IN RE: THE INTERDICTION OF JOANN CHAMPAGNE LEVATINO (2025)

In this interdiction proceeding, the trial court granted the proposed interdict's motion to quash a subpoena seeking her medical records and then dismissed the petitioner's request for preliminary and permanent interdiction. We vacate and remand with instructions.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 4, 2024, Mindy Levatino Patteson filed a verified petition for interdiction and ex parte request for temporary interdiction that sought preliminary and permanent full interdiction of her mother, Joann Champagne Levatino (“Patteson Interdiction”).¹ Mindy contended that Joann is seventy-seven years old, divorced, and has three adult children—herself, Michelle Champagne Lynam, and Michael Champagne. Mindy contended that her mother suffers from an infirmity that renders her unable to make reasoned decisions regarding the care of her person and her property, management of her affairs, or to communicate those decisions, and her interests cannot be protected by less restrictive means than a full interdiction. Specifically, Mindy alleged that Joann suffers from dementia, is frequently confused, and requires significant assistance in her home with the activities of daily life. Mindy further contended that Joann received treatment in 2021 from a physician who opined that Joann required around-the-clock care and should not be left to attend to herself. According to Mindy, Joann's current health care power of attorney had failed in their responsibility to ensure Joann's care.²

Mindy also sought temporary interdiction of her mother, alleging that because of Joann's dementia, immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage would result to Joann's person or property before a hearing could be held on her request for preliminary interdiction. Mindy's petition detailed an incident that occurred on March 18, 2024, where neighbors discovered Joann “alone and disoriented at night” and “in a fit of confusion, trapped in her backyard with no means of entering her own home or getting help.” Law enforcement officers responded to the scene, and Joann was purportedly unable to comprehend the situation or provide coherent answers to the officers. Mindy alleged that following that incident, Joann was transported to a hospital emergency room where health care providers allegedly “expressed concern that her recent state and lack of care may constitute elder abuse.” Mindy contended that her mother then received treatment and care at Oceans Behavioral Hospital of Baton Rouge (“Oceans”).³ Mindy claimed that while at Oceans, Joann has “displayed combative behavior ․ necessitating sedation due to her limited grasp of the current circumstances.”

Mindy sought to be appointed curator of her mother and requested that her brother, Michael, be appointed as undercurator. She averred that Joann had no other person previously designated as curator. Mindy acknowledged that Michael had opened a prior interdiction proceeding in 2021, but argued that “such proceeding was not fully pursued.”⁴ Mindy alleged that as the proposed curator, she would engage full-time, around-the-clock sitters for her mother. If efforts to keep Joann in her home proved futile, Mindy indicated that she would have Joann admitted to a yet-to-be-determined skilled nursing facility, custodial nursing home, or long-term care facility that could offer the medical and psychiatric care required for her mother's health. Mindy attached her own affidavit and a copy of the police report generated after the March 18, 2024 incident to her petition.⁵

The trial court signed an order on April 8, 2024, granting Mindy's ex parte request for temporary interdiction of Joann, “as [Joann] may suffer irreparable harm in the event that such relief is not granted[.]” The trial court's April 8, 2024 order also appointed Mindy as Joann's temporary curator; appointed an attorney to represent Joann in the interdiction proceedings; and set a hearing on Mindy's request for preliminary interdiction for May 2, 2024.⁶ Mindy and Michael executed oaths as curator and undercurator.

By certified mail dated April 19, 2024, Mindy sent Joann a copy of a yet-to-be-issued subpoena duces tecum addressed to Oceans, which sought discovery of all of Joann's medical records. On April 29, 2024, Joann filed a motion to quash the subpoena seeking discovery of her medical records. She asserted the health care provider-patient privilege to prevent the production of her medical records from Oceans. The trial court set the hearing on Joann's motion to quash for May 10, 2024, and also continued Mindy's request for preliminary interdiction to that date as well. The parties later agreed to continue the hearing to May 21, 2024, so they would have “time to complete the subpoenas for this matter.” Prior to the hearing, Mindy filed a witness list of persons who might be called to testify on her behalf at the preliminary interdiction hearing.

At the May 21, 2024 hearing on Joann's motion to quash and Mindy's request for preliminary interdiction,⁷ Mindy's counsel objected to proceeding with the hearing without the presence of Joann, who was absent from the courtroom. Mindy's counsel argued to the trial court: “[Joann] is not present, and I believe that the court cannot go forward with the hearing on the preliminary interdiction in her absence.” The trial court denied what it termed Mindy's “request for a continuance,” ruling that Joann “can choose not to be here” after being counseled by her attorney, who was present at the hearing.

Following arguments on the motion to quash the subpoena of Joann's medical records, the trial court granted Joann's motion to quash, holding that it was not aware of “any authority” that would allow the court “to order that medical records of a proposed interdict be made available to this court without” lawful orders of the court.

After ruling on Joann's motion to quash, the trial court asked, “Was there also a motion made to dismiss?” Counsel for Joann answered, “Yes, your honor.” The trial court then ruled, “The court, having considered the oral motion made by [Joann's counsel], having ruled on the previous matter, hereby dismisses this matter with prejudice.” In accordance with its oral ruling, the trial court signed a judgment on June 19, 2024 that granted Joann's motion to quash Mindy's subpoena duces tecum addressed to Oceans that sought discovery of Joann's medical records; terminated and/or vacated the April 8, 2024 order granting temporary interdiction of Joann and appointing Mindy as Joann's curator;⁸ granted Joann's motion to dismiss Mindy's interdiction action; dismissed with prejudice Mindy's verified petition for interdiction and ex parte request for temporary interdiction that sought the preliminary and permanent full interdiction of Joann; and taxed all costs of the interdiction proceedings to Mindy.

Mindy now appeals, assigning three errors to the trial court's June 19, 2024 judgment.⁹

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error No. 2: Health Care Provider-Patient Privilege and the Production of a Proposed Interdict's Medical Records

We begin our discussion with Mindy's second assignment of error, wherein she contends that Joann does not have a right to assert the health care provider-patient privilege to prevent the production of her medical records regarding her admission and hospitalization at Oceans pursuant to the physician's emergency certificate (“PEC”) and coroner's emergency certificate (“CEC”) issued on March 18, 2024. Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash concerning a subpoena duces tecum under an abuse of discretion standard. Further, a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters, which will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Hughes v. Capital City Press, L.L.C., 2022-1133 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So.3d 441, 444. Additionally, the trial court in its discretion may vacate or modify the subpoena duces tecum request if it is unreasonable or oppressive. La. C.C.P. art. 1354(A). The subpoena request must be limited to information that is relevant or necessary to the case before the court. Hughes, 369 So.3d at 444.¹⁰

A party may obtain discovery by requesting the release of medical records. La. C.C.P. art. 1421. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1469.1 pertinently provides that “[n]o order, subpoena, or subpoena [duces tecum] for the purpose of obtaining ․ the production or inspection of medical, hospital, or other records relating to a person's medical treatment, history, or condition ․ shall be granted or issued except as provided in [La.] R.S. 13:3715.1.” Under La. R.S. 13:3715.1(B), “[t]he exclusive method by which medical, hospital, or other records relating to a person's medical treatment, history, or condition may be obtained or disclosed by a health care provider ․ [is] pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of [La.] R.S. 40:1165.1 or [La. C.E. art.] 510, or a lawful subpoena or court order[.]”

The legislature has statutorily provided a qualified privilege for communications ¹¹ between a patient and his health care provider ¹² in civil proceedings. La. R.S. 13:3734. Generally, in civil cases, a patient or his authorized representative has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent a health care provider from disclosing any communication made for the purpose of advice, diagnosis, or treatment of his health condition between or among himself or his representative, his health care provider, or their representatives. La. R.S. 13:3734(B); La. C.E. art. 510 (B)(1). The privilege is “qualified” in that it is not applicable in all civil proceedings. La. R.S. 13:3734(B); La. C.C. art. 510(B)(2). Louisiana Code of Evidence article 510(B)(2) provides a list of exceptions to the privilege; however, that list is not exclusive because La. R.S. 13:3715.1(B)(5) contemplates that there may be situations beyond those listed in which the release of the information is necessary to promote the interests of justice.

The exceptions to the health care provider-patient privilege potentially applicable to the instant matter are found in La. C.E. art. 510(B)(2)(c) and La. C.E. art. 510(B)(2)(g)(i). Louisiana Code of Evidence article 510(B)(2)(c) pertinently provides that there is no privilege as to a communication between a health care provider and a patient “[w]hen the communication is relevant to an issue of the health condition of the patient in any proceeding in which the patient is a party and relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense[.]” Louisiana Code of Evidence article 510(B)(2)(g)(i) provides that in a noncriminal proceeding there is no privilege as to a communication between a health care provider and a patient:

When the communication is made by a patient who is the subject of an interdiction or commitment proceeding to his current health care provider when such patient has failed or refused to submit to an examination by a health care provider appointed by the court regarding issues relating to the interdiction or commitment proceeding, provided that the patient has been advised of such appointment and the consequences of not submitting to the examination. [Emphasis added.]

In the instant matter, it appears that some of Joann's medical records may be subject to the exception to the privilege found in La. C.E. art. 510(B)(2)(c). By seeking to interdict Joann, Mindy has named Joann as a party to the interdiction proceedings, and accordingly, Joann must rely upon the soundness of her mental condition as an element of her defense to interdiction. Medical records of Joann's mental health treatment by mental health care professionals at Oceans, especially the treatment rendered following the events of March 18, 2024, are unquestionably relevant to the issue of Joann's mental health condition and are discoverable in support of the elements of Mindy's interdiction claim pursuant to the exception to the health care provider-patient privilege found in La. C.E. art. 510(B)(2)(c).

In light of the significant policy reasons supporting the legislatively established health care provider-patient privilege and the constitutional dimensions of the privacy expectations protected thereby, the burden is on the party seeking to overcome the privilege to establish the propriety of disclosure. There should be a substantial showing of relevance and need, i.e., the lack of ability to obtain the evidence elsewhere, by the party seeking disclosure. Further, any exception to the privilege should be narrowly tailored and should extend only to information necessary and relevant to the condition relied on as a defense or claim. In other words, it is “proper” to disregard the privilege only to the limited extent necessary to access information which is directly related to determining the truth. Following these guidelines, courts can insure that both the privacy interests of the patient and the due process rights of the litigant seeking disclosure are respected. Moss v. State, 2005-1963 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1185, 1201 (addressing the question of when medical records of a non-party may be released).

In the subpoena duces tecum to be issued to Oceans, Mindy sought:

A certified copy of any and all medical records (including any mental health records), a copy of the medical file, a copy of any and all medical bills, prescriptions, any and all x-rays, MRI, CT scans, or other films, and any information whatsoever which you have in your possession, pertaining to the medical treatment of [Joann.]

Please note that this request is to be interpreted as expansive as possible. It includes, but is not limited to, any records prepared by any doctor at your facility, any records from other healthcare providers that may have been provided to your facility, whether therapist, hospitals, other doctors, or otherwise, any financial records pertaining to this patient, any notes made of any discussions with this patient whether by the doctor or anyone on the staff. Any insurance information, whether provided by the patient, or to or from any of the insurers, any correspondence or notes or letters to or from counsel or otherwise.

Our review of the subpoena shows that Mindy's request is overly broad and would undoubtedly retrieve information outside the scope of Mindy's claims raised in her petition for interdiction. That information may have no relevance to the interdiction proceedings. However, in such instances, the trial court may limit the scope of discovery. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1426 provides, in pertinent part:

A. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending ․ may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:

***

(4) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters. [Emphasis added.]

In fashioning a remedy, there are numerous tools available to the courts, such as in camera inspections, omitting highly personal and/or irrelevant matters, or allowing depositions limited to specific relevant questions. Moss, 925 So.2d at 1201. Additionally, the trial court could have held a contradictory hearing pursuant to La. R.S. 13:3715.1(B)(5) to determine which, if any, of Joann's medical records could be disclosed. Instead, the trial court ruled on Joann's motion to quash as follows:

Medical records, by law, are confidential. Issuing a subpoena for the disclosure of protected medical and healthcare records without the consent of the individual whose records are sought is improper. The court has not been presented with any authority, that I am aware of, that allows this court to order that medical records of a proposed interdict be made available to this court without consent of the — without some lawful orders of the court [authorizing] those records to be made available. The court is unaware of any authority for that proposition. As such, the court grants the motion to quash the subpoena or the subpoenas [duces tecum] in this regard.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, counsel for Mindy had presented the trial court with the “relevancy” exception to the health care provider-patient privilege. Counsel for Mindy argued:

I don't think that there is any dispute, maybe [Joann's counsel] will disagree with me, that [Joann] was involuntarily committed to a mental health facility following that event on March 18th. And it is the records of that facility, as well as the other neuropsychological records, that need to be presented to the court for consideration regarding the very relevant issue of whether or not this interdiction is necessary[.] ․ [I]f ․ the court finds that the information sought to be disclosed is pertinent and relevant then it should be ordered to be produced. And, judge, I can't think of any evidence that is more pertinent or more relevant than the psychiatric and psychological services rendered to [Joann] on March 19th [sic]. ․

This information is relevant, pertinent, necessary[,] and should be available for the court to review in making its determination concerning her interdiction.

This court has reviewed many interdiction cases where the proposed interdict's medical records, along with depositions, affidavits, and live testimony from treating physicians and medical experts, were introduced as evidence in interdiction proceedings. These cases include In re Interdiction of DeMarco, 2009-1791 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/7/10), 38 So.3d 417, 425, in which an affidavit of the doctor who treated the proposed interdict during her hospitalization and evaluation at Oceans, as well as the proposed interdict's medical records, were introduced into evidence during the interdiction trial.¹³

In the instant matter, the trial court did not address any of exceptions to the health care provider-patient privilege found in La. C.E. art. 510(B)(2), give the parties the opportunity to limit the scope of discovery or offer to provide guidance in that exercise, or hold a contradictory hearing pursuant to La. R.S. 13:3715.1(B)(5) to determine which, if any, of Joann's medical records from Oceans could be disclosed.

Additionally, we note that the exception to the privilege found in La. C.E. art. 510(B)(2)(g)(i) does not apply here because there is no evidence that Joann “failed or refused to submit to an examination by a health care provider appointed by the court regarding issues relating to the interdiction ․ proceeding[.]” See La. C.C.P. art. 4545. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 4545:

After the filing of a petition for interdiction, the court may appoint an examiner who has training or experience in the type of infirmity alleged. The court may compel the defendant to submit to an examination by the examiner. Not less than seven days prior to a hearing, the examiner shall provide a written report to the court, all counsel of record, and any unrepresented parties. The report shall include such matters as the court directs. The report may consider the infirmities suffered by the defendant, the appropriateness of interdiction, including whether a less restrictive means of intervention is available, the type of interdiction that is appropriate, and any other relevant matters.

Accordingly, we must vacate the portion of the trial court's June 19, 2024 judgment that granted Joann's motion to quash Mindy's subpoena duces tecum addressed to Oceans that sought discovery of Joann's medical records. We remand this matter to the trial court for the purpose of conducting a contradictory hearing pursuant to R.S. 13:3715.1(B)(5) consistent with the guidelines discussed herein, regarding Mindy's discovery request.

Assignment of Error No. 3: Dismissal of Interdiction Proceedings Without a Hearing on a Petitioner's Request for Preliminary Interdiction

We next examine Mindy's third assignment of error, wherein she argues that the trial erred in “first suggesting, and then granting,” a motion for involuntary dismissal of her interdiction action.

An involuntary motion to dismiss, as outlined in La. C.C.P. art. 1672, is a motion filed by a party, or even the court itself, to dismiss a case when—pertinent herein—the petitioner fails to present a case that shows a right to relief. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1672(B) provides:

In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, any party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal of the action as to him on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the moving party or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.

The transcript of the May 21, 2024 hearing shows that after granting Joann's motion to quash, the trial court asked, “Was there also a motion made to dismiss?” Counsel for Joann answered, “Yes, your honor.” The trial court then ruled, “The court, having considered the oral motion made by [Joann's counsel], having ruled on the previous matter, hereby dismisses this matter with prejudice.”

We cannot find anything in the record showing that counsel for Joann actually moved for an involuntary dismissal. After concluding his arguments on the motion to quash, counsel for Joann stated: “So we would ask that the motion [sic] be quashed and that we move forward with the case.” The trial court committed error by granting such a dismissal on its own motion without conducting a hearing. See Wooley v. AmCare Health Plans of Louisiana, Inc., 2006-1146 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/17/07), 952 So.2d 720, 729.¹⁴ Furthermore, Joann could not properly make a motion for an involuntary dismissal until “after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence[.]” La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B). Here, the trial court dismissed the matter before Mindy could present any evidence or testimony in support of her request for preliminary interdiction. The petitioner in an interdiction proceeding bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. La. C.C.P. art. 4548. Although it is not apparent from the record what evidence and testimony Mindy might introduce at a hearing on her request for preliminary interdiction of Joann, Mindy is certainly entitled to present that evidence while making a case to obtain a judgment in her favor.

Accordingly, we must vacate the portions of the trial court's June 19, 2024 judgment that granted Joann's motion to dismiss Mindy's interdiction action; that dismissed with prejudice Mindy's verified petition for interdiction and ex parte request for temporary interdiction that sought the preliminary and permanent full interdiction of Joann; and that taxed all costs of the interdiction proceedings to Mindy. We remand this matter with instructions to the trial court to conduct a hearing on Mindy's request for preliminary interdiction of Joann.

Assignment of Error No. 1: Presence of a Proposed Interdict at Interdiction Hearings

Finally, in Mindy's first assignment of error, she argues the trial court erred in allowing the May 21, 2024 preliminary interdiction hearing to proceed without the presence of the proposed interdict, Joann.¹⁵ She avers that Joann submitted no evidence to establish good cause for her absence. Citing La. C.C.P. art. 4547, Mindy contends that a proposed interdict shall be present at interdiction hearings, unless the trial court finds that good cause exists for the proposed interdict's absence.¹⁶

In light of the fact that no preliminary interdiction hearing was held in the trial court and because we are vacating the trial court's June 19, 2024 judgment and remanding this matter to the trial court, the question of whether the trial court erred in allowing the preliminary interdiction hearing to proceed in Joann's absence is now moot at this stage of the proceedings. For this court to decide the issue at this point in the proceedings would result in an impermissible advisory opinion on a moot issue. See Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Gov't, 2004-1459 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 55. It is well settled that an appellate court will not render advisory opinions. See Allen v. Allen, 2016-0407 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/16), 210 So.3d 477, 480. Accordingly, we must pretermit discussion of this assignment of error.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the trial court's June 19, 2024 judgment.

We remand this matter to the trial court first for the purpose of conducting a contradictory hearing pursuant to La. R.S. 13:3715.1(B)(5), consistent with the guidelines discussed herein, regarding Mindy Levatino Patteson's request for production of Joann Champagne Levatino's medical records regarding her admission and hospitalization at Oceans following the March 18, 2024 incident.

We further remand this matter with instructions to the trial court to conduct a hearing on Mindy Levatino Patteson's request for preliminary interdiction of Joann Champagne Levatino.

All costs of this appeal are assessed to Joann Champagne Levatino.

JUNE 19, 2024 JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Probate Docket Number P-114,973, Section 21, Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana.

2.   Mindy's verified petition for interdiction does not name Joann's current health care power of attorney, but it does state that Michelle Champagne Lynam is Joann's legal power of attorney.

3.   In her brief on appeal, Mindy claims Joann was transported to the emergency room at Our Lady of the Lake in Baton Rouge. She further argues that while being treated at the emergency room, Joann was involuntary committed and then transported to Oceans for treatment pursuant to a physician's emergency certificate (“PEC”) and a coroner's emergency certificate (“CEC”). In Louisiana, a PEC allows a person to be detained for up to seventy-two hours for evaluation and treatment, followed by a CEC if continued detention is deemed necessary, allowing for up to fifteen days of treatment. See La. R.S. 28:53 and La. R.S. 28:53(G)(2)(a).

4.   Michael's prior-filed interdiction proceeding was at issue in a supervisory writ application filed with this court, 2024 CW 1060. See Pinegar v. Harris, 2006-2489 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 1246, 1249 (“This court may take judicial notice of its own proceedings.”). Prior to the filing of the instant Patteson Interdiction, Michael filed a petition for interdiction and motion for ex parte judgment of temporary interdiction on November 29, 2021, seeking to have his mother, Joann, interdicted (“Champagne Interdiction”). See Probate Docket Number P-110,686, Section 27, Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana. In addition to seeking a full interdiction of his mother, Michael requested that the trial court appoint him curator and appoint his sister, Mindy, as undercuratrix, of Joann. On December 3, 2021, the trial court signed an ex parte judgment of temporary interdiction that appointed Michael as his mother's curator and Mindy as her undercuratrix. The judgment authorized Michael to transfer Joann to a skilled nursing facility, custodial nursing home, or long-term care facility. That judgment expired on December 15, 2021, the day on which the trial court ordered a hearing be held on Michael's request for a preliminary interdiction.According to Mindy's petition, the Champagne Interdiction “was not fully pursued”; it is unclear whether a preliminary interdiction hearing was ever held. Then, on May 17, 2024—after Mindy filed the instant Patteson Interdiction—Michael filed a motion to consolidate the Patteson Interdiction with his prior-filed Champagne Interdiction, which according to him, “is still pending before the [c]ourt.” Following a hearing on August 8, 2024, the trial court in the Champagne Interdiction granted Michael's motion and signed a judgment of consolidation on September 6, 2024, that consolidated the Champagne Interdiction and the Patteson Interdiction. Joann sought supervisory review of the September 6, 2024 judgment of consolidation rendered in the Champagne Interdiction. This court denied her writ application. See Matter of Interdiction of Levatino, 2024-1060 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/13/25), 2025 WL 80339 (unpublished writ action). No writ application was filed on that ruling with the Louisiana Supreme Court. Mindy has not appealed any of the trial court's rulings regarding consolidation. The consolidation of the two interdiction proceedings is not before this court in the instant appeal; therefore, we pretermit any further discussion regarding consolidation.

5.   Under La. C.C.P. art. 4549(A)(2)(a), a pleading requesting ex parte temporary interdiction shall be accompanied by an affidavit by a licensed physician or psychologist, attesting to facts supporting the claim that all grounds for temporary interdiction set forth in La. C.C. art. 391 exist. In the instant matter, Mindy failed to attach an affidavit by a licensed physician or psychologist.

6.   A judgment of temporary interdiction granted ex parte terminates ten days after being signed. See La. C.C. art. 397; La. C.C.P. art. 4549(A)(1). Pertinently, La. C.C.P. art. 4549(A)(1) sets forth that the trial court “shall schedule a preliminary interdiction hearing to be held not more than ten days following the signing of the [ex parte] judgment of temporary interdiction. On motion of the defendant or for extraordinary reasons shown at a contradictory hearing, the court may continue the hearing for one additional period not to exceed ten days.”

7.   At the outset of the May 21, 2024 hearing, the trial court granted a motion to substitute counsel for Mindy.

8.   The April 8, 2024 order granting an ex parte temporary full interdiction of Joann had already expired on April 18, 2024, ten days after being signed, in accordance with La. C.C. art. 397. Accordingly, this portion of the trial court's June 19, 2024 judgment was rendered moot by operation of law.

9.   Mindy filed a motion for suspensive appeal on June 24, 2024. The trial court signed an order of devolutive appeal on June 28, 2024, notice of which was transmitted by the Clerk of Court to the parties on July 16, 2024.

10.   Attached to Joann's motion to quash was a certified letter dated April 19, 2024 that Mindy sent to Joann with a copy of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Oceans. Mindy states that no subpoena duces tecum was ever issued to Oceans. Accordingly, she argues that Joann's motion to quash was not an available remedy, and Joann should have filed a motion seeking a protective order prohibiting any discovery of Joann's medical records from Oceans. See La. C.C.P. art. 1426. It has long been recognized that a court will look to the import of a pleading and not be bound by the title. Every pleading is to be construed so as to do substantial justice. The caption of the pleading does not control. Rather, the court is obligated to determine the substance of the pleading. Lexington Land Development, L.L.C. v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 2020-0622 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/25/21), 327 So.3d 8, 18 n.13, writ denied, 2021-01194 (La. 11/17/21), 327 So.3d 996. The standard of review is the same for either a protective order or a motion to quash—abuse of discretion. See Hughes, 369 So.3d at 444; Bless Home Health Agency v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Hospitals, 99-0936 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/22/00), 770 So.2d 780, 785 (“The granting or not of a protective order and the extent of protection extended are within the discretion of the trial court; and the court of appeal will not ordinarily modify or reverse the trial court in such matters absent an abuse of the trial court's discretion.”).

11.   “ ‘Communication’ means the acquiring, recording or transmittal, of any information, in any manner whatsoever, concerning any facts, opinions or statements necessary to enable the health care provider to diagnose, treat, prescribe or to act for the patients; said communications may include, but are not limited to any and all medical records, office records, hospital records, charts, correspondence, memoranda, laboratory tests and results, x-rays, photographs, financial statements, diagnoses and prognoses.” La. R.S. 13:3734(A)(1).

12.   ‘ “Health care provider’ means a hospital, as defined in this Subsection, and means a person, corporation, facility, or institution licensed by the state to provide health care or professional services as a physician, hospital, dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, psychologist, social worker, or licensed professional counselor and an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his employment.” La. R.S. 13:3734(A)(2).

13.   See also Interdiction of Constance, 2023-318 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/22/24), 384 So.3d 1111; In re Interdiction of Jones, 55,235 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So.3d 1164, writs denied, 2023-01637, 2023-01629 (La. 2/6/24), 378 So.3d 751, 755; Matter of “LRB”, 2022-140 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/22), 355 So.3d 715; In re Interdiction of Cockerton, 2021-1316 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 341 So.3d 834; Matter of Interdiction of Keith, 2017-1573 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/22/18), 2018 WL 3080456 (unpublished); Interdiction of Metzler, 2017-0615 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/4/18), 2018 WL 1632692 (unpublished), writ denied sub nom., Interdiction of Metzler, 2018-0720 (La. 9/14/18), 252 So.3d 479; In re Interdiction of Parnell, 2013-1201 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/13/13), 129 So.3d 690; and Interdiction of Von Schneidau, 560 So.2d 942 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 567 So.2d 612 (La. 1990) (discussing the privilege under the prior law of interdiction).

14.   The trial court's ability to dismiss an action on its own motion is limited to the failure of the parties to appear on the day set for trial, and even then, the trial court is limited to dismissing the action without prejudice. La. C.C.P. art. 1672(A)(2).

15.   To the extent the trial court denied what it termed Mindy's “request for a continuance” of the May 21, 2024 hearing due to Joann's absence, that ruling is interlocutory and generally not appealable. See La. C.C.P. art. 1841; Ballard v. Waitz, 2006-0307 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So.2d 335, 338, writ denied, 2007-0846 (La. 6/15/07), 958 So.2d 1193. However, when an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment, the appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse interlocutory rulings prejudicial to her, in addition to review of the final judgment appealed. Dunbar v. Howard, 2021-1171 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/16/22), 348 So.3d 738, 743 n.9.

16.   This appears to be a res nova issue before this court.

EDWARDS, J.