BREAUX ENTERPRISES LLC v. LAFAYETTE CITY PARISH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT (2025)

J Breaux Enterprises, LLC, wants to develop a fifty-acre plot of unimproved property in an unincorporated area of Lafayette Parish into “Ivywood,” a 189-lot residential subdivision. The Lafayette Parish Planning Commission and the Lafayette Parish Council denied J Breaux's preliminary plat application. J Breaux appealed to the district court, which affirmed the denial.

The proposed use, J Breaux contends, is a use by right of the property. J Breaux says this means the ordinances must be interpreted in the manner most favorable to it, and the Planning Commission, Parish Council, and trial court arbitrarily and capriciously did not apply the correct standard of review – strict scrutiny. In contrast, LCG argues that approval or disapproval of a subdivision plat is subject to legislative discretion and that consideration of a plat such as J Breaux's can look at factors like traffic impact and environmental issues.¹

Facts and Procedural History

J Breaux has a contractual interest in buying and developing the property; it is not yet the owner. The Lafayette Development Code says a preliminary plat will be approved if the application follows LDC § 89-57 and is consistent with the Comprehensive Plan of the Parish. J Breaux's preliminary plat was consistent with the existing zoning designation (the property was not zoned) and did not request any conditional use.

The Planning Commission denied J Breaux's request for preliminary approval. The denial said Bayou Tortue Road would not accommodate the amount of traffic Ivywood would generate. The Commissioners did not believe the development would have a positive impact on the area, and they voiced concerns for the neighboring residents because of the existing road conditions.

J Breaux appealed the denial to the Parish Council. At the public hearing, J Breaux's engineering representative explained to the Parish Council that his company and J Breaux would provide impact analysis on traffic and drainage at the appropriate point in the project. He noted that traffic impact studies were not needed until after approval of the preliminary plat.

Discussion among the Parish Council members centered around the substandard condition of Bayou Tortue Road and the cost to remediate it. One Councilman considered the cost of remediation as a potential reason to oppose the Ivywood development. The Parish Council denied J Breaux's appeal without giving reasons.

J Breaux next filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Judicial Review, and Statutory Appeal after the Parish Council denied its administrative appeal. The petition alleged J Breaux's proposed use represented a “use by right” of the property, concluded the Parish Council arbitrarily and capriciously did not apply the use by right standard, and sought judgment reversing the denial of the preliminary plat application.

LCG argued that approval or disapproval is subject to the Planning Commission's discretion under La.R.S. 33:101.1. Further, it contended that LDC § 89-55(b) requires a subdivision plat to include evaluation of all factors influencing its decision, including traffic and environmental issues. LCG concluded the Parish Council properly exercised its legislative discretion and was not arbitrary and capricious in denying J Breaux's application.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of LCG and found the Planning Commission's decision to deny J Breaux's preliminary plat application “was not made in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner[.]” It affirmed the Planning Commission's decision and dismissed J Breaux's appeal. J Breaux now seeks review of that decision.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

J Breaux's appeal sets out seven assignments of error. The first four contend the LCG arbitrarily, capriciously, and unlawfully denied J Breaux's fully compliant preliminary plat application, ignored the presumption of validity of J Breaux's use by right, and improperly gave LCG legislative discretion to deny the use by right. The remaining three assignments argue the trial court erred in not applying strict scrutiny to LCG's denial of J Breaux's use by right and did not consider competent evidence and/or relied on insufficient evidence leading to the arbitrary and capricious denial of the appeal. J Breaux also says the trial court erred in relying on lay public opinions and other irrelevant evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

What exactly is strict scrutiny? The Louisiana Supreme Court says “[s]trict scrutiny is the most rigorous test for deciding whether a law is constitutional. Laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny because they are considered to be so essential to the structure of our society, in which citizens enjoy ‘ordered liberty.’ ” State v. Webb, 13-1681, p. 8 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 971, 977–78. “Under strict scrutiny the government bears the burden of proving” that a law “is narrowly tailored to serve” a compelling governmental interest. In re Warner, 05-1303, p. 37 (La. 4/17/09), 21 So. 3d 218, 246. Our case involves no allegation that a particular statute or ordinance is unconstitutional.

Yet, J Breaux trumpets strict scrutiny as the standard for reviewing the government's actions and the trial court's ruling here. Setting aside the question of how a court would do this, the source of this standard in land use cases does not withstand its own scrutiny, strict or otherwise.

D'Argent Properties., LLC v. City of Shreveport, 44,457 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/09), 15 So.3d 334, writ denied, 09-1726 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 308, is where it all began. Sonic's plans to build a restaurant on property zoned for restaurants fully complied with the city's zoning laws. The second circuit found Sonic enjoyed a “use by right” which was “presumptively valid and approved.” Id. at 340. The court went further, saying, “On judicial review, the council's decision to deny a use by right is subject to strict scrutiny, not the normal broad discretion applied to variance cases.” Id.

The court cites no support or authority for its position, does not explain how courts scrutinize such actions vigorously, and indeed does not explain what strict scrutiny means. Yet some courts have embraced this standard.² The embrace is fleeting, though, as those courts return to the abuse of discretion standard in their final analyses.

For example, this court said it should apply strict scrutiny to a recent case also involving the LCG. Singh Signature Stores v. Lafayette Par. Council, 24-464 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/25/25), 404 So.3d 1117, writ denied, 25-432 (La. 6/17/25), ___ So.3d ___ (2025 WL 1692130). But the court then cited Falcon v. Parish of Jefferson, 22-526 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/14/23), 367 So.3d 857, writ denied, 23-974 (La. 10/31/23), 372 So.3d 809, and discussed how the LCG could consider “certain factors affecting the public, such as public safety, health, and general welfare” that are “legitimate public concerns and supported by evidence[.]” Singh, 404 So.3d at 1127. By using these factors, the analysis returns to La.R.S. 33:101.1, which declares the approval/disapproval of a subdivision plat to be:

a legislative function involving the exercise of legislative discretion by the planning commission, based upon data presented to it; provided that any subdivision ordinance ․ shall be subject to judicial review on the grounds of abuse of discretion, unreasonable exercise of police powers, an excessive use of the power herein granted, or denial of the right of due process.

The statute does not distinguish between subdivision plats in zoned versus non-zoned areas.

Likewise, in Zachary Housing Partners, L.L.C. v. City of Zachary, 12-1952, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/10/13), 185 So. 3d 1, 4, writ denied, 13-2615 (La. 2/7/14), 131 So. 3d 864, the first circuit stated, “A legislative body's decision to deny a use by right, in compliance with the applicable zoning ordinances is subject to strict scrutiny, not the normal standard of broad discretion applied to variance cases.” However, in the very next sentence, the court says, “The reviewing court does not consider whether the district court manifestly erred in its findings, but whether the legislative body acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or with any calculated or prejudicial lack of discretion.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, while the court called its standard of review “strict scrutiny,” it in fact recognized that the court used discretion in reaching its decision.

In contrast, the first circuit ignores the strict scrutiny application in Honeybee Holdings, LLC v. St. Tammany Parish Zoning Commission, 23-1051 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/31/24), 391 So.3d 690. The Parish Council denied a developer's general implementation plan after a public hearing where neighboring residents expressed concern about drainage, traffic, and other issues.

Honeybee said mandamus was a proper remedy in the trial court because the Parish Council's duty was ministerial, not discretionary, and the Parish Council had arbitrarily and capriciously denied its plan. The trial court dismissed Honeybee's petition, finding “an element of discretion inheres” in the decision of the zoning commission and Parish Council. Id. at 699. That exercise of discretion properly considered whether the public officials’ acts were arbitrary and capricious.

Honeybee also argued “that the denial of its ‘use by right’ ” proved the denial of its plan was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 701, citing Zachary, 185 So.3d 1. The first circuit said this “argument [was] simply another basis on which Honeybee asserts [the Parish government] did not have discretion to deny its” plan.³ Honeybee, 391 So.3d at 701.

Before the jurisprudentially-created rule of D'Argent, 15 So.3d 334, and its progeny, the Louisiana Supreme Court set out how to analyze the fact patterns and legal issues presented here. In Toups v. City of Shreveport, 10-1559 (La. 3/15/11), 60 So.3d 1215, the plaintiff sought a special exception use for a proposed liquor store close to a church and a school. After the Planning Commission recommended approval, the church appealed, and the City reversed the decision “based on due consideration of the public health, safety, and general welfare of the municipality.” Id. at 1217.

The trial court affirmed the denial, finding it “was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” and “was ‘articulably consistent with promoting health, safety, [and] morals and for the general welfare of the community[.]’ ” Id. Although the second circuit first affirmed the judgment, on rehearing it found the City Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the special exception use and reversed the trial court.

The supreme court noted that because the issue fell “under the jurisdiction of the legislature” it would not interfere “unless the action [was] palpably erroneous and without any substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare.” Id. The court noted that “when there is room for two opinions, an action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed an erroneous conclusion has been reached.” Id.

A challenge to a zoning decision in Louisiana is a de novo proceeding on the issue of whether the result of the legislation is arbitrary and capricious, and therefore a taking of property without due process of law. Whether an ordinance bears the requisite relationship to the health, safety, and welfare of the public is a factual question which must be determined from the evidence in the record. The property owner has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision by the governmental body to deny the variance has no substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the municipality.

Id. at 1218 (citations omitted). Using that standard, the court found the decision to deny the special exception was not arbitrary and capricious. Although our case deals with non-zoned property, approving J Breaux's subdivision preliminary plat has the effect of zoning it residential; the fact that the property is presently not zoned does not distinguish this case from Toups, 60 So.3d 1215.

As noted by the fifth circuit in Willow, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish Council, 05-754, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/25/06), 756, 760, writ denied, 06-1596 (La. 9/29/06), 937 So.2d 869, “[t]o determine if the governing authority's decision regarding a resubdivision request is valid, the trial court must ask whether the decision bears so little relationship to public safety, health, or general welfare as to render it arbitrary and capricious.” (See also Glomax, LLC v. Lafayette Consolidated Gov't, 24-183, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/27/24), 403 So.3d 32, 38, writ denied, 24-1587 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 573, where this court quotes this language from Willow, 928 So.2d at 760.)

J Breaux has not alleged the unconstitutionality of any law or ordinance that would invoke the application of strict scrutiny. Even the application of that standard of review requires consideration of a compelling interest; in this case, the compelling interest is public safety and welfare. This case requires the application of discretion, first by the Planning Commission and next by the trial court, in considering J Breaux's appeal. While we review the trial court's decision under the abuse of discretion standard, we also note that, based on LCG's compelling interest in protecting the public, the facts of this case would also survive strict scrutiny if the constitutionality of a statute were involved.

The fact that J Breaux's proposed development was in an unincorporated area without zoning restrictions (allowing the “fully compliant” argument) does not entitle it to a presumption. The parish government has approved no lawful uses because the property is not subject to zoning requirements. Thus, the use by right principle does not apply here. Indeed, applying that standard to non-zoned property without approved uses results in any use being acceptable – an absurd result surely not contemplated by law. The solution? Decide what is best for public health, safety, and welfare, and rule accordingly. Even the courts using a strict scrutiny standard ultimately exercise discretion that considers public issues. We exercise that discretion here.

DISCUSSION

Courts will usually not interfere with the discretion of the governing authority of a parish or municipality unless the denial at issue clearly lacks a legitimate relation to public health, safety, or general welfare concerns. Falcon, 367 So.3d 857. J Breaux hangs its hat on LDC § 89-57(f)(1), which says the Planning and Zoning Commission will approve its preliminary plat when its application “complies with all applicable requirements of” Chapter 89 and is “consistent with the Comprehensive Plan.”

The Comprehensive Plan, according to the LCG's website:

is a long-range plan or “guidebook” for a community's growth, development[,] and redevelopment. It is a vision for the future that plans for a twenty[-]year time period, based on local conditions, values and aspirations. It is called comprehensive because it coordinates the efforts of many different aspects of a community, such as land use, transportation, and economic development.

One of the most important purposes of a Comprehensive Plan is to formally identify the elements that create a thriving, attractive community: one that offers viable options to its residents regarding where and how they want to live, work, and play.

The purpose of LDC § 89-55, “Subdivision Plats, Generally,” is to implement LCG's Comprehensive Plan and Chapter 89 of the ordinances by:

• establishing a procedure to approve plats and maps that subdivide or resubdivide real property, and

• examining subdivision plats and maps to ensure that they comply with [Chapter 89], and

• protecting the health, safety[,] and general welfare of the people of the City and Parish of Lafayette and their property.

Section 89-55(b)(1) says the requirements for approval:

do not imply an inherent right to subdivide property or to create building sites except as consistent with the public health, safety[,] and welfare of the entire community ․. [A]ny decision to approve a subdivision plat shall include an evaluation of all aspects that might relate [to] this decision, including but not limited to: infrastructure capacity or impact, current growth management policies, traffic congestion, and environmental impacts.

We note that J Breaux's preliminary plat application does not seek approval to build Ivywood. Rather, the application is J Breaux's first step to see if its right to use the property follows applicable zoning and conforms to lawful uses. This includes, according to the Comprehensive Plan and LCG ordinances, consideration of health, safety, and general welfare issues. We further note that § 89-55 makes no distinction between subdivision plats in zoned or non-zoned areas.

Discussion at the Parish Council meeting showed that Bayou Tortue Road does not meet the requirements for a safe public roadway. Indeed, that discussion showed that the road is fairly classified as “substandard.” There are no plans to upgrade the road. Evidence showed lane width on parts of Bayou Tortue Road was less than ten feet, and the asphalt was deteriorating in some areas.

Neighboring residents of the proposed development expressed adamant objection to J Breaux's project at the Parish Planning Commission's hearing. Not only did they complain about the condition of Bayou Tortue Road, but they also expressed concerns, supported by photographs, about significant flooding and erosion issues affecting the road. Residents were particularly concerned with the increased traffic Ivywood would bring to this already substandard roadway. Even J Breaux's representative at the hearing acknowledged “without a doubt, [Bayou Tortue Road] is substandard.” The Parish Council thoroughly discussed these issues and their potential impact on the public before denying the preliminary plat application.

The trial court's Written Reasons for Judgment noted the Planning Commission denied J Breaux's application “out of traffic and public safety concerns.” The court cited La.R.S. 33:101.1 to support the Planning Commission's exercise of legislative discretion, noting that legislative acts are presumed valid. The trial court found no “willful and unreasoning action” to show the Planning Commission's denial was arbitrary and capricious. To the contrary, the court noted LDC § 89-55(b)(1) requires consideration for issues of “public health, safety[,] and welfare of the entire community” as well as those of “infrastructure capacity or impact, current growth management policies, traffic congestion, and environmental impacts.” The Planning Commission's decision directly reflects consideration of those exact issues.

CONCLUSION

LCG's exercise of legislative discretion showed legitimate public safety concerns. Its denial of J Breaux's application for a preliminary plat was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable regardless of the standard of review applied. Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and the Lafayette Parish Council denying preliminary plat approval and dismissing J Breaux's appeal. We assess costs of the appeal against J Breaux Enterprises, LLC.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We refer to the Lafayette Parish Planning Commission, Lafayette Parish Council, and Lafayette Consolidated City-Parish Government collectively as “LCG.”

2.   See Singh Signature Stores v. Lafayette Par. Council, 24-464 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/25/25), 404 So.3d 1117, writ denied, 25-432 (La. 6/17/25), ___ So.3d ___ (2025 WL 1692130); Falcon v. Par. of Jefferson, 22-526 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/14/23), 367 So.3d 857, writ denied, 23-974 (La. 10/31/23), 372 So.3d 809; Zachary Hous. Partners, LLC v. City of Zachary, 12-1952 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/10/13), 185 So.3d 1, writ denied, 13-2615 (La. 2/7/14), 131 So.3d 864; and Urban Hous. of Am. Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 44,874 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/28/09), 26 So.3d 226, writ denied, 10-26 (La. 4/23/10), 34 So.3d 269.

3.   See also Glomax, LLC v. Lafayette Consol. Gov't, 24-183 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/27/24), 403 So.3d 32, writ denied, 24-1587 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 573; Willow, Inc. v. Jefferson Par. Council, 05-754 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/25/06), 928 So.2d 756, writ denied, 06-1596 (La. 9/29/06), 937 So.2d 869; and B & A Holdings, LLC v. City of Natchitoches, 23-620 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/24), 382 So.3d 471, which look at legitimate public concerns as the basis for a court to find that denial of a development plan is not arbitrary and capricious.

CLAYTON DAVIS JUDGE