SHELTON v. LANDSTAR RANGER INC GEICO (2025)

This matter is before us on appeal by plaintiff, Terrance Shelton, from a judgment of the trial court granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants, Landstar Ranger, Inc., Old Republic Insurance Company, and Aston Carvalho, and dismissing Mr. Shelton's claims with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 3, 2021, Mr. Shelton was a passenger in a 2015 Kia Optima operated by Tiera White. While traveling westbound on I-110 near the I-10/I-110 split in Baton Rouge, they were involved in an accident with an 18-wheeled 2015 Freightliner operated by Aston Carvalho, who was in the course and scope of his employment with Landstar Ranger, Inc. (“Landstar”), which was also traveling westbound on I-10 near the I-10/I-110 split. According to the investigating officer, at the time of the accident, Ms. White, who was approaching the I-10/I-110 split, was attempting to change lanes to the left to travel onward to I-10 westbound toward Lafayette when she entered a lane occupied by Mr. Carvalho's 18-wheeler. As a result, Ms. White collided with Mr. Carvalho's 18-wheeler positioning her vehicle underneath his trailer. Following the accident, Ms. White and Mr. Shelton reported that they did not recall what happened.

Mr. Shelton subsequently filed a petition seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of this accident. Therein, Mr. Shelton named Ms. White, her insurer, Geico Casualty Insurance Company (“Geico”), Mr. Carvalho, Landstar, and Landstar's insurer, Old Republic Insurance Company (“Old Republic”), as defendants.¹ In his petition, Mr. Shelton claimed that the accident was caused by the actions or inactions of Mr. Carvalho and/or Ms. White, which included: violating La. R.S. 32:58 (careless operation); failing to maintain reasonable and proper control of the vehicle under their control on a public road; operating the vehicle under their control in a reckless and negligent manner; failing to see what should have been seen; and other acts of negligence to be shown at trial.

Mr. Carvalho, Landstar, and Old Republic (collectively “defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment contending that Mr. Shelton could not meet his burden of establishing that the accident was caused by the fault of Mr. Carvalho, and as such, they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law dismissing Mr. Shelton's claims against them with prejudice. In support of their motion, defendants attached a copy of the petition for damages, Mr. Shelton's answers to defendants’ interrogatories and request for production, deposition excerpts from Sergeant Jeffrey Coleman with attached accident report, deposition excerpts from Acadian Ambulance paramedic Lauren Ashleigh Chandler with attached “Prehospital Care Report Summary,” and deposition excerpts of Mr. Shelton.

Mr. Shelton filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment contending that genuine issues of material fact remained as to the comparative fault of Mr. Carvalho. Therein, Mr. Shelton objected to Sgt. Coleman's deposition testimony and attached accident report, requesting that the accident report be stricken as improper hearsay evidence not appropriate for consideration on a motion for summary judgment. In support of his opposition, Mr. Shelton attached excerpts from his deposition testimony and excerpts from Mr. Carvalho's deposition testimony.

Defendants filed a reply memorandum contending that in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Shelton offered “no evidence beyond a mere speculative sentence” and had produced no evidence to show that the cause-in-fact inquiry has been met so as to establish any fault of Mr. Carvalho. Defendants also contended a proper foundation was laid for Sgt. Coleman's accident report, which laid out the findings of his investigation. Defendants noted that Sgt. Coleman testified to the accuracy of the report, the accuracy of the witness statements, and the findings of his investigation. Finally, defendants contended that the accident report was properly attached to Sgt. Coleman's deposition testimony, which was properly attached to the motion.

The matter was argued before the trial court on May 6, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In accordance with its ruling, the trial court signed a judgment on June 17, 2024, granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Shelton's claims against Mr. Carvalho, Landstar, and Old Republic with prejudice.²

It is from this judgment that Mr. Shelton now appeals.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 3

The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article 969. The procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

The only documents that may be filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, certified copies of public documents or public records, certified copies of insurance policies, authentic acts, private acts duly acknowledged, promissory notes and assignments thereof, written stipulations, and admissions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4)(a).

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

The court shall consider only those documents filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment but shall not consider any document that is excluded pursuant to a timely filed objection. Any objection to a document shall be raised in a timely filed opposition or reply memorandum. The court shall consider all objections prior to rendering judgment. The court shall specifically state on the record or in writing whether the court sustains or overrules the objections raised. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2).

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or by further affidavits. La. C.C.P. art. 967(A).

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him. See La. C.C.P. art. 967(B).

An appellate court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo under the same criteria governing the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Wiggins v. Schneider, 2023-1303 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/19/24), 405 So. 3d 622, 626. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Wiggins, 405 So. 3d at 626.

DISCUSSION

Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence

At the outset, we note that Mr. Shelton's previously raised objection to the accident report attached to Sgt. Coleman's deposition testimony was again raised by counsel for defendants at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The trial court discussed the objection with counsel, but did not specifically rule on the objection as required by La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2). To the extent that the trial court may have considered Sgt. Coleman's accident report, we deem the trial court's silence as a denial or rejection of Mr. Shelton's objection. See Lucas v. Maison Insurance Company, 2021-1401 (La. App 1st Cir. 12/22/22), 358 So. 3d 76, 89. On our de novo review, we must consider whether the accident report is proper summary judgment evidence.

As set forth above, a deposition is proper summary judgment evidence under La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4), and documents that are not included in the exclusive list set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4) are allowed to be filed if they are properly authenticated by an affidavit or deposition to which they are attached. See La. C.C.P. art. 966, Comments-2015, comment (c) (Subpart (A)(4) intentionally does not allow the filing of documents that are not included in the exclusive list, such as photographs, pictures, video images, or contracts, unless they are properly authenticated by an affidavit or deposition to which they are attached.); Lucas, 358 So. 3d at 90. The proper authentication of unsworn and unverified exhibits is based on their attachment to a deposition. See Lucas, 358 So. 3d at 90 n.6, citing May v. Carson, 2021-1156 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/2/22), 348 So. 3d 88, 92-93, writ denied, 2022-01394 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So. 3d 497.

In the instant case, defendants attached the accident report prepared by Sgt. Coleman to his deposition. In his deposition, Sgt. Coleman testified that he prepared the February 3, 2021 “traffic crash report” that was attached to his deposition as Exhibit A. He identified the copy of the accident report as a complete official copy of the accident report that he received from the department, which he drafted and recorded all information relevant to his investigation. The accident report was attached to Sgt. Coleman's deposition that was attached as an exhibit to the motion for summary judgment.

The proper question before us, however, is not whether the accident report is attached and properly authenticated. Instead, the proper question is whether the report contains inadmissible hearsay. A police investigative report contains hearsay and is inadmissible. See La. C.E. art. 803(8)(b)(i)-(iv).⁴ Thus, while attaching the accident report to the deposition may authenticate the report, coupling the accident report with the deposition does not convert the document - or the facts contained therein – from hearsay to statements made on personal knowledge as required by La. C.C.P. art. 967(A) such that they would be admissible. We thus conclude that simply attaching an accident report to the officer's deposition does not make the accident report proper summary judgment evidence.

Accordingly, after conducting a de novo review of the accident report, we find that it has no evidentiary value. See Williams v. GEICO Casualty Company, 2019-541 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 3/18/20), 2020 WL 1428940 **3-4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2020-00991 (La. 11/4/20), 303 So. 3d 646; cf. Pottinger v. Price, 2019-0183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/23/19), 289 So. 3d 1047, 1053-1054. Accordingly, we will not consider this improper summary judgment evidence on our de novo review.

Assignment of Error

In his sole assignment of error on appeal, Mr. Shelton contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment where genuine issues of fact remain as to Mr. Carvalho's comparative fault in causing the accident. We now review the admissible summary judgment evidence de novo in this case to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact as to that issue.

As the movers on the motion for summary judgment, the defendants bore the burden of pointing out the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to Mr. Shelton's claim. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1); Cunningham, 2024 WL 5000134 at *3. Defendants contend that because Ms. White left her lane of travel and entered Mr. Carvalho's lane of travel, striking his vehicle, there is a presumption that she was negligent and that her substandard conduct alone was the cause-in-fact of Mr. Shelton's injuries.

A defendant's liability in negligence is determined by employing a duty/risk analysis. See Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2022-00849 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So. 3d 467, 473. To impose liability, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of duty element); and, (5) actual damages (the damages element). Farrell, 359 So. 3d at 473. The failure to prove any one of these essential elements is fatal to a plaintiff's claims. Cunningham v. Borden Dairy Company of Texas, LLC, 2024-0104 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/6/24), 2024 WL 5000134, *3 (unpublished), writ denied, 2025-00030 (La. 4/1/25), 404 So. 3d 653.

The duties of a motorist making a lane change are set forth in the law and the jurisprudence. Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 2009-1408 (La. 3/16/10), 35 So. 3d 230, 241. Pursuant to La. R.S. 32:79(1), whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. When a driver leaves his own lane of travel and strikes another vehicle, a presumption of negligence arises. Bickham v. Toon, 2019-0548 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/19/20), 2020 WL 6145292, *3, writ denied, 2020-01320 (La. 1/20/21), 308 So. 3d 1166. In such a case, the burden of proof on such a defendant motorist is to show that he was not guilty of any dereliction, however slight. Carias v. Loren, 2014-0655 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/9/15), 2015 WL 1019481, *2 (unpublished), writ denied, 2015-0879 (La. 8/28/15), 176 So. 3d 402. A motorist has a duty to maintain control of his vehicle. Shephard, on behalf of Shephard v. Scheeler, 96-1690 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So. 2d 1308, 1318.

When there is a change of lanes by a motorist immediately preceding an accident, the burden of proof is on the motorist changing lanes to show that he first ascertained that the movement could be made safely. McDowell v. Diggs, 2017-0755 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/3/18), 264 So. 3d 489, 495, citing Brewer, 35 So. 3d at 243. Under the jurisprudence, a greater burden of care is required for a motorist changing lanes than is demanded of a driver preceding at a lawful rate on a straight line in a marked lane. McDowell, 264 So. 3d at 495. The person who leaves his lane of travel is required to exculpate himself from any fault, however slight, that may have contributed to the accident. See Reichert v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 96-1419 (La. 5/20/97), 694 So. 2d 193, 201.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants offered the deposition testimony of the investigating officer, Sgt. Coleman of the Baton Rouge Police Department. Sgt. Coleman testified that he responded to the scene of the accident on February 3, 2021, and prepared the accident report, which was attached to his deposition. In the course of Sgt. Coleman's investigation, he testified that he interviewed Ms. White who advised that she was traveling westbound on I-110 and noticed that she needed to change lanes to go I-10 westbound to Lafayette. Ms. White stated there was a black 18-wheeler that was not allowing her to change lanes to the left, and when she did change lanes, Vehicle 2, which was another 18-wheeler, was already occupying that lane. Ms. White stated that she did not remember what happened, but she collided into Vehicle 2 underneath his trailer.

Sgt. Coleman testified that he also interviewed Mr. Carvalho. Mr. Carvalho advised Sgt. Coleman that he was traveling on I-10 westbound when he “felt a big jolt.”

The defendants also offered excerpts of the deposition testimony of Lauren Ashleigh Chandler, a paramedic who responded to the scene of the accident. Ms. Chandler identified the ambulance report she prepared in connection with the accident. Ms. Chandler evaluated Mr. Shelton and noted that he told her that Ms. White “swerved” to the left lane and hit the back of an 18-wheeler and the wall of the interstate.

Lastly, defendants offered excerpts of Mr. Shelton's deposition testimony wherein he stated that he did not remember what happened and that he only remembered that the vehicle he was riding in went under the 18-wheeler.

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Shelton also offered an excerpt from his deposition testimony where he stated that he did not recall the accident. Mr. Shelton further offered excerpts of Mr. Carvalho's deposition testimony wherein Mr. Carvalho stated that a passenger was in the vehicle with him at the time of the accident. Mr. Carvalho also testified that Ms. White told the investigating officer that she was about to miss her exit. Notably, Mr. Shelton offered no evidence to establish that the actions or inactions of Mr. Carvalho were a cause-in-fact of the accident herein.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no evidence to show that the cause-in-fact inquiry has been met. Wiggins, 405 So. 3d at 627, citing Young v. Department of Transportation and & Development, 2020-0526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/20), 318 So. 3d 887, 892. After the defendants established that a presumption arose as to Ms. White's negligence, Mr. Shelton failed to rebut the defendants’ showing with any evidence which would establish that he can meet his burden at trial and show that Mr. Carvalho bore any fault for the accident herein. In other words, Mr. Shelton offered no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Carvalho was negligent in any way.

Accordingly, on our de novo review of the proper admissible summary judgment evidence, we find there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Mr. Carvalho's liability for the accident herein and affirm the judgment of the trial court granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the June 17, 2024 judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff/appellant, Terrance Shelton.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Shelton subsequently settled his claims with Geico. Thereafter, his claims against Geico were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the filing of a joint motion by the parties. Mr. Shelton, however, reserved his right to proceed against the remaining defendants, including Ms. White.

2.   The June 17, 2024 judgment granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing the suit as to less than all of the defendants is a partial final judgment, which is subject to an immediate appeal. See La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(1) and (3).

4.   Although some types of public records and reports are not excluded by the hearsay rule, factual findings resulting from investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident, including an investigation into the facts and circumstances on which the present proceeding is based or an investigation into a similar occurrence or occurrences, are inadmissible hearsay. La. C.E. art. 803(8)(b)(iv). Lacoste v. Davenport, 2023-0279R (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/17/25), 2025 WL 1147543, *5 n.10 (on rehearing) (unpublished).

MILLER, J.

GREENE, J. concurs.