GOAL PROPERTIES INC v. PRESTRIDGE (2025)

Defendants, Janet Craig Prestridge, Joan Craig Sonnier, and James Robert Craig, appeal the judgment of the trial court granting Plaintiff, Goal Properties, Inc., ownership of a tract of land located in Rapides Parish, Louisiana. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This dispute involves a tract of land in the Northeast 1/4 section of Section 7, Township 2 North, Range 2 East, in Rapides Parish, Louisiana. In 1963 brothers, Gus and James Craig, purchased a tract of land in Rapides Parish from Salina and Mayo Wiley, Jr. In 1971, James Craig bought Gus Craig's interest in the property. In conjunction with this sale, the Craig brothers had the property surveyed by Barrett Gremillion. The act of sale contained a property description involving 133.97 acres and the survey's property description was made a part of the sale. The act of sale also purported to include “any other property owned in the section not particularly described in the survey[.]” Defendants, who are the children of James Craig, contend this “other” property is approximately 100 acres and was obtained by Defendants by virtue of an Act of Donation from their father when he donated all of his undivided interest in and to the property located in Sections 6 and 7, Township 2 North, Range 2 East.

Plaintiff acquired ownership of property in Section 7, Township 2 North, Range 2 East in 2007 from Eddy Carpenter. Plaintiff's property lies between Hogg Lake and the Red River. In conjunction with this purchase, Plaintiff had the property surveyed by Frank Willis. Defendants own land to Plaintiff's east and south. The southeastern boundary of Plaintiff's property contained an old wire fence (old fence line). Defendants began building a new fence twenty to thirty feet inside the old fence line on property that Plaintiff asserts it had been maintaining, thinking that the old fence line was the boundary line. Initially, the disputed area was just between the two fence lines, however it eventually included the entire Northeast 1/4 section. All of the disputed land is located in the Northeast 1/4 section and outside of the land that was surveyed by Gremillion. A large portion of this property is swampland or a lake.

Plaintiff filed an action claiming a possessory interest in the land forming the eastern boundary line of Plaintiff's property adjoining the western property line of Defendants, asserting possession up to the boundary established by the old fence for more than one year. Defendants filed an answer and reconventional demand and subsequently a first supplemental and amending reconventional demand wherein they alleged ownership in the property and prayed that judgment be rendered recognizing their ownership.

At the trial, Plaintiff asserted that it had filed a possessory action, and that Defendants had responded in their reconventional demands that they had ownership and thus converted the matter into a petitory action.¹ Following trial, the court held Defendants were asking to be declared owners of the property through possession as opposed to title. The trial court rendered judgment for Defendants, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish possession. Plaintiff appealed to this court, which reversed the trial court and held that Defendants had converted the possessory action to a petitory action, and that Defendants had confessed possession with Plaintiff. Goal Props., Inc. v. Prestridge, 15-225 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/15), 177 So.3d 126. The matter was remanded to the trial court for trial as a petitory action with Defendants having the burden of proving their ownership claims.

The trial of this matter after remand took place on July 21, 2022, August 11 and 12, 2022, and September 28, 29, and 30, 2022. Following the completion of the trial, the court ruled that Defendants did not meet their burden of proving an unbroken chain of title or acquisitive possession in excess of 30 years to any property in the Northeast 1/4 section that lies to the north of the Gremillion line ² or that lies to the west of the old fence line. Plaintiff was granted possession of all of the immovable property in the Northeast 1/4 section that lies either to the north of the Gremillion line or to the north or west of the old fence line pursuant to the confession of possession of Defendants.

Based on the trial court's ruling, Defendants assert the following assignment of errors:

1. The trial court erred by denying [Defendants’] peremptory exception of prescription of the original possessory action filed by [Plaintiff] since it was filed more than one year after the initial date of disturbance in fact.

2. The trial court's judgment was erroneous since Louisiana law has revised La.Code Civ.P. art 3657 and the 2023 revisions apply retroactively to this case.

3. The trial court's judgment denying the petitory action was erroneous since Louisiana law has now changed and the burden of proof was improperly placed upon the Craig heirs due to the revision of La.Code Civ.P. art 3657.

4. The trial court erred in limiting [Defendants] to only two ways to prove their petitory action when there is a common ancestor in title.

5. The trial court erred in its analysis of historical acts of possession above the Gremillion survey line due to the terrain involved.

OPINION

Defendants’ Exception of Prescription.

Following remand from this court with instruction that this matter was to be tried as a petitory action, Defendants filed for the first time an exception of prescription, asserting that Plaintiff failed to file its possessory action within the required one year of the disturbance of its possession.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3658,³ at the time this matter was tried, provided:

To maintain the possessory action the possessor must allege and prove that:

(1) He had possession of the immovable property or real right therein at the time the disturbance occurred;

(2) He and his ancestors in title had such possession quietly and without interruption for more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance, unless evicted by force or fraud;

(3) The disturbance was one in fact or in law, as defined in Article 3659; and

(4) The possessory action was instituted within a year of the disturbance.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff was aware of the disturbance by Defendants within a week or two of purchasing the property in December 2007, when Plaintiff first noticed the new fence posts being put up by Defendants. Plaintiff subsequently saw the barbed wire along the fence line and approximately a year later saw fresh white paint on some trees inside the lake property denoting a property line. These disturbances took place in 2007, and the possessory action was not filed by Plaintiff until May 29, 2009. Following a hearing, the trial court rejected Defendants’ prescription exception.⁴

This court, in our October 7, 2015 opinion, provided an analysis of the difference between “possession” and “ownership,” stating:

The Louisiana Civil Code distinguishes “possession” from “ownership.” “Possession is the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal thing, movable or immovable, that one holds or exercises for himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name.” La.Civ.Code art. 3421. “A possessor is considered provisionally as owner of the thing he possesses until the right of the true owner is established.” La.Civ.Code art. 3423. “[O]ne who has possessed a thing for over a year acquires the right to possess it.” La.Civ.Code art. 3422.

“Ownership is the right that confers on a person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The owner of a thing may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under the conditions established by law.” La.Civ.Code art. 477. “Ownership exists independently of any exercise of it and may not be lost by nonuse. Ownership is lost when acquisitive prescription accrues in favor of an adverse possessor.” La.Civ.Code art. 481. Possession is lost, by contrast, by abandonment or eviction through force or usurpation. La.Civ.Code art. 3433.

The rights of ownership or possession against another claimant are asserted by the petitory or possessory actions, as set forth in Book VII, Title II, of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. The petitory action is defined by La.Code Civ.P. art. 3651 as, “one brought by a person who claims the ownership, but who is not in possession, of immovable property or of a real right therein, against another who is in possession or who claims the ownership thereof adversely, to obtain judgment recognizing the plaintiff's ownership.” The possessory action is defined in La.Code Civ.P. art. 3655 as, “one brought by the possessor of immovable property or of a real right therein to be maintained in his possession of the property or enjoyment of the right when he has been disturbed, or to be restored to the possession or enjoyment thereof when he has been evicted.”

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3657 provides that petitory and possessory actions may not be cumulated or pled in the alternative. It further provides, “When, except as provided in [La.Code Civ.P. art.] 3661(1)–(3), the defendant in a possessory action asserts title in himself, in the alternative or otherwise, he thereby converts the suit into a petitory action, and judicially confesses the possession of the plaintiff in the possessory action.” The exceptions recognized in La.Code Civ.P. art. 3661(1)–(3) recognize a party's right to introduce evidence of ownership only to prove his possession as owner, the extent of his possession, or the length of time he and his ancestors in title have had possession of the property.

Goal Props., 177 So.3d at 128–29.

In instructing the trial court in how this matter should proceed upon remand, this court stated:

Here, Appellees not only alleged ownership in their “Answer and Reconventional Demand,” and supplemental pleading, they also prayed that judgment be rendered recognizing their ownership. The matter was unequivocally converted from a possessory action to a petitory action. The trial court erred as a matter of law in allowing the matter to proceed as a possessory action and in placing the burden of proof on Goal. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion, specifically, that the matter be tried as a petitory action with Appellees as the plaintiffs therein.

Id. at 129–30.

It is Defendants’ position that with the remand of this case back to the trial court, they are entitled to assert for the first time that Plaintiff's possession claim was prescribed even though this court has ruled that Defendants confessed the possession of Plaintiff and that this matter was to be tried solely as a petitory action.

In support of their position, Defendants cite the case of O'Rourke v. Cormier, 459 So.2d 200 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1984), in which the plaintiff's filed suit against the defendants to obtain specific performance on the right to purchase a tract of land. Although the defendants filed a general denial, they subsequently filed an amended and supplemental petition in which they asserted affirmative defenses to the claims of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court. Among the reasons given by the trial court for the grant of the summary judgment was that the defenses asserted by the defendants were prescribed. On appeal, this court held that since no party had pled prescription, it was improper to grant summary judgment on that basis. This court also held that plaintiffs were not precluded from filing prescriptive or other preemptory exceptions on remand.

In contrast to Defendants’ assertions, we find that O'Rourke is inapposite to the present matter. In O'Rourke, the judgment was overturned, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. In essence, the case was remanded to its original pre-judgment posture where the issues presented in that suit were ripe for decision. In the case sub judice, there was a judgment by this court holding that possession was granted in favor of Plaintiff and the matter was remanded to be tried as a petitory action. The issue of possession was decided and no longer at issue other than as incident to acquisitive prescription in the petitory action.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2163 provides:

A. The appellate court may consider a peremptory exception filed for the first time in that court if the exception is pleaded prior to a submission of the case for a decision and if proof of the ground of the exception appears of record.

B. If the ground for the peremptory exception pleaded in the appellate court is prescription or peremption, the plaintiff may demand that the case be remanded to the trial court for trial of the exception.

In Merchants Adjustment Bureau v. Malta, 102 So.2d 781, 783–84 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1958), the court explained when an exception of prescription must be filed:

Finally for consideration is defendant's plea of prescription under LSA-C.C. Art. 3538 which provides that actions of physicians, surgeons and hypothecaries for visits, operations and medicines, as well as on other open accounts, are prescribed by three years. This appeal was duly docketed for hearing March 31, 1958, briefed, argued orally, and submitted to the court for decision on that date. However, no formal plea of prescription was filed until April 7, 1958. A plea of prescription is a peremptory exception, (C.P. Art. 345) and may be pleaded at every stage of the action previous to definitive judgment, but must be pleaded specifically and in sufficient time to allow the adverse part[y] to produce its evidence (C.P. Art. 346), and may be pleaded on appeal. LSA-C.C. Art. 3464—C.P. Art. 902. However, the jurisprudence is well settled that a plea of prescription may not be filed after the case has been submitted for decision.

In O'Hara v. City of New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 152, it was held that on the submission of the case to the court for decision the case passed from the control of the parties and their attorneys, and no additional plea could thereafter be regularly filed in the case; that no peremptory exception so filed in that court would be given consideration—that it was too late to file such an exception after the case had been submitted. A provision of C.P. Art. 902 authorizes the party to whom the plea of prescription in the Supreme Court is opposed to request that the cause be remanded for trial upon that plea. In giving consideration to this provision and other provisions of C.P. Art. 346, the court stated:

‘The letter of these articles indicates that, in the appellate as well as in the lower court, such a plea should be filed on the trial, at any stage of the trial, and before submitting the cause to the court. Otherwise, how construe that part of the article 346 which provides ‘that the peremptory exception shall be pleaded in time to allow the adverse party to bring his evidence’, etc.—and that part of article 902 which gives to that party the privilege of having the cause remanded?

‘The plea of prescription urged by defendant was not filed at any stage of the trial, but after the trial and can not be considered.’

The Supreme Court held in State ex rel. Hundley v. City of Alexandria, 164 La. 624, 114 So. 491, that the filing of certain pleas as a defense, after submission of the case to that Court, came too late.

In In re Succession of Hebert, 13-954, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1101, 1104, this court addressed when an exception of prescription may be filed by explaining:

Ms. Coleman argues that Mr. Hebert improperly brought an exception for prescription for the first time on appeal since Mr. Hebert filed his exception after the briefs were filed. We disagree. The peremptory exception of prescription may be heard for the first time on the appellate level “if pleaded prior to a submission of the case for a decision, and if proof of the ground of the exception appears of record.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 2163. Here, there was ample evidence in the record to indicate that Ms. Coleman did not file her filiation action timely. Furthermore, a case is not submitted for decision on the appellate level until after it has been argued by briefs and oral arguments if requested. See Smith v. Jones, 8 So.2d 718 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1942). Here, while Mr. Hebert filed his exception after the briefs, it was still submitted prior to oral arguments. As such, it was timely filed and may be considered for the first time by this court.

In contrast to Hebert, here the prescription exception was made not only after submission of the case for a decision, but after this court had rendered a judgment that possession was confessed by Defendants in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants did not appeal this judgment, and it is now final.⁵ At no stage prior to the submission of this matter to this court did Defendants urge prescription, and therefore it is too late for them to do so on remand. This assignment of error is without merit.

Whether the 2023 amendment to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3657 rendered the trial court's Judgment erroneous.

Defendants contend that the trial court's judgment was erroneous since the 2023 amendment to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3657 ⁶ applies retroactively to this case and alters the burden of proof in a petitory action by removing the judicial confession of possession. This amendment took place after the trial on remand, but while the court had the matter under advisement.

The trial of this matter after remand took place on July 21, 2022, August 11 and 12, 2022, and September 28, 29, and 30, 2022. Written reasons for judgment were issued by the trial court on May 22, 2024, and the judgment was signed on June 25, 2024.

The version of La.Code Civ.P. art. 3657, prior to the 2023 amendment, provided:

The plaintiff may not cumulate the petitory and the possessory actions in the same suit or plead them in the alternative, and when he does so he waives the possessory action. If the plaintiff brings the possessory action, and without dismissing it and prior to judgment therein institutes the petitory action, the possessory action is abated.

When, except as provided in Article 3661(1)-(3), the defendant in a possessory action asserts title in himself, in the alternative or otherwise, he thereby converts the suit into a petitory action, and judicially confesses the possession of the plaintiff in the possessory action.

If, before executory judgment in a possessory action, the defendant therein institutes a petitory action in a separate suit against the plaintiff in the possessory action, the plaintiff in the petitory action judicially confesses the possession of the defendant therein.

Following the amendment to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3657, which became effective August 1, 2023, the article now provides:

A. The plaintiff shall not cumulate the possessory action with either the petitory action or a declaratory judgment action to determine ownership. If the plaintiff does so, the possessory action does not abate, but the defendant may object to the cumulation by asserting a dilatory exception. If, before executory judgment in the possessory action, the plaintiff institutes the petitory action or a declaratory judgment action in a separate suit, the possessory action abates.

B. When the defendant in a possessory action asserts title in himself, in the alternative or otherwise, the defendant does not thereby convert the possessory action into a petitory action or judicially confess the possession of the plaintiff in the possessory action, but the defendant's assertions of title shall be considered in defense of the possessory action only for the purposes stated in Article 3661(B).

C. Unless the plaintiff in the possessory action seeks an adjudication of his ownership, the defendant shall not file a reconventional demand asserting a petitory action or declaratory judgment action to determine ownership. If, before executory judgment in a possessory action, the defendant therein institutes a petitory action or a declaratory judgment action to determine ownership in a separate suit he files against the plaintiff in the possessory action, the defendant in the possessory action judicially confesses the possession of the plaintiff in the possessory action.

The 2023 comments for La.Code Civ.P. art. 3657, provide in pertinent part:

(d) Prior to the 2023 revision, the consequences for a defendant who asserted title in himself in response to a possessory action were grave. Not only did his assertions of title convert the possessory action into a petitory action in which he became the plaintiff, but they also constituted a judicial confession of the other party's possession, thus triggering the onerous burden under Article 3653 of proving title good against the world. This harsh penalty has been removed. The defendant's assertions of title in a possessory action no longer convert the action into a petitory action or constitute a judicial confession of the plaintiff's possession; however, the defendant's assertions of title are considered in defense of the possessory action only for the limited purposes specified in Article 3661(B)(1) through (3). Thus, the defendant cannot divert the focus of a possessory action from the issue of possession to the often more complicated issue of ownership through the simple expedient of injecting issues of ownership in his pleadings.

Defendants’ argument that the 2023 amendment should be applied retroactively ignores the fact that this court ruled on October 7, 2015, that, “[t]he matter was unequivocally converted from a possessory action to a petitory action.” Goal Properties, 177 So.3d at 129. As such, the law of the case doctrine applies to this court's ruling that this matter was converted to a petitory action and that the burden of proof lay with the Defendants. In explaining the law of the case doctrine, this court in XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 16-269, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/28/16), 206 So.3d 885, 888, writ denied, 16-2181 (La. 3/24/17), 216 So.3d 814, stated:

The law of the case doctrine embodies the principles of the binding force of trial court rulings during later stages of the proceedings, the conclusive effects of appellate rulings in the trial court on remand, and that an appellate court generally does not revisit its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case. Kaleel v. Div. Transp., 00-803 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/23/00), 769 So.2d 110, writ denied, 00-2976 (La. 12/15/00), 777 So.2d 1232. “ ‘The reasons for this doctrine are: (1) avoidance of indefinite litigations; (2) consistency of results in same litigation; (3) essential fairness between the parties; and, (4) judicial efficiency.’ ” Id. at 111 (quoting Schultz v. Doyle, 98-1113, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/99), 727 So.2d 691, 693–94, writ denied, 99-994 (La. 5/28/99), 743 So.2d 670). ‘ “[T]he doctrine applies with equal force to writ decisions as it does to judgments rendered at the conclusion of the appellate process.’ ” Id. An appellate court may exercise discretion in application of the doctrine and choose not to apply it in cases where the former appellate decision was clearly erroneous or if a manifest injustice would occur. Id.

In Holmes v. City of New Orleans, 24-269, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/26/24), 399 So.3d 827, 829-30, the court stated:

Law of the case refers to a discretionary, jurisprudential doctrine under which courts—both trial and appellate—ordinarily will not reconsider their prior rulings in the same case. See KeyClick Outsourcing, Inc. v. Ochsner Health Plan, Inc., 11-0598, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/14/12), 89 So.3d 1207, 1211. A more complete definition of law of the case is that it refers to “(a) the binding force of trial court rulings during later stages of the trial, (b) the conclusive effects of appellate rulings at the trial on remand, and (c) the rule that an appellate court will ordinarily not reconsider its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case.” Petition of Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 278 So.2d 81, 83 (La. 1973).

Law of the case is the proper procedural principle—as opposed to res judicata—for describing the relationship between prior judgments by trial and appellate courts rendered within the same case. Posey v. Smith, 453 So.2d 1016, 1018 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984). Simply stated, law of the case “bars reconsideration of issues [between the same parties] in the same case”; whereas, “res judicata bars the relitigation of the same issues between the same parties in a second, subsequent case.” Erica P. Sensenbrenner, Comment, A Proposal to Codify Louisiana's Law of the Case Doctrine, 64 LOY. L. REV. 215, 222-23 (2018). Moreover, law of the case is jurisprudential; res judicata is statutory. See Daigre v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp., 10-1379, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/5/11), 67 So.3d 504, 513-14.

Additionally, the ruling of this court declaring that Defendants confessed possession of the disputed property in favor of Plaintiff granted Plaintiff a vested right to possession of the property. In Segura v. Frank, 93-1271, 93-1401, pp. 8-9 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 720–21, (footnotes omitted), the court explained:

In determining whether laws may be applied retroactively, we are guided by La.C.C. art. 6, which provides:

In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretive laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.

This court recently explained the application of La.C.C. art. 6 in Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1063 (La. 1992):

LSA–C.C. Art. 6 requires that we engage in a twofold inquiry. First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application. If the legislature did so, our inquiry is at an end. If the legislature did not, we must classify the enactment as substantive, procedural or interpretive.

Additionally, this court has observed that the principle contained in La.C.C. art. 6 has constitutional implications under the due process and contract clauses of both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So.2d 809, 816 n. 11 (La. 1992); Board of Comm'rs v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281, 291 (La. 1986); Cahn v. Cahn, 468 So.2d 1176, 1181 (La. 1985); Graham v. Sequoya Corp., 478 So.2d 1223, 1226 (La. 1985); Terrebonne v. South Lafourche Tidal Control Levee Dist., 445 So.2d 1221, 1224 (La. 1984); Block v. Reliance Ins. Co., 433 So.2d 1040, 1044 (La. 1983); Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521, 523 (La. 1979); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So.2d 1381, 1387 (La. 1978). Thus, even where the legislature has expressed its intent to give a substantive law retroactive effect, the law may not be applied retroactively if it would impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights. Id.

Based on the law of the case doctrine and Plaintiff's vested right of possession, Defendants’ assertion that the amendment to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3657 should be applied retroactively, is without merit.

The trial court's judgment denying the petitory action was erroneous since Louisiana law has now changed and the burden of proof was improperly placed upon the Craig heirs due to the legislative amendment of La. Code Civ.P. art. 3657.

The October 7, 2015, judgment of this court instructed the trial court on remand to try the case as a petitory action with Defendants assuming the role of a plaintiff and having the burden to prove their title. Defendants again argue that the amendment of La.Code Civ.P art. 3657 did away with the harsh penalty of having to prove good title in a possessory action. Although true, as noted above, the law of the case doctrine is applicable herein and this matter was properly tried as a petitory case. Therefore, this argument is without merit.

The trial court erred in limiting the Defendants to only two ways to prove their petitory action.

It is Defendants’ position that the trial court restricted them to only two ways to establish valid title to the property in dispute and disregarded their poof of having a more ancient title from a common ancestor. In its written reasons for ruling, the trial court stated:

In an effort to reach a just and equitable decision grounded in the principles of law, this Court has evaluated and re-evaluated, considered and re-considered every word of the witnesses’ testimonies, every deposition, every survey, every diagram, every map, every image and every other exhibit properly admitted into evidence. After such a thorough in depth and broad assessment, the Court didacts that the cusp of the evidence presented permits the Plaintiffs to meet their burden in either one of two fashions, which presents the court with two narrowly drawn issues;

1. Did the Plaintiff (The Craigs) meet their burden of proof as to whether the land in their unbroken chain of title encompasses the 164 acres (formerly 200 acres prior to the traversal of the Red River) more specifically described as northeast corner section of Fractional 7? Or,

2. Have the Craigs met their burden of proof by showing that they obtained the disputed property through acquisitive prescription by displaying inch by inch possession or possession within enclosures, considering that the possession must be continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public and unequivocal La CC Art 3476.

Regarding the first issue, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their Burden of Proof, reasoning that the Plaintiffs were unable to overcome the discrepancies in Title created by the act of sale of the disputed, subject property to E. Schmalinski, supported by the R.W. Bringhurst Map (Exhibit G5).

In Pure Oil v. Skinner, 294 So.2d 797, 798-99 (La. 1974), the supreme court explained the burden of proof for a plaintiff when the other party is the possessor of the property in question, by stating:

The Court of Appeal in the instant cases held that respondents, the parties claiming title or ownership of the disputed land against adverse claimants in possession without a deed translative of title, did not have to prove a title good against the world but only had to prove better title than relators.

The issues in the instant cases were first presented for consideration in 1961 when The Pure Oil Company, which had oil, gas and mineral leases covering the disputed property from both claimants, instituted a concursus proceeding by depositing royalties attributable to the property in controversy in the registry of the court and citing both relators and respondents to assert their respective interests. Subsequent to the institution of the concursus proceedings, respondents instituted a boundary action against the relators and, by stipulation, the parties agreed that judgment rendered in the concursus proceedings would be determinative of the issues in the boundary action.

The one and one-half acres tract of land, the ownership of which is the subject of the controversy, is claimed under two chains of title. It was established in the lower courts to their satisfaction, and to ours, that neither respondents nor relators have valid record title to the property in dispute.

Code of Civil Procedure Article 3654 provides:

‘When the issue of ownership of immovable property or of a real right is presented in an action for a declaratory judgment, or in a concursus, expropriation, or similar proceeding, or the issue of the ownership of funds deposited in the registry of the court and which belong to the owner of the immovable property or of the real right is so presented, the court shall render judgment in favor of the party:

(1) Who would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real right in a possessory action, unless the adverse party makes out his title thereto; or

(2) Who proves better title to the immovable property or real right, when neither party would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real right in a possessory action.’

The record in this case establishes, and it is undisputed, that the relators have possessed the property in question since 1947. Therefore, it is clear that the burden of proof placed on respondents is greater than that provided in Code of Civil Procedure Article 3654(2), the burden of proving a better title. The statutory imposition of a higher burden of proof than simply proving better title when an adverse claimant is in possession of disputed land leads to the inevitable conclusion that respondent's burden was to ‘make out his title thereto.’ In other words, respondents were required to prove valid record title, to show title good against the world without regard to the title of the party in possession. C.C.P. Arts. 3653, 3654. See 2 A. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, s 137 (1967); 35 Tul.L.Rev. 541, at 547 (1961).

At the time of the trial of this petitory matter, La.Civ.Code art. 531, provided:

One who claims the ownership of an immovable against another in possession must prove that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription. If neither party is in possession, he need only prove a better title.

As asserted by Defendants, effective August 1, 2023, La.Civ.Code art. 531, was amended ⁷ to read:

One claiming the ownership of an immovable against another who has been in possession of the immovable for one year after having commenced possession in good faith and with just title or who has been in possession of the immovable for ten years shall prove that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription. In all other cases, he need only prove a better title.

The revision comments 2023 for this article provides:

(a) The 2023 revision of this Article changes substantially the burden of proof imposed upon a person claiming the ownership of an immovable against another who is in possession. Prior to the revision, this Article provided that in such cases, the claimant's burden of proof was to prove that he had acquired ownership from a prior owner or by acquisitive prescription. This burden of proof, which has often been characterized as the requirement of proving “title good against the world,” applied even when the defendant was a usurper who had no title at all. See Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974). Application of that rule could lead to obvious inequities by allowing a usurper who was in possession for only one year to prevail against a party who might have been in possession for many years previously under a title that suffered from only minor defects. See Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797, 799 (La. 1974) (Summers, J., dissenting).

(b) The 2023 revision narrows the circumstances in which the person claiming ownership must prove that he acquired ownership from a prior owner or by acquisitive prescription. As revised, the Article provides that this onerous burden of proof applies only when the defendant has been in possession for one year after having commenced possession in good faith and with just title or when the defendant has been in possession for ten years, regardless of whether in good faith or with just title. Where neither of these circumstances applies, the burden imposed upon the claimant is merely to prove a better title than that of the defendant.

Additionally, La.Code Civ.P. art. 3653 ⁸ following its 2023 amendment now provides:

A. To obtain a judgment recognizing his ownership of immovable property or real right therein, the plaintiff in a petitory action shall:

(1) Prove that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription, if the court finds that the defendant has been in possession for one year after having commenced possession in good faith and with just title or that the defendant has been in possession for ten years.

(2) Prove a better title thereto than the defendant in all other cases.

B. When the titles of the parties are traced to a common author, the common author is presumed to be the previous owner.

We are not required to determine whether the amendments to La.Civ.Code art. 531 or those to La.Code Civ.P art. 3653 are to be applied retroactively, as contrary to Defendants’ contentions, we find the trial court did permit Defendants to attempt to prove there was a common author in title.

In Baker v. Romero, 10-1125, pp. 8–11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/11), 55 So.3d 1035, 1040–42, this court stated:

Baker next contends that the trial court erred in applying the Pure Oil standard and requiring that she prove title good against the world. She argues that the trial court should have instead applied the La.Code Civ.P. art. 3657 standard and simply required that she prove title better than that of the Romeros, as was done in Badeaux, 382 So.2d 954, a supreme court decision rendered after Pure Oil. The Romeros insist that the trial court properly and appropriately applied the Pure Oil standard and that Badeaux is not applicable to this matter. In support of their argument, they rely on Aymond v. Smith, 476 So.2d 1081, 1084 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1985), wherein this court held that:

When the defendant in the petitory action ․ is in possession, the plaintiff in the petitory action ․ must rely on the strength of his own title and not the weakness of that of his adversary, and the title of the defendant in the petitory action is not at issue until the plaintiff has proved valid title in himself.

․

In dismissing Baker's petitory action and granting the Romeros’ possessory action on the basis that they established their right to possess the Property, the trial court, referring to the burden established in Pure Oil, noted the Latin phrase “Dura Lex, Sed Lex” which means “the law is harsh, but it is the law.” Nevertheless, the trial court recognized that although it had been heavily criticized, Pure Oil remained the law of this state and it was “duty-bound to apply it.” Citing Aymond, the trial court reasoned that “[a] tax sale bespeaks prior private ownership, thus the evidentiary destination to a sovereign grant, the originating transfer upon which all title to the tract is founded, has not been reached.” The trial court went on to state:

Ownership back to a common ancestor in title, another route to prove ownership, does not apply here as Defendants claimed only possession of the subject tract, thus no possibility of a common author. The remaining alternative to prove ownership, acquisitive prescription, was neither pleaded nor argued and the court is prohibited from doing so sua sponte. La.Civ.Code art. 3452.

In Exxon Corp. v. Garber, 99-0317, pp. 2–3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 747 So.2d 639, 641, this court stated:

The record in this case establishes, and the Bernard Heirs do not dispute, that the Garber Heirs have possessed the property in question since 1928. Therefore, it is clear that the burden of proof placed on the Bernard Heirs is greater than that provided in La.Code Civ.P. art. 3654(2). Instead the Bernard Heirs are required to prove valid record title, that is, to show title good against the world without regard to the title of the party in possession. Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So.2d 797 (La.1974).

The Bernard Heirs assert that La.Civ.Code art. 532 and La.Code Civ.P. art. 3653 establish a presumption that a common ancestor in title is a previous owner. This is a proper statement of the law. In Pure Oil there was no common author involved. In Weaver v. Hailey, 416 So.2d 311 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1982), this court discussed whether the legislative amendment of La.Civ.Code art. 532 and La.Code Civ.P. art. 3653 was intended to overrule Pure Oil. We held that Pure Oil was still the law. Weaver, 416 So.2d 311. However, we reiterated that the seminal holding in Pure Oil was that the word “title” meant “ownership.” Id. Thus, when the legislature amended these and related articles to require proof of acquisition from a “previous owner,” it was merely a reflection of the holding in Pure Oil. Likewise, in adopting the presumption that a common author is a “previous owner,” the legislature was codifying the conclusion reached by this court. In Clayton v. Langston, 311 So.2d 74 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1975), we concluded that proof of title to a common author was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Pure Oil.

Accordingly, if the Bernard Heirs establish that they and the Garbers have a common author in title they will have carried their burden of proof under La.Code Civ.P. art. 3654(1).

Defendants in this matter contend the trial court required them to establish valid title or thirty-year acquisitive prescription and disregarded the more ancient title from a common ancestor which was available to Defendants and, as such, committed legal error which warrants a de novo review by this court. However, the trial court permitted Defendants to present documentation of record title. In fact, during a discussion between the attorneys and the trial judge, counsel for Defendants stated: “We have submitted the chain of title.” Despite Defendants’ assertion, they were indeed permitted to present evidence to establish a common ancestor in title but were simply unable to do so. The trial court held that Defendants “were unable to overcome the discrepancies in Title created by the act of sale of the disputed, subject property to E. Schmalinski, supported by the R.W. Bringhurst Map (Exhibit G5).”

The trial court determined that with the sale of the Northeast 1/4 Section to E. Schmalinski, there was no common ancestor in title, and in fact as it was in the Pure Oil case, neither party had valid title to the disputed Northeast 1/4 Section of property. The title history of the property reveals that Levi Wilson received a land patent from the Louisiana Land Office in February 1855, for the Northeast 1/4 of Fractional Section 7, Township 2 North, Range 2 East in Rapides Parish consisting of 164.6 acres (the disputed property). With the death of Levi Wilson, his son, George Wilson, inherited this property. The property was sold in 1876 by George Wilson to Elise Schmalinski. The property description for this sale was identical to that found in the 1855 patent received by Levi Wilson, being, “1269 NE 1/4 of fract Sect 7 T2N R2E 164.6”.⁹

On April 9, 1873, George Wilson sold a separate 200-acre tract to William Hogg (“Hogg Place”).¹⁰ In 1885, William Hogg sold Hogg Place to E.D. Ryland, who sold the land in 1887 to Moab Ryland. The map by R.W. Bringhurst, the parish surveyor, showed Moab Ryland as the owner of the 200-acre Hogg Place and Elise Schmalinski as the owner of the 164.6-acre Northeast 1/4 section.

Regarding the “Hogg Place” property owned by Moab Ryland, Defendants’ alleged common ancestor, Moab Ryland sold 100 acres of this property to A.B. Ryland in 1900. In 1902, Moab Ryland sold his half interest in the remaining 100 acres to A.B. Ryland.¹¹ In 1921, thirty acres of the A.B. Ryland tract fell into the river, leaving seventy acres. In 1937, the heirs of A.B. Ryland sold the seventy acres to LeRoy and Evalina Stafford, who eventually sold the property to Gus and James Craig. In 1971, James Craig bought Gus Craig's interest in the property utilizing the Gremillion survey as an attached property description. This property was inherited by Defendants, who are the children of James Craig.

The Northeast 1/4 section tract (the disputed land) never appears in Defendants’ nor Plaintiff's chain of title and, therefore, there can be no common ancestor for the parties regarding this tract of land.

The judgment of the trial court stated:

IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the property lines referenced herein be defined as follows:

NORTHEAST 1/4 SECTION. The “NORTHEAST 1/4 SECTION,” as used herein, shall refer to the Northeast Quarter of Fractional Section 7, Tract 2 North, Range 2 East, Rapides Parish, Louisiana.

GREMILLION LINE. The “GREMILLION LINE” is defined as that line, running east/west, that constitutes the northern boundary of the 133.97 acre tract surveyed by Barrett Gremillion in 1971 as shown on the survey by Frank Willis (“Willis Survey”) introduced into evidence as Exhibit G-27, attached hereto as Exhibit “A” and is shown highlighted on the excerpt of the Willis Survey attached hereto as Exhibit “B.”

OLD FENCE LINE. This curved line runs generally Southwest from a point on the GREMILLION LINE toward the Red River and is marked by an old fence, labeled “OLD FENCE” on the Willis Survey introduced into evidence as Exhibit G-27, an excerpt of which, with the OLD FENCE LINE highlighted with bold marking, is attached hereto as Exhibit “C.” This line shall extend from the southernmost end of the old fence to the river such that it intersects the low water mark of the Red River at a right angle thereto.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the petitory action of the plaintiffs-in-reconvention is denied as to all immovable property in the Northeast 1/4 Section lying to the north of the GREMILLION LINE and to all immovable property in the NORTHEAST 1/4 SECTION lying to the north or west of the OLD FENCE LINE. For the purpose of interpreting this provision, this provision shall apply to any property in the Northeast 1/4 Section that lies either to the north of the GREMILLION LINE or to the north or west of the OLD FENCE line.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the possession of GOAL PROPERTIES, INC., of all of the immovable property in the Northeast 1/4 Section that lies to the north of the GREMILLION LINE and all of the immovable property in the Northeast 1/4 Section that lies to the west of the OLD FENCE LINE is hereby recognized and that GOAL PROPERTIES, INC., is entitled to the possession of same pursuant to the confession of possession of the plaintiffs-in-reconvention herein. For the purpose of interpreting this provision, this provision shall apply to any property in the Northeast 1/4 Section that lies either to the north of the GREMILLION LINE or to the north or west of the OLD FENCE line.

In discussing the deference to be given to the finding of fact made by the trial court, this court in Thymes v. Golden Nugget Lake Charles, LLC, 23-100, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/23), 373 So.3d 129, 133, writ denied, 23-1576 (La. 1/24/24), 378 So.3d 69, stated:

When reviewing a verdict in a civil case, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard applies, and the appellate court should not disturb a finding of fact made in the trial court unless it is clearly wrong. The Louisiana Supreme Court fashioned a two-part test when applying this standard: (1) is there a reasonable factual basis for the finding of the trial court; and (2) does a reading of the record establish that the finding is not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La. 1978). In Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989), the court discussed the manifest error-clearly wrong standard in detail, stating:

It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong,” and where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330, 1333 (La.1978); Canter v. Koehring, 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1973)․ [I]f the trial court or jury findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Arceneaux, supra at 1333, Watson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967 (La. 1985).

When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Canter, supra at 724.

Here the trial court was presented with conflicting testimony and evidence regarding whether Hogg Place and the Northeast 1/4 section were two separate pieces of property with two separate chains of title. There was ample evidence to support the trial court's determination that the Hogg Place and the Northeast 1/4 section were separate tracts of land. This supporting evidence included the map by the parish surveyor, R.W. Bringhurst, which showed Moab Ryland as the owner of the 200-acre Hogg Place and Elise Schmalinski as the owner of the 164.6-acre Northeast 1/4 section. Charlotte Murchinson, an expert abstractor, testified that the Northeast 1/4 section was never in the Defendants’ chain of title and was a separate tract of land from Hogg Place. She testified that there was no evidence Moab Ryland ever owned more than the 200-acre Hogg Place in Fractional Section 7. As such, we find the trial court did not commit manifest error in holding that the Northeast 1/4 section tract (the disputed land) never appears in either Defendants’ or Plaintiff's chain of title and, therefore, there could not be a common ancestor between the parties. Consequently, Defendants cannot establish record title to the Northeast 1/4 section of land and this assignment of error is without merit.

The trial court erred in its analysis of historical acts of possession above the Gremillion survey line due to the terrain involved.

After finding Defendants were unable to establish valid title to the Northeast 1/4 section, the trial court next addressed whether Defendants met their burden of proving ownership of the disputed property via thirty years of possession. In holding that Defendants failed to meet their burden, the court stated:

Thus, this Court, having determined the ownership claims of the Plaintiffs through written title have failed, must now turn to claims of the Craigs concerning acquisitive prescription of the property in dispute.

Mr. James Robert Craig purchased his brother's interest via deed with a survey by Barnett Gremillion performed in 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the “Gremillion line”) and some general or omnibus language regarding any other property owned in the section not particularly described in the survey.

Without good documentary or written title, i.e. just title, the Craigs are required to prove possession of the disputed property inch by inch possession or possession within enclosures. The possession must be continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public and unequivocal La CC Art 3476.

To compound the complexity presented in this case, the disputed property is in a fractional section (a section containing less than the standard 640 acres in a standard one mile square configuration) and a majority of the property is swampland or a pond.

Proof of possession for the purposes of 30 year acquisitive possession varies according to the type and nature of the property being possessed. Acceptable boundaries establishing possession by those claiming title as result of prescription are related to nature of land involved, and interpretation is not as strict with relation to swamplands as it is with respect to property in agricultural areas. Menefee v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 141 So.2d 58 (App. 2 Cir. 1962)

It is clear from the testimony and photographs introduced at trial, identifying and showing the blaze marks (artificial marks) of the Gremillion survey, possession along the Gremillion line is open, notorious and continuous. Since the Gremillion Line is in a north south direction and there are not other markings on trees dating back to this time, the only reasonable conclusion this Court can reach is Barrett Gremillion was establishing possession by the Craigs along this north south line. Regarding swamplands, blazing of lines has been found to be sufficient to evidence possession against all others See Bagby v. Clause, 251 So.2d 172, (App. 1 Cir. 1971) writ refused 259 La. 773, 252 So.2d 669.

The vestiges of the old fences encased in the center of large trees along the blue line also called the Old Fence Line shown on “Figure 1” in the second post-trial brief filed by Goal Properties. The Court finds the Old Fence Line constitutes evidence sufficient to establish the limits of possession by the Craigs by enclosure, on the western edge of the disputed tract.

The court recognizes that in the initial possessory action, the Honorable Judge George Metoyer (the predecessor to this Court's current Judge) ruled that the Craigs, who were then recognized as defendants in rule, were successful in preventing the then plaintiffs from overcoming their burden of proof. However, in our current action, not only does the burden now rests upon the Craigs, but the threshold or legal requirement for proving possession in a possessory action as opposed to acquisitive prescription is considerably different and creates a significantly higher hurdle for the Craigs to overcome. Furthermore, the Court finds that the acts aimed towards establishing possession performed by the Craig's on the disputed property above the “Gremillion line” were insufficient to meet the more cumbersome requirements of establishing acquisitive prescription.

In Brunson v. Hemler, 43,347, pp. 3-5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 989 So.2d 246, 249-50, writ denied, 08-2297 (La. 12/12/08), 996 So.2d 1119, the court explained the requirements for the establishment of ownership in an immovable by thirty-year prescription, stating:

Ownership of immovable property may be acquired by the prescription of 30 years without the need of just title or possession in good faith. La. C.C. art. 3486. Ownership of immovable property under record title may be eclipsed and superseded by ownership acquired under prescriptive title. Brown v. Wood, 451 So.2d 569 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1984), writ denied, 452 So.2d 1176 (La. 1984). A possessor lacking good faith and/or just title may acquire prescriptive title to land by corporeally possessing a tract for 30 years with the intent to possess as owner. La. C.C. arts. 3424, 3486. Such possession confers prescriptive title upon the possessor only when it is continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public and unequivocal and confers title only to such immovable property as is actually corporeally possessed. See La. C.C. arts. 3424, 3426, 3476, 3486, 3487 and 3488.

For purposes of acquisitive prescription without title, possession extends only to that property which has been actually possessed. La. C.C. art. 3487. Actual possession must be either inch-by-inch possession or possession within enclosures. According to well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence, an enclosure is any natural or artificial boundary. La. C.C. art. 3426, comment (d), Revision Comments-1982, citing A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property §§ 212-214, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed.1980). The party who does not hold title to the disputed tract has the burden of proving actual possession within enclosures sufficient to establish the limits of possession with certainty, by either natural or artificial marks, giving notice to the world of the extent of possession exercised. Conway v. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp., 93-1158 (La.App. 3rd Cir.4/6/94), 635 So.2d 544, writ denied, 94-1198 (La.7/1/94), 639 So.2d 1166; Hill v. Richey, 221 La. 402, 59 So.2d 434(1952).

One is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he began to possess in the name of and for another. La. C.C. art. 3427. The intent to possess as owner may be inferred from all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Livingston v. Unopened Succession of Dixon, 589 So.2d 598 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1991). Openly maintaining property to which one does not have record title by raising crops or using the property for pasturage is evidence of intent to possess as owner. Id.

․

Whether or not disputed property has been possessed for 30 years without interruption is a factual issue and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion or manifest error. Greengrove Missionary Baptist Church v. Cox, 42,418 (La.App. 2d Cir.9/19/07), 966 So.2d 707, writ denied, 07-2064 (La. 12/14/07), 970 So.2d 537; Bowman v. Blankenship, 34,558 (La.App. 2d Cir.4/4/01), 785 So.2d 134, writ denied, 01-1354 (La.6/22/01), 794 So.2d 794. Where findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trier of fact demand great deference and are virtually never manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989).

Thus, in the case sub judice, Plaintiffs would have acquired the disputed property through acquisitive prescription if they established that they and/or their ancestors in title had possessed the disputed property within bounds for 30 years.

In Phillips v. Fisher, 93-928 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/94), 634 So.2d 1305, 1308, writ denied, 94-813 (La. 5/6/94), 637 So.2d 1056, this court stated:

Actual corporeal possession is necessary to commence thirty years acquisitive prescription, and external and public signs are required to keep possession running. Lasseigne v. Clement, 311 So.2d 600 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 313 So.2d 846 (La. 1975). In light of the expert and contradictory testimony presented at trial, we find no manifest error in the trial court's determination that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proving thirty year acquisitive prescription.

A trial court's decision on acquisitive prescription is a factual determination and cannot be reversed on appeal unless manifestly erroneous. Meridian Land & Mineral Corporation v. Bagents, 30 So.2d 563 (La. 1947); Aymond v. Smith, 476 So.2d 1081 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1985). Furthermore, a trial court's findings based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses demand great deference and are virtually never manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989).

The trial court here held Defendants did not establish possession to any property outside the Barrett Gremillion survey, and since all of the disputed property lies outside the Gremillion survey, they did not establish possession to the disputed property. The Barrett Gremillion survey was performed in 1971 for the sale of Defendants’ property from Gus Craig to James Craig (Defendants’ father) and established the northern border of Defendants’ property. In April 2007, Frank Willis, registered professional civil engineer and land surveyor, performed a survey of Plaintiff's property and utilized the Gremillion line as the northern border of Defendants’ property, noting hack marks on trees, posted signs put up by Defendants and a long-established wire fence line (old fence line).¹² During his trial testimony, Mr. Willis explained that this wire fence had been replaced and repaired numerous times and had grown into various depths of mature trees along the Gremillion line. There was no evidence of thirty-year possession by Defendants above the Gremillion line.

Additionally, Defendants’ reconventional demand asserted that the “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers survey dated December 1976 reflects the correct title and boundary and boundary lines․” This survey utilized the Gremillion line as the Defendants’ northern boundary and labeled all of the land within the Willis survey as being owned by Plaintiff's ancestor in title, Valvus Ryland. James Craig, Defendants’ father, was shown to be the owner of the land inside the Gremillion survey. The fact Defendants only owned land within the Gremillion survey was further reinforced by the tax records that showed Defendants were not assessed with any property outside of the Gremillion survey. Still further evidence of the fact Defendants did not believe they had ownership or possession of the Northeast 1 /4 section was when they partitioned their property in 2009 utilizing the Barrett Gremillion survey and only involving the 133.97 acres that their father, James Craig, bought from Gus Craig in 1971. They did not include the other acres located in the Northeast 1/4 section.

Defendants in 2007 or 2008 built a new fence to the west of the old fence line. This new fence line is to the west of the western border of the Defendants’ border as shown on the Gremillion survey and was built shortly before the filing of this litigation in 2009. Additionally, there was evidence Defendants began painting the eastern line of the Northeast 1/4 Section north of the Gremillion line in 2007 in response to ribbons being placed by Frank Willis for his survey. Neither of these actions establish proof of possession for thirty years.

There was much conflicting testimony and evidence presented regarding the extent of possession by Defendants. The trial court determined that Defendants failed to establish possession of any property lying in the Northeast 1/4 section north of the Gremillion line and west of the old fence line. This was a factual determination entitled to great deference.

We find that the trial court did not commit manifest error in its determination that Defendants failed to establish thirty-year acquisitive possession to any of the disputed property outside of these boundaries.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court denying the petitory action of Defendants, Janet Craig Prestridge, Joan Craig Sonnier, and James Robert Craig, as to all immovable property in the Northeast 1/4 Section lying to the north of the Gremillion line and to all immovable property in the Northeast 1/4 Section lying to the north or west of the old fence line is affirmed.

Further, the judgment of the trial court that the possession of Plaintiff, Goal Properties, Inc., of all of the immovable property in the Northeast 1/4 Section that lies to the north of the Gremillion line and all of the immovable property in the Northeast 1/4 Section that lies to the west of the old fence line is hereby recognized and that Plaintiff, Goal Properties, Inc., is entitled to the possession of same pursuant to the confession of possession of the Defendants is also affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendants, Janet Craig Prestridge, Joan Craig Sonnier, and James Robert Craig.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3651, as amended by 2023 La. Acts No. 421, § 2, effective August 1, 2023, provides:The petitory action is one brought by a person who claims the ownership of, but who does not have the right to possess, immovable property or a real right therein, against another who is in possession or who claims the ownership thereof adversely, to obtain judgment recognizing the plaintiff's ownership.

2.   The northern boundary of the Defendants’ property as shown by the Gremillion survey is referenced as the Gremillion line.

3.   La.Civ.Code art. 3658 was amended by 2023 La. Acts No. 421, § 2, effective August 1, 2023.

4.   During this August 22, 2016 hearing, the trial court also denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment which asserted that by answering Plaintiff's possessory action and asserting a petitory action, Defendants confessed possession for Plaintiff and Defendants cannot meet their burden of proving title against the world and therefore the petitory action of Defendants should be dismissed.

5.   Although Defendants filed a request for rehearing of this court's October 7, 2015 decision, said rehearing request was denied on November 25, 2015. Defendants did not apply for supervisory writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and therefore the judgment of this court became final. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 2166(C), which provides that when a timely application for rehearing is denied by the court of appeal, “the judgment becomes final and definitive unless an application for writ of certiorari to the supreme court is filed within thirty days of the transmission of the notice of a denial of rehearing.”

6.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3657 was amended by 2023 La. Acts No. 421, § 2.

7.   La.Civ.Code art. 531 was amended by 2023 La. Acts No. 421, § 1, effective August 1, 2023.

8.   La.Code Civ.P. art. 3653 was amended by 2023 La. Acts No. 421, § 2, effective August 1, 2023.

9.   Exhibits G2 and G19.

10.   There was no evidence in the record as to how George Wilson acquired this 200-acre tract, however no parish records exist before 1865 because the parish courthouse was destroyed by the Union army during the civil war. It is Defendants’ position that this 200-acre tract was inherited by George Wilson from his parents as their entire estate and this is what was sold to William Hogg. Defendants assert George Wilson had already sold this property to William Hogg prior to the sale to Ms. Schmalinski and therefore no title passed to Ms. Schmalinski. The trial court rejected this argument.

11.   Moab Ryland's wife died in 1901, and her children (A.B. Ryland and Moab Ryland, Jr.) inherited her half interest in the property. In 1915, Moab Ryland, Jr and A.B. Ryland partitioned the property and each got 100 acres of Hogg Place.

12.   The land surveyed by Gremillion is in Fractional Section 7. In the 1970s, the remainder of land in Fractional Section was claimed by Valvus Ryland. Valvus Ryland sold his property to Eddy Carpenter in 2000. This land was surveyed by Frank Willis in connection with the purchase of the property by Plaintiff from Eddy Carpenter

KYZAR, Judge.