STATE OF LOUISIANA v. STEPHANIE DAWN MERRITT (2025)

The defendant, Stephanie Dawn Merritt, was charged by amended bill of information with possession of a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance with an aggregate weight of less than two grams (heroin) (Count One), in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(C)(4)(a); possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with an aggregate weight of less than two grams (methamphetamine) (Count Two), in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1); possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with an aggregate weight of less than two grams (fentanyl) (Count Three), in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(4)(a); and possession of a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance (clonazepam) (Count Four), in violation of La. R.S. 40:969(C)(2) (prior to amendment).¹ She initially pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress evidence, which was denied. She then pled guilty, reserving her right to appeal the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence under State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). The trial court sentenced her to concurrent terms of four years at hard labor, suspended, with three years of probation on Counts One and Three, four years at hard labor, suspended, with three years of probation on two counts of possession of a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance, and two years at hard labor with three years of probation on Count Two. The defendant now appeals, designating two assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions, vacate the sentences as to one count of possession of a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance and Count Two, and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

On December 2, 2022, Sergeant Dennis Bush and Detective Ben Williams with the Slidell Police Department (“SPD”) received information regarding possible drug trafficking at a nearby hotel. Sergeant Bush and Detective Williams approached the hotel room identified by the informant in order to conduct a “knock and talk,” and smelled marijuana coming from the direction of the room. The defendant opened the door, and Sergeant Bush identified himself and Detective Williams and the nature of their investigation. Sergeant Bush observed several individuals inside the hotel room and ordered them to exit. Without knowing if any others were in the hotel room, Sergeant Bush conducted a protective sweep for officer safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence. The defendant later gave the officers permission to search the room, and they discovered narcotics during the search. The defendant was subsequently arrested.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

In her first assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence.

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is entitled to great weight because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony. State v. Landor, 2020-0336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/21), 318 So.3d 225, 228. When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. State v. St. Cyre, 2019-0034 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/19/19), 292 So.3d 88, 96, writ denied, 2020-00142 (La. 5/26/20), 296 So.3d 1063. A trial court's legal findings, however, are subject to a de novo standard of review. Landor, 318 So.3d at 228.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5, of the Louisiana Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. A defendant may move to suppress any evidence from trial on the basis that it was unconstitutionally obtained. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(A). A search and seizure conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause is per se unreasonable unless the State can affirmatively show the warrantless search and seizure was justified by one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(D); State v. Coleman, 2019-1458 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/12/20), 305 So.3d 878, 881, writ denied, 2020-00868 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 294, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 1739, 209 L.Ed.2d 505 (2021). If evidence was derived from an unlawful search or seizure, the proper remedy is exclusion of the evidence from trial. State v. Benjamin, 97-3065 (La. 12/1/98), 722 So.2d 988, 989.

At the motion to suppress hearing, Sergeant Bush testified he initiated a traffic stop wherein he recovered narcotics. During the traffic stop, the SPD received information that narcotics, specifically methamphetamine, were being sold out of Room 110 at the nearby America's Best Value Inn & Suites. Sergeant Bush decided to conduct a “knock and talk” at the hotel room and, while approaching the door, smelled marijuana coming from the direction of the room. Bodycam footage ² from the “knock and talk” investigation recorded the following exchange:

Sergeant Bush: Who's room is this?

The defendant: Mine.

Sergeant Bush: And your name is?

The defendant: Stephanie Merritt.

Sergeant Bush: Stephanie. Okay. Is Mike, Mike staying with you?

The defendant: Mike?

Sergeant Bush: Uh-huh.

The defendant: Yeah.

Sergeant Bush: Okay.

The defendant: That's all I know of him. I met him here. I moved in not too long ago.

Sergeant Bush: Okay. Alright.

The defendant: I'm about to go do laundry.

Sergeant Bush: Is there narcotics in this room? Because Mike said he had - there's drugs in there.

Sergeant Bush testified that when the defendant opened the door, he saw several individuals inside the room, so he stepped inside and ordered the occupants to exit. According to Sergeant Bush, an officer with thirty-one years of law enforcement experience, it was common, especially in these kind of hotel settings, for other individuals to be in the bathroom, possibly with a weapon or destroying evidence by flushing it down the toilet. Sergeant Bush conducted a protective sweep for officer safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence. Sergeant Bush testified that during the protective sweep, he observed a small bag of marijuana on a nightstand. Following the protective sweep, the defendant gave Sergeant Bush verbal and written consent to search the room. Illegal narcotics and paraphernalia were recovered from the hotel room.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, noting that during the hearing, in addition to testimony, a video and a consent to search form were entered into evidence. The trial court stated:

The Court took the matter under advisement. The Court reviewed the video. And considering the video, the testimony, and the Consent to Search form, the Court finds there was probable cause to go to this location to do a knock and talk with the occupants of the motel room. And, further, that on completion of that investigation, a Consent to Search form was signed by [the defendant] allowing officers to go into the motel room, search the room, seize the illegal drugs; and [the Court] denies the Motion to Suppress.

The defendant objected to the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence and thereafter pled guilty to the charges. On appeal, the defendant argues Sergeant Bush exceeded the scope of a “knock and talk” by entering the hotel room without having probable cause to do so. The defendant similarly asserts Sergeant Bush exceeded the parameters of a permissible protective sweep. Therefore, according to the defendant, her consent to search the room was vitiated by the unlawful actions of the officers.

A “knock and talk” investigation involves officers knocking on the door, identifying themselves as officers, asking to talk to the occupant about a criminal complaint, and eventually requesting permission to search the house. If successful, it allows police officers who lack probable cause to gain access to a house and conduct a search. Federal and state appellate courts that have considered the question have concluded a “knock and talk” procedure does not, per se, violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Warren, 2005-2248 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1221-22; State v. Brite, 2016-1528 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/12/17), 2017 WL 2982913, *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2017-1406 (La. 5/18/18), 242 So.3d 1218.

Though the “knock and talk” procedure is not automatically violative of the Fourth Amendment, it can become so. The constitutional analysis begins with the knock on the door. The prevailing rule is, absent a clear expression by the owner to the contrary, police officers, in the course of their official business, are permitted to approach one's dwelling and seek permission to question an occupant. Warren, 949 So.2d at 1222. The constitutional protection provided in the Fourth Amendment also applies to hotel rooms. Brite, 2017 WL 2982913 at *4.

In the instant case, Sergeant Bush and Detective Williams were justified in conducting a “knock and talk” investigation at the defendant's hotel room based on the information provided by the informant, Mike. The SPD had conducted a traffic stop, recovered narcotics during the traffic stop, and received information from Mike that narcotics were being sold from Room 110, which was where Mike was living at the time. The officers smelled marijuana emanating from Room 110 when they approached, and when the defendant opened the door, she said she knew Mike. We next address Sergeant Bush's protective sweep.

A protective sweep is a quick and limited search of a premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1094, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). In order to conduct a protective sweep, the searching officer must possess a “reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts” which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants the officer to believe the area swept “harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” See Id. 494 U.S. at 337, 110 S.Ct. at 1099-1100. In upholding a police officer's ability to conduct a protective sweep, the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated the following:

The reasonableness of a security check is simple and straightforward. From the standpoint of the individual, the intrusion on his privacy is slight; the search is cursory in nature and is intended to uncover only ‘persons, not things.’ United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5 Cir. 1977). Once the security check has been completed and the premises secured, no further search be it extended or limited is permitted until a warrant is obtained. From the standpoint of the public, its interest in a security check is weighty. The delay attendant upon obtaining a warrant could enable accomplices lurking in another room to destroy evidence. More important, the safety of the arresting officers or members of the public may be jeopardized. Weighing the public interest against the modest intrusion on the privacy of the individual, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) [(per curiam)]; Perry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a security check conducted under the circumstances stated above satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Guiden, 399 So.2d 194, 199 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150, 102 S.Ct. 1017, 71 L.Ed.2d 305 (1982) (quoting United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 107, 66 L.Ed.2d 40 (1980)).

The plain view doctrine renders a warrantless search reasonable: (1) if the police officer is lawfully in the place from which he views the object; (2) where the object's incriminating character is immediately apparent; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object. State v. Miguel, 2018-0711 (La. 1/30/19), 263 So.3d 873, 874 (per curiam).

In this case, Sergeant Bush was justified in ordering the individuals out of the room and in conducting a quick and limited protective sweep for officer safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence. As a seasoned law enforcement officer, Sergeant Bush testified as to the regularity in which individuals flush narcotics down the toilet to destroy evidence and arm themselves with weapons. He did not know if others were in the room and had the opportunity to destroy the evidence or endanger the lives of the officers. We find, based on these facts, Sergeant Bush possessed a reasonable belief that the hotel room could have been occupied by an individual posing a danger to the officers on the scene. During the protective sweep, Sergeant Bush observed marijuana in plain view on a nightstand. Sergeant Bush was lawfully in the hotel room and the incriminating character of the marijuana was immediately apparent.

Finally, we do not find the defendant's verbal and written consent to search was vitiated. A search conducted pursuant to consent is an exception to the requirements of both warrant and probable cause. State v. Jarrell, 2007-1720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/12/08), 994 So.2d 620, 626. However, a consent to search is only valid when it is freely and voluntarily given by a person who possesses common authority or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. The State bears the burden of proving that the consent has been freely and voluntarily given. Brite, 2017 WL 2982913 at *5. Sergeant Bush testified he did not force, threaten, or coerce the defendant to give him permission to search, and she willingly signed a written consent to search form. The trial court was able to observe the interactions between the defendant and Sergeant Bush on the bodycam footage and concluded her consent was voluntarily and freely given.

Considering the great deference owed to the trial court's factual findings based on the weight of the testimony and credibility of witnesses, and the totality of the circumstances presented herein, we find no error in the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling and affirm the defendant's convictions.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO AND PATENT ERROR

In her second assignment of error, the defendant argues she was sentenced on two counts of possession of clonazepam despite only being charged with one count. She further argues the record is defective insomuch as it does not contain a uniform commitment order.

The record reveals the defendant was charged with one count of possession of heroin, one count of possession of methamphetamine, one count of possession of fentanyl, and one count of possession of a clonazepam. After the defendant pled guilty as charged, the trial court sentenced her as follows:

Possession of heroin, possession of fentanyl, possession, I believe it's two counts of [possession of clonazepam], four years with the Department of Corrections at hard labor. Suspended. Three years [of] probation. Possession of Schedule II, Methamphetamine, two years with the Department of Corrections at hard labor. Three years [of] probation. All of those sentences run concurrent with each other. Special condition of her probation. She resides in North Carolina. The fine is $500 in costs. She must take a substance abuse drug or counseling course, drug classes or counseling course at the direction of her probation officer. Subject to random drug screens while she is on probation.

As the defendant correctly points out, the trial court imposed sentences for two counts of possession of clonazepam. The defendant was charged with and pled guilty to only one count of possession of clonazepam. Thus, we vacate the sentence imposed on the count of possession of clonazepam for which she was not charged.

In addition, pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found a sentencing error in this case in connection with the sentence imposed for possession of methamphetamine (Count Two). Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(C)(1) provides a sentencing range of not more than two years with or without hard labor and not more than a five thousand dollar fine. The defendant was sentenced to two years at hard labor with three years of probation. There is no mention in the sentencing transcript that the defendant's sentence on Count Two was suspended either in whole or in part.³ In essence, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the maximum term of imprisonment and an additional three years of probation. Therefore, we vacate the sentence imposed on Count Two and remand for resentencing on that count in accordance with La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1).

Finally, the defendant correctly notes the record does not contain a Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 892(B) requires the clerk of court to prepare a copy of the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order in the format authorized by the Louisiana Supreme Court. However, failure to prepare a commitment order shall not affect the validity of a prosecution, conviction, or sentence. La. Code Crim. P. art. 892(D). Accordingly, we instruct the trial court to direct the clerk of court to prepare a Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences on Counts One, Three, and Four. We vacate the sentence imposed on the count of possession of clonazepam for which the defendant was not charged. We also vacate the sentence on Count Two and remand for resentencing. We further instruct the trial court to prepare a Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order with the necessary information following resentencing.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES ON COUNTS ONE, THREE AND FOUR AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AS TO ONE COUNT OF POSSESSION OF A SCHEDULE IV CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCE AND AS TO COUNT TWO VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Effective October 1, 2024, La. R.S. 40:969(C) was amended and renumbered; La. R.S. 40:969(C)(2) is now 40:969(C)(1)(b). The language of this subsection remains the same.

2.   Detective Williams was wearing a body camera during the investigation.

3.   The court minutes, however, indicate the trial court suspended the defendant's two-year sentence. When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

PENZATO, J.