FELICIANO v. HUTSON (2025)

This matter arises from an election contest concerning a proposition submitted to voters in Orleans Parish on May 3, 2025. On June 12, 2025, the matter was heard in the district court and judgment was rendered dismissing the claims of Danilo Augusto Feliciano (“Appellant”). Appellant now seeks review of that judgment. Defendants, Nancy Landry in her official capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State and Susan Hutson in her official capacity as Orleans Parish Sheriff, filed motions to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the procedural record establishes that the appeal was not perfected in accordance with the requirements of La. R.S. 18:1409(D). For the reasons set forth below, we grant the motions to dismiss the appeal.

On May 27, 2025, Appellant filed a Petition Contesting Election challenging the results of a local proposition election held on May 3, 2025. Trial on the matter was held on June 12, 2025. The district court rendered judgment dismissing the petition at 2:29 p.m., and the written judgment was signed in chambers at 3:52 p.m. that same day. On June 13, 2025, Appellant filed a notice of appeal at 3:44 p.m. and submitted a cash bond to the clerk of court at 4:13 p.m., twenty-one minutes after the 24-hour statutory deadline had expired.

Appeals in election matters are governed by the expedited procedures set forth in La. R.S. 18:1409(D), which provides: “Within twenty-four hours after rendition of judgment, a party aggrieved by the judgment may appeal by obtaining an order of appeal and giving bond for a sum fixed by the court to secure the payment of costs.” The statute imposes two mandatory requirements: the appellant must (1) obtain an order of appeal, and (2) furnish a bond, both within twenty-four hours of the trial court's judgment.

Our jurisprudence has consistently held that these timelines are jurisdictional in nature. The failure to comply deprives this Court of authority to consider the merits of the appeal. Dumas v. Jetson, 446 So.2d 747, 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Cornelius v. Greggs, 21-0883, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/2/21), 329 So.3d 314, 316; Sens v. Plaisance, 20-0382, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/12/20), 365 So.3d 17, 18 (“Absent a timely filed motion for appeal, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal”)(quoting Joseph v. Egan Health Care Corp., 19-10, p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/6/19), 273 So.3d 459, 462). In Sens and Plaquemines Par. Council v. Petrovich, 95-2263 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/18/95), 662 So.2d 542, we reaffirmed that election statutes are to be construed strictly.

In Dumas, the court dismissed an election appeal where the bond was filed just twenty-two minutes beyond the 24-hour deadline. The court emphasized that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and that the timeframe for perfecting an appeal must be strictly enforced to ensure the timely resolution of election disputes. Id., 446 So.2d at 749.

On a motion to dismiss an appeal, the burden of proof rests initially with the mover to demonstrate a jurisdictional defect, and in the case sub judice, the defect was the alleged untimely furnishing of the appeal bond. See PRCP-NS New Orleans, LLC v. Swanson, 22-0393, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/22), 354 So.3d 239, 243. Once that prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the appellant to establish that the appeal was perfected in compliance with the strict 24-hour deadline imposed by La. R.S. 18:1409(D), which requires that both the order of appeal be obtained and the bond furnished within 24 hours of the signing of the judgment.

In this case, the district court's written judgment was signed at 3:52 p.m. on June 12, 2025. Accordingly, the statutory deadline for perfecting the appeal expired at 3:52 p.m. on June 13, 2025. The notice of appeal was filed at 3:44 p.m., but the appellate record reflects that the bond was not posted until 4:13 p.m., twenty-one minutes after the deadline. On its face, the record supports the conclusion that the appeal was not timely perfected.

The record does not clearly indicate the precise time at which the trial judge signed the order of appeal and set the bond. However, Appellant failed to respond to the motions to dismiss, did not offer any evidence to rebut the time stamps, and did not explain or offer justification for the delay. When questioned at oral argument, Appellant provided no factual basis to dispute the 4:13 p.m. bond time or to demonstrate timely compliance.

Given the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the deadlines in election appeals, the absence of any contrary evidence or justification for the delay, and the jurisprudential mandate for strict construction, dismissal is warranted. See Dumas, 446 So.2d at 749; Sens, 20-0382, p. 2, 365 So.3d at 18. Under the clear language of La. R.S. 18:1409(D), the appeal was not timely perfected and must be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss the appeal are GRANTED. The appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

APPEAL DISMISSED

I respectfully dissent. Although I reach the same result as the majority, I do so through a different path.

The Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal was timely filed at 3:44 p.m., on June 13, 2025. Arguably, the Plaintiff may have paid his bond 21 minutes late. We do not know what transpired that contributed to the delay. Our job is to administer justice. We have a sound judgment from the trial court together with a record that supports that judgment. Consequently, I would find that the trial judge did not abuse their vast discretion in dismissing the Plaintiff's case.

Election cases address the heart of our democracy. In contesting an election, it isn't enough to make unsupported allegations that question the integrity of the voting process. Proof is required. Here the plaintiff does nothing more than utilize speculation, supposition and innuendo to voice his opposition to a narrow outcome. These allegations were insufficient to move the trial judge and to move this writer.

Plaintiff asserts two assignments of error: that the Honorable Darren Lombard should have been dismissed, and; that the statutory guidelines of HAVA should be applied to State wide elections.

The trial Court correctly denied Plaintiff's motion to dismiss Mr. Lombard from the trial. “A third person having an interest therein may intervene in a pending action to enforce a right related to or connected with the object of the pending action against one or more of the parties.” La. C.C.P. art. 1091. Lombard is the Chief Elections Officer for Orleans Parish and oversaw the recount of this election. He had a clear connection related to this case and a right to resist the Plaintiff's demand. Further, there is no prohibition against his intervention.

The second assignment of error asserts that the guidelines set out in the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) should have been applied to this millage renewal proposition. The statutory language of HAVA applies to the State's administration of Federal elections. 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a). The Plaintiff's argument that this language should apply State-wide elections is without merit and unsupported.

I find that the trial court did not abuse their discretion or commit legal error in dismissing the Plaintiff's case that was lacking both factual and legal substance.

For these reasons, I dissent.

Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano