973); Chaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 259 La. 1, 249 So.2d 181 (1971); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971). See also D'Albora v. Tulane Univ., 274 So.2d 825 (La.App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 So.2d 504, 505 (La.1973).

Id. at 1250-52.

Based on its foregoing analysis, the supreme court reconsidered its holding in Butler v. Baber, 529 So.2d 374 (La. 1988), that a plaintiff holding coexisting rights in the same property as the defendant was only required to prove causation and damage to prove fault under La.Civ.Code art. 667:

In reconsidering Butler, we agree with the concurring opinion that the portion of the Butler decision hinging liability of a mineral lessee to an oyster lessee of the same property on proof only of causation and damages reached the correct result in that case, but was an oversimplification of a complex problem. A court, in formulating standards of strict liability, should conduct an objective search for a rule to govern the case, looking for analogies among codal and statutory rules, principles, concepts and doctrines, and taking into account all of the social, moral, economic and other considerations that an objective rule maker would consider in forming a rule to govern the case. Butler v. Baber, 529 So.2d 374, 382 (La. 1988) (Dennis, J., concurring). Although Butler correctly held that negligence is not the standard to be applied, there are many other considerations that go into the determination of delictual liability between holders of coexisting rights to the same immovable property, such as the temporal order of the leases or other rights, the nature of the rights, the type of activities normally incidental to the use for which the rights were granted, the damage-causing party's knowledge of the existence of the damaged party's rights, the availability of alternative methods of exercising the right so as to cause little or no damage, and others. Of course, the existence of these considerations and the importance thereof will vary from case to case.

We therefore clarify the Butler decision to hold that, in cases involving damages caused to one holder of a right to immovable property by another holder of a right to the same property, the court in determining “fault” under Article 2315 must consider not only Articles 667–669, but also all other applicable codal and statutory rules and legal principles and other pertinent considerations.

Id. at 1252.

Although the facts in Inabnet differ in that the coexisting rights were both granted by the landowner, we find its holding instructive as it involves “damages caused to one holder of a right to immovable property by another holder of a right to the same property[.]” Id.

Thus, La.Civ.Code art. 2315 provides a property owner a personal right of action, whether in negligence or strict liability, for property damage inflicted during its ownership, including against a party holding coexisting rights in the same property. With regard to Honeywell, Vinton Harbor does not belong to that class of persons to whom the law grants this cause of action as any damage inflicted by its predecessors-in-interest would have occurred prior to Vinton Harbor's acquisition of the property. Accordingly, we find that the trial court legally erred in denying Honeywell's exception of no right of action on this issue.

However, with regard to Texas Pacific, Vinton Harbor owned and held coexisting rights in tract 4 with Texas Pacific's predecessor-in-interest, Seagram, for eighty-seven days between July 23, 1968 and October 18, 1968. Thus, Vinton Harbor belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants a cause of action under La.Civ.Code art. 2315. Accordingly, we find no legal error in the trial court's denial of Texas Pacific's exception of no right of action on this issue.

As the objection to Honeywell's exception of no right of action cannot be removed by amendment of the petition, Vinton Harbor's claims against it for preacquisition and post-acquisition property damage are dismissed with prejudice. La.Code Civ.P. art. 934.

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment is rendered granting the peremptory exception of no right of action in favor of Honeywell International, Inc., dismissing Vinton Harbor and Terminal District's claims against it with prejudice.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PREEMPTORY; REVERSED AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Vinton Harbor, in its opposition to the exceptions, mentions that it purchased two other tracts of land (tract 1 and 2) in 2013, one on which it obtained one-half of the mineral rights (tract 2), neither tract of land was covered by the mineral lease at issue.

2.   According to the lease history compiled by attorney Jamie C. Gary, this property was subject to two prior mineral leases. On April 14, 1938, Cleon Land entered into Lease 229961 with E.I. Thompson, which lease was released in its entirety pursuant to partial releases dated September 17, 193 8 and October 15, 1940. On June 2, 1941, Cleon Land entered into Lease 273055 with I.J. Goode, who assigned his interests in the lease to Union Sulphur on June 11, 1941. Following a merger between Union Sulphur's successor-in-interest, Union Texas Natural Gas Corporation, and Allied Chemical Corporation, Allied Chemical released its rights in the mineral lease back to Cleon Land on January 1, 1971.

3.   Union Texas Natural Gas Corporation resulted from a February 4, 1960 merger between Union Oil and Texas Natural Gasoline Corporation.

4.   Seagram acquired Frankfort Oil Company on August 1, 1957, which it operated as Frankfort Oil Company, a Division of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. Frankfort Oil Company was renamed Texas Pacific Oil Company by Seagram effective November 1, 1963. By a stock exchange, dated April 30, 1969, Texas Pacific acquired all of the assets, properties, and business owned by Seagram's oil division.

5.   Vinton Harbor amended its petition twice to add two additional defendants, BP America Production Company and Trek Resources, Inc., who are not pertinent to this review.

6.   An identical opinion was rendered in the companion case Castex Development, LLC v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 23-393 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/15/23), 374 So.3d 376.

7.   Louisiana Civil Code Article 667 was amended by 1996 La. Acts, 1st Ex.Sess. No. 1, § 1 to limit the scope of strict liability to damage caused by the ultrahazardous activities “pile driving [and] blasting with explosives.” As these amendments were substantive in nature, they were held to have “prospective application only.” Boudreaux v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 01-1329, p. 4 (La. 2/26/02), 815 So.2d 7, 10.

8.   Louisiana Civil Code Article 668, provide, in part:Although one be not at liberty to make any work by which his neighbor's buildings may be damaged, yet every one [sic] has the liberty of doing on his own ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor.Louisiana Civil Code Article 669 provides:If the works or materials for any manufactory or other operation, cause an inconvenience to those in the same or in the neighboring houses, by diffusing smoke or nauseous smell, and there be no servitude established by which they are regulated, their sufferance must be determined by the rules of the police, or the customs of the place.

KYZAR, Judge.