BENJAMIN WOODS v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (2025)

This matter is before us on appeal by defendant, the City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, through the Department of Emergency Services, from a judgment of the district court reversing a decision of the Personnel Board for the City/Parish and reinstating plaintiff, Benjamin Woods, to his former position. Mr. Woods has filed a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and motion to dismiss appeal. For the reasons that follow, we deny Mr. Woods's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and motion to dismiss the appeal and reverse the judgment of the district court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Benjamin Woods was employed in the classified service of the City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge (“City/Parish”), Emergency Services Department (“EMS”), as an Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic (“EMT”). On July 5, 2018, Mr. Woods was driving a patient to the hospital in an ambulance when he heard a “pop” like he had driven over a small “limb or branch.” After he arrived at the hospital, he observed that the ambulance had sustained damage. While Mr. Woods could not account for what happened, the parties do not dispute that the ambulance sustained damage. Following the filing of an incident report, Mr. Woods was ordered to undergo a drug screen. The results of the drug screen showed that Mr. Woods tested positive for Methamphetamine (“meth”) and Cocaine.¹

After receiving the positive drug screen results, the Director of EMS, Chad Guillot, notified Mr. Woods by letter dated July 11, 2018, that he was being placed on administrative leave with pay, pursuant to Rule X, Section 5 of the Rules Governing Employees in the Classified Service of the City/Parish, while EMS conducted an investigation of the incident.

On July 19, 2018, Mr. Guillot sent Mr. Woods a pre-termination notice informing Mr. Woods that he was being placed on leave without pay pending a pre-termination hearing to be held on July 24, 2018. In the notice Mr. Guillot explained that the positive results of his post-accident drug/alcohol screen constituted a Class I violation of the City/Parish Code Ordinances, Title 1 - Municipal and Parish Organization, Chapter 8 - Drug-Free Workforce. Mr. Guillot relied on Section 1:907(D)(1)(i), which provides that an employee who reports to work with a sufficient amount of cocaine, amphetamines, or metabolites of these classes of drugs, in his or her urine to result in a positive test is in violation of Section 1:903(C). Mr. Guillot also relied on Section 1:907(D)(2), which provides that an employee who commits a Class I violation shall be dismissed from City/Parish employment. Mr. Guillot attached to the notice the: (1) Employee-Supervisor Incident/Accident Report; (2) Serious Incident Testing Checklist; and (3) Drug Test Report. Although a second pre-termination notice was sent to Mr. Woods by Mr. Guillot on August 1, 2018, of a pre-termination hearing scheduled for August 14, 2018, the hearing was actually held on August 23, 2018.

Following the pre-termination hearing, Mr. Guillot issued a “Termination Notice” dated September 12, 2018, terminating Mr. Woods's employment effective September 21, 2018. A second “Termination Notice” dated September 17, 2018, was sent to Mr. Woods via certified mail. The notice provided that his termination was mandated by Section 1:907(D)(2), given his violation of Section 1:907(D)(1)(i), as set forth above.

Mr. Woods appealed his termination to the Personnel Board for the City/Parish. After a hearing on July 18, 2019, the Personnel Board unanimously voted to uphold the appointing authority's decision to terminate his employment.

Mr. Woods filed a petition for review of the Personnel Board's decision in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court on September 13, 2019.² Therein, Mr. Woods alleged that the findings of the Personnel Board were not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and/or were arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Specifically, Mr. Woods contended that the Personnel Board erred in: (1) finding that the accident in question constituted a “serious incident” pursuant to Section 1:902(H)(1)(c); (2) finding that a drug test was warranted under Section 1:905 where no serious incident had occurred and the testimony presented at the hearing demonstrated that none of the City/Parish agents had any indication or suspicion that Mr. Woods was using drugs; and (3) not allowing Mr. Woods to introduce the expert report of Dr. Ashraf Mozayani, where Dr. Louis Cenac, Jr., testified that he relied partly on Dr. Mozayani's report in forming his opinions.

The matter was argued before the district court on March 28, 2022. The district court considered the record developed before the Personnel Board, and no additional evidence was admitted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to file post-hearing memoranda. On April 14, 2022, the district court signed a judgment in favor of Mr. Woods, reversing the decision of the Personnel Board and reinstating Mr. Woods to his former position with back pay and interest, setting off any wages earned in private employment during his period of separation.³ In response to a request by the City/Parish, the district court issued written reasons for its judgment.

The City/Parish filed the instant suspensive appeal, contending that the district court erred in: (1) determining that the drug test administered to Mr. Woods was unconstitutional and in violation of the Baton Rouge Municipal Code; (2) determining that the instructions to the Personnel Board by their attorney concerning the threshold costs of damages were improper; and (3) determining that the constitutionality of the drug test was a question of law, not of fact, and the administration of the drug test to Mr. Woods was unreasonable.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

During the pendency of this appeal, Mr. Woods filed a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction contending that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction and moving to dismiss this appeal.

The declinatory exception raising the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction addresses a court's authority to adjudicate the cause of action before it. Bon Amis Investments, LLC v. Lapeyrouse, 2015-1459 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/16), 195 So. 3d 514, 517, n.2. The exception may be raised at any stage of an action and may even by raised by the court on its own motion. Bon Amis Investments, LLC, 195 So. 3d at 517, n.2. Subject matter jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a tribunal to adjudicate a particular matter involving the legal relations of the parties and to grant the relief to which the parties are entitled. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1 and 2. Where the exception is raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court has discretion to consider such exception, because it goes to the core of the validity of the judgment and is not subject to the waiver provisions generally affecting declinatory exceptions. Bon Amis Investments, LLC, 195 So. 3d at 517, n.2, citing Kerr-McGee Corporation v. McNamara, 2000-0770 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/22/01), 826 So. 2d 1, 5.

Mr. Woods contends that the City/Parish is attempting to appeal this matter beyond the express provisions of Section 9.05 of its Plan of Government, which provide for the City/Parish's right to appeal Personnel Board decisions. As such, Mr. Woods argues that the City/Parish lacks procedural capacity to take this appeal, thus requiring its dismissal.

Section 9.05 of the City/Parish's Plan of Government provides, in part, that:

No member of the Classified Service shall be suspended for more than thirty days, reduced in rank or pay, or removed, except after notice in writing of the grounds of the proposed disciplinary action and an opportunity to be heard thereon by the Personnel Board at a hearing which may be public at his option, and at which he may be represented by counsel, to be held not less than ten nor more than sixty days after the service of such notice at a time to be specified therein. The decision of the Personnel Board either sustaining, reversing or modifying the disciplinary action against a Classified Service member may be appealed by such Classified Service member or the applicable department head to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court within sixty (60) calendar days from the appealing party's receipt of notice of the Personnel Board's decision. [Emphasis added.]

At the outset, we note that the decision of the Personnel Board was appealed to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court by the Classified Service member, he., Mr. Woods, not the City/Parish. The City/Parish subsequently appealed the judgment of the district court reversing the Personnel Board's decision. Now, in support of his exception, Mr. Woods argues that Section 9.05 only confers appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Personnel Board to the district court (to the exclusion of this court). In doing so, Mr. Woods relies on City of Baton Rouge v. Bernard, 2001-2468 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/22/03), 840 So. 2d 4, 6, writ denied, 2003-1005 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1278 and City of Baton Rouge v. Bethley, 2009-1840 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/29/10), 68 So. 3d 535, 539, writ denied, 2011-1884 (La. 11/4/11), 75 So. 3d 927. Both of these cases are distinguishable from the instant case and not controlling.⁴

Section 9.05 purports to vest the Personnel Board with original jurisdiction and the Nineteenth Judicial District Court with appellate jurisdiction. See Martin v. Board of Adjustment Through Chairman, 2023-0658 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/23/24), 387 So. 3d 17, 21, n.7. To the extent that Mr. Woods contends that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction over this matter, we note that this Court has jurisdiction over all civil matters decided within its circuit subject to very limited exceptions. La. Const, art. V, § 10; see Bernard, 840 So. 2d at 7; Touchette v. City of Rayne, Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Board, 321 So. 2d 62, 64 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1975); Loop, Inc. v. Collector of Revenue, 523 So. 2d 201, 203, n.1 (La. 1987); Martin, 387 So. 3d at 21, n.7. There is no suggestion that this appeal falls within any of the exceptions. This Court's jurisdiction over decisions of the district court is well established.

However, were we to apply Bernard and Bethley, Mr. Woods may be “hoist by his own petard.” These cases explicitly call into question the district court's authority to act as a court of review over decisions of the Personnel Board, where no specific statute vests the district court with appellate jurisdiction. Were we to conclude that the district court had no authority to review the decision of the Personnel Board, the Personnel Board's ruling would remain in place. So, while this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions of the district court is firmly established, the district court's authority to hear “appeals” from the Personnel Board is not so deeply rooted.⁵ See footnote 4, infra.

Nevertheless, this Court has repeatedly recognized, and referred to, the “exclusive original” jurisdiction of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in cases originating from the Personnel Board and similar matters. See Tanner v. City of Baton Rouge, 422 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Lemoine v. Department of Public Works, 2002-2532 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/03), 857 So. 2d 550, 552; Potier v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2022-0137 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 355 So. 3d 648, 651; Campagna v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge Through Department of Finance, 2022-0692 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/3/23) (unpublished) 2023 WL 2749191, *2. Thus, we are constrained to review this matter under such jurisdiction. Accordingly, we deny Mr. Woods's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and motion to dismiss appeal.

STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Having recognized the district court's authority to review decisions of the Personnel Board, we now turn to the review standard applied by this Court while sitting as the second level of judicial review. Otherwise stated, we must determine what standard of review to apply to the district court's ruling on its review of the Personnel Board's decision.

No person who has gained permanent status in the classified state or city service shall be subjected to disciplinary action except for cause expressed in writing. La. Const. Art. X, § 8(A). The burden of proof on appeal, as to the facts, shall be on the appointing authority. La. Const. Art. X, § 8(A). As set forth above, Section 9.05 of the City/Parish's Plan of Government provides that “the decision of the Personnel Board either sustaining, reversing or modifying the disciplinary action against a Classified Service member may be appealed by such Classified Service member or the applicable department head to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court within sixty (60) calendar days from the appealing party's receipt of notice of the Personnel Board's decision.”

In reviewing a decision of the Personnel Board on a petition for judicial review, the district court does not conduct a trial de novo and cannot ignore the Personnel Board's findings and conclusions. Campagna, 2023 WL 2749191 at *2. The district court's proper function is to serve as a court of review. The decision of the Personnel Board may not be overturned absent a finding that it is either not supported by substantial and competent evidence or that it is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Campagna, 2023 WL 2749191 at *2. Moreover, a presumption of regularity must be accorded to the Personnel Board's decision. As the finder of fact, which personally observed the witnesses, the Personnel Board's credibility determinations are entitled to great weight. Potier v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2022-0137 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 35 5 So. 3d 648, 651.

While ordinarily, the second court of appellate review grants no deference to the first court of review, this Court has consistently held that, in the event a district court reverses a decision of the Personnel Board on a petition for judicial review, the court of appeal's review is limited to whether the district court was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in concluding the Personnel Board's findings either were not supported by substantial and competent evidence or that based upon these findings, the Personnel Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. See Campagna, 2023 WL 2749191 at *2, citing Potier, 355 So. 3d at 651, and Lemoine, 857 So. 2d at 552.

APPLICABLE LAW

Mr. Woods was alleged to have committed a Class I violation of the City Code Ordinances of the City/Parish, Title 1 – Municipal and Parish Organization, Chapter 8 - Drug-Free Workforce, Section 1:907(D)(1)(i) by reporting to work with a sufficient amount of cocaine or methamphetamine in his urine to result in a positive test.⁶ The discipline for commission of Class I violation is mandatory dismissal from employment pursuant to Section 1:907(D)(2).

At the time of the incident herein, the pertinent Chapter 8 provisions stated as follows:

Section 1:902. – Definitions.

G. Reasonable suspicion means the observation of any one of the following facts:

1. Employee behavior that indicates that the employee may be under the influence of drugs or alcohol while in the city-parish workplace;

2. Direct observation by a supervisor of employee drug or alcohol use or possession while in the city-parish workplace;

* * *

5. Information received by a supervisor from an unidentified source or sources that the employee is using drugs or alcohol or is impaired in the city-parish workplace, when this information is corroborated by direct observation by any supervisor of drug or alcohol use by the employee or by other evidence from any supervisor with training and experience in the evaluation of drug-induced impairment.

H. Serious incident means:

1. Any occurrence involving a city-parish employee in the city-parish workplace which:

* * *

c. Results in damage to property which renders the property inoperable or causes two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) or more in damages.

Section 1:905. – Enforcement of this chapter.

A. General. In order to enforce the provisions of this chapter against drugs and alcohol in the city-parish workplace, the city-parish may:

* * *

2. Perform drug and alcohol testing and conduct searches of the city-parish employees when circumstances provide reasonable, individualized suspicion of a violation of the prohibitions of this chapter;

3. Perform drug and alcohol testing of city-parish employees following serious incidents[.]

* * *

C. Reasonable suspicion.

1. The city-parish may search the person of any employee when there exists individualized reasonable suspicion that the employee is violating the prohibitions of this chapter. This search may include a drug test and an alcohol test. In addition, the search may encompass any areas of the city-parish workplace to which the employee has access. Without limitation, the city-parish may search desks or work stations, lockers, storage areas, parking lots (not including personal vehicles parked therein), equipment bags, lunch boxes, and city-parish vehicles and other motorized equipment. Employees should have no expectation of privacy in any such places.

2. The reasonable suspicion upon which the search is based shall be supported by specific, objective facts known or observed by a supervisor or other appropriate city-parish personnel or safety officer and reduced to writing prior to the search or test, and by any rational inferences the observer is entitled to draw from those facts based upon his or her experience.

Section 1:907 – Discipline.

D. Class I.

1. An employee commits a class I violation of this chapter when the employee:

* * *

i. Reports for work or performs work with a sufficient amount of anabolic steroids, marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, opiates or phencyclidine, or metabolites of these classes of drugs, in his or her urine to result in a positive test in violation of subsection 1.903.C. of this chapter.

2. An employee who commits a class I violation shall be dismissed from city-parish employment.

DISCUSSION

In its first and third assignments of error, the City/Parish contends that the district court erred in finding that the drug test administered to Mr. Woods was unconstitutional and violated the City/Parish ordinances because there was no reasonable suspicion that Mr. Woods violated the drug-free workforce regulations and that the administration of such test was unreasonable and was conducted in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, which prevent the use of evidence against a defendant whose rights have been violated in the process of obtaining the evidence.

Section 1:905(C)(1) provides that the City/Parish may search the person of any employee when an individualized reasonable suspicion that the employee is violating the drug-free workforce regulations exists. This search includes a drug test and an alcohol test. Section 1:905(C)(2) provides that this reasonable suspicion shall be supported by specific, objective facts known or observed by a supervisor, and by any rational inferences the observer is entitled to draw from those facts based upon his or her experience. Pursuant to Section 1:902(G)(1), reasonable suspicion is defined as an observation that the employee's behavior indicates that the employee may be under the influence of drugs or alcohol while in the City/Parish workplace. In order to enforce drug-free workforce regulations, the City-Parish may perform drug and alcohol testing of its employees when the circumstances provide a reasonable, individualized suspicion of a workplace violation or following a serious incident. Section 1:905(A)(2) and (3).

Although reasonable suspicion is not a substantial burden to meet, to adequately protect and safeguard the constitutionally recognized due process and privacy rights of employees, reasonable suspicion must be established based on articulable facts uncovered before drug testing is ordered. Richard v. Lafayette Fire and Police Civil Service Board, 2008-1044 (La. 2/6/09), 8 So. 3d 509, 521-522. An intrusion into one's right to privacy, consisting of ordering the taking of a urine sample, cannot be justified based on an investigation conducted after the test is ordered. Because constitutional rights of the person tested are implicated, the burden is on the appointing authority to establish reasonable suspicion before the test is ordered. Richard, 8 So. 3d at 522.

The testimony set forth by the City/Parish established that on July 5, 2018, Mr. Woods was driving an ambulance, whose passengers included his partner, Stephanie Quibedeaux, and a low priority patient, to Our Lady of the Lake Hospital. Mr. Woods testified that they were stopped at a red light on Essen Lane near the hospital, and when Mr. Woods accelerated after the light turned green, he heard a “pop.” He did not exit the ambulance and inspect it or immediately contact his supervisor, but instead, continued on to the hospital while checking his mirrors to see if he had hit anything. Mr. Woods stated that there was nothing near his vehicle, and the closest thing he saw was brush taken off of trees several feet away from his vehicle. Mr. Woods denied any impact with another vehicle. When they arrived at the hospital, Mr. Woods exited the vehicle and inspected its exterior. He observed that a piece of the “rub railing,” a foot and a half to two feet long, was missing. He identified photographs he had taken with his phone that showed where the rail was missing and scratches on the vehicle. Mr. Woods testified that he notified the deputy shift supervisor, Kendall Washington, and sent him the photographs he had taken of the ambulance. After consulting with his supervisor, Minette Wicker, Mr. Washington directed Mr. Woods to report for drug and alcohol testing.

Ms. Wicker is a shift supervisor who had been employed by Baton Rouge EMS since 1996, and prior to that she was employed by Acadian Ambulance. She testified that after receiving the July 5, 2018 incident report she spoke to Mr. Woods and he advised her that he was not aware that damage to a vehicle required immediate supervisor notification. Ms. Wicker testified that she was not able to determine whether there was damage to anything other than the ambulance because the ambulance had been moved from the scene of the incident and returned to the station. Thus, she had no way to determine if another vehicle, object, or anything else had been hit. She stated that Mr. Woods initially denied any damage to the ambulance and the only thing Mr. Woods could recall was feeling a “bump” while he was driving. Mr. Woods thus “hypothesized” to her that that's how the damage occurred. Ms. Wicker noted that the fact that there was new damage to the ambulance and that Mr. Woods could offer no explanation or definitive evidence as to how the damage occurred factored into Ms. Wicker's decision to send Mr. Woods for a drug test.⁷

The Director of EMS, Chad Guillot, who had been with EMS for twenty-seven years, testified that he was the director in July of 2018 and was familiar with the incident involving Mr. Woods. Mr. Guillot testified that they request drug testing for any incident, such as the accident herein, if there is reasonable suspicion of drug use. Mr. Guillot testified that Mr. Woods was not drug tested because he “wrecked” the ambulance. He stated the accident was a “trigger” that created a reasonable suspicion that “some strange activity was going on.”

Thus, at the time the drug testing was ordered herein, the record establishes that Mr. Woods was driving an EMS ambulance when one and a half to two feet of rub rail broke off of the vehicle and the vehicle was scratched; that Mr. Woods could not identify what he hit or provide an explanation as to how the rub rail was broken off and the vehicle was scratched; and that Mr. Woods failed to immediately notify his supervisor of the accident as EMS policy required. The decision to request drug testing was not arbitrary or out-of-the-blue. Instead, Ms. Wicker's reasonable suspicion was clearly supported by specific, objective facts known or observed, and by rational inferences she was entitled to draw from those facts based upon her experience before ordering the testing. See Section l:905(C)(2); cf. Richard, 8 So. 3d at 521.⁸ We find these circumstances sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the Mr. Wood's behavior indicated that he may have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol while working for the City/Parish such that the administration of a drug test was reasonable and warranted. See Sections 1:902(G)(1) and 1:905(A)(2). Because we find that a reasonable individualized suspicion of a violation existed to justify alcohol and drug testing, we find the district court erred in excluding any evidence derived from such testing.

In order to reverse the Personnel Board's decision, the district court was required to find the decision either was not supported by substantial and competent evidence or that it was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. See Potier, 355 So. 3d at 651; Lemoine, 857 So. 2d at 552. Based on our review of the record, we find the Personnel Board's decision that there was reasonable individualized suspicion that Mr. Woods violated City/Parish ordinances sufficient to sustain the appointing authority's disciplinary action terminating Mr. Woods was supported by the substantial and competent evidence of record and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we find the district court erred in determining otherwise.

In its second assignment of error, the City/Parish contends that the district court erred in finding that instructions by Michael Remson, the Board's attorney, concerning the threshold amount of damages necessary to constitute a serious incident were improper. However, because we find that the City/Parish had authority to administer the drug test because the circumstances provided that a reasonable, individualized suspicion of a violation existed pursuant to Section 1:905(A)(2), we find any discussion of whether the threshold amount of damages were met to establish a serious incident pursuant to Section 1:905(A)(3) unnecessary.

Considering our determination that the district court manifestly erred in reversing the Personnel Board's decision with respect to Mr. Woods's termination and ordering his reinstatement with back pay, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the decision of the Personnel Board is reinstated.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above and foregoing assigned reasons, the April 14, 2022 judgment of the district court is reversed and the decision of the Personnel Board upholding the termination of Mr. Woods's employment is reinstated. The exception of lack of subject matter and motion to dismiss appeal is denied.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff/appellee, Benjamin Woods.

REVERSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Woods also tested positive for amphetamines. However, when Dr. Muni Khalid Abasi, the Medical Review Officer for Total Occupational Medicine, consulted Mr. Woods about the results, Mr. Woods advised that he was taking prescription medications for attention deficit disorder (“ADD”), Vyvanse and Adderall, which, according to Dr. Abasi, accounts for the amphetamine component of the results. Mr. Woods’ prescriptions were subsequently verified and the positive result for amphetamines was not reported.

2.   Mr. Woods also filed a petition for damages against the City of Baton Rouge through the Department of Emergency Medical Services in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in a separate proceeding. The matters were ultimately consolidated by an order of the district court.

3.   Although the judgment of the district court references the Personnel Board's decision of July 19, 2019, the only ruling of the Personnel Board in the record before us on appeal is the ruling contained in the July 18, 2019 transcript of the Personnel Board's hearing.

4.   In Bernard, the City/Parish attempted to appeal a decision of its Personnel Board, which right was precluded by the version of Section 9.05 of the City/Parish's Plan of Government in effect at that time. The court noted therein that “[t]he City/Parish has by its own charter limited its recourse as a juridical entity from adverse decisions of its own Personnel Board.” See Bernard, 840 So. 2d at 7. The court thus dismissed the appeal finding that neither the district court nor this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the City/Parish's appeal. This limitation no longer exists in the current version of Section 9.05.In Bethley, the employee's involuntary resignation resulted from her failure to return to work, not from a disciplinary action. The City/Parish appealed the Personnel Board's decision to reinstate the employee to the district court, and the appellate court determined that, since no disciplinary action was involved, the provisions of Section 9.05 were not implicated. However, while this Court recognized its authority to review the decision of the district court, the panel was split as to whether the district court had the authority to act as a court of review in the first instance. See Bethley, 68 So. 3d at 538-539.

5.   In Martin, 387 So. 3d at 21, n.7, this Court noted that when a district court acts as a reviewing court in an appellate capacity, original jurisdiction is vested in the administrative tribunal or board. In doing so, the Court discussed the pronouncement in Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La. 839, 853, 253 So. 2d 200, 205 (1971), that the district court's review of administrative actions was an invocation of its original jurisdiction. Martin further cited Touchette, 321 So. 2d at 64; and Loop, Inc., 523 So. 2d at 203, n.1, which recognized that Bowen was decided under the 1921 Louisiana Constitution and Article V, § 16(B) of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution restored the legislature's power to vest district courts with appellate jurisdiction over administrative actions. Notwithstanding judicial attempts to distinguish, and perhaps limit the pronouncement in Bowen, Le., that the district court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving decisions of the Personnel Board, this concept has persisted through the jurisprudence of this circuit since the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. See Tanner v. City of Baton Rouge, 422 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (finding that “courts have granted judicial review in the absence of statutory authority” and “[t]hough the trial court termed its review an ‘appeal’, it was actually exercising its exclusive original jurisdiction to review decisions of administrative boards”); Lemoine v. Department of Public Works, 2002-2532 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/03), 857 So. 2d 550, 552; Potier v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2022-0137 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 355 So. 3d 648, 651; Campagna v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge Through Department of Finance, 2022-0692 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/3/23) (unpublished) 2023 WL 2749191, *2. See, however, Matter of American Waste & Pollution Control Company, 588 So. 2d 367, 370 (La. 1991), which calls into question Bowen’s viability.We further acknowledge that this Court has recognized that, although conferred by Section 9.05, no specific statute vests the district court with appellate jurisdiction to review a decision of the Personnel Board and further, has questioned whether, in the absence of a statute enacted by the Louisiana legislature, the provisions of a plan of government passed by a municipal entity can confer appellate jurisdiction on a district court. See Bernard, 840 So. 2d at 6; see also Bethley, 68 So. 3d at 539.

6.   Louisiana Revised Statute 49:1015 provides that a public employer may require, as a condition of continued employment, samples from his employees to test for the presence of drugs following an accident during the course and scope of his employment, under other circumstances which result in reasonable suspicion that drugs are being used. La. R.S. 49:1015(A). Any such testing shall occur pursuant to a written policy, duly promulgated, and shall comply with the provisions of this Chapter. La. R.S. 49:1015(D).

7.   Ms. Wicker also testified that based on her years of experience, she reasonably believed that the damage to the ambulance exceeded $2,500.00. An occurrence which results in damage to property in excess of $2,500.00 constitutes a “serious incident.” See Section 1:902(H). The City/Parish may also perform drug and alcohol testing of City/Parish employees following serious incidents. See Section 1:905(A)(3). The only evidence presented to establish the amount of damages resulting from this incident, however, was an estimate valuing the repair cost of the ambulance at $2,060.00.

8.   In Richard, the court concluded that the record was confused as to what the Chief knew at the time he ordered the testing and the defendants could not rely on information acquired after the Chief ordered the tests to justify ordering the tests. See Richard, 8 So. 3d at 521. The court found that the city violated its own mandatory rules, as well as its medical review process, which both serve as a protection against arbitrarily ordered tests. See Richard, 8 So. 3d at 521. We find the facts and circumstances set forth in Richard distinguishable from the facts and circumstances herein.

MILLER, J.

McClendon, C.J. concurs Hester, J. concurs