WEDGEWORTH v. MITCHELL (2025)

In this case, the plaintiff, individually and as the succession representative, filed state constitutional and tort claims against the defendants, the sheriff and a deputy of Sabine Parish. The defendants filed a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a peremptory exception of no right of action, a peremptory exception of no cause of action, and a motion for summary judgment.

After a hearing on the matters, the trial court granted the defendants’ exceptions and dismissed the plaintiff's claims without prejudice. Further, the trial court found that the plaintiff's petition could not be amended to remove the basis for the defendants’ exceptions. The plaintiff appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On August 21, 2020, Donnie Ray Wedgeworth (decedent) died while domiciled in Sabine Parish, Louisiana. Plaintiff/Appellant, Garet Wedgeworth (Wedgeworth), was appointed independent administrator of the succession of decedent, his father, and letters of administration were issued to Wedgeworth on September 9, 2020.

Wedgeworth learned that the decedent's former caregiver, Shelia Darlene Deon (Deon), was in possession of decedent's 2013 Dodge Caravan.¹ Wedgeworth requested that Deon turn the van over to him, and on August 26, 2020, as requested, Deon turned the van over to Wedgeworth.

On September 23, 2020, Deon filed a complaint against Wedgeworth with the Sabine Parish Sheriff's Office, which was handled by Detective Greg Sculthorpe (Detective Sculthorpe). In that complaint, Deon alleged that Wedgeworth had stolen the van, and in support of her complaint she presented Detective Sculthorpe with certain documentation, including an act of donation indicating that the decedent had donated the van to Deon on April 10, 2020, along with a Registration Certificate of Title issued by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety, Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV), that identified her as the owner of the van.

Detective Sculthorpe also took the affirmative step of searching the State of Louisiana OMV's online records and confirmed that Deon was identified as the owner of the van on those records. Based upon that information and documentation, Detective Sculthorpe then entered the van into the National Crime Information Center as stolen. He also contacted law enforcement in LaVergne, Tennessee, where Wedgeworth lived, requesting they assist him in contacting Wedgeworth.

Detective Sculthorpe then spoke to Wedgeworth via phone call, informing him of Deon's complaint and documentation supporting that complaint. Wedgeworth expressed concerns about the authenticity of both the act of donation and certificate of title, but he did not contend to have any evidence that those documents were not authentic at that time. Wedgeworth then informed Detective Sculthorpe of the van's location in Sabine Parish.

On September 25, 2020, Detective Sculthorpe, using the documentation provided by Deon and in performing his discretionary actions based thereon, went to the van's location and directed the van to be returned to Deon.

Following the return of the van to Deon, Deon and Meriam Wedgeworth (Meriam), decedent's ex-wife, were later deposed in decedent's succession proceeding. During Meriam's deposition, Wedgeworth alleges that she admitted that she signed decedent's name on the act of donation and certificate of title for the van and that neither the act of donation nor the certificate of title was signed in the presence of the notary. Likewise, Wedgeworth alleges that during Deon's deposition, she admitted that decedent did not sign the act of donation or certificate of title and that neither she nor the witnesses signed the act of donation or certificate of title before the notary.

Subsequent to these depositions, Wedgeworth informed Detective Sculthorpe, based on the alleged testimonies of Meriam and Deon, that he believed that the act of donation and certificate of title were forged. Detective Sculthorpe was then provided copies of the donation, certificate of title, and pages of Meriam and Deon's deposition testimony.² According to Wedgeworth, he was assured that the matter would be fully investigated. However, Wedgeworth was later informed that the Sabine Parish Sheriff's Office would not be proceeding further with the investigation due to jurisdictional issues and would not be arresting Meriam or Deon, as these alleged acts took place in Vernon Parish. Wedgeworth was informed to file his complaint in Vernon Parish.

Wedgeworth then filed a complaint with the Vernon Parish Sheriff's Office regarding Meriam and Deon's actions. A warrant was issued for the arrest of Meriam in Vernon Parish, but the warrant was sent to Sabine Parish, where Meriam is a resident.

On December 9, 2021, Wedgeworth filed suit against Aaron Mitchell, the Sheriff of Sabine Parish, and Sabine Parish Detective Greg Sculthorpe (collectively “Defendants”). On December 18, 2023, Defendants filed exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no right of action, and no cause of action. On January 24, 2024, prior to a hearing on the exceptions, Wedgeworth moved and was granted leave of court to file an amended petition. Defendants replied by moving for summary judgment in addition to reiterating their exceptions.

On January 29, 2024, a hearing was held regarding Defendants’ exceptions and motion for summary judgment. On March 25, 2024, the trial court granted Defendants’ exceptions and dismissed Wedgeworth's suit without prejudice without granting Wedgeworth leave to amend the petition to remove the basis of the exceptions. Wedgeworth appeals, asserting four assignments of error.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. The District Court erred in granting Defendants’ exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Wedgeworth's claims involve a constitutional violation of property rights through an unlawful taking without due process, violations of criminal law enforcement procedures under Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, conversion, negligence, failure to train and intentional interference.

2. The District Court erred in granting Defendants’ exception of no cause of action. Mr. Wedgeworth's amended petition alleges Defendants’ affirmative acts regarding its law enforcement procedures which resulted in unlawful deprivation of property from Succession, violations of specific statutory duties under La.R.S. 14:67.26, conversion, negligence, failure to train and intentional interference. Defendants’ immunity defense is misplaced, as their actions are not discretionary but are governed by mandatory statutory requirements and Defendants violated clearly established law.

3. The District Court erred in granting Defendants’ exception of no right of action by finding that Mr. Wedgeworth, in his individual capacity and as the independent administrator of the Succession, lacks standing to assert claims involving the unlawful law enforcement actions, deprivation of Succession property, conversion, negligence, failure to train and intentional interference. As the rightful owner of the property, the Succession, through its administrator Mr. Wedgeworth, has a legal interest and authority to bring this action to recover and protect the Succession assets and asset [sic] a claim for damages. Mr. Wedgeworth also has the right to bring claims for damages against Defendants for their unlawful and negligent acts of threatening to arrest Mr. Wedgeworth and intentionally interfering with the arrest of Meriam Wedgeworth.

4. The District Court erred in granting the exceptions dismissing Plaintiff's claims without prejudice but prohibiting Plaintiff from amending his petition to remove the basis for ․ Defendants’ exceptions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

At issue in this case is the following: a declinatory exception of subject matter jurisdiction, a peremptory exception of no right of action, and a peremptory exception of no cause of action. Each of these are subject to a de novo review. See Adkins v. City of Natchitoches, 14-491 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So.3d 646 (subject matter jurisdiction); McKay v. Fontenot, 22-690 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/28/23), 368 So.3d 282, writ denied, 23-1040 (La. 11/8/23), 373 So.3d 62 (no right of action), and; Descant v. King Buffet, Inc., 20-310 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/16/20), 310 So.3d 228 (no cause of action). As such, we will apply the de novo review standard to each of the issues addressed in this matter.

DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS:

In this matter, Wedgeworth's original petition and amended petition asserted claims resulting from certain affirmative acts by Defendants, which resulted in the alleged (1) constitutionally unlawful deprivation of property without due process, (2) conversion, (3) negligence, (4) failure to train, and (5) intentional interference in criminal proceedings. Defendants responded by raising exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no right of action, and no cause of action based on the affirmative defense of statutory immunity.

Trial Court's Judgment

A review of the trial court's judgment shows that the language contained therein generally grants the Defendants’ exceptions and dismisses Wedgeworth's claims without prejudice. However, we find the judgment fails to indicate, with specificity, which of Wedgeworth's claims were dismissed due to which of the specific exception raised by Defendants. Further, although we hold to the principle that appeals are from judgments and not reasons for judgments, after a thorough review of the record, we find no reasons for judgment, written or oral, indicating which claim(s) the trial court dismissed, without prejudice, pursuant to which one of the exceptions raised by Defendants.

Regardless, the lack of discernable reasons for judgment does not hinder our ability to conduct a review of this appeal given the de novo standard of review applicable to each exception. It does, however, impact the most efficient way for this court to address each assigned error and the issues in this case.

Here, Wedgeworth's assigned errors address each exception as they relate to each of his asserted claims. This was necessary as Wedgeworth's legal burden of proof requires him to show that each claim can survive each exception for that claim to be further adjudicated. However, in our review, should this court find that a claim can be properly dismissed by one exception, we need not address whether that claim can properly be dismissed also by a different exception, as such adjudication would be superfluous and merely advisory.

Thus, we find that Wedgeworth's claims can be grouped temporally into three categories/claims, for review, namely: 1) alleged actions by Defendants prior to Deon filing a complaint that her van was stolen by Wedgeworth, 2) alleged actions by Defendants resulting in Deon being placed in possession of the van, and 3) alleged actions by Defendants after Deon was placed in possession of the van.

Accordingly, rather than addressing each assignment of error under a heading and how that exception applies to each of Wedgeworth's claims, we will address each of Wedgeworth's claims and assignments of error, under separate headings based on these groupings and timing of the alleged actions by Defendants.

A. Defendants’ Actions Prior to Deon Filing a Complaint

Failure to Train

Wedgeworth claims that prior to Deon filing her complaint with the Sheriff's Department alleging that Wedgeworth had stolen the van, Sheriff Mitchell failed to train Detective Sculthorpe on proper investigation of theft of a motor vehicle, which resulted in Deon being improperly placed in possession of the van. Wedgeworth claims damages as to Sheriff Mitchell's alleged negligence pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2315(A) which states, “Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”

To prevail on a negligence claim under La.Civ.Code art. 2315, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (duty); (2) defendant failed to conform his conduct to the appropriate standard (breach of duty); (3) defendant's conduct was the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injuries (cause-in-fact); (4) defendant's conduct was a legal cause of plaintiff's injuries (the risk and harm caused to plaintiff was within the scope of the protection afforded by the duty); and (5) plaintiff incurred actual damages (damages). Theriot v. Lasseigne, 93-2661 (La.7/5/94); 640 So.2d 1305; Faucheaux v. Terrebonne Consolidated Government, 615 So.2d 289 (La.1993); Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032 (La.1991); Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So.2d 1 (La.1989). A negative answer to any of the above inquiries will result in the determination of no liability. Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-0952 (La.11/30/94); 646 So.2d 318.

Gray v. Economy Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 96-667, pp. 6–7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/96), 682 So.2d 966, 970 (footnote omitted).

Defendants respond that Sheriff Mitchell is entitled to immunity from Wedgeworth's claim pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2798.1. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2798.1 provides for immunity for discretionary acts of public entities and their employees as follows:

A. As used in this Section, “public entity” means and includes the state and any of its branches, departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, employees, and political subdivisions and the departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, and employees of such political subdivisions.

B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.

C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not applicable:

(1) To acts or omissions which are not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists; or

(2) To acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.

D. The legislature finds and states that the purpose of this Section is not to reestablish any immunity based on the status of sovereignty but rather to clarify the substantive content and parameters of application of such legislatively created codal articles and laws and also to assist in the implementation of Article II of the Constitution of Louisiana.

According to Defendants, Louisiana law sets the minimum requirements for law enforcement training, and the curriculum required is pursuant to La.R.S. § 40:2401, et seq. Further, Defendants note that sheriffs have broad discretion in hiring, training, and supervising their deputies, citing Smith v. Lafayette Parish Sheriff's Department., 03-517 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/21/04), 874 So.2d 863. As such, according to Defendants, La.R.S. 9:2798.1(B) applies to Sheriff Mitchell's discretionary act of training Detective Sculthorpe.

Additionally, Defendants point out that Wedgeworth's amended petition fails to allege any egregious conduct required to overcome Sheriff Mitchell's immunity, as provided in La.R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(2).

The supreme court has adopted a two-part test for determining when the discretionary function exception applies. Alpha Alpha, Inc. v. Southland Aviation, 96-928 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/9/97); 697 So.2d 1364, (citing, Archon v. Union Pac. R.R., 94-2728, 94-2743 (La.6/30/95); 657 So.2d 987). First, the court must determine whether the government's action was a matter of choice. Id. If the action was not a matter of choice because some statute, regulation, or policy prescribed a specific course of action to follow, then the exception does not apply and there is no immunity. Id. If, on the other hand, the action involved an element of choice or discretion, then the court must determine whether that discretion is the type that is shielded by the exception because it is grounded in social, economic, or political policy. Id. It is only those actions that are based on public policy that are protected by La.R.S. 9:2798.1. Id.

In Kniepp, [v. City of Shreveport] 609 So.2d 1163, the police chief's decision to withdraw forces from a crowd where a homicide occurred and establish a perimeter to contain the disturbance was a discretionary, tactical decision to protect life, rather than property, for which the city was immune from liability for negligence. Likewise, in the present case, the patrol practices of the City of DeRidder are a matter of choice as no statute, regulation, or policy proscribed times or locations for patrol. These determinations are within the realm of discretionary functions grounded in social, economic and political policy, and therefore, the city is immune from liability for such decisions under La.R.S. 9:2798.1.

Shepard v. Bradford, 98-172, p. 5–6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/98), 721 So.2d 1049, 1052 (emphasis added).

In looking to Wedgeworth's original and amended petition, we find that there is no allegations that Detective Sculthorpe did not receive any of the required training under Louisiana law. The amended petition does specifically allege that Detective Sculthorpe failed to provide Deon with an affidavit for her to sign that outlines the potential consequences of filing a false report pursuant to La.R.S. 14:67.26(B)(1), which, in pertinent part, states:

A person who alleges that there has been a theft of a motor vehicle shall attest to that fact by signing an affidavit provided by the law enforcement officer or agency which shall indicate that a person who falsely reports a theft of a motor vehicle may be subject to criminal penalties under Subsection E of this Section.

Thus, Wedgeworth principally argues that Detective Sculthorpe's failure to have the Deon sign an affidavit addressed in by La.R.S. 14:67.26(B)(1) when she reported the van stolen, that he was inadequately trained by Sheriff Mitchell.

La.R.S. 14:67.26(B)(1) mandates what the reporter of a theft must state in the affidavit and the penalty for making a false statement therein. This provision states that one who reports a claim for the theft of a vehicle “shall” sign an affidavit that states one who makes a falsely reports a vehicle as stolen “shall” be subject to criminal prosecution. The word “shall” is mandatory. La.R.S. 1:3. However, it does not mandate that a law enforcement officer is required to receive such an affidavit before acting on the reporter's claim of theft. Additionally, this provision sets out a crime as to the reporter of a theft, not the duty of law enforcement officers to obtain such affidavit.

And as stated above, our jurisprudence makes a distinction between discretionary and mandatory government action that holds a government entity cannot be held liable for failing to perform discretionary actions.

Regardless of the validity of that argument, we find that Wedgeworth's amending petition fails to state any allegations or facts to show that Sheriff Mitchell's conduct in the alleged failure to train Detective Sculthorpe was “criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct” as required by La.R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(2). Accordingly, we find that Wedgeworth's claim for failure to train is a claim with no cause of action. As such, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of this claim/action and find this assignment of error is without merit.

B. Defendants’ Actions Resulting in Deon's Possession of the Van

Next, we will look at Defendants’ alleged actions resulting in Deon's repossession/possession of the van. Wedgeworth asserts that Defendants unconstitutionally deprived the succession of property, namely the 2013 Dodge Caravan, without due process of law. Furthermore, Wedgeworth alleges an intentional tort of conversion by Defendants related to the taking of the van.

Constitutional Claim

Wedgeworth's constitutional claim is asserted under Title 42 § 1983 of the United States Code that provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law․

Wedgeworth argues that Defendants’ acceptance and action upon Deon's unsworn complaint by threat of arrest and causing the transfer of possession of the van from Wedgeworth to Deon was a deprivation of property of the Succession without adhering to due process safeguards.

To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and prove two essential elements. First, a plaintiff must show that conduct occurred under color of state law. Second, a plaintiff must show that this conduct deprived him or her of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or a law of the United States.

Moresi v. State, Dep't of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081, 1084 (La.1990).

Here, Wedgeworth's amended petition alleges that Defendants’ conduct was under the color of state law and that conduct deprived him of his ownership right of the van in violation of La.Const. art I, § 2 which states, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.”

Defendants responded to Wedgeworth's constitutional claims asserting, inter alia, an exception of no cause of action based on the affirmative defense that they enjoy qualified and discretionary immunity under La.R.S. 9:2798.1 from both Wedgeworth's constitutional claims and any other claims stemming from those constitutional claims.

The peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action tests the legal sufficiency of the petition and is triable solely on the face of the petition. For the purpose of determining the validity of the exception, all well-pleaded allegations of fact are accepted as true, and if the allegations set forth a cause of action as to any part of the demand, the exception must be overruled. Any doubts are resolved in favor of the sufficiency of the petition.

The petition must set forth material facts upon which the cause of action is based. The correctness of conclusions of law is not conceded for the purposes of a ruling on an exception of no cause of action.

When an exception of no cause of action is based on an affirmative defense, the exception must be overruled unless the allegations of the pleading exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the premise upon which the defense is based.

Lambert v. Riverboat Gaming Enf't Div., 96-1856, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97), 706 So.2d 172, 175, writ denied, 98-297 (La. 3/20/98), 715 So.2d 1221 (citations omitted).

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the United States Supreme Court articulated a new objective standard with regard to the qualified immunity defense, stating that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages, unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

․

The Supreme Court in Harlow expressed its belief that the new qualified immunity standard would permit “the resolution of many claims on summary judgment” and that, toward that end, “discovery should not be allowed” until resolution of the threshold question of the application of an immunity defense. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2739.

Lambert, 706 So.2d at 176.

Important to this appeal, we note, at the hearing on the matter, Wedgeworth's counsel clarified that Wedgeworth's claims were not for Defendants’ failure to act, but for affirmative actions taken by Defendants. In addressing Wedgeworth's deprivation of property claim, counsel stated, “I want to be clear that we are not making a failure to investigate or a failure to prosecute claim. We affirmatively argue that it is the ․ defendant's affirmative acts that led to the deprivation of the van from the Succession.” Thereafter, Wedgeworth's counsel reiterated, “We'er asking for damages and return of the car based on the defendants’ affirmative acts.” Later, counsel stated, “We're trying to get the car back [,] and our damage is based on the defendants’ affirmative actions.” Finally, counsel again addressed the court, stating, “we are not asserting a failure to investigate or failure to act claim.”

Given the above, we now look to Wedgeworth's amended petition and take as true the alleged affirmative acts by Detective Sculthorpe. Specifically, we focus on those alleged acts that are related to Wedgeworth's claims for constitutionally unlawful deprivation of property, and negligence as the basis for those affirmative acts.

As stated hereinabove, “[w]hen” an exception of no cause of action is “based” on an affirmative defense, the exception must be overruled unless the allegations of the pleading exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the premise upon which the defense is based. Lambert, 706 So.2d at 176.

Additionally, and as stated above, our jurisprudence makes a distinction between discretionary and mandatory government action that holds a government entity cannot be held liable for failing to perform discretionary actions.

Here, on or about September 25, 2020, at the time of the alleged deprivation of the van, Detective Sculthorpe had taken a statement from Deon that the van was her property. Deon supported her statement by presenting Detective Sculthorpe with an act of donation signed by the decedent transferring ownership of the van from decedent to her and a certificate of title indicating that Deon was the registered owner of the van. Additionally, and based on that documentation, Detective Sculthorpe took the affirmative step of searching the State of Louisiana OMV's online records and confirmed that Deon was identified as the owner of the van on those records, at that time.

Detective Sculthorpe then spoke to Wedgeworth, via telephone call, informing him of Deon's complaint and the documentation supporting that complaint, wherein Wedgeworth expressed concerns about the authenticity of both the act of donation and certificate of title. However, he did not contend, at this time, to have any evidence that those documents were not authentic. Wedgeworth then informed Detective Sculthorpe that the van was located in Sabine Parish. On September 25, 2020, Detective Sculthorpe, pursuant to the documentation provided by Deon and information available to him at that time, then directed that the van be placed in possession of Deon.

Authentic acts constitute full proof of the agreement it contains. La.Civ.Code art. 1835. Authentic acts are presumed genuine, and the party attacking the authenticity of the act bears the burden of proving invalidity. Perry v. Akin, 174 La. 472, 141, So. 32 (1932). “The law accords a high degree of sanctity to authentic acts”. Pierre v. Donaldsonville Motor Co., 22 So.2d 291, (La.App. 4 Cir. 1945).

The Louisiana Supreme Court explained:

The effect given by law to authentic acts, rests upon the presumption that a public officer, exercising a high and important trust, under the solemnity of an oath, has done his duty when acting within the scope of his authority. Selected for their character, capacity and probity, as notaries are presumed to be, the law attaches full credit to their official acts. This prerogative is established in the interest of public order, to maintain peace among men, and to prevent contestations concerning the proof or evidence of their conventions.

Succession of Tete, 7 La.Ann. 95, 96 (La.1852).

Therefore, under Louisiana law, Detective Sculthorpe was entitled to rely on the act of donation and certificate of title showing that Deon was the owner of the van in performing his discretionary acts and duties. See DiVinceenti v. McIntyre, 611 So.2d 140 (La.App 1 Cir. 1992).

Thus, pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2798.1(B), liability cannot be imposed on Defendants based upon their discretionary acts in performing their lawful powers and duties. Here, Defendants were clearly performing discretionary acts in an attempt to protect the property rights of a citizen, Deon, a lawful duty of the Sabine Parish Sheriff and Sabine Parish Sheriff's Office.

Additionally, and for La.R.S. 9:2798.1(B) not to apply, Wedgeworth's original petition or amended petition must allege, with specificity, that Defendants’ actions “are not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists” or “criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.” After review, we find neither the original nor amended petition alleges either of these such acts or claims.

The amended petition does allege that, prior to removing the van from Wedgeworth's possession, by failing to investigate the veracity of Deon's claim of ownership of the van, that Detective Sculthorpe failed to act. As stated above and shown by statements from Wedgeworth's counsel, any alleged claims for failure to act are not being pursued by Wedgworth and as such are not before us in this appeal.

We find that Wedgworth's claims that by failing to investigate the veracity of Deon's claim of ownership of the van, that Detective Sculthorpe failed to act are the only affirmative acts of Detective Sculthorpe which were alleged in Wedgeworth's amended petition that relate to Wedgeworth's claim for constitutionally unlawful deprivation of property and other constitutional claims. Therefore, and even taking these acts as true, we find that Wedgeworth has no cause of action due to Defendants’ immunity.

Further, the amended petition alleges that Detective Sculthorpe's failure to follow mandated actions increased the chances of his losing possession of the van. We find this argument speculative. This loss of chance to maintain possession is not a claim alleged in the amended petition, which simply states that Deon's statement made to Detective Sculthorpe was unsworn and failed to include the required notice of La.R.S. 14:67.26. Although Wedgeworth did express concerns to Detective Sculthorpe about the authenticity of the documents, when he was first contacted, Wedgeworth did not produce any evidence that those documents were not authentic, at that time, prior to the van being returned to Deon. Thus, showing that this failure by Detective Sculthorpe to provide Deon with the affidavit is not an affirmative act towards removing Wedgeworth's possession of the van. As stated above, and according to his counsel, Wedgeworth's claims are based on affirmative acts by Defendants, and not Defendants’ failure to act.

Finally, we find that Detective Sculthorpe's failure to have Deon sign the affidavit is harmless as the affidavit's purpose is to notify Deon of the potential consequences of her filing a false complaint. Additionally, there are no allegations set forth by Wedgeworth that Deon refused to sign such an affidavit, which then could possibly or reasonably have put Detective Sculthorpe on alert as to the veracity of Deon's statement or authenticity of the documents she provided to the Defendants at that time.

Given the above, we find no error by the trial court in dismissing Wedgeworth's claims of constitutionally unlawful deprivation of property and damages based upon losing possession of the van. Based upon our review of their original and amended petitions, even when taken as true, we find the Defendants’ discretionary actions were immune from those claims pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2798.1(B).

Therefore, we find no error by the trial court in dismissing Wedgeworth's constitutional claims and claims for damages. This assigned error is without merit.

Conversion

Wedgeworth also asserts conversion.

The tort of conversion is an intentional act done in derogation of the plaintiff's possessory rights. It is committed when one wrongfully does any act of dominion over the property of another in denial of or inconsistent with the owner's rights. Any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority over another's goods, depriving him of the possession, permanently or for an indefinite time, is a conversion. Although a party may have rightfully come into possession of another's goods, the subsequent refusal to surrender the goods to one who is entitled to them may constitute conversion.

Kinchen v. Louie Dabdoub Sell Cars, Inc., 05-218, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/6/05), 912 So.2d 715, 718 (citations omitted), writ denied, 05-2356 (La.3/17/06), 925 So.2d 544.

As was the case regarding Sheriff Mitchell's failure to train his deputy claims above, La.R.S. 9:2798.1 applies to Detective Sculthorpe's discretionary act of placing Deon in possession of the van unless Wedgeworth's amended petition had allegations of egregious conduct required to overcome Detective Sculthorpe's immunity pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(2). Here, we find that there are no alleged actions by Detective Sculthorpe in the amended petition that can reasonably constitute “criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.” As such, discretionary immunity applies to the conversion claim asserted by Wedgeworth. Based upon our review of their original and amended petitions, even when taken as true, we find the Defendants’ actions were immune from those claims pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2798.1(B).

Therefore, we find no error by the trial court in dismissing Wedgeworth's claims of conversion of the van. This assigned error is without merit.

C. Defendants’ Actions After Deon was Placed in Possession of the Van

Finally, we will look at Defendants’ actions after Deon was placed in possession of the van and Wedgeworth's claims based on those alleged actions. Intentional Interference in Criminal Proceedings & Failure to Arrest

Wedgeworth's sole claim against Defendants for actions after Deon was placed in possession of the van is the alleged intentional interference with criminal proceedings, namely, failing to arrest or somehow stopping the arrest of Deon or Meriam Wedgeworth.

Louisiana Code Civil Procedure Article 2 states, “Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted.”

When addressing a litigant's standing, we have found that the “predicate requirement of standing is satisfied if it can be said that the [litigant] has an interest at stake in litigation which can be legally protected”. Conversely, a litigant who is not asserting a substantial existing legal right is without standing in court. In addition, that a party has the legal capacity to appear in court does not alone define standing; rather, standing is gauged also by the specific statutory or constitutional claims that the party presents and the party's relationship to those claims. The standing inquiry requires careful examination of whether a particular litigant is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims it has asserted.

In re Matter Under Investigation, 07-1853, p. 10 (La. 7/1/09), 15 So.3d 972, 981 (In re. Melancon, 05-1702, p. 9) (La. 7/10/06. 935 So.2d 661.668) (alteration in original).

“The function of the exception of no right of action is to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the suit.” Reese v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 03-1615, p. 2–3 (La. 2/20/04), 866 So.2d 244, 246.

As such,

[T]he focus in an exception of no right of action is on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, but it assumes that the petition states a valid cause of action for some person and questions whether the plaintiff in the particular case is a member of the class that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation.

Id.

Our state constitution divides governmental power into separate legislative, executive and judicial branches and provides that no one branch shall exercise powers belonging to the others. This trichotomous branching of authority furnishes the basis for the existence of an inherent judicial power which the legislative and executive branches cannot abridge. Likewise, the judicial branch is prohibited from infringing upon the inherent powers of the legislative and executive branches. Thus, when litigants seek to invoke the power of the judiciary to compel another branch of government to perform or act, we must closely and carefully examine whether the action is within the confines of our constitutional authority.

Hoag v. State, 04-857, p. 4 (La. 12/1/04), 889 So.2d 1019, 1022 (citations omitted).

Where a special personal or individual one-to-one relationship arises between the police officer and an individual, liability may be imposed for the officer's breach of the duty thereby created toward the individual. Kendrick v. City of Lake Charles, 500 So.2d 866, 870 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986); Fusilier v. Russell, 345 So.2d 543 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 347 So.2d 261 (La.1977). However, as a general rule, a police officer's duty to make arrests is owed to the general public and not to individuals; therefore, the breach of such a duty does not result in liability to an individual. Fusilier v. Russell, supra. See also Frank v. Pitre, 353 So.2d 1293, 1296 (La.1977) (sheriff's duty not to give prisoner weekend pass not designed to protect policeman wounded in barroom brawl) (see also Tate concurrence); Guillot v. State, through La. State Police, 364 So.2d 254 (La.App. 3d Cir.1978), writ refused, 366 So.2d 576 (La.1979) (duty to take drivers license from DWI convict does not encompass risks to third persons).

Hopkins v. Sovereign Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 626 So.2d 880, 888 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 93-2958 (La. 3/11/94), 634 So.2d 402, and 94-154 (La. 3//11/94), 634 So.2d 390.

“[I]t is not the province of the judiciary to dictate prosecutorial or investigative decisions to the executive branch.” Lefebure v. D'Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 655 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 2732 (2022) citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), wherein an action was brought for failure to investigate or prosecute another.

Here, Wedgeworth alleges in the amended petition that Defendants failed to arrest or interfered with the arrest warrant issued against Meriam Wedgeworth. Wedgeworth's amended petition asks this court to order the arrest warrant to be executed, or if not, then Wedgeworth should be compensated for Defendants’ failure to arrest Deon or Meriam. Such an order clearly runs afoul with separation of powers principles. Lefebure v. D'Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, at 654.

Accordingly, we find no subject matter jurisdiction over Wedgeworth's claims as to relief requested as related to the trial court ordering the Defendants to arrest Deon or Meriam Wedgeworth. The power to order such relief is beyond the trial court or any court's constitutional powers. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

Denial of Leave to Amend Petition

Finally, Wedgeworth asserts in his appeal that the trial court should have granted him leave to amend the petition to cure the errors rather than dismissal of the petition, without prejudice. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 934 states, “[w]hen the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court.” However, the article further provides that if the grounds of the objection cannot be removed by amendment, the action shall be dismissed.

The language of La. Code Civ.P. art. 934 does not limit a plaintiff to a single amendment of his petition. Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114. Additional opportunities for amendment of a petition pursuant to the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 934 may be allowed at the discretion of the court. Id.

In the instant case, the trial court allowed Wedgeworth's amended petition on the same day of the hearings for Defendants’ exceptions and motion for summary judgment. As stated above, there is no evidence or allegation contained in the amended petition which can reasonably be interpreted that Defendants actions were “criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct”, as such establishing Defendants’ immunity pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2798.1(B) would not apply pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(2). Further, as found hereinabove, there is no amendment that could cure Wedgeworth's claims regarding Defendant's failure to prosecute Miram Wedgworth or execute the warrant for her arrest.

After reviewing the amended petition, we find that the basis for Defendants’ objection to Wedgeworth's amended petition cannot be removed by amendment. Accordingly, we find no error by the trial court in dismissing Wedgeworth's claims without prejudice and denial of leave to amend the petition. Thus, we find no merit in this assignment of error.

DECREE:

Plaintiff/Appellant, Garet Wedgeworth, individually and on behalf of the Succession of Donnie Ray Wedgeworth, raises four assignments of error that their claims against Sheriff Aaron Mitchell, Sheriff of Sabine Parish, and Detective Greg Sculthorpe, an employee of the Sabine Parish Sheriff's Office, were improperly dismissed without prejudice by the trial court. We find no merit in any of the assignments raised. As such, we affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing all claims without prejudice. Costs of these proceedings are assessed to Garet Wedgeworth, individually and on behalf of the Succession of Donnie Ray Wedgeworth.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The 2013 Dodge Caravan has been referenced as “minivan” or “van” by each party. We will use “van” hereinafter for consistency.

2.   Although Wedgeworth alleges the existence of these depositions in his petition, a review of the record reflects that Wedgeworth failed to submit or enter these alleged depositions into the record at the trial court's hearing, as these depositions are not part of this appeal record.

ORTEGO, Judge.