SUCCESSION OF WILLIAM BRENT LUMPKIN v. << (2025)

The children of William Brent Lumpkin (“Decedent”) filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment asking the trial court to clarify certain provisions of Decedent's Last Will and Testament. Decedent's wife, Jane Barten Jessen Lumpkin (“Mrs. Lumpkin”) responded to the Petition with a Reconventional Demand, asking the trial court to adopt her interpretation of the Last Will and Testament. After a contradictory hearing, the trial court denied the Petition for Declaratory Judgment and granted the Reconventional Demand. The children appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves the interpretation of Decedent's Last Will and Testament. Decedent died on November 28, 2020. He had six children—Lindsey Lumpkin Colvin, Garrett Lumpkin, Blake Lumpkin, Casey Lumpkin, Brooks Lumpkin, and Taylor Lumpkin. At the time of his death, Decedent was married to Mrs. Lumpkin. On December 4, 2020, it was ordered that Decedent's testament, dated December 31, 2014, be filed and recorded in the Calcasieu Parish Clerk of Court's Office and executed according to law. Betty B. Sarver was appointed as Independent Executrix of Decedent's succession.

The testament created two trusts: the William Brent Lumpkin Legacy Trust (“Legacy Trust”) for the benefit of his children; and the William Brent Lumpkin Marital Trust (“Marital Trust”) for the benefit of his wife, children, and grandchildren. Article III of the testament bequeathed to the Legacy Trust, subject to a lifetime usufruct in favor of Mrs. Lumpkin, “the family home, including the land upon which the house is situated and all of the household effects situated in our family home.” Article IV then established a legacy to be included in the Legacy Trust for the benefit of Decedent's children. Article IV further specifically provided that Decedent's rental property located at 1200 Miller Avenue, Westlake, Louisiana (“the Miller Avenue property”) would not form a part of the Legacy Trust but would instead form a part of the Marital Trust.

The dispute at issue involves the amount to be distributed to Mrs. Lumpkin as a beneficiary of the Marital Trust. Article IX, Section 9.2 of the testament provides, “My wife Jane Barton Jessen Lumpkin shall be the income beneficiary of 25% of the income or $24,300.00 annually, whichever is greater, from the rental property located at 1200 Miller Avenue, Westlake, Louisiana.” According to Mrs. Lumpkin, she is entitled to the greater of either 25% of the income of the rental property located at Miller Avenue, or $24,300.00 annually regardless of the source. Decedent's children agree that Mrs. Lumpkin is entitled to 25% of the income or $24,300.00 annually, whichever is greater, but argue that this financial compensation is limited to income solely generated from the Miller Avenue property as that is the only property specifically bequeathed to the Marital Trust and the Marital Trust contains no other source of income.

On August 16, 2023, Garrett Lumpkin, Blake Lumpkin, Casey Lumpkin, Taylor Lumpkin, and Lindsay Lumpkin Colvin (“Petitioners”) filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment seeking an order from the trial court clarifying (1) the assets to be placed in possession of the Legacy Trust versus the Marital Trust, and (2) the distributions to which Mrs. Lumpkin is entitled under the Marital Trust. Mrs. Lumpkin responded to the Petition with an Answer and Reconventional Demand filed on October 27, 2023, in which she asked the trial court to adopt her interpretation of the testament—that she is entitled to future income of $24,300.00 per year for the rest of her life to be paid out of Decedent's estate.

A contradictory hearing was held on March 18, 2024, after which the trial court ruled in favor of Mrs. Lumpkin. The trial court rendered a Judgment on April 27, 2024, denying the petition for declaratory judgment filed by Petitioners and granting Mrs. Lumpkin's reconventional demand. Petitioners filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the judgment was contrary to the law and evidence. That motion was denied by the trial court after a hearing on June 7, 2024, with a Judgment dated July 2, 2024.

Petitioners appealed the April 27, 2024 judgment of the trial court denying their petition for declaratory judgment and granting Mrs. Lumpkin's reconventional demand. Once the appeal was filed, this court issued an order to the trial court on December 27, 2024, stating that the Petitioners were seeking “to appeal a judgment which lacks the proper decretal language in that it does not specify the relief awarded, as required by La.Code Civ.P. art. 1918(A).”¹ Per this court's order, the appeal was suspended, and the matter was remanded to the trial court with instructions to amend the judgment.

The trial court rendered an Amended Judgment on December 30, 2024, denying Petitioners’ petition for declaratory judgment and granting Mrs. Lumpkin's reconventional demand. In denying the petition for declaratory judgment, the Amended Judgment ordered “that the Marital Trust's assets are not limited solely to the Miller Avenue property; and that the Marital Trust's terms do not limit Jane Barton Jessen Lumpkin's interest to income from the Miller Avenue rental property alone.” Further, in granting the reconventional demand, the Amended Judgment ordered that, “under the Will, Jane Barten Jessen Lumpkin is an income beneficiary entitled to $24,300.00 per year since William Brent Lumpkin's death and $24,300.00 each year thereafter, to be obtained from any part of the estate, along with interest and costs.”

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In their appeal, Petitioners have asserted the following assignments of error:

1. The Amended Judgment did not comply with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1951 or Rule 9.5 of the Uniform District Court Rules and therefore is an absolute nullity;

2. The trial court erred in failing to rule on the questions presented in Appellants’ Petition for Declaratory Judgment;

3. The trial court erred in ruling that amounts due to Jane can be obtained from any part of the estate;

4. The trial court erred in finding that the language of the Testament was ambiguous and considering extrinsic evidence concerning the testator's intent; and

5. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants’ Motion for a New Trial.

DISCUSSION

The Amended Judgment

Petitioners’ first assignment of error addresses the December 30, 2024 Amended Judgment of the trial court. On December 27, 2024, this court issued an order remanding the matter back to the trial court to amend its original judgment because that judgment failed to specify the relief awarded. On December 30, 2024, the trial court asked Mrs. Lumpkin's counsel to prepare an amended judgment. Mrs. Lumpkin's counsel sent an amended judgment to the trial court that same day, which was executed by the trial court and submitted to this court.

Petitioners contend that the December 30, 2024 Amended Judgment failed to comply with either Rule 9.5(b) of the Louisiana District Court Rules or La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951, thereby rendering the amended judgment absolutely null. Louisiana District Court Rule 9.5(b) provides (emphasis added):

If presented later, the responsible attorney or the self-represented party shall circulate the proposed judgment, order, or ruling to counsel for all parties and to self-represented parties and allow at least five (5) working days for comment before presentation to the court. When submitted, the proposed judgment, order, or ruling shall be accompanied by a Rule 9.5(b) certificate stating: the date of mailing; the method of delivery of the document to other counsel of record and to self-represented parties; whether any opposition was received; and the nature of the opposition.

Additionally, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1951 provides (emphasis added):

On motion of the court or any party, a final judgment may be amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment or to correct deficiencies in the decretal language or errors of calculation. The judgment may be amended only after a hearing with notice to all parties, except that a hearing is not required if all parties consent or if the court or the party submitting the amended judgment certifies that it was provided to all parties at least five days before the amendment and that no opposition has been received. A final judgment may not be amended under this Article to change its substance.

Petitioners argue that the amended judgment is an absolute nullity because Mrs. Lumpkin's counsel failed to provide their counsel with the amended judgment prior to presenting it to the trial court for signature, as required by both Rule 9.5 and La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951, thereby preventing Petitioners the opportunity to oppose or consent to the amended judgment. There was also no Rule 9.5 certificate attached to the amended judgment stating that it had been delivered to Petitioners’ counsel and whether there was any opposition to the proposed amended judgment. Additionally, Petitioners contend that the amended judgment further violates the provisions of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951 because it substantively altered the original final judgment, which is expressly prohibited by 1951. Petitioners therefore ask this court to vacate both the original and amended judgments and remand the matter back to the trial court for a new trial on their Petition for Declaratory Judgment.

In response to Petitioners, Mrs. Lumpkin first argues that the amended judgment is not substantively different from the original judgment, and therefore not an absolute nullity under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951. An amendment which merely changes the language of the judgment without changing the effects is not a substantive change. Calhoun v. James, 24-181 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/24), 396 So.3d 150. See also Lewis v. Hart, 17-24 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/17/17), 221 So.3d 152. “[T]he judgment may be amended by the court where the amendment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment.” Calhoun, 396 So.3d at 153, (quoting Bourgeois v. Kost, 02-2785, p. 5 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 692, 695). Mrs. Lumpkin maintains that the amended judgment neither added to nor subtracted from the original judgment's effects as the amended judgment has the exact same effect as the original judgment. Therefore, the amended judgment is not a substantive change. She further asserts that since there was no substantive change in the amended judgment, “[a]ny failure to comply with Art. 1951’s timing requirements is therefore harmless.”

Mrs. Lumpkin does admit that her counsel did not follow Rule 9.5 when presenting the amended judgment to the trial court. However, she again maintains that any failure to comply with Rule 9.5 in this matter was harmless because the amended judgment did not change the substance of the original judgment.

In evaluating whether the amended judgment substantively changed the effects of the original judgment, we look to the oral reasons and findings made by the trial court at the March 18, 2024 contradictory hearing for guidance. At that hearing, Petitioners argued that the literal language of the testament dictated that, under the Marital Trust, Mrs. Lumpkin is to receive at least $24,300.00 annually solely from income generated by the rental property located at Miller Avenue. Russell Stutes, Jr., the attorney who prepared Decedent's testament, testified at the hearing that Decedent intended for Mrs. Lumpkin to receive at least $24,300.00 annually for the remainder of her life, and that if 25% of the rental income from the Miller Avenue property was not sufficient to provide Mrs. Lumpkin with at least $24,300.00 annually, the funds would be taken from other sources within Decedent's estate. Petitioners’ trial counsel argued that while Mr. Stutes testified that Mrs. Lumpkin is entitled to $24,300.00 annually regardless of the source, “the literal language doesn't say that.” The following discussion then took place.

THE COURT:

Well, I've read the literal language too, and the literal language does say that. It does say that Jane was to get $24,300.00 at least from somewhere. And if Miller Avenue was sufficient to give her that, then it was coming from Miller Avenue. But it was -- the testimony was clear that she was getting that amount annually, period. And I accept that testimony. And I think it matches with the language in the will, Article 9.2. And so I accept all of that, and I'm going to deny the declaratory judgment request filed by the children.

MR. WOODS [Petitioners’ attorney]:

We need for the record --

THE COURT:

Pardon me?

MR. WOODS:

What we need for the record is for the Court to clarify the two issues that were prayed for in the declaratory judgment as opposed to simply denying the declaratory judgment because the declaratory judgment doesn't -- it asks for the Court's interpretation.

THE COURT:

Okay. So one -- the first one is “what property of decedent's estate is bequeathed to the Legacy Trust and what property other than the proceeds from the May 17, 2022, sale allocable to decedent's interest in Miller Avenue property is subject to any bequest to the Marital Trust created under Article IX of the testament?”2

Did I read that correctly? Is that the issue?

․

MR. FINCH [Petitioners’ attorney]:

Judge, if I could clarify a question, so that might give some help. I'm the one that wrote it.

The question is -- Okay. So we've got Article IV and it says what it says, which there is some disagreement, but I'll paraphrase it again. It says whatever I can leave to my kids estate tax-free through the Legacy Trust, that's what I leave to them minus the 1200 Miller Avenue property, which I leave to the Marital Trust.

And then at the -- as I understand it, the Court is taking Mr. Stutes’ testimony into appreciation and saying that -- and I don't want to represent what the Court is saying, but to some extent I think the Court wants the executrix to make sure or satisfy that income provision under the Marital Trust such that Jane receives $24,300.00 per year; is that correct in my appreciation of your position and interpretation of the language?

THE COURT:

You are saying that now that -- now that Miller Avenue has been sold, there are -- there is cash and --

MR. FINCH:

And we're agreeing that whatever portion of that property belonging to the estate -- because I think some of it was owned by -- and this would be a Shelley question, too - - some of it was owned through an LLC. I think the estate only owned a certain percentage through the LLC. We would agree that the proceeds that are allocable to the estate out of that sale should go to the Marital Trust.

Then the question is, well, can the Court please tell us what it thinks in terms of are there any other assets that are supposed to go into that trust as well? That's the ultimate question.

MR. COX [Mrs. Lumpkin's attorney]:

Our position, Judge, is it's whatever assets out of his estate are required to meet that $24,300.00.

THE COURT:

Yes, I agree.

MR. FINCH:

So are we leaving that to the discretion of the executrix at this time?

THE COURT:

I would think so.

MR. FINCH:

Okay.

THE COURT:

I mean, I think that's what was anticipated.

Based on the comments made by the trial court when rendering its judgment at the hearing, we find that the amended judgment did not substantively change the effects of the original judgment. The amended judgment merely corrected deficiencies in the decretal language of the original judgment, as ordered by this court and specifically allowed by La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951, and clarified what the trial court had initially intended. We further find that even though Petitioners were not provided with the amended judgment prior to its presentation to the trial court for signature, Petitioners were not prejudiced by the additional language in the amended judgment as it merely followed what the trial court held at the hearing. As the amended judgment only reiterated what had already been discussed by the trial court and all counsel of record, neither of the parties can claim to have been surprised by the language of the amended judgment. Therefore, any failures to comply with the time requirements of Uniform District Court Rule 9.5 and La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951 were harmless.

We find that this assignment of error is without merit.

The Trial Court's Ruling on the Petition for Declaratory Judgment

In their second assignment of error, Petitioners contend that the trial court “abused its discretion in failing to rule on the questions presented in the original Petition for Declaratory Judgment and ‘denying’ [their] petition.” Petitioners argue that instead of resolving the issues presented in their petition, the trial court simply denied the request for declaratory judgment and left the decision up to the executrix of where the estate was to obtain $24,300.00 per year for Mrs. Lumpkin. Petitioners submit that they are entitled to relief through declaratory judgment and that a proper and complete declaratory judgment will remove all uncertainty.

Mrs. Lumpkin, however, argues that the trial court clearly ruled on the questions presented in Petitioners’ petition for declaratory judgment by finding that Petitioners’ interpretation of the testament was not correct and denying their petition. Mrs. Lumpkin submits that Petitioners will only be satisfied by a “decision from the Trial Court which determines where each and every asset in decedent's $8.5 million estate should be individually moved, or a determination of the specific bank account where each individual dollar payable to [Mrs. Lumpkin] must come from.” Mrs. Lumpkin contends that there is no authority allowing Petitioners to compel a district court to micro-manage the entire administration of an estate via declaratory judgment.

After reviewing the record, we find that, when denying the petition for declaratory judgment, the amended judgment answered the questions posed by the petition for declaratory judgment, specifically “that the Marital Trust's assets are not limited solely to the Miller Avenue property; and that the Marital Trust's terms do not limit [Mrs. Lumpkin's] interest to income from the Miller Avenue rental property alone.” Additionally, the trial court stated at the March 18, 2024 hearing that it agreed with Mrs. Lumpkin's position that if the income from the Miller Avenue property was insufficient to satisfy the $24,300.00 annual payment to Mrs. Lumpkin, then additional assets could be taken from Decedent's estate. The trial court further stated that the decision of where those assets came from would be at the discretion of the executrix.

Therefore, we find that the trial court did answer the questions posed in the petition for declaratory judgment and, thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

Trial Court's Interpretation of the Testament

Petitioners assert in their third assignment of error that the trial court erred in ruling that the $24,300.00 annual payment to Mrs. Lumpkin can be obtained from any part of Decedent's estate. Petitioners maintain that, pursuant to the testament, the Marital Trust is comprised of the Miller Avenue property and the Legacy Trust is comprised of the remainder of Decedent's estate. Thus, according to Petitioners’ interpretation, the plain language of the testament provides that the Marital Trust would be comprised of only the Miller Avenue property and, further, that any amount due to Mrs. Lumpkin would be limited to rental income from the Miller Avenue property. The testament contains no other bequests to the Marital Trust. However, the trial court's judgment requires the executrix to take property that was bequeathed to different legatees through a separate trust to satisfy the trial court's interpretation of the testament, thereby altering Decedent's literal bequests. Petitioners maintain that there is no language within the testament that expands the Marital Trust's source of income for Mrs. Lumpkin. Therefore, the trial court's ruling is legally incorrect because it alters the terms of the testament.

In response, Mrs. Lumpkin argues that the trial court's decision is supported by Mr. Stutes’ testimony, the attorney who prepared the testament. Mr. Stutes testified that the Marital Trust was designed so that if the Miller Avenue property did not produce enough income, Mrs. Lumpkin would be entitled to the minimum of $24,300.00 from some other source. Mr. Stutes also testified that the minimum of $24,300.00 per year was a specific bequest and that the testament provides the executrix with discretion and power to make sure that specific bequests would be satisfied. Thus, according to Mrs. Lumpkin, the trial court's ruling gives effect to Decedent's clear intent—that Mrs. Lumpkin receive at least $24,300.00 annually for the rest of her life.

In regard to Mr. Stutes’ testimony at the hearing, Petitioners assert in their fourth assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding the testament to be ambiguous and allowing extrinsic evidence to be introduced concerning Decedent's intent. Mr. Stutes’ testimony was the subject of a motion in limine filed by Petitioners and denied by the trial court prior to the contradictory hearing. Petitioners maintain that the plain language of the testament is clear that Decedent's intent was to bequeath to Mrs. Lumpkin either $24,300.00 or 25% of the income from the Miller Avenue property, whichever is greater. “Nowhere in the Testament does it say that ‘regardless of the source’ [Mrs. Lumpkin] should receive a ‘minimum’ of $24,300.00 annually from any of Decedent's assets.” Thus, Petitioners contend that because the language of the testament is clear, the trial court committed legal error in considering Mr. Stutes’ testimony to ascertain Decedent's intent.

Mrs. Lumpkin responds to this argument by asserting that Petitioners waived their objection to the trial court's denial of their motion in limine and rendered the issue of Mr. Stutes’ testimony moot when Petitioners themselves called Mr. Stutes to testify at the hearing on their petition for declaratory judgment. Mrs. Lumpkin further argues that regardless of whether Petitioners may raise this issue on appeal, there was no error committed by the trial court in allowing Mr. Stutes to testify because Section 9.2 under Article IX of the testament was clearly subject to more than one interpretation, as illustrated by the competing arguments of Petitioners and Mrs. Lumpkin.

“The interpretation of a testament is a question of law.” In re Succession of Cole, 12-802, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/26/12), 108 So.3d 240, 247, writ denied, 13-257 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 384. Thus, when reviewing a trial court's interpretation of a testament, this court shall determine whether the trial court was legally correct. Succession of Collett, 09-70 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09), 11 So.3d 724, writ denied, 09-1485 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 112. Additionally, “[i]n suits contesting a testament, the factual findings of the trial court are afforded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of manifest error.” Succession of Perritt, 52,210, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 253 So.3d 861, 864, writ denied, 18-1525 (La. 11/20/18), 256 So.3d 994.

When interpretating a last will and testament, the courts are obliged to consider several principles which have been well established in our laws and recognized by this court and others. One such principle is that the will should be read in a manner that gives effect to the bequests or dispositions. “The cardinal principle of the interpretation of acts of last will is to ascertain and honor the intent of the testator, ascribing meaning to a disposition so that it can have effect.” Lingo v. Courmier, 95-542, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95), 667 So.2d 1091, 1093, writ denied, 96-795 (La. 5/10/96), 672 So.2d 925. The court should also give weight to the first and natural impression upon the reading of a pertinent clause. Thus, “[i]n the interpretation of a testament, the first and natural impression conveyed to the mind on reading the pertinent clause is entitled to great weight.” Succession of Perritt, 253 So.3d at 864. Additionally, when interpreting a will, “the court's function is to construe the will as written, without adding words to any controversial parts under the guise of interpreting the testator's intent.” Succession of Laborde, 17-1334, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/31/18), 251 So.3d 461, 464. Furthermore, when a will was prepared by an attorney, we must presume that the attorney knows the law and has clearly expressed the intentions of the testator. See Succession of Jones, 172 So.2d 312 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ refused, 247 La. 718, 174 So.2d 131 (1965). The court must also look at the entire context of the will to give effect to any unclear provision. Thus, “when a provision standing alone is not clear, a court must take into consideration the entire context of the will.” Estate of Doucet, 94-61, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94), 643 So.2d 882, 884.

Applying these principles to the Last Will and Testament of William Brent Lumpkin, we first note the structure of the testament. The testament contains fourteen separate articles. The first article, Article I, is a declaration of marital status and an identification of heirs. Article II defines the terms related to Decedent's property. Importantly, the testament defines “My Remaining Property” as “all of My Property except for the specific bequests set forth in Articles III and IV of my Will. A bequest of My Remaining Property shall include any lapsed legacies.”

Article III contains specific bequests to be left in a trust, “as set forth in Article VIII[.]” Article IV contains more specific bequests to be left in a trust, “as set forth in Article VIII.” Important to the resolution of the controversy in this matter is a specific bequest in Article IV, paragraph E, “My rental property at 1200 Miller Avenue, Westlake, Louisiana shall not form any part of this legacy or the trust established in Article VIII, but it shall form a part of the trust established by Article V and administered as set forth in Article IX.” (Emphasis added.) Article V is another bequest of “all of My Remaining Property to the trust set forth in Article IX.” Article VI is a spousal predecease clause and bequest. Article VII is a children predecease clause and bequest.

Article VIII sets out the terms and conditions for the administration of the “William Brent Lumpkin Legacy Trust.” This trust has Decedent's children as sole beneficiaries and is referred to as the “Legacy Trust.” Article IX then sets out the terms and conditions for the administration of the “William Brent Lumpkin Marital Trust.” This trust has two beneficiaries—Decedent's spouse and Decedent's children—and is referred to as the “Marital Trust.” What is important to note here is that all bequests of the testament were made in Articles III, IV, V, VI, and VII. Articles VIII and IX merely set out the “terms and conditions” of the two trusts established in the previous sections.

The controversy before us here arises from the language in Article IX, Section 9.2, paragraph A, which states in whole:

Income Beneficiaries. My wife Jane Barton Jessen Lumpkin shall be the income beneficiary of 25% of the income or $24,300.00 annually, whichever is greater, from the rental property located at 1200 Miller Avenue, Westlake, Louisiana. The income beneficiaries for the remainder of the trust corpus shall be My Children in equal shares. The successor income beneficiaries shall be my grandchildren, in equal shares.

We first note that this paragraph is not a bequest of the property located at 1200 Miller Avenue, Westlake, Louisiana. The disposition of that particular property was made specifically in Article IV, paragraph E, relating to the bequests to Decedent's children. It is in that section that the property is clearly identified as not to be considered part of “this legacy or the trust established in Article VIII,” the Legacy Trust, “but it shall form a part of the trust established by Article V and administered as set forth in Article IX[,]” the Marital Trust. This statement is clear and unequivocal—the property is being bequeathed to the Marital Trust to be “administered” according to the provisions of Article IX.

Again, as stated above, Article IX, Section 9.2 does not contain a bequest of this property. Rather it declares who gets the income benefits of the property. If we look at the context and structure of the testament, this becomes obvious. Article VIII sets forth the conditions of the administration of the Legacy Trust. It too has a section concerning “Income Beneficiaries,” found under Article VIII, Section 8.2. If we were to follow Mrs. Lumpkin's and the trial court's interpretation of the testament, we would have to consider Section 8.2, “Income Beneficiaries,” located under Article VIII, as a condition of the Legacy Trust while at the same time considering Section 9.2, located under Article IX, as a specific bequest that undermines and conflicts with previous bequests under the Articles of the testament that concern bequests. Such an interpretation would be irreconcilable with the plain language and structure of the testament. Section 8.2 is a subsection of Article VIII. Like all Article VIII subsections (8.1 through 8.10), Section 8.2 provides for the terms of the administration of the Legacy Trust. In the very same way, Section 9.2 is a subsection of Article IX, and like all subsequent Article IX subsections (9.1 through 9.10), Section 9.2 provides for the terms of the administration of the Marital Trust.

We next note that although the Miller Avenue property was placed in trust pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Marital Trust, the Marital Trust also identifies Decedent's children as “income beneficiaries.” Furthermore, the Miller Avenue property was not the only asset which the Decedent bequeathed to the Marital Trust. The Decedent specifically defined “My Remaining Property” in Article II and, in Article V, specifically placed said “remaining property” in the Marital Trust. Therefore, given the plain meaning of the text, it is clear and unambiguous that the testament placed into the Marital Trust the Miller Avenue property and “My Remaining Property.” As defined in Article II, “My Remaining Property” would have included all property exceeding the conditions of the specific bequests contained in Articles III and IV. The parties stipulated at the March 18, 2024 hearing that none of Decedent's property or assets exceeded the estate tax conditions. Therefore, as no estate tax had been owed by the estate, Article IV disposed of the entire estate and the only property placed into the Marital Trust was the Miller Avenue property. There is no other property which could be identified as “My Remaining Property.”

The language of Article IX, Section 9.2 is also clear and unambiguous. The phrase, “from the rental property located at 1200 Miller Avenue, Westlake, Louisiana,” is identifying the asset from which the income would be generated. To read it any other way results in the undermining or redefining of the specific bequests made in Articles III and IV.

It has been argued that Decedent's intent was to grant his surviving spouse, Mrs. Lumpkin, a minimum of $24,300.00 annually regardless of the assets which would produce the income. The trial court agreed with this argument after hearing extrinsic evidence, specifically testimony from the attorney who prepared the testament. When “the terms of the testament are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is not necessary to determine the testator's intent.” Estate of Doucet, 643 So.2d at 884. After a complete review of Decedent's testament, we find that the language, structure, and context of the testament can be ascertained by its plain reading. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in considering extrinsic evidence at the hearing, specifically Mr. Stutes’ testimony, to assist in its interpretation of the testament.

For the judgment of the trial court to have effect, the specific bequests and provisions of Decedent's testament would have to be negated. When a testament can have multiple interpretations, the court must consider the entire context of the testament and give weight to the interpretation that preserves the integrity of the bequests and dispositions made by the testator as a whole. La.Civ.Code. art. 1611; see also Estate of Doucet, 643 So.2d 882. In this case, as stated above, there is no ambiguity which would require consideration of extrinsic evidence.

The trial court ruled that Mrs. Lumpkin “is an income beneficiary entitled to $24,300.00 per year since [Decedent's] death and $24,300.00 each year thereafter, to be obtained from any part of the estate, along with interest and costs.” (Emphasis added.) For this judgment to be satisfied, Articles III and IV would have to be either nullified or modified. Additionally, such an interpretation would alter the specific paragraph which gives rise to this matter, Article IX, Section 9.2 of the Marital Trust. As discussed above, Section 9.2 does not contain bequests of property; it only sets out the income benefits of the assets placed in the Marital Trust—the Miller Avenue property. As written, it identifies Mrs. Lumpkin and Decedent's children as income beneficiaries in the proportion it outlines. The terms and conditions for the administration of a trust should not be construed to modify provisions of a testament that clearly bequeathed property. Furthermore, all the assets of the estate, save the Miller Avenue property, were placed into the Legacy Trust. Mrs. Lumpkin is not a beneficiary of that trust. Thus, in order to satisfy the trial court's judgment, the trustee would be required to violate the terms of the Legacy Trust to provide benefits to Mrs. Lumpkin. Such a result violates not only the legacy provisions of the testament, it would violate the terms of the trusts created therein.

For the reasons discussed above, we find that the trial court erred when it allowed extrinsic evidence to be introduced at the hearing and when it granted Mrs. Lumpkin's reconventional demand. We further find that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's petition for declaratory judgment. Article IX, Section 9.2, Paragraph A of Decedent's testament does not bequeath property to any legatee. It is a term and condition of Article IX setting forth the income benefits for the beneficiaries of the Marital Trust. Those beneficiaries are identified as Mrs. Lumpkin and Decedent's children. The asset to be placed into the Marital Trust was the property located at 1200 Miller Avenue, Westlake, Louisiana, which was to be administered according to the subsequent provisions of Article IX. As stipulated at the March 18, 2024 hearing, there is no other property that could be identified as “My Remaining Property.” Therefore, the only asset bequeathed to the Marital Trust is the Miller Avenue property.

As per the terms of Article IX, Section 9.2, Mrs. Lumpkin shall be the income beneficiary of 25% of the income or $24,300.00 annually, whichever is greater, from the rental property located at 1200 Miller Avenue, Westlake, Louisiana. As there is no other property or assets in the Marital Trust, the only income to be distributed to the beneficiaries of the Marital Trust is the income generated by the Miller Avenue property. In the event there is no income from the Miller Avenue property, there is no income from the Marital Trust for any beneficiary. The trustee shall administer the Marital Trust in accordance with the remaining terms of the trust.

Motion for New Trial

Petitioners assert in their last assignment of error that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion for new trial as the original judgment was clearly contrary to the law and evidence.

As discussed above, we have found that the trial court did err in denying the petition for declaratory judgment and granting the reconventional demand. Thus, this assignment of error is now moot.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment denying Petitioners’ Petition for Declaratory Judgment and granting Mrs. Lumpkin's Reconventional Demand is reversed. Per the terms of Article IX, Section 9.2, paragraph A of the Marital Trust included in the Last Will and Testament of William Brent Lumpkin, Mrs. Lumpkin shall be the income beneficiary of 25% of the income or $24,300.00 annually, whichever is greater, from the rental property located at 1200 Miller Avenue, Westlake, Louisiana. The Miller Avenue property is the only property and/or asset placed in the Marital Trust. Thus, the annual income due Mrs. Lumpkin shall be limited to income generated from the Miller Avenue property and shall not be taken from any other part of Decedent's estate, even should the income from that property not meet the minimum amount stated in the Marital Trust.

Costs of this proceeding are assessed to Defendant/Appellee Jane Barton Jessen Lumpkin.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1918(A) provides:A final judgment in accordance with Article 1841 shall be identified as such by appropriate language; shall be signed and dated; and shall, in its decree, identify the name of the party in whose favor the relief is awarded, the name of the party against whom relief is awarded, and the relief that is awarded. If appealed, a final judgment that does not contain the appropriate decretal language shall be remanded to the trial court, which shall amend the judgment in accordance with Article 1951 within the time set by the appellate court.

2.   We note for the record that the Miller Avenue property was sold on May 17, 2022, by Ms. Sarver, the independent executrix of Decedent's estate, after Decedent's death and prior to this hearing.

WILBUR L. STILES JUDGE