STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHARLES TURNER (2025)

Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for aggravated rape of a juvenile under the age of thirteen. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 28, 2016, a Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant, C.T.,¹ with aggravated rape ² of a known juvenile where the victim was under the age of thirteen, in violation of La. R.S. 14:42. Defendant was convicted of that charge by a non-unanimous vote of the jury on November 18, 2017, and was sentenced by the trial court on December 11, 2017. On rehearing of his appeal from that conviction, this Court vacated defendant's conviction and sentence in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020), and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new trial. State v. C.T., 18-650 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/30/19), 307 So.3d 325, 326-27.³

On remand, on May 6, 2024, the case proceeded to jury trial, and on May 8, 2024, the jury unanimously found defendant guilty as charged. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court denied on May 29, 2024. On that same date, the trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. This appeal followed.

FACTS

The victim, D.A., was born of the relationship between A.A. and defendant on August 26, 2004. At trial, he testified that while growing up, he lived with various family members and friends, including his grandmother, his mother, his mother's friend, Ms. Fields and his father, the defendant herein. D.A. first met his father in person when he was approximately seven or eight years old, and was excited to spend time with him in those early visits.

D.A. confided in Ms. Fields that during a visit with his father, he awakened to find defendant lying next to him with his pants down. When his mother appeared to pick him up, D.A. recounted to her what occurred during a visit with his father. D.A. recalled his mother was very upset and told him that his father could get into a lot of trouble if true. Her reaction was very upsetting, D.A. testified, causing him to recant the incident to his mother.

Later, while residing with his maternal great-grandmother, D.A. asked to live with his father at his paternal grandmother's house. He recalled wanting more of a relationship with his father than just visiting. D.A. testified that defendant did not sexually abuse him when they lived with his paternal grandmother. However, D.A. recalled that his father would direct he drop his pants when whipping him on the “butt”.

From his paternal grandmother's house, D.A. testified that they moved into an apartment with defendant's then-girlfriend. He explained that at first things were fine, but changes happened over a few weeks. In his testimony, D.A. recounted one occasion when he accidently dropped and broke a plate. Defendant took him into his room, and administered a “whipping” to his bare bottom.

After receiving the whipping, D.A. testified that defendant disrobed, got onto the bed with him, touched his own penis, and then touched D.A.’s butt area. D.A. described in graphic detail the penile anal penetration performed by defendant. D.A. testified this recurred after every whipping received from defendant, which he recalled being “very frequently.” He could not recall all the times defendant did this because the memories ran together. D.A. did recall that after the initial incident, defendant applied lotion to his own penis and to D.A.’s butt in subsequent sexual assaults.

D.A. testified they later moved from the apartment with defendant's girlfriend to Laplace. He stated that there was no sexual abuse that occurred there.

From Laplace, he and defendant moved back to his paternal grandmother's house. D.A. testified that within a few days of moving there, an incident occurred while he was playing a video game in his room. He recalled that defendant became angry about a broken television. Defendant informed D.A. that he was getting a whipping. D.A. described in graphic detail how he was anally penetrated by defendant's penis, recalling defendant using a coconut scented lotion in the process. During this incident, D.A. believed his paternal grandmother may have been in the house, and he thought to call out for her, but never did.

In his testimony, D.A. explained that at the time he was abused, he did not know what sex was and did not know that what was being done to him was wrong. He did not know to tell anyone about the abuse. D.A. recalled that on one occasion after being abused by his father, he went to the restroom and saw semen on his “poop.” He did not know that it was semen at the time, but realized it later. After the sexual abuse started, it did not affect him because he did not realize it was wrong. When he later realized it was wrong, he became confused by defendant's threats, recalling that he feared for his and his mother's family's safety.

D.A. described being sexually abused by the defendant once or twice a week. He recalled the last occasion on which his father abused him. It was during a Sunday morning barbeque at his paternal grandmother's house, when defendant led D.A. upstairs. Defendant was mad at him about his school grades and told him to lie down and remove his clothes, administering a whipping to D.A. In his testimony, D.A. graphically detailed being anally penetrated by defendant.

Afterwards, D.A. moved to live with his mother and sisters in Ponchatoula. Their house was small and D.A. shared a bed with one of his sisters. He testified to anally penetrating his sister with his penis. When confronted by his mom about this incident, D.A. recalled telling his mom it was something he had seen before and that it was done to him by his father. He also recalled the police coming to their house, going to Children's Hospital in New Orleans, seeing a doctor at the Audrey Hepburn Care Center, and giving a statement at the Children's Advocacy Center. D.A. testified that he told everyone what happened to him.

In his testimony, D.A. recalled how the abuse affected his behavior in school, and his ability to relate to kids his own age. He testified to telling his mother generally what happened with his father, but did not provide specifics. As he got older and went through puberty, the abuse affected his mental health and he experienced suicidal thoughts. D.A. testified that he used his mother's and grandmother's razors to cut into his left wrist, which left scars that he showed the jury at trial. He also described marks on his back and butt left by defendant's whippings.

Kandi Fields, a friend of D.A.’s mother, testified that D.A. temporarily stayed with her in 2011, when he was seven or eight years old. She recounted that after a weekend visit with defendant, D.A. said to her, “My daddy's nasty.” When she asked what he meant, he cried and said, “My daddy licks my butt when he thinks I'm asleep.” She reported this to D.A.’s mother, who then traveled from her residence in Texas to Ms. Field's home to speak with him.

A.A., D.A.’s mother, testified that she is the mother of four children, including, D.A. When D.A. was eight or nine years old, they lived with her friend, Ms. Fields. While living with Ms. Fields, defendant contacted her and expressed a desire to be involved in D.A.’s life. D.A. and his father began visiting with each other, and spending time together. When she decided to move to Texas, D.A. stayed with Ms. Fields to attend school.

She recalled receiving a call from Ms. Fields regarding D.A. and allegations of abuse. She then returned to Louisiana to speak with D.A. After he explained what had happened, she informed him that she would have to call the police. She described D.A. as becoming frightened, denying the abuse, and pleading with her not to call the police. He explained to her that the story was made up because he wanted to live with her. She decided to not call the police at this time, however she took D.A. back with her to Texas.

A year later, they returned to Louisiana. Again, she tried to involve defendant in D.A.’s life. She allowed D.A. to live with defendant when she moved to Ponchatoula.

In 2015, D.A. came to stay with her and her other children in Ponchatoula. During the stay, she found D.A. and his younger sister together, with the younger sister's panties off. The younger sister disclosed that he was “touching her, her butt with his private.” When she confronted D.A., he began crying, and told her his prior story about the defendant was true, and explained that he “was doing it to her so I could see what it felt like to do it to somebody else․[b]ecause my dad had been doing it to me.”

A.A. testified that she then contacted defendant. She recalled being angry when confronting the defendant about D.A.’s allegations, and yelling at him, “Here we go with this again.” Defendant claimed to her that D.A. was lying, at which time she hung up on him. Afterwards, she called the police, who advised her to bring the children to Children's Hospital in New Orleans. There, she reported to members of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office what D.A. had said. After D.A.’s examination at Children's Hospital, she was advised to take him to the Audrey Hepburn Care Center and the Children's Advocacy Center. A.A. testified that she did not bring the children to the Children's Advocacy Center until approximately two months after initial Children's Hospital emergency room visit.

Detective Kristen Martinez testified that on August 1, 2015, she was dispatched to Children's Hospital in New Orleans, where she met with Detective Dwayne Roman, D.A., and his mother. At that time, she was employed with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office Fourth District Patrol Division. After speaking with D.A. and his mother, Detective Martinez testified that she obtained a search warrant for 113 Maryland Avenue in Metairie, Louisiana. Defendant and his mother were in the residence during execution of the warrant. The search included photographing various areas of the house.

Dr. Sonseeahray Bridges, a pediatric medicine physician, treated D.A. in the Children's Hospital emergency room on August 1, 2015. Dr. Bridges testified that D.A.’s mother reported what she witnessed between him and his sister in bed. She also recounted to Dr. Bridges that her daughter disclosed what D.A. did to her on more than one occasion since returning to their home from living with his father. She further reported that D.A. explained to her that what he did to his sister was done to him by his father.

Dr. Bridges testified that she conducted a full forensic examination of D.A. She did not find any signs of physical trauma on D.A. In her opinion, the absence of physical findings of trauma was not unusual based on D.A.’s report that the last incident of sexual abuse had occurred at least three weeks beforehand. Dr. Bridges also stated that there was no DNA found in the matter, which was also not unusual given the time frame reported by D.A. She further explained that in these types of cases, she would only expect to find bodily fluids in the first seventy-two hours.

Ms. Brittney Millet, testified that she conducted a forensic interview with D.A. on August 13, 2015.⁴ At that time, Ms. Millet was a forensic interviewer with the Jefferson Parish Children's Advocacy Center. In the audio and video recorded interview, D.A. gave a detail account of the abuse. After the interview was completed, Ms. Millet referred him to the Audrey Hepburn Care Center for a forensic medical exam.

Dr. Jamie Jackson, accepted as an expert in the field of child abuse pediatrics, testified to conducting an examination of D.A. at the Audrey Hepburn Care Center. D.A. had been referred from the Children's Advocacy Center with reports of “penile anal penetration.” Her examination included an interview of D.A. and obtaining a “medical history.” She described D.A. as quiet and reserved during her examination. Dr. Jackson testified that D.A. provided a clear and detailed history, in which he disclosed that his father “put his private in his butt” and “a finger into his butt.” He reported that it may have happened once or twice a week from age eight to ten, and that it had been approximately three weeks from the last incident of sexual abuse.

In her physical examination, Dr. Jackson testified, no signs of physical trauma were revealed. She opined that the likelihood of any physical evidence of sexual abuse would be extremely rare since it had been three weeks since the last incident of sexual abuse. Dr. Jackson opined that D.A.’s act of sexually touching his sister was typical sexually reactive behavior resulting from his own abuse, and that in most cases children delay disclosing their abuse. She also explained that false recants are not uncommon due to fear of consequences or isolation from family, and that it was common for a child who had recanted to later re-describe the abuse.

Defendant testified that D.A. was approximately six years old when he first lived with him. He recalled that while D.A. was staying with Ms. Fields, he received a call from A.A. regarding the claims that D.A. was making against him. He denied the allegations, and claimed that D.A. fabricated stories of sexual abuse because he wanted to distance himself from his black father and live with his mother and siblings.

Defendant also recalled that when A.A. was living in Ponchatoula, she called to ask him if D.A. could live with him. He was hesitant to agree because of the allegations that D.A. had made against him, and suggested that he come when he was older. Ultimately, he agreed for D.A. to live with him again. Defendant recalled that D.A. was having issues with school, and that he was looking at pornography. While admitting to disciplining D.A. with a belt, defendant claimed it was done when his clothes were on. Defendant testified that he eventually stopped using a belt to discipline D.A., and instead, started taking things away from him as punishment.

Defendant's mother, E.T., testified that D.A. lived with her and the defendant at 113 Maryland Avenue, Metairie, Louisiana for approximately two years. During that time, she recalled that D.A. did not want to live with them. Rather, he wanted to live with his mother, and would act out as a result. She recalled that on one occasion, when she caught him watching “dirty movies,” he gave her “attitude” about the movies he was watching. She further testified that she did not see any marks on D.A.’s face from physical abuse, nor heard or saw anything that would indicate he was being sexually abused by defendant.

Terry Lee testified that he lived next-door to D.A.’s grandmother, E.T., who asked him to keep an eye on D.A. when he came home from school. Mr. Lee recalled that D.A. told him that “did not want to be black,” but instead to be more like his mother and grandmother, who were white. He described D.A. as being frequently “down” at that time, and not having many friends. Mr. Lee also testified that he never heard any spanking or other noises coming from E.T.’s apartment that would indicate physical or sexual abuse.

Also testifying at trial was R.T., defendant's sister. She testified that D.A. and defendant lived with her for approximately two weeks, until she asked them to leave because of a “discipline issue.” R.T. recalled that D.A. was approximately eight years old at the time. She testified that she never witnessed any inappropriate behavior between the defendant and D.A., and did not see any signs of physical abuse or marks on D.A.’s face.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In this appeal, defendant raises three assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred by admitting testimony regarding D.A.’s alleged self-harm, and allowing the jury to view the resulting scars; (2) the trial court's admission of the evidence of self-harm infringed upon defendant's constitutional right to present a defense; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial which was predicated on the improper admission of the evidence of the victim's self-harm. Defendant also contends that he had no prior knowledge of the evidence, and the State's late disclosure impacted his right to present a defense, resulting in prejudice to him.

The State responds that admitting evidence of D.A.’s self-harm was not an error, arguing that the evidence was relevant to show the victim's state of mind as to how the sexual abuse affected him, and to counter defendant's assertion that the allegations were false. The State further avers that defendant's ability to present his own probative and admissible evidence was not impacted, pointing out that at trial, defendant was allowed to present his defense, argue why the State did not meet its burden, and argue why the jury should discount the evidence against him. As to the denial of the motion for new trial, the State argues that it was properly denied, and no injustice was done to the defendant.

Because all three assignments relate to the issue of whether the defendant was deprived of the right to present a defense, we consider these assignments of error jointly in our discussion below.⁵

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Defendant's assignments of error concern the trial court's admission of evidence of the victim's physical scars resulting from self-harm, first mentioned by the State in opening statements. Defendant argues that the trial court's admission of the late disclosed evidence denied him of his right to present a defense. On review, we find no merit to defendant's argument that he was denied his right to present a defense.

The record shows that:

On May 7, 2024, during opening statements, the State asserted:

He didn't understand the nature of what was happening to him. It wasn't until he was a teenager that he really understood what had been done to him. And you'll hear that this had an effect on [D.A.]. You will hear about how this affected him as he was growing up after this abuse occurred. In fact, you will see the physical scars that [D.A.] gave himself when he was trying to deal with this trauma.

After opening statements, defense counsel orally raised a motion in limine seeking to prohibit any discussion and evidence of scarring averring he had no prior knowledge of the victim's “physical scars” until opening statements, and that he had not been provided with any evidence or photographs of such prior to trial.

Initially, the trial court granted defense's motion in limine, finding that the defense was entitled to the information prior to trial. The State noted its objection and intent to seek supervisory writs. Later, during trial, at a bench conference, the State withdrew its notice and raised an oral motion for reconsideration urging the court to reconsider its ruling in light of State v. Duck, 54,597 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/14/22), 352 So.3d 1097, writ denied, 23-79 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So.3d 717, a case in which the second circuit found that evidence of self-harm was relevant to demonstrate the victim's state of mind and to counter the defendant's argument that the victim fabricated the allegations.

At the reconsideration hearing, the State relied on Duck to support the admission of the evidence. Additionally, the State argued that the evidence of D.A.’s scars were not favorable to the defense, hence were not “discoverable” and did not trigger the State's duty to disclose under Brady ⁶ or Giglio ⁷ In response, defendant averred that first mentioning the evidence in opening statements was improper notice. After argument of counsel and review of Duck, the trial court reversed its earlier ruling, and denied defense's motion in limine.

At trial, D.A. testified that the sexual abuse affected his emotional well-being and caused him to have suicidal thoughts. He explained that he would take his mother's and grandmother's razor blades and “slash them” into his wrists. He testified that it left “marks” on his writs, which he showed the jury.

After trial, defense counsel moved for a new trial predicated upon the improper admission of the evidence of the victim's self-harm. The trial court denied the motion.

Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to present a defense. State v. Lirette, 11-1167 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/28/12), 102 So.3d 801, 813, writ denied, 12-1694 (La. 2/22/13), 108 So.3d 763. However, this right is not without limits. The right to present a defense does not require a trial court to admit evidence that is irrelevant or has so little probative value that it is substantially outweighed by other legitimate considerations in the administration of justice. State v. Stevenson, 13-156 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/30/13), 121 So.3d 792, 794, writ denied, 13-2025 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1175. The determination regarding the relevancy of tendered evidence, and therefore the scope and extent of cross-examination, is within the discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

Relevant evidence is any “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” La. C.E. art. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. La. C.E. art. 402. However, even relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.” La. C.E. art. 403. Stevenson, 121 So.3d at 794.

Evidence of physical scars from self-harm has been found to be admissible in a sexual abuse case if it is relevant to demonstrating the victim's state of mind or to counter arguments that the victim fabricated allegations. Duck, 352 So.3d at 1113-14. In Duck, the defendant was convicted of first- and second-degree rape. On appeal, the defendant complained that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce photographs and testimony with regard to the victim engaging in self-harm (cutting). The defendant argued the photographs were “extremely emotional,” and unrelated to the charged offense, thus should not have been admitted, nor should witnesses not have been allowed to testify about the victim's acts of cutting. Id. at 1113-14.

The second circuit found evidence of the victim's self-harm relevant to her state of mind caused by sexual abuse. That court pointed out that the defendant attacked the charges against him by arguing that the victims concocted false allegations of sexual abuse. In responding to that defense, the State introduced photographs to show one of the victim's levels of anxiety after a meeting regarding the impending trial. Id. at 1114.

We likewise find, in this case, that evidence of D.A.’s self-harm was relevant to demonstrating the effect of the sexual abuse on D.A.’s mental health, and to counter defense arguments that he fabricated allegations against his father. We further find that the evidence was not so gruesome as to prejudice or mislead the jury.

In addition to arguing the evidence of D.A.’s harm to be irrelevant, defendant contends the State's delayed disclosure of evidence concerning self-harm and scarring impeded his ability to present a defense. Considering this argument, we first point out that the State has a continuing duty to disclose additional evidence which it discovers or decides to use at trial. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 729.3. However, the State's failure to comply with discovery procedures must be shown to be prejudicial in order to reverse a conviction. State v. Diaz, 20-381 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/17/21), 331 So.3d 500, 530, writ denied, 21-1967 (La. 4/5/22), 335 So.3d 836.

On appellate review, the court must examine the circumstances of the case to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced and whether any prejudice resulting from the State's non-compliance with discovery procedure caused the trier of fact to reach the wrong conclusion. State v. Trim, 12-115 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/16/12), 107 So.3d 656, 662, writ denied, 12-2488 (La. 4/19/13), 111 So.3d 1030 (citing State v. Sweeney, 443 So.2d 522, 527 (La. 1983)).

As pointed out by the State, defendant does not cite to any authority regarding discovery that requires the State to turn over evidence of D.A.’s self-harm. Our review for applicable discovery law reflects the same.

In State v. Donnaud, 04-624 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/15/05), 896 So.2d 1151, 1156, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial and failed to grant the motion for new trial when the State failed to inform the defense of tangible objects it intended to introduce at trial. Defendant was convicted of unauthorized use of an access card in violation of La. R.S. 14:67.3. Id. at 1153. Defendant argued that she was prejudiced by the State's discovery rule violation in failing to inform the court and defense of its intention to introduce K-Mart merchandise found in her apartment. Id. at 1156. This Court found the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for mistrial and motion for new trial based on the State's discovery violation, reasoning that the evidence was clearly not favorable to defendant under La. C.Cr.P. art. 718(1).⁸ While finding that defendant was entitled to inspect the evidence before trial, this Court found the trial court's error was harmless because the merchandise located in defendant apartment, in plain view, was central evidence in the State's prosecution for unauthorized use of a credit card. This Court explained:

Defendant moved the trial court for a mistrial, a drastic remedy. A more reasonable alternative for the defense would have been to move for a recess or a continuance to allow counsel to inspect the evidence. But defendant did not make such a request. In any case, counsel for both defendants thoroughly cross-examined Ms. Kerner and Billy regarding the K-Mart items. Given these circumstances, we do not find that defendant was prejudiced by the State's failure to produce the evidence prior to trial. Any error the trial court made in denying defendant's mistrial motion was harmless.

Id. at 1158-59.

In this case, defendant argues that the late disclosure impeded his ability to present a defense. We disagree. While our review shows that the evidence of D.A.’s self-harm should have been disclosed before trial under rules of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, the record does not support defendant's contention that he was prejudiced by the untimely disclosure. The first mention of the self-harm was during the State's opening statements. Defendant was afforded the opportunity to fully examine and cross-examine the victim and every other witness at trial on the subject of D.A.’s self-harm scarring.

Defendant also argues that the State used the evidence to “buttress” D.A.’s credibility and testimony. However, again, the record reflects that defense counsel was afforded full opportunity to cross-examine D.A. regarding self-harm, as well as to attack his credibility concerning his recollection of the sexual abuse. In our review of the record, we find defendant's opportunity to effectively counter the evidence at trial was not impacted in this case.

Nevertheless, while we find defendant was not prevented from effectively countering evidence of D.A.’s self-harm, reversal may be required if there exists a reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence might have contributed to the verdict. State v. Stockstill, 19-1235 (La. 10/1/20), 341 So.3d 502, 507. An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it is unimportant in relation to the whole, and the verdict rendered is surely unattributable to the error. State v. Brown, 16-998 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 745, 791, cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 143 S.Ct. 886, 215 L.Ed.2d 404 (2023).

Evidence presented at trial included testimony of the victim, who detailed the multiple incidents of sexual abuse he endured from his father. His accounts of that sexual abuse were also reflected in his interview at the Children's Advocacy Center. The jury viewed the Children's Advocacy Center's interview tape and was presented with multiple witnesses.

In sex offense cases, the testimony of the victim alone can be sufficient to establish the elements of a sexual offense, even when the State does not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense. State v. Chinchilla, 20-60 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/20), 307 So.3d 1189, 1195, writ denied, 21-274 (La. 4/27/21), 314 So.3d 838, cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 142 S.Ct. 296, 211 L.Ed.2d 138. In this case, the jury heard testimony presented by the State as well as defendant's own testimony, from which they made a credibility determination. Considering the evidence presented, we also find that the guilty verdict rendered by the jury was surely not attributable to the admission of the evidence of defendant's self-harm and physical scars, and that any error in its admission was harmless.

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying him his constitutional right to present a defense and avers that the trial court erred in the denial of the motion for new trial predicated upon the improper admission of this evidence. However, for the same reasons as discussed above, we find that defendant's right to present a defense was not affected or limited by the admission of the evidence and that these assignments are without merit.

As discussed, defendant was able to fully cross-examine D.A. Additionally, the denial of a motion for new trial is not subject to appellate review except for an error of law. La. C.Cr.P. art. 858; State v. Nix, 22-446 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/31/23), 374 So.3d 212, 217, writ denied, 23-1540 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 604. The ruling on a motion for new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. For the same reasons discussed above with regard to defendant's arguments for the erroneous admission of evidence, we find that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for new trial.

Considering the foregoing, defendant's assignments of error lack merit.

ERRORS PATENT

We reviewed the record for errors patent in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

Our review reveals that the record does not reflect that the trial court advised defendant of the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. If a trial court fails to advise, or provides an incomplete advisal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the appellate court may correct this error by informing the defendant of the applicable prescriptive period for post-conviction relief by means of its opinion. State v. Britton, 22-476 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/10/23), 366 So.3d 652, 665.

Accordingly, the defendant is hereby informed that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. Id.

Additionally, our review reveals a discrepancy between the sentencing minute entry and the sentencing transcript, insofar as the sentencing minute entry reflects that the sentence is to be served at hard labor, whereas the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that the trial court did not specify on the record that the sentence was to be served at hard labor. The transcript prevails when there is a discrepancy between the transcript and the sentencing minute entry. See State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). Defendant was sentenced under La. R.S. 14:42(D)(2)(b), which mandates a life sentence at hard labor if the district attorney does not seek a capital verdict and does not allow any trial court discretion.

Because the statute mandates hard labor and there is no discretion allowed, we find the trial court's failure to state on the record that defendant's sentence was to be served at hard labor is harmless and no corrective action is required. See State v. Trice, 14-636 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14), 167 So.3d 89, 90 n.2; State v. Pollard, 12-346 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/12), 106 So.3d 1194, 1203, writ denied, 13-140 (La. 6/21/13), 118 So.3d 408.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

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JUDGES

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GRETNA, LA 70053

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the interest of protecting minor crime victims and victims of sexual offenses as set forth in La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(3), the judges of this Court have adopted a policy that this Court's published work will use only initials to identify the victim and any defendant or witness whose name can lead to the victim's identity (i.e., parent, sibling, or relative with the same last name as the victim). State v. Ross, 14-84 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/15/14), 182 So.3d 983, 985 n.3.

2.   After the offense in this case, La. R.S. 14:42 was amended in 2015 by La. Act. No. 184, to rename the offense of aggravated rape to first degree rape.

3.   On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on July 30, 2019. State v. C.T., 18-650 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/30/19), 279 So.3d 431. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted defendant's writ application and remanded the matter to this Court for reconsideration in light of the decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020). State v. C.T., 19-1390 (La.6/3/20), 296 So.3d 1026. On reconsideration, we found defendant was entitled to a new trial, vacated his conviction and sentence, and remanded to the trial court for a new trial. State v. C.T., 18-650 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/30/190), 307 So.3d 325, 326-27.

4.   D.A.’s interview was admitted as State's Exhibit 5. During the interview, D.A. graphically detailed another incident of abuse which began with defendant whipping him and led to defendant's penetrative sexual assault. D.A. also told Ms. Millet that he found a video in defendant's drawer that he thought was a music video, but when he played it, images of “naked girls” appeared, so he turned the video off and put it back in the drawer.

5.   In his appellant brief, defendant addresses all three assignments together and briefs one argument for all three assignments.

6.   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

7.   Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).

8.   La. C.Cr.P. art. 718(1) provided:Subject to the limitation of Article 723, on motion of the defendant, the court shall order the district attorney to permit or authorize the defendant to inspect, copy, examine, test scientifically, photograph, or otherwise reproduce books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of the state, and which:(1) are favorable to the defendant and which are material and relevant to the issue of guilt or punishment[.]

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL JUDGE